핵심요약

• 이란은 미국의 공격을 보복적이고 방어적인 것으로 규정하며 선제적인 군사 작전을 수행하고 있습니다.
• 이라크의 이슬람 저항 운동은 중재를 통해 미국의 사우디 공격에 대한 대응을 연기했습니다.
• 미국-사우디 공격으로 이란 지원 민병대(PMF)의 최소 20명이 사망했습니다.
• 이라크 총리는 민병대 관련 '특수 작전' 계획을 연기하고 외교를 허용하기로 합의했습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란과 미국 간의 군사적 대립이 지역 안정성과 글로벌 에너지 시장에 미치는 영향을 분석하는 데 중요합니다. 분쟁 지역의 역학 관계 변화는 국제 무역 흐름과 지정학적 리스크를 직접적으로 반영하며, 이는 투자 포트폴리오의 위험 평가에 필수적인 정보입니다.

본문 1: 지정학적 리스크와 군사적 역학 관계

이란이 공격을 보복적이고 방어적인 것으로 규정하면서도 선제적인 군사 작전을 수행하고 있다는 점은 현재의 분쟁이 단순한 반응을 넘어 전략적 목표 달성을 위한 능동적인 행동임을 시사합니다. 이는 지역 내 세력 간의 군사적 균형이 급격히 변화하고 있음을 의미하며, 이는 에너지 공급망과 주요 무역로에 직접적인 영향을 미칩니다. 특히 이라크 내에서 이란의 후원을 받는 민병대(PMF)와 같은 비국가 행위자의 역할은 지역 안보의 핵심 변수로 작용하며, 이들의 움직임은 국제 사회의 개입 가능성을 높이는 요인입니다. 이러한 군사적 역학 관계의 변화는 지역 내 정치적 안정성을 저해하며, 잠재적인 무력 충돌의 위험을 증가시킵니다.

본문 2: 중재와 외교의 역할

이슬람 저항 운동이 중재를 통해 대응을 연기한 사례는 분쟁 해결 과정에서 외교적 노력이 군사적 행동에 미치는 영향을 보여줍니다. 하디 알 아메리(Hadi al Ameri)와 같은 중재자의 역할은 분쟁 당사자들 간의 대화 채널을 유지하고 무력 충돌을 관리하는 데 필수적입니다. 이는 군사적 긴장이 고조될 때, 외교적 해법이 어떻게 적용될 수 있는지에 대한 중요한 시사점을 제공합니다. 중재를 통한 대응 연기는 단기적으로는 군사적 긴장을 완화시키지만, 장기적으로는 근본적인 정치적 해결이 이루어지지 않는 한 잠재적인 갈등을 내포하고 있음을 인지해야 합니다. 외교적 노력은 분쟁의 장기적인 해결을 위한 기반을 마련하지만, 군사적 목표 달성이라는 현실적인 제약 속에서 그 효과는 제한적일 수 있습니다.

본문 3: 경제적 파급 효과와 장기 전망

이란 분쟁의 지속은 국제 유가 및 에너지 시장의 변동성에 지속적인 압력을 가할 것입니다. 중동 지역의 불안정성은 원유 및 천연가스 공급망에 직접적인 영향을 미치므로, 이는 글로벌 인플레이션 압력과 연관됩니다. 또한, 이 지역의 지정학적 불안정성은 국제 투자 심리를 위축시켜 관련 산업 섹터에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 장기적인 관점에서 볼 때, 분쟁의 결과는 국제 제재의 강도와 지역 강대국들의 전략적 목표 달성 여부에 따라 달라질 것입니다. 따라서 투자자들은 군사적 사건뿐만 아니라 외교적 협상 과정과 국제 제재의 변화를 면밀히 주시해야 합니다.

결론

이란 분쟁은 단순한 지역 갈등을 넘어 국제 에너지 시장과 지정학적 리스크에 복합적인 영향을 미치고 있습니다. 군사적 행동과 외교적 중재가 복잡하게 얽혀 있는 상황에서, 향후의 안정화 추세는 중재 노력의 성공 여부에 달려있을 것입니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 변수들이 글로벌 경제에 미치는 연쇄 효과를 지속적으로 모니터링하며 장기적인 위험과 기회를 평가해야 할 것입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilgFBVV95cUxNVGk1REhza1NwYXRKRU84VHVnOUIxRGt5a2FOeFViS1FZYjEtRXIxOHlIS2NGSlhZV3d5SGNVRmhjcHR3MXFBbDVnckU3dmtjZklBaXlwYnU5UWctcFNWb21NeDdJa1NiQkJFR085aUJpUDFwVEU3ZzkyZmdwVGNFMzY3QzNBY1lSdk9wN3VtYm9JalZkQkE?oc=5

Iran Update Special Report, August 7, 2026 - Institute for the Study of War

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

Note : ISW-CTP has revised its update structure due to the resumption of war between the United States and Iran. Iran is currently engaged in an information effort to frame its attacks on US bases and regional states as retaliatory and defensive. Iran is not merely responding to US strikes on Iran, however, but is engaged in proactive military operations to achieve discrete objectives. The revised update structure reflects some of these key objectives.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, announced on August 7 that it would postpone its response to recent US-Saudi strikes on militia positions in Iraq due to mediation by Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri.[1] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, said on June 29 that it would respond to recent US-Saudi strikes on militia positions in Iraq after August 6.[2] The US-Saudi strikes killed at least 20 members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[3] Multiple political and government security sources told Iraqi media on August 7 that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi and Ameri agreed to postpone the Iraqi security establishment’s plan for “special operations” against militias suspected of involvement in attacks against Saudi Arabia, combined with a “widespread” force deployment and military readiness campaign, to allow for Iraqi federal government diplomacy.[4] Hadi al Ameri has often served as the mediator between the Iraqi federal government and the Iraqi militias due to his deep ties with Iran and Badr’s greater integration into the Iraqi state compared to other Iraqi militias.[5] Iraqi media reported on August 7 that the Iraqi federal government raised the level of security preparedness and that unspecified Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) regiments moved from Anbar, Salah al Din, and Ninewa provinces to Baghdad Province in response to Iraqi intelligence indicating the militias planned to attack Saudi Arabia within the next 48 hours.[6] The militias store and distribute weapons within Baghdad Province.[7] The Iraqi prime minister also ordered the ISF to inspect all checkpoints and apprehend any vehicle or driver carrying illegal materials, weapons, or explosives.[8] Iran has smuggled weapons to its Iraqi partners for decades.[9] An unidentified Iraqi security source told Saudi media on August 7 that the scale of the deployments is “unprecedented.”[10] Part of the Iraqi source’s intent is likely to suggest to Saudi Arabia that Iraq is taking Saudi Arabia’s security concerns seriously; ISW-CTP can only corroborate a few deployments near Baghdad.[11] Zaydi and Ameri’s agreement ended the enhanced security precautions, according to Iraqi media, which would presumably improve the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s freedom of movement.[12]

Zaydi and Ameri’s agreement causing the Islamic Resistance in Iraq to pause its attack plans follows an August 5 Iraqi media report in which informed sources said that the Iraqi militias had already decided to make their response contingent on Saudi Arabia meeting militia demands.[13] The reported militia demands included an official apology from Saudi Arabia, compensation for the victims’ families and damage caused to Iraqi property, and limiting anti-militia discourse in Iraqi media.[14] ISW-CTP noted on August 6 that the militias could still resort to using force at any time, particularly if Saudi Arabia does not agree to their demands.[15]

The Iraqi militias were reportedly planning multiple “imminent” attacks on Saudi Arabia coordinated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Houthis, according to a senior Saudi official speaking to Western and regional media.[16] The Saudi official added that the attacks could target civilian and economic sites, including energy infrastructure, according to Saudi, US, and other regional reports.[17] An Iraqi government source told anti-regime media on August 7 that the militias were also planning to attack Kuwait, Jordan, and Syria.[18] Multiple nearby countries have pressured the Iraqi federal government to stop militia attacks on their territories in recent weeks.[19] UK-based, Qatari media also reported on August 7 that unspecified intelligence demonstrated that Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba planned to attack Saudi Arabia.[20] These militias have attacked many regional countries recently and are some of the closest Iraqi militias to Iran ideologically.[21] The IRGC has played a direct role supporting militia activity in Iraq in recent months, per a Reuters report on June 19 detailing that the IRGC directly supported Iraqi militia cells in their attacks on the Gulf states hosting US forces between late April and mid-May.[22] The recent US-Saudi strikes on Iraqi militia positions in Iraq also killed multiple IRGC officers.[23]

The scale of the Iraqi federal government’s security precautions to thwart militia attacks on Saudi Arabia demonstrates the continued armament of the Iraqi militias in the face of the government’s ongoing efforts to restrict arms to the state. The Iraqi federal government continues to insist that it will complete such efforts by its September 30 deadline, which corresponds with the planned withdrawal of US-led international coalition forces from Iraq.[24] A Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on August 7 that the framework, which includes Iranian-backed political parties, considers the September 30 deadline “flexible.”[25] Saudi media also reported on August 5 that some framework members have begun to assert conditions and reservations concerning militia disarmament amid regional tensions and claimed threats to Iraqi internal security.[26] Multiple Iraqi militias, especially Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, continue to refuse to disarm and will likely continue to use a myriad of excuses to remain armed.[27] Some Iraqi militias are also attempting to circumvent the disarmament process, including by handing over inoperable weapons to the government.[28] The federal government also lacks accurate information on the militias and their arms due to the covert nature of the groups, including those within the PMF.

Iran may have supported the Iraqi militias’ planned attack against Saudi infrastructure as part of Iran’s broader pressure campaign to coerce the United States and its allies into agreeing to further diplomatic concessions. An attack to the extent the militias reportedly planned, or even the threat of such an attack, would be consistent with Iran’s established pattern of using military escalation and regional instability to gain leverage.[29] Reports of the planned attack come as Iranian decisionmakers reportedly want further economic concessions under the Iran-Oman Strait of Hormuz agreement.[30] Regional mediators told the Wall Street Journal ( WSJ ) on August 6 that the IRGC is trying to extract further concessions from the United States and its allies under the Iran-Oman Strait of Hormuz agreement.[31] The agreement appears to be based on the US-Qatari proposed traffic management scheme under which inbound traffic would transit through Iranian waters, while outbound traffic would pass through Omani waters, according to mediators speaking to WSJ in recent days.[32] WSJ described Iran’s preferred concessions as more explicit references to Iran’s role in managing traffic in the strait, charging transit fees, and “assurances” that the United States will lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports and sanctions on Iranian oil sales.[33]

The mediators, in their mention of the IRGC seeking more US concessions, are likely referring to the political faction in Iran that is attempting to extract more concessions from the United States while making fewer concessions in return.[34] ISW-CTP has referred to this group as the “anti-concessions” faction and assesses it consists of IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and many of those around him.[35] The mediators confirmed that the IRGC’s response to the latest draft of the Iran-Oman agreement is holding up talks.[36] A mediator told an Axios reporter on August 7 that the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, which is dominated by Vahidi’s anti-concessions faction, is reviewing the agreement.[37]

It remains unclear whether the agreement that Iranian negotiators — Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi — sent to Iranian decisionmakers for approval includes transit fees or proposes any further economic relief for Iran. US officials and mediators previously stated that the proposal did not involve transit fees.[38] Ghalibaf and Araghchi reportedly supported some form of the agreement that they viewed as an acknowledgment of Iranian control over the strait.[39] Reports on the status of the agreement come amid the United States continuing its economic campaign against Iran.[40] The US Treasury imposed further sanctions on the regime’s shadow banking network on August 7 to restrict the Iranian regime’s ability to generate revenue that it could use to reconstitute.[41] Iranian Central Bank Governor Abdolnasser Hemmati stated that these August 7 sanctions contradict US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s statements about Iran reaching a deal on the Strait of Hormuz.[42] Hemmati’s statement indicates that the regime continues to tie sanctions relief and the lifting of the blockade as conditions to a settlement over the strait.

Low-level Iranian regime officials and media meanwhile continue to claim that Iran is only negotiating with Oman, and not the United States, over management of the strait.[43] Regime officials and media may be continuing to voice this narrative to reassure Iran’s domestic audience and the regime’s anti-negotiation camp that Iran is not conceding to the United States, however.[44]

The Houthis have increasingly coordinated with the IRGC and Iraqi militias to attack Saudi Arabia in recent weeks, likely as part of a multi-pronged effort to compel Saudi Arabia to accept Houthi demands. Western and regional media reported on August 7 that Houthis planned “imminent” coordinated strikes with the Iraqi militias on Saudi targets, including energy infrastructure, according to US, Saudi, and other regional reports.[45] Two regional sources also told Reuters on July 30 that Saudi Arabia and unspecified regional partners assess that the Houthis attacked Saudi Arabia on July 27 from Iraqi territory in coordination with the Iraqi militias and under IRGC supervision.[46] US-Saudi airstrikes, in response to the attacks on Saudi Arabia, reportedly killed a senior Houthi member on July 29, according to an independent Yemeni journalist.[47] The Houthis also reportedly established a new headquarters in a Kataib Hezbollah stronghold south of Baghdad to coordinate with the militias.[48]

This increased Houthi coordination with the Iraqi militias comes amid continued Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia and the Saudi-backed Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) targets.[49] The Houthis attacked an unspecified target in Najran Province in southern Saudi Arabia and wounded 11 civilians in the attack.[50] The Houthis previously struck the Najran Regional Airport with a drone on August 4.[51] The Houthis also struck ROYG-affiliated military positions in Yemen on August 7.[52] The Houthis attacked the Sahn al Jinn military camp using ballistic missiles and drones on August 7, but ROYG-affiliated media and an independent journalist said that at least 20 ballistic missiles and multiple drones struck Marib City and killed at least two people.[53] The military camp is close to the city, and it is unclear if the casualties were civilians or military. The Houthis also reportedly struck ROYG-affiliated units in Shabwa Governorate on August 7.[54]

The Houthis are continuing to attack ships to prevent them from entering Saudi ports as part of their so-called “blockade” of Saudi ports. ROYG state media and an independent Yemeni journalist reported that ROYG-affiliated forces destroyed a Houthi one-way naval attack drone attempting to strike an unspecified vessel near Mokha, Taiz Governorate, on August 7.[55] The Houthis likely sunk an Indian cargo vessel with a one-way naval attack drone on August 4.[56] The Houthis have claimed multiple attacks against Saudi-owned or operated civilian vessels in recent days to compel commercial vessels to comply with the group’s blockade of Saudi ports.[57]

Senior Houthi officials stated on August 7 that the Houthis will continue to sustain their naval blockade and strike Saudi and Saudi-affiliated targets until Saudi Arabia accepts Houthi demands, including the lifting of the Saudi “blockade” on shipping and aid to Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory, paying Houthi civil servant salaries, and allowing Iranian flights to land at Houthi airports.[58] Houthi officials, including Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea and Houthi Supreme Political Council President Mahdi Mashaat, stated that the Houthis will continue to enforce their blockade on Saudi Arabia and attack Saudi-affiliated forces that threaten the Houthis until the Houthis achieve their objectives.[59]

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan are expanding defense cooperation in response to shared regional threats, including threats from Iran and Iranian-backed actors.[60] These agreements reflect a broader regional effort to strengthen coordination against common threats, mostly but not exclusively emanating from Iran. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed a joint defense agreement on August 7 that includes a collective defense provision for “mutual support only for defense.”[61] Saudi Arabia and Pakistan previously signed a mutual defense agreement in September 2025, and Pakistan later deployed 8,000 troops, a fighter squadron, and an air defense system to Saudi Arabia under that pact.[62] Saudi Arabia also announced a proposed 14-country maritime defense coalition in July 2026 to protect shipping in the Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden.[63] The new arrangement reflects a broader regional trend in which states are building partnerships and coalitions to protect themselves and their interests from persistent security threats.[64] Syria has also increased coordination with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) amid shared concerns about Iranian and the Axis of Resistance’s activity.[65] These arrangements will create long-term strategic challenges for Iran by strengthening coordination among regional states that increasingly view Iranian and Iranian-backed activity as a common threat even if these agreements remain limited in scope.

Nothing significant to report.

Lebanese officials will reportedly convene on August 10 to discuss redeveloping pipeline and overland transit projects to export Iraqi oil through Lebanon.[66] These projects are unlikely to create a near-term alternative to export routes through the Strait of Hormuz and are liable to security threats within Syria, however. Lebanese media reported on August 7 that unspecified officials scheduled a near-future meeting to discuss developing a pipeline that would extend from Iraq to Lebanon.[67] Saudi media reported on August 7 that Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam will convene a Lebanese ministerial meeting on August 10 to discuss establishing an overland tanker truck route from Iraq through Syria to Lebanon’s primary oil refinery in Tripoli, on the Mediterranean coast.[68] It is unclear whether Iraqi officials will join Salam’s ministerial meeting, however. Salam previously discussed Iraqi fuel exports to Lebanon and prospects of reviving the long-defunct Kirkuk-Tripoli oil pipeline with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi in Baghdad on July 26.[69] Iraq has discussed several proposals with the United States and regional partners in recent weeks to develop alternative routes to the Strait of Hormuz for Iraqi oil exports, amid Iranian efforts to control traffic in the strait and the Persian Gulf.[70] Salam’s plans to discuss only logistical prerequisites, including repairs to the Tripoli refinery and derelict crossings on the Lebanon-Syria border, in the August 10 meeting indicate that Iraqi-Lebanese energy corridor plans will require significant time, resources, and preparation to successfully implement.[71] These extensive requirements suggest that Iraq and Lebanon will be unable to fully implement an alternative oil export route to the Strait of Hormuz in the near term.

The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) would likely conduct attacks on overland transportation projects — including both trucks and pipelines — within Syrian territory. ISIS fighters frequently attack tanker trucks and oil infrastructure in northern and eastern Syria as part of the group’s “economic war” against the Syrian state and other anti-ISIS actors.[72] ISIS attacked an Iraqi tanker truck in northern Syria’s Aleppo Province on June 16, for example.[73] ISIS has abundant incentives to attack Iraqi oil tanker trucks and other oil infrastructure because of the group’s long-standing conflict with the Iraqi government and the prospects of both economic gains from stealing oil and damage to Iraq’s heavily oil-dependent economy.[74] Iraq and Lebanon must be able to rely on the Syrian government to suppress ISIS activity to ensure the safe and reliable transit of Iraqi oil through Syrian territory. ISIS’s growing militant activity in Syria’s major urban centers may limit the Syrian government’s ability to ensure safe passage for Iraqi oil convoys to Lebanon, however.[75]

Iran could, in the future, leverage members of the Axis of Resistance, including the Iraqi militias and Hezbollah, to conduct clandestine attacks on Iraqi-Lebanese oil infrastructure projects if Iran or one or more of its partners feels doing so would deter an adversary from taking a specific action. Iran has a strategic interest in maintaining positive relations with the Iraqi government because Iran is heavily economically dependent on Iraq, which could deter direct Iranian attacks on Iraqi oil projects.[76] The IRGC could direct its Axis of Resistance proxies, or front groups under their control, to disrupt future Iraqi-Lebanese oil infrastructure and transportation projects within Syria to express discontent with Iraqi or Lebanese government activities that challenge Iran’s interests.

Lebanese and Israeli representatives developed a tentative “shortlist” of countries whose forces could verify Hezbollah disarmament efforts in southern Lebanon during recent negotiations in Rome, according to Reuters on August 7.[77] A Lebanese official told Reuters that the candidate countries could deploy ground forces to southern Lebanon to confirm that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have successfully disarmed Hezbollah in “pilot zones” agreed on by Israel, Lebanon, and the United States under the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement.[78] The official did not disclose which countries Israel and Lebanon have agreed on as potential verifying agents but clarified that the United States will issue final approval for one or more countries on the “shortlist.”[79] Israeli and Lebanese negotiators previously disagreed on mechanisms to monitor LAF activity in the “pilot zones” before the latest round of negotiations in Rome between August 4 and 6.[80] Israeli, Lebanese, and US officials have planned to resume direct negotiations on September 1.[81]

The LAF announced on August 7 that an Israeli drone struck an LAF bulldozer in Mansouri, Tyre District.[82] The LAF said that the attack mildly wounded one Lebanese soldier.[83] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has not commented on the incident at the time of this writing.

An unspecified source told Saudi media on August 7 that a Shia Coordination Framework delegation arrived in Tehran to discuss the Iraqi federal government’s disarmament campaign.[84] It is unclear which framework members comprise the delegation, but the framework includes multiple Iranian-backed parties. The source added to Saudi media that the framework is forming a committee to negotiate disarmament with the Iraqi militias.[85]

[1] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1646

[2] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1644 ; https://www.arabworldnews.com/news/2026-06-21-arbaeen-2026-iran-sets-registration-dates-for-pilgrims-heading-to-karbala

[3] https://al-hashed.gov dot iq/2026/07/29/حصيلة-أولية-20-شهيداً-و32-جريحاً-جراء-الاع/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/the-leadership-and-purpose-of-iraqs-popular-mobilization-forces/

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilgFBVV95cUxNVGk1REhza1NwYXRKRU84VHVnOUIxRGt5a2FOeFViS1FZYjEtRXIxOHlIS2NGSlhZV3d5SGNVRmhjcHR3MXFBbDVnckU3dmtjZklBaXlwYnU5UWctcFNWb21NeDdJa1NiQkJFR085aUJpUDFwVEU3ZzkyZmdwVGNFMzY3QzNBY1lSdk9wN3VtYm9JalZkQkE?oc=5