미국-이스라엘의 이란 전쟁이 중동 정세에 미치는 영향
The cycle of violence: From Israel-Palestine to Iran and back - Brookings
중동의 정치적 불안정이 지속되고 있지만, 단기적으로 시장에 미치는 영향은 명확하지 않아 중립적인 입장을 취하는 것이 적합합니다.
핵심 요약
미국과 이스라엘의 이란 전쟁으로 미국 동맹국들이 미국이 그들을 보호할 수 있다는 확신을 잃고 있습니다.
핵심요약
- 가자 지구에서의 주요 전투는 끝났지만, 이스라엘의 공격은 계속되고 있습니다.
- 서안 지역에서는 정착민 폭력이 증가하고 정착지 확장이 이어지고 있습니다.
- 사우디아라비아와 아랍에미리트를 비롯한 주요 아랍 만국은 갈라지고 있습니다.
- 미국 동맹국들은 미국이 그들을 보호할 수 있다는 확신을 잃고 있습니다.
- 미국의 중동에서의 힘도 약해지고 있습니다.
도입
이 기사는 투자자에게 중동 정세 변화가 글로벌 시장과 경제에 미칠 영향에 대해 이해하는 데 중요한 정보를 제공합니다. 특히 미국과 이스라엘의 이란 전쟁이 중동의 정치적 동력과 안보 환경을 어떻게 바꿀지 분석함으로써, 투자자들이 리스크와 기회를 평가하는 데 도움을 줄 것입니다.
본문 1: 중동 정세의 변화와 미국의 역할
미국과 이스라엘의 이란 전쟁은 중동의 정치적 동력을 크게 바꿨습니다. 가자 지구에서의 주요 전투는 끝났지만, 이스라엘의 공격은 계속되고 재건 노력은 막혀 있습니다. 서안 지역에서는 정착민 폭력이 증가하고 정착지 확장이 이어지고 있으며, 사우디아라비아와 아랍에미리트를 비롯한 주요 아랍 만국은 갈라지고 있습니다. 이는 중동에서의 미국의 영향력이 약해지고 있다는 신호로 읽힙니다. 미국 동맹국들은 미국이 그들을 보호할 수 있다는 확신을 잃고 있으며, 미국의 중동에서의 힘도 약해지고 있습니다. 이는 중동에서의 안보 환경을 불안정하게 만들며, 투자자에게 새로운 리스크를 가져올 가능성이 있습니다.
본문 2: 글로벌 안보 환경의 변화와 투자 기회
이 전쟁은 글로벌 안보 환경을 변화시키고 있습니다. 중국과 러시아를 비롯한 미국의 경쟁자들은 미국의 중동에서의 힘 약화를 기회로 삼을 가능성이 있습니다. 이는 중동에서의 미국의 영향력이 약해지고, 다른 국가들이 중동에서의 역할을 확대할 수 있는 계기가 될 수 있습니다. 또한, 중동에서의 안보 불안정성은 에너지 시장에도 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 이는 석유 가격의 변동성을 증가시키고, 에너지 시장에 새로운 리스크를 가져올 가능성이 있습니다. 투자자들은 이러한 변화를 고려하여 포트폴리오를 조정할 필요가 있습니다.
본문 3: 장기적 전망과 투자 전략
장기적으로 볼 때, 중동에서의 안보 불안정성은 지속될 가능성이 있습니다. 이는 중동에서의 미국의 영향력이 약해지고, 다른 국가들이 중동에서의 역할을 확대할 수 있는 계기가 될 수 있습니다. 또한, 에너지 시장에도 영향을 미칠 수 있으며, 석유 가격의 변동성을 증가시키고, 에너지 시장에 새로운 리스크를 가져올 가능성이 있습니다. 투자자들은 이러한 변화를 고려하여 장기적인 투자 전략을 수립할 필요가 있습니다. 특히, 중동에서의 안보 불안정성과 에너지 시장 변동성을 고려하여 포트폴리오를 다양화하는 것이 중요합니다.
결론
이 기사는 미국과 이스라엘의 이란 전쟁이 중동 정세와 글로벌 안보 환경을 어떻게 바꿀지 분석했습니다. 중동에서의 미국의 영향력이 약해지고, 다른 국가들이 중동에서의 역할을 확대할 수 있는 계기가 될 수 있으며, 에너지 시장에도 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 이러한 변화를 고려하여 포트폴리오를 조정하고, 장기적인 투자 전략을 수립할 필요가 있습니다. 향후 중동 정세의 변화와 에너지 시장 변동성을 주시하는 것이 중요합니다.
Original Article
The cycle of violence: From Israel-Palestine to Iran and back - Brookings
This piece is part of the “ Blowback: How the Iran war may change the world ” series, which features original analyses and policy recommendations by experts on the immediate and prospective long-term fallout from the 2026 Iran war.
The United States and Israel’s war in Iran has meaningfully shifted political dynamics in the Middle East and diplomatic focus away from Israel and Palestine amid worsening conditions on the ground. While major combat in Gaza has ended, Israeli attacks on the enclave continue, and efforts at reconstruction and to provide governance have stalled. The West Bank, too, is beset by increasing settler violence and settlement expansion. An intensifying divergence between key Arab Gulf states—notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—is reducing internal Gulf alignment and thus the incentives to take positive steps in Israel-Palestine. The United States and regional governments should recognize that unresolved structural inequities in Israel-Palestine are a key driver of Middle Eastern conflict, including in nearby Lebanon. Absent improvements on the ground, they will continue to fuel regional instability.
My Brookings colleague Bob Kagan persuasively argues that the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran represents a simultaneous collapse of deterrence and diplomacy. Many American allies—including some in the Middle East—doubt whether the United States can now protect them. U.S. rivals, such as China and Russia, see declining American power in the region. And indeed, some Gulf states may further hedge their relations with Iran while relying less on the U.S. security umbrella. But let’s not forget that the war in Iran was initially sparked by renewed conflict in Israel-Palestine that escalated into a regional conflict. For that reason, it’s important to understand not only the impact of the Iran war on Israel/Palestine, but also how improving the situation there can calm the situation in the region.
The most direct impact of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran on Israel-Palestine has been to divert energy and attention away from the so-called ceasefire. Major hostilities in Gaza have ended, but Israel continues to attack the enclave—with hundreds killed since the war on Iran began. Meanwhile in the West Bank, extremist Israeli settlers continue attacking and killing Palestinians with what looks like Israeli military acquiescence —if not protection—and in a manner that looks systematic. Since the Iran war began, over 40 Palestinians have been killed in the West Bank alone.
Preoccupied with Iran, the Trump administration has made little progress on Gaza. No real economic redevelopment has begun; in fact, Gaza is back to counting trucks for the entry of basic necessities. The Israeli military has attacked and killed those trying to restore water and sewer services to Gaza, leaving Gazans without clean water, and even halted aid deliveries to Gaza following attacks from Iran. Even the Palestinian National Committee for the Administration in Gaza has not yet been let into the enclave to begin the process of providing governance.
Global public opinion is not only distracted from Israel-Palestine by the larger conflict in Iran, but the Trump administration’s very structure also makes progress on the Palestinian territories difficult. The Trump team operates through a very tiny circle of senior officials, like Steve Witkoff, so little can get done when these officials have their attention directed to the wars in Iran and Lebanon and trying to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. That’s certainly been the case on Gaza. Nickolay Mladenov, the High Representative for Gaza and the director-general of the U.S.-backed “Board of Peace,” with whom I’ve worked over the years, is an astute diplomat, but he doesn’t appear to have the necessary backing to deliver even on elements of Trump’s own plan.
Israel has used the Iran war to tighten its stranglehold on the West Bank and rapidly expand its settlements , further increasing the transfer of Israeli civilians into the territory. The war on Iran and Israel’s behavior also appear to have put Israel much more on the defensive in American discourse than ever before —with recent polls showing 60% of Americans having an unfavorable view of Israel , including 80% of Democrats and 84% of those under the age of 50.
The Iran war’s unpopularity and Israel’s role in it have also harmed Trump’s standing and perceptions of U.S. power. Trump’s favorability has continued to plummet since the war began on February 28. As of mid-May, only 37% of Americans approved of the job Trump is doing as president—a second-term low—while majorities disapproved of how he is handling the war in Iran (65%) and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (62%). Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s choice of words intimated 1 that the United States followed Israel into a war against Iran, implying deep American weakness and raising concerns about Israel’s role in U.S. government decisionmaking. This drew criticism from the American Jewish community that the administration was placing the responsibility on Israel for the war—even as Trump made his own decision.
Further, the war on Iran has also engulfed Lebanon. Israel’s brutal war in Lebanon has displaced over 1 million Lebanese citizens, and its deliberate, systematic leveling of villages across southern Lebanon has killed over 3,000, including over 110 health care workers—far more than twice the number of Israelis killed on October 7, 2023. And notwithstanding the recent efforts by Lebanon’s weak central government to further isolate Hezbollah , Israel’s ferocious actions are likely increasing the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s resistance to Israel, even among those Lebanese who are predisposed to hate the militant group. Perceptions of Israel are not only worsening in the Arab world, but also in Europe, Asia, and the United States. This has implications for improving the situation in Israel-Palestine.
The Iran war has also impacted regional alignments, as seen in the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) decision to move closer to Israel and distance itself from neighbors like Saudi Arabia. One example of this shift is that the UAE chose this occasion to exit OPEC—the Saudi-led oil cartel. Meanwhile, Israel has acted to defend the UAE from Iranian drones and missile attacks by sending Iron Dome air defense batteries and personnel to operate them to the UAE in May. There are also credible reports that Israel may allow the UAE’s Emirates Airlines to fly nonstop flights between New York City and Tel Aviv. Saudi Arabia, for its part, has announced a new deal with Turkey to create an Istanbul-to-Oman railway that bypasses both Israel and the UAE .
These trends create further challenges for Palestinians, who would be best served if Gulf countries—particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE—were aligned in their efforts to improve Palestinians’ conditions. Such cooperation could help end the killing in Gaza and the West Bank, promote economic growth, or advance other shared objectives. Lack of Arab Gulf state unity on Israel-Palestine weakens their collective leverage over both Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Neither side faces the clear incentives—or disincentives—that a unified Gulf position could provide to encourage positive steps at a time when such alignment is needed more than ever.
None of these developments will help de-escalate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Quite the opposite: In recent days, we have seen both Israel and the United States lash out at Palestinians in new ways. Indeed, the war has empowered those whose actions show they are least interested in compromise.
Yet there are also factors that augur in a positive direction. Saudis and other regional actors may conclude that the continuation of Palestinian suffering is becoming an increasingly intolerable driver of regional conflict, particularly as nonstate actors continue to leverage Palestinian grievances to pursue their own goals. Thus, there may be new incentives for diplomatic engagement and improving the situation on the ground in Israel-Palestine as regional governments conclude that their own security requires a fair and just solution in Israel-Palestine.
It’s also possible that Israelis elect a somewhat less extremist government later this year—certainly not peaceniks, but one that would see it as in Israel’s interest to at least partially de-escalate the situation with the Palestinian people and the international community. There’s also the fact that diplomatic progress in the Middle East sometimes occurs after moments of profound change or even war—much like the hopeful Madrid summit which brought together Israelis, Palestinians, and regional states at the conclusion of the 1991 Iraq War.
What should be done about all of this?
In the first instance, the Trump administration should deepen its bench and bring the diplomatic talents at its disposal into the fold to ensure that sufficient diplomatic energy is invested in Israel-Palestine and Lebanon. Not only are the people of Gaza—and now Lebanon—in desperate need of housing, reconstruction, and redevelopment, but failing to alleviate suffering risks renewed conflict.
The Trump administration should also come to terms with the fact that conflict in Israel-Palestine is a driver of regional instability. It should focus more political energy on ending Israel’s settlement drive in the West Bank and on improving living conditions in Gaza to provide hope to the Palestinian people.
While it is unclear what the Trump administration could do to mend the Saudi-UAE divide, regional governments should also align around practical measures to improve living conditions and advance hope for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza. These efforts could take the forms of economic assistance, increased trade, and a presentation of clear trade-offs to Israel based on its behavior toward Palestinians. Of course, the Palestinian and Israeli leadership have a role to play as well in improving their collective situation. However, with Israel now in an election campaign that is driving policy even more to the right, and the Palestinian Authority hobbled by Israel continuing to seize the majority of its ongoing revenues, we should expect little positive movement on the issue from either of those two actors.
The United States and Israel’s war on Iran has set back progress on the ground in Israel-Palestine by sidelining the issue and creating division in the Arab world. Yet hope remains that the war will spur regional governments to finally come together to end the inequalities and grievances that continue to perpetuate the cycle of violence in Israel-Palestine. If there’s a lesson here for Washington and the world, it’s that failure to address the structural inequities in Israel-Palestine does not contain conflict but regionalizes it.
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