핵심요약

• 이스라엘 주식 시장은 기록을 세우고 시켈(Shekel)은 상승했습니다.
• 이스라엘 방위 산업은 전례 없는 수익을 기록했습니다.
• 이란의 대리 세력 네트워크(헤즈볼라, 후티 등)가 현재는 붕괴하고 있습니다.
• 미국은 이란 대리 세력에 대한 압력을 통해 이 지역의 정치적 지형을 변화시켰습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란 전쟁이라는 지정학적 사건이 어떻게 이스라엘 경제에 역설적인 이익을 가져왔는지 분석합니다. 이는 단순한 군사적 충돌을 넘어, 대리 세력 네트워크의 붕괴와 지정학적 재편이 어떻게 실제 경제적 성과로 전환되는지를 보여줍니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 변동성이 어떻게 자국 경제에 영향을 미치는지, 그리고 이러한 변화가 장기적인 경제 구조에 어떤 영향을 미칠지 이해하는 것이 중요합니다.

본문 1: 지정학적 대리 네트워크의 붕괴와 비용 전가

이란이 구축했던 대리 세력 네트워크는 40년간의 억지력의 핵심이었습니다. 이 네트워크는 레바논의 헤즈볼라부터 예멘의 후티 반군, 이라크의 다양한 무장 세력에 이르기까지 이란의 확장주의 정책을 관철하는 수단이었습니다. 현재의 전쟁은 이 도전에 가장 큰 타격을 입혔습니다. 헤즈볼라는 2024년 이스라엘과의 전쟁과 시리아에서의 전략적 깊이 상실로 이미 지쳐 있었으며, 이스라엘에 대한 개입으로 심각한 대응을 받았습니다. 미국은 레바논 정부에 압력을 가하여 헤즈볼라의 군사 활동 금지와 해체에 대한 논의를 이끌어냈습니다. 이처럼 이란의 억지력 기반이 무너지는 과정에서, 대리 세력들은 비용을 부담하고 군사적 손실을 입게 되며, 이는 지정학적 비용이 경제적 비용으로 전가되는 구조를 형성합니다.

본문 2: 경제적 역설과 방위 산업의 이익

전쟁의 비용이 주변국과 국제 사회에 전가되는 상황에서, 이스라엘은 경제적 이익을 취했습니다. 아시아 및 아랍 소비자들이 호르무즈 해협 폐쇄 비용을 흡수하는 동안, 이스라엘은 주식 시장에서 기록을 세우고 시켈 가치를 상승시켰습니다. 더욱이, 이스라엘의 방위 산업은 전례 없는 수익을 기록하며 이 지정학적 불확실성을 직접적인 경제적 기회로 전환했습니다. 이는 분쟁 상황에서 국방 및 안보 산업이 어떻게 경제적 수혜를 얻는지를 보여주는 사례입니다. 이는 지정학적 위험이 특정 산업 부문에 집중될 때, 해당 산업이 새로운 성장 동력으로 작용할 수 있음을 시사합니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망과 구조적 변화

이란의 억지력 기반이 해체되고 미국이 이 지역의 정치적 지형을 재편하는 과정은 장기적인 구조적 변화를 예고합니다. 이 과정에서 이스라엘의 안보 산업은 지속적인 수요를 확보할 가능성이 높습니다. 다만, 이러한 경제적 이익이 지속되기 위해서는 국제 사회의 안정화와 미국 및 지역 강대국 간의 외교적 합의가 필수적입니다. 향후 전망은 대리 세력의 통제력 상실이 어떻게 안정적인 안보 환경으로 이어지는지에 달려 있습니다. 따라서 투자자들은 단기적인 시장 변동성보다는 장기적인 지정학적 안정화 추세에 주목해야 합니다.

결론

이란 전쟁의 역설은 지정학적 갈등이 어떻게 경제적 기회로 전환될 수 있는지 보여줍니다. 이스라엘은 전쟁의 비용을 최소화하면서도 방위 산업을 통해 이익을 극대화하는 구조적 이점을 확보했습니다. 앞으로도 대리 세력 네트워크의 해체와 국제적 압력 증가는 이스라엘의 안보 산업에 지속적인 긍정적 영향을 미칠 가능성이 높습니다. 따라서 투자자들은 지정학적 리스크가 실제 경제 성과로 어떻게 반영되는지에 대한 심층적인 분석을 지속해야 할 것입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMikgFBVV95cUxNSlQ4LW5SNnhoNE03Wkh0eXg5RWdkREhtX3hrT0ZJd0xzb0xCOUJ3ay1UQjFDN2p6Q3VncFRvQkdkM3Z4UVZkWExPQUxCMW9DbENkSk1DR2M3X3VlSjRYTVZhM1pVaHJhSzdaa252MzRlQnhOMDdmdkVUc1VRdFVRemljby11Z2NiamNSU2t6QzVBUdIBlwFBVV95cUxOWmZJN1kzc0ZnUW8yMDJCcFpyOE83Sm5QQjJQLVd6aF9hdlUwalN3YW9tcC11b0J4dE9KRnRhSHc0azFXVFE5cnJXWk54NmJZQzZrYng5bTBNVm1HOFpVb3FwaXB6Q1ZrLXpDZXJGMVF4a0x6ekFEbHJ3WjV5b0RPdDhKYVlvTEtsY3diNjJCTkQ2TVQteERn?oc=5

Israel and the cost paradox of the Iran war - Al Jazeera

Since the breakout of war on February 28, the US-Israeli conflict with Iran has been framed as an existential for Tel Aviv and Tehran. Yet a calm, structural reading of the past five months of fighting and faltering truces reveals a striking paradox: the party that incited this war has become the one least exposed to its fire and the one collecting most of its returns.

While Iranian missiles and drones fall on critical Gulf infrastructure, while Asian and Arab consumers absorb the bill for the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and while American troops die in Iranian strikes, the Tel Aviv stock exchange keeps setting records, the shekel keeps rising, and Israel’s defence industries post unprecedented earning numbers.

Israel is bearing the least cost of a war that is eroding its adversary’s defences and devastating its neighbourhood.

A security doctrine Iran built for four decades is now unravelling. It was premised on moving confrontation away from Iranian territory through a network of proxies and allies, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen and various armed factions in Iraq.

That network was the core of Iranian deterrence and the lever of its expansionist policy. The current war has dealt this doctrine the harshest blow in its history.

Hezbollah entered 2026 already exhausted by its 2024 war with Israel and by the loss of strategic depth in Syria. In March, it committed a fatal error by intervening on Tehran’s behalf and drawing a devastating Israeli response. Then the United States put pressure on the Lebanese government to act against Hezbollah, leading to a prohibition on the group’s military activities and talk of disarmament.

The pro-Iranian Iraqi factions also intervened on behalf of their benefactor, but suffered losses in US strikes. The US managed to block the return of the pro-Iran Nouri al-Maliki to the prime minister’s post in Iraq and install a relatively unknown banker, Ali al-Zaidi. His government now is under severe pressure to move against pro-Iran factions and disarm them by the end of September or suffer punitive economic measures from the US.

The Houthis, having learned from Hezbollah’s fate and the cost of their previous rounds of confrontation with Washington, were reluctant to join the fray. They have now been compelled to act, but not against the US or Israel directly; they are targeting Saudi interests, thus facing off with one of the largest armies in the world, as well as Yemeni forces loyal to the internationally recognised government.

The net result is that Iran increasingly bears the burden of the war alone. Israel’s first and perhaps most important strategic gain lies here: the war is accelerating the erosion of the network Iran spent more than four decades building, and with it the strategic logic of surrounding Israel with multiple fronts.

At the beginning of the war, Israel did absorb direct Iranian missile barrages, but many of them were taken down by the Iron Dome and the additional air defence systems deployed by the US. By contrast, the Gulf states faced much more intense Iranian attacks that went beyond military targets and struck energy and civilian infrastructure.

In the current escalation, Iranian strikes have concentrated on civilian infrastructure across the Gulf states and Jordan, while deliberately avoiding both Israel and the American naval assets off the Iranian coast.

Tehran understands that striking US aircraft carriers would open the gates of hell upon it, and that hitting the Israeli interior again would widen the war at the very moment it is trying to preserve some space for talks with Washington. It has opted instead to pressure Washington through its Gulf neighbours.

The consequence is that Israel’s home front has effectively exited the target set. The cost of deterrence that Israel, as an instigator of this war, should be paying has been transferred to Gulf civilians who have no hand in it, some in states furthest removed from any normalisation with Israel.

As US air strikes continue to degrade Iranian missile capabilities, military infrastructure and senior command, Israel enjoys the strategic advantages of this sustained pressure without absorbing equivalent retaliation on its own territory.

While Israel is successfully transferring the military costs of war to the US and the Gulf, its economy is doing well. The Bank of Israel, even after cutting its forecast because of the war, still expects the economy to grow by 4 percent in 2026, ahead of most developed economies even in peacetime. The projected growth for 2027 is 5.5 percent.

The markets are more eloquent still. The shekel has appreciated by roughly 20 percent against the US dollar over the past year; the Tel Aviv-35 Index keeps setting records; and in March, at the height of the war, Google completed its $32bn acquisition of Israeli cloud cybersecurity startup Wiz.

Global capital, in other words, is pricing this war as an opportunity to reshape the region in Israel’s favour, not as a risk to it.

Then there is the direct war economy. In June, the Israeli Ministry of Defence announced that defence exports reached $19.2bn in 2025, up nearly 30 percent for a fifth consecutive record year, led by the missile and air defence systems whose chief marketing asset is precisely their battlefield performance. Every new engagement is, from the vantage point of Israel’s defence industries, a live demonstration before prospective clients.

In the energy sector, Israeli gas output from the Leviathan and Tamar fields is on track to exceed three billion cubic feet (85 million cubic metres) per day this year, with the surplus piped for export to Egypt, where it is liquified and sold on a global market with skyrocketing prices.

Israel’s shipping industry remains relatively untouched by the war, with its Mediterranean ports operating at capacity. Meanwhile, the blockade Iran imposes on the strait punishes the Gulf and their Asian partners.

None of this suggests that Israel is fighting a cost-free war. Defence spending has surged, economic output has fallen below its pre-war trajectory, and prolonged mobilisation imposes significant social and fiscal burdens.

But strategy is measured not by the absence of costs, but by the relationship between costs and gains, and by that measure Israel’s position appears far stronger than that of its principal adversary.

This is the central paradox of the current war. Israel’s greatest gains have not come from battlefield victories, but from the transformation of the regional strategic environment: accelerated pressure on Iran’s proxy architecture, dispersed Iranian military attention across multiple theatres, and a significant share of the war’s immediate costs shifted onto other regional actors. The distribution of those costs has become profoundly uneven.

Whether that asymmetry proves temporary or becomes the foundation of a new regional order remains to be seen. Preserving it will likely be the main goal of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as he visits Washington this week.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMikgFBVV95cUxNSlQ4LW5SNnhoNE03Wkh0eXg5RWdkREhtX3hrT0ZJd0xzb0xCOUJ3ay1UQjFDN2p6Q3VncFRvQkdkM3Z4UVZkWExPQUxCMW9DbENkSk1DR2M3X3VlSjRYTVZhM1pVaHJhSzdaa252MzRlQnhOMDdmdkVUc1VRdFVRemljby11Z2NiamNSU2t6QzVBUdIBlwFBVV95cUxOWmZJN1kzc0ZnUW8yMDJCcFpyOE83Sm5QQjJQLVd6aF9hdlUwalN3YW9tcC11b0J4dE9KRnRhSHc0azFXVFE5cnJXWk54NmJZQzZrYng5bTBNVm1HOFpVb3FwaXB6Q1ZrLXpDZXJGMVF4a0x6ekFEbHJ3WjV5b0RPdDhKYVlvTEtsY3diNjJCTkQ2TVQteERn?oc=5