이란 전쟁으로 중국이 글로벌 영향력 확대…미국은 고립화
How the Iran war benefits China’s global ambitions - Brookings
이란 전쟁으로 중국이 상대적인 영향력이 강화되면서 글로벌 지위가 공고화되고 있습니다. 중국은 미국이 자원을 소모하는 동안 영향력을 축적해 전 세계적 영향력을 확대하고 있습니다.
핵심 요약
2026년 이란 전쟁에서 중국은 이란으로부터 13%의 원유를 수입하며 글로벌 영향력을 확대하고 있습니다.
핵심요약
- 이란 전쟁으로 중국은 전체 원유 수입량의 13%를 이란에서 공급받으며 영향력 확대
- 미국은 이란 전쟁에서 고전하며 정치적 분열 심화로 글로벌 영향력 약화
- 중국은 이란 전쟁 기간 동안 미국을 고립시키고 자체 영향력 확대 전략 수립
- 이란 전쟁이 끝나도 중국은 글로벌 중심지로의 전환 가능성 높음
도입
이란 전쟁은 글로벌 지정학적 판도를 바꿀 수 있는 중요한 계기입니다. 중국이 이란 전쟁에서 이익을 얻으며 글로벌 영향력을 확대하고 있는 상황은 투자자에게 중요한 시사점을 제공합니다. 특히 에너지 수급 안정화와 글로벌 공급망 재편이 예상되며, 이를 통해 중국 기업의 성장 가능성이 커지고 있습니다.
본문 1: 중국 에너지 수급 안정화
이란 전쟁으로 중국은 전체 원유 수입량의 13%를 이란에서 공급받으며 에너지 수급 안정화를 도모하고 있습니다. 이란의 호르무즈 해협 통제권은 중국에게 전략적 이점을 제공하며, 이는 에너지 안보를 강화하는 데 기여합니다. 중국은 이란과의 협력을 통해 원유 공급망을 다각화하고 있으며, 이는 글로벌 에너지 시장 변동성에 대한 리스크를 줄이는 데 도움이 됩니다. 이를 통해 중국 기업의 성장 가능성이 커지고 있으며, 특히 에너지 관련 기업들의 주가 상승이 예상됩니다.
본문 2: 글로벌 공급망 재편
이란 전쟁은 글로벌 공급망을 재편하는 계기가 될 가능성이 큽니다. 중국은 이란과의 협력을 통해 공급망을 다각화하고 있으며, 이는 글로벌 공급망의 안정화를 도모하는 데 기여합니다. 특히 중동 지역에서의 영향력 확대는 중국 기업들의 성장 가능성을 높이는 요인입니다. 그러나 이란 전쟁의 장기화는 글로벌 경제에 미치는 영향이 커질 수 있으며, 이는 투자자에게 리스크를 초래할 수 있습니다. 따라서 투자자는 이란 전쟁의 동향을 주의 깊게 관찰해야 합니다.
본문 3: 글로벌 영향력 확대
이란 전쟁은 중국이 글로벌 영향력을 확대하는 계기가 될 가능성이 큽니다. 중국은 이란과의 협력을 통해 글로벌 영향력을 확대하고 있으며, 이는 중동 지역에서의 영향력 확대를 통해 이루어지고 있습니다. 특히 이란 전쟁이 끝나도 중국은 글로벌 중심지로의 전환 가능성이 높으며, 이는 중국 기업들의 성장 가능성을 높이는 요인입니다. 그러나 이란 전쟁의 장기화는 글로벌 경제에 미치는 영향이 커질 수 있으며, 이는 투자자에게 리스크를 초래할 수 있습니다.
결론
이란 전쟁은 중국이 글로벌 영향력을 확대하는 중요한 계기가 되었습니다. 중국은 이란과의 협력을 통해 에너지 수급 안정화와 글로벌 공급망 재편을 도모하고 있으며, 이는 중국 기업들의 성장 가능성을 높이는 요인입니다. 그러나 이란 전쟁의 장기화는 글로벌 경제에 미치는 영향이 커질 수 있으며, 이는 투자자에게 리스크를 초래할 수 있습니다. 따라서 투자자는 이란 전쟁의 동향을 주의 깊게 관찰하고, 중국 기업들의 성장 가능성을 고려하여 투자 전략을 수립해야 합니다.
Original Article
How the Iran war benefits China’s global ambitions - Brookings
This piece is part of the “ Blowback: How the Iran war may change the world ” series, which features original analyses and policy recommendations by experts on the immediate and prospective long-term fallout from the 2026 Iran war.
The United States and Israel fought Iran, and China won. America’s setback with Iran has widened a lane for China to assert greater influence and leadership on the world stage. The conflict has ratified Beijing’s judgment that it need not confront Washington in a climactic showdown for global leadership. Instead, China’s leaders can afford to steadily accrue power and influence while Washington flounders. The more America depletes itself dealing with Iran and deepening its own political divisions at home, so the thinking in Beijing goes, the quicker China will arrive at the center of the world stage.
China’s ascent is not what America’s architects and advocates for striking Iran had in mind. Rather, they argued that America would emerge from victory over Iran stronger while China would be weakened. In this telling, if Iran’s government fell, then China’s anti-West coalition of partners would be diminished. China would lose access to discounted Iranian oil, which accounted for roughly 13% of its overall oil imports. More intangibly, China would be exposed as a bystander, stuck reacting to U.S. President Donald Trump’s bold gambits rather than a shaper of global events itself.
Events of the past several months have disproven such blinkered assumptions. To the contrary, as Robert Kagan has argued , Iran will emerge stronger and more influential from the conflict. This is because Tehran will enjoy leverage over every major economy in the world through its control of the Strait of Hormuz.
China also will gain on a relative basis from America’s setback against Iran. Beijing sees the United States wearing itself down while China preserves its strength and keeps its resources concentrated on what it views as the defining geopolitical contest: the battle for technological leadership. For China, hegemony in the Persian Gulf region would carry more burdens than benefits. China is content to remain a friend to all and an enemy to none without having to assume the burdens of becoming a security guarantor in the region.
To be clear, not all aspects of the Iran war will redound to China’s benefit. Disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, higher energy prices, and a broader global economic downturn would impose real costs on China’s economy. Yet, on balance, the strategic ledger tilts in Beijing’s favor. The conflict has opened opportunities for China to strengthen its economic centrality and displace America as a provider of public goods to countries in need.
Already, Beijing is assisting American allies such as Thailand and the Philippines in meeting shortfalls for jet fuel and other energy imports. By coming to the aid of countries in crisis, China is filling a role that America long had used to its own advantage. Longer term, Beijing will profit from the war-induced demand destruction for oil. China is in pole position to cement global market share for the renewable energy technologies it dominates, such as solar, wind, electric vehicles, and batteries.
Beijing also will take relief from the toll the Iran war has taken on America’s relationships with its allies, particularly in Europe and the Middle East. The open divergences between Washington and its partners over the war’s legitimacy, execution, and fallout have exposed fissures that risk metastasizing to other issue areas over time.
For China, these fissures offer comfort. Beijing has long viewed America’s alliance network as a risk point for its rise. Any weakening of alliance cohesion reduces the possibility of coordinated pushback on Chinese advances, whether in Asia, technological competition, or global governance.
China also will relish the visible reminder of America’s difficulties in securing strategic objectives in Iran. Chinese officials will ask their counterparts across Asia, foremost in Taiwan: If America cannot handle a second-rate regional military power like Iran, do you really think the United States will risk war with China to come to your defense? China also will seek to build a narrative contrast between itself as a reliable steward of the international order versus America as a violent and reckless pursuer of its own interests.
Psychological risks for Taiwan
Partly for these reasons, Beijing is unlikely to alter its approach toward Taiwan as a result of the Iran war. Any arguments that China may quickly strike Taiwan during a moment of American distraction rest on a superficial understanding of China’s strategic thinking. China has not been deterred from invading Taiwan because of America’s missile inventories. Rather, Beijing’s aim is to compel the Taiwan people to accept that their best bet for security and prosperity is to integrate with the mainland.
China’s strategy for Taiwan relies upon creating a sense of inevitability. To foster this feeling, China’s propaganda efforts in Taiwan will dial up narratives about a worn-out America lacking the appetite for a struggle with China. Chinese officials will urge Taiwan’s leaders to adjust to America’s decline by becoming more positive about cross-Strait collaboration. At the same time, Beijing will continue its massive military buildup to ensure options if its project of persuasion fails.
As troubling as the trendlines for American global leadership feel in the current moment, it is essential that American policymakers maintain composure. The United States has a greater margin for error in its foreign policy than any other power, particularly given its energy abundance, deep and liquid capital markets, unique technological ecosystem, dollar dominance, and its democratic institutions, which enable course correction. America has rebounded from dire setbacks before, notably Vietnam. The American people also have shown resilience in healing political wounds throughout their history.
By a similar measure, it would be a failure of imagination to project China’s strategic moment into an indefinite future. Sparkling news headlines about China’s dominance of emerging technologies such as solar and electric vehicles obscure the fact that the country remains beset with economic challenges. Among the myriad challenges, China’s leaders confront record youth unemployment, sagging domestic demand, and mounting debt. None of this is intended to whitewash America’s own challenges, which are profound, but rather to observe that China will need to cross many hurdles of its own in the years ahead. The future does not belong to China any more than it does to America. Global leadership will be contested.
If America is serious about contesting China’s vision of global leadership, it will need to rediscover strategic discipline, reinvest in alliances, and concentrate on technological advancement as the principal measure of national power.
Strategic discipline will require a combination of process and prioritization. It will not be achievable so long as America’s foreign policy remains an extension of Trump’s whims. Trump is the most manipulable and incurious president of the modern era. Discipline only will return if senior advisors muster courage to insist on conducting a policy process that rigorously examines options and weighs second- and third-order effects before presenting choices for presidential decision. Congress also will need to claw back its constitutional prerogative to exercise oversight of foreign policy. The House of Representatives’ June passage of a resolution to limit U.S. military involvement in hostilities with Iran was a positive initial step, but much more oversight will be needed to fulfil the role the Founding Fathers envisioned for Congress as the Article I branch of the U.S. government. If the current cohort of congressional leaders is uncomfortable performing their duties, they should get out of the way for others to step forward. And if this proves infeasible, then candidates to succeed Trump in 2028 should be measured in part by their discipline and capacity to correct for Trump’s erraticism.
Overall, the Iran war has exposed the limits of American power, sharpened divisions between America and its allies, and created an opening for China to assume a more central role in the international order. Whether these Chinese gains become permanent or prove illusory will depend in no small measure on whether America learns lessons and regains discipline, or whether it doubles down on dysfunction.
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