핵심요약

• 공중 통제 용어는 1차 세계대전부터 20세기 초반에 걸쳐 발전했습니다.
• '공중 우위'에 대한 개념은 1917년, 1921년, 1923년, 1938년, 1942년 등 역사적 시점에 뿌리를 두고 있습니다.
• 현대의 공역은 유인 항공기뿐만 아니라 로켓, 순항 미사일, 드론 시스템 등 다양한 무인 시스템으로 점유됩니다.
• 구시대적 용어들은 항공력 증강을 위한 수사적 정당화에 사용되었으며, 현재는 현실을 반영하지 못합니다.

도입

본 기사는 최근의 분쟁에서 사용되는 '공중 우위', '공중 지배'와 같은 용어들이 어떻게 구시대적인 개념으로 전락했는지 분석합니다. 이는 단순히 군사 용어의 변화를 넘어, 기술 발전과 무력의 양상이 변화하는 현대 지정학적 환경을 이해하는 데 중요한 시사점을 제공합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 용어의 변화를 통해 현재의 지정학적 리스크와 기술 패권 경쟁의 본질을 파악해야 합니다.

본문 1: 구시대적 개념의 역사적 기원

'공중 우위'와 같은 용어는 20세기 초반에 그 기원을 두고 있습니다. '항공 우위(air superiority)'는 1917년까지 거슬러 올라가며, '공중 지배(command of the air)'는 1921년에 쥘리오 두엣에 의해 대중화되었습니다. 이는 1923년 미국 육군 소장 메이슨 패트릭이 '항공 우세(aerial supremacy)'를 사용하고, 1925년 빌리 미첼이 '공중 통제(control of the air)'에 대해 논한 역사적 흐름을 보여줍니다. 이러한 용어들은 주로 유인 항공기가 공중 공격을 제압하는 주된 수단이었던 시기에, 공군력 증강의 논리적 근거와 수사적 정당화를 위해 사용되었습니다. 당시의 논리는 유인 항공기를 통한 공중 전투가 지배적인 상황이라는 전제하에 형성되었으며, 이는 오늘날의 복잡한 다영역 전쟁 환경과는 근본적으로 차이가 있습니다.

본문 2: 현대 전장의 현실과 용어의 괴리

현대 전쟁의 공역은 과거와는 완전히 다릅니다. 과거에는 유인 항공기가 주요한 공중 지배 수단이었으나, 현재는 유인 항공기 외에도 대규모 로켓, 순항 미사일, 탄도 미사일, 그리고 드론 시스템 등 매우 다양한 무인 시스템들이 공역을 점유하고 있습니다. 이러한 무인 시스템들은 국가, 비국가 행위자, 그리고 모든 군사 서비스에 의해 사용되고 있습니다. 이러한 현실은 '공중의 소유권'이라는 개념이 더 이상 현실적으로 존재하지 않음을 의미합니다. 과거의 용어들은 이러한 복잡하고 분산된 공역의 현실을 포괄하지 못하며, 단지 유인 항공기 중심의 전투 논리에 국한되어 있습니다. 따라서 현재의 용어들은 실제 무력의 분포와 기술적 현실을 정확하게 반영하지 못하고 있습니다.

본문 3: 미래 전략적 함의

이러한 용어의 구시대성은 향후 지정학적 리스크 평가에 중대한 영향을 미칩니다. 미래의 분쟁은 물리적 항공 우위보다는 센서 기술, 사이버 공간, 그리고 무인 시스템의 통합적 통제 능력에 의해 결정될 것입니다. 따라서 투자 분석 시, 전통적인 항공 우위 개념에만 의존하기보다는, 드론 및 사이버 공간을 포함하는 광범위한 '공간 지배(spatial dominance)'의 개념을 중심으로 리스크를 평가해야 합니다. 이는 기술 패권 경쟁이 물리적 통제에서 정보 및 시스템 통합으로 이동하고 있음을 시사합니다.

결론

결론적으로, 공중 통제에 대한 구시대적 용어들은 현대의 다영역 전쟁 환경과 기술적 현실을 반영하지 못하고 있습니다. 투자 분석가는 이러한 용어의 괴리를 인지하고, 물리적 항공력 중심의 평가에서 벗어나 무인 시스템과 정보 우위를 포함하는 통합적 관점에서 미래의 지정학적 위험을 예측해야 합니다. 향후 기술 발전은 전통적인 군사 용어의 변화를 넘어, 공간 지배의 새로운 정의를 요구할 것입니다. 따라서 미래의 분쟁 양상과 기술 패권 경쟁에 대한 면밀한 모니터링이 필요합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMirAFBVV95cUxOOE5UM0dwdGRXTmJlS3k4VEFaRDRhS1JjZXdHUnBlRnVrbEp1TTlhaEdSc21fZ0tWS0ppR2JvNE4xd3F6UlJfck5vakpLRVhwQU1hTThzUmlSTElOTkgyNE5fZXBJOWN6UFVWU3g5dlhfbGIxbVU5QUNjRF9aeDNUaHZCOGh1d3diRXhiNm5pV3JUUVhGV0lTSzQ4WExmX0lPZjFKYldNeHhPTUdM?oc=5

Supremacy, Superiority, Dominance: The Iran War and Our Obsolete Air-Control Lexicon - Modern War Institute -

As with most recent conflicts, commentary on the recent Iran War used a variety of confusing terms to describe the success of the air battle. Pundits and officials alike spoke of air dominance , air supremacy , air superiority , and control of the air . Meanwhile, in Ukraine, others talked of air parity . In reality, these terms are so last century. This is a factual statement, not a throwaway line.

The fundamental reason the terms now confuse rather than bring clarity is that the air is now filled by more than only the manned aircraft that were present when these definitions were established. The airspace of modern wars is now routinely also used by large numbers of remarkably diverse types of rockets, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and drone systems. Compounding this, such unmanned systems are now used by everybody: states, nonstate actors, and all the military services, whether land, sea, or air. It’s a busy sky, open to all, used by all. and at all times.

These terms all suggest a certain ownership of the sky that’s no longer possible, even in limited ways.

The terms can trace their origins back to the first half of the last century. “Air superiority” is perhaps traced as far back as 1917; “command of the air” was popularized in 1921 by Giulio Douhet; in 1923 US Army Major General Mason Patrick used “aerial supremacy”; in 1925 Billy Mitchell wrote about “control of the air”; in 1938 “air parity” was being debated in Britain’s Houses of Parliament; and in 1942 President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke of “domination of the air” while the war plans drafted to achieve this sought “air ascendancy” over the adversary.

In many cases, such terms were undefined, meant to be dramatic and used in rhetorical justifications for creating, sustaining, or enlarging air forces. In the first half of the twentieth century, manned aircraft were the principal means to defeat air attacks. The need to gain control of the air through air-to-air combat was a compelling rationale for forming air forces.

In this century however, it’s no longer possible for one side in a war to prevent another using the air. In the 2026 war, Iran kept on launching missiles and drones throughout and beyond the conflict while in the face of intense Israeli and US air operations. This inability to own the air is even evident in cases of extreme airpower differentials such as that between the United States and the nonstate Houthi group in the 2025 Operation Roughrider in Yemen. The Houthis kept on launching drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles until well after the United States had wearied of the operation.

It can be argued that this is reflected in control of the air being defined doctrinally as “a level of influence in the air domain relative to that of an adversary.” The degree of control then rests on an assessment of the degree to which the other is influential in the air, not on fielded capabilities or on the effect these capabilities have on the war. Still, there remain shortcomings.

In the civil war in Myanmar, the military government had supersonic fighter-bombers and armed helicopters while the insurgent bands had small hobbyist drones purchased from Chinese commercial businesses across the border. For a couple of years the insurgents steadily advanced and captured significant territory, a feat in which their drones played a significant role—some say a decisive one . The drones though gave the insurgents no control of the air. The government’s air assets operated virtually unimpeded seemingly in complete control of the air but were relatively uninfluential in being unable to stop the drones operating as they wished. Trying to compare relativities between Myanmar’s jet fighters and hobbyist drones in terms of their “level of influence in the air domain” is an apples and oranges task; they are fundamentally different and cannot be practically compared.

Over time, control of the air has gradually come to be seen as a continuum running from little influence to great. However, the terms used to set out where on the continuum an air operation is, such as air supremacy and air superiority, do not easily lend themselves to expressing shades of gray. The terms lack nuance, are contextual, and are imprecise in offering any quantifiable basis, leaving the person using the terms to decide on their applicability to the circumstance. There are echoes of Humpty Dumpty in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass : “When I use a word . . . it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”

The most often used term is air superiority , that: “degree of control of the air by one force that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats.” This again does not adequately capture today’s reality of mixed manned and unmanned system employment.

Using the extreme case of the United States and the Houthis again, the former could conduct operations in the Red Sea as it wished although the latter’s missile and drone attacks continued and contributed to the loss of an F/A-18. This could be construed as not “prohibitive interference” even if the interference persisted across Operation Roughrider. In Yemeni airspace the issue was less clear given the Houthis’ air defense systems quickly shot down seven Reaper drones using surface-to-air missiles. With an ongoing Houthi air defense threat, Operation Roughrider could not proceed as planned after the initial thirty days. In some respects, this might be seen as representing “prohibitive interference” and thus air superiority was not achieved as doctrinally defined. There is no doubt though that American air capabilities and capacities were always far superior to—that is technically better than—the Houthis’.

On the other hand, it is certainly also not the lesser case of air parity in which the influence criteria no longer holds sway. Air parity is instead “a condition in which no force has control of the air [and] in which both friendly and adversary land, maritime, and air operations may encounter significant interference by the opposing force.” Parity as a word means equivalence or equality. When the United States fought the Houthis, the Houthis never attained any identifiable form of air operation equivalence. The Houthis did though continue attacking during and after the periods discussed. Neither air superiority nor air parity sensibly fits the US/Houthi case and by extension, neither does air supremacy or air dominance.

Unhappiness with the inferences of the air superiority, parity, and supremacy terms has led some to advocate for a new label, air denial . This term is held to particularly apply to the Ukraine War, where both sides can deny their respective territorial airspace to the other’s manned aircraft in terms of imposing an unacceptable attrition rate. Air denial is then apparently only applicable to manned aircraft and not to rockets, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, or drones. Air denial as a useful term falls down in being a condition seemingly only appropriate for some types of air vehicles.

The air littoral term has also been coined. This is intended for the lower altitudes, say below ten thousand feet, where large numbers of small and medium-sized drones might operate in certain areas. As fighter aircraft or medium-range surface-to-air missile systems are less suited for engaging such drones, it is implied that these air defense assets should be reserved to intercept targets flying above that nominal cutoff altitude. This highlights that the air littoral concept is derived from traditional airspace management measures that control friendly air operations using height, location, and time—or as the air littoral advocates write, “time, planar distance, and altitude.”

The reason given to adopt the air littoral term is the need to reconceptualize control of the air as a “volume rather than a flat bounded plane.” It is argued the air littoral should be decoupled from “the blue skies,” principally as the sky is now occupied not just by manned aircraft but also by rockets, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and drone systems. However, the air is indivisible in that parts of it cannot be cordoned off. Rockets, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and drone systems operate below and above ten thousand feet. Air defense systems of whatever kind may need to defend against hostile attack from any arbitrarily chosen altitude.

The air littoral argument is correct in that combat airspace now includes rockets, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and drone systems. However, creating a new airspace management term is a limited doctrinal response to this new reality, not an answer to it.

The multiple shortcomings with the various traditional ways of describing control of the air are unsurprising. Air wars today are waged very differently to the air wars of the first half of the twentieth century, for which the terms were coined. The skies are increasingly crowded with unmanned systems. Therefore, the terminology—air parity, air superiority, air supremacy, and control of the air terms—derived when manned aircraft were the only means of using the air should be retired, as least in professional usage.

If these older terms are abandoned, what might replace them? Kazunobu Sakuma has devised a clever solution called the “two-parities model,” which creates a four-quadrant matrix from access and exploitation. Either both combatants may access and exploit the air, only one can do so, or neither can. This highlights some issues useful when planning air operations and it’s applicable to manned aircraft and unmanned air systems. On the other hand, as argued, everybody can now access and exploit the air if they choose to; the terms then don’t allow discrimination between combatants or describe their successes.

The old terms remain rhetorically powerful; superiority, dominance, and supremacy exude confidence and send a message of combat triumph. This has its downsides, however, in implying a level of safety from hostile air attack. Passive defenses can seem unnecessary but, as the Iran War demonstrated , some rocket, missiles, and drone attacks are likely to penetrate. Moreover, intercepting incoming ballistic missiles overhead means potentially damaging debris falling on people and facilities. The old terms arguably mislead.

Irrespective of the old terminology’s shortcomings, their advocates express a fundamental truth. It is critically important to counter the adversary’s use of the air. And maybe that’s the answer. Instead of relying on outdated, subjective, and imprecise terms, focus instead on the mission of countering—that is, counterair operations.

In being a type of air operation—not a condition—counterair is inherently objective and can be used with precision, which gives it much greater utility.

With more than a quarter of this century already gone, now might be a good time to move on from using last century’s terms.

Dr. Peter Layton is a Royal United Services Institute (London) associate fellow and a visiting fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute (Brisbane, Australia). A retired Royal Australian Air Force Group Captain, he has extensive aviation and defense experience and is the author of the book Grand Strategy and coauthor of Warfare in the Robotics Age .

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Tasnim News Agency

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMirAFBVV95cUxOOE5UM0dwdGRXTmJlS3k4VEFaRDRhS1JjZXdHUnBlRnVrbEp1TTlhaEdSc21fZ0tWS0ppR2JvNE4xd3F6UlJfck5vakpLRVhwQU1hTThzUmlSTElOTkgyNE5fZXBJOWN6UFVWU3g5dlhfbGIxbVU5QUNjRF9aeDNUaHZCOGh1d3diRXhiNm5pV3JUUVhGV0lTSzQ4WExmX0lPZjFKYldNeHhPTUdM?oc=5