핵심요약

• 유가가 6주 만에 70% 급등하며 $100/배럴에 근접
• 중동의 지정학적 갈등이 유가 상승의 주요 원인
• 서방의 러시아 제재 전략이 어려워지며 새로운 접근 필요
• 기사는 암호화폐에 집중할 시점이 되었다고 주장

도입

이 기사는 우크라이나 전쟁과 관련된 서방의 제재 전략이 변화하는 과정을 분석합니다. 특히 유가의 급등이 러시아에 대한 제재의 효과를 약화시키고 있음을 강조합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 변화가 글로벌 에너지 시장에 미치는 영향을 주시해야 합니다.

본문 1: 유가 급등의 지정학적 배경

유가가 6주 만에 70% 급등하며 $100/배럴에 근접했습니다. 이는 중동의 지정학적 갈등, 특히 이란과 이스라엘 간의 폭격과 보복 공격이 원인입니다. 스트레이츠 오르무즈 해협의 폐쇄 위협도 유가 상승에 기여했습니다. 이 같은 변화는 러시아에 대한 서방의 제재 전략을 재고하게 만드는 핵심 요소입니다. 유가가 급등하면서 러시아의 에너지 수익이 증가하고 있어 제재의 효과가 약화되고 있습니다.

본문 2: 제재 전략의 변화와 암호화폐의 역할

기사는 암호화폐에 집중할 시점이 되었다고 주장합니다. 기존의 유가 가격 상한선과 같은 전통적인 제재 전략이 효과를 잃고 있음을 지적합니다. 암호화폐는 러시아가 제재를 우회하는 데 사용되고 있어 새로운 제재 수단으로 주목받고 있습니다. 그러나 암호화폐를 활용한 제재는 기술적 및 법적 장벽이 존재합니다. 이러한 문제를 해결하기 위한 정책적 접근이 필요합니다.

결론

유가의 급등과 중동의 지정학적 갈등이 러시아에 대한 서방의 제재 전략을 재고하게 하고 있습니다. 암호화폐를 활용한 새로운 제재 수단이 주목받고 있지만, 그 효과와 실현 가능성에 대한 추가 연구가 필요합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 변화를 주시하며 글로벌 에너지 시장의 동향을 면밀히 분석해야 합니다.

---

원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMikAFBVV95cUxOamc0VjBfeVRIcDVNWERWbTVCeFA0RU9qTXdld2ZXZEdFd0ZCV2F3Vm94dFhadWhrbmxpT3lhcHBtY1p2MmFCOXVFZlhQWjdLTlBPNXZTQzRPUFVRZGdheG5ra2FjMG03RzZXTDFaYmY0T2ZpNnpPOGxqSTN3MWEtZWdPbzMxdDFwQk1FVDRkMTQ?oc=5

The West’s Ukraine Sanctions Strategy has Lost its Way - Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

Abandoned: Finished oil field in Russia during the winter period. Image: Sergey Ezrikov / Alamy Stock

World events and the oil price are likely to determine the future sanctions strategy of Ukraine’s allies. It is time to finally focus on crypto.

Back in February, just a few short weeks ago, Ukraine’s western allies were planning a further blow against Russia’s primary source of revenue, oil. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen noted that ‘Russia will only come to the table with genuine intent if it is pressured to do so’, promising the introduction of ‘a full maritime services ban for Russian crude oil [that] will slash further Russia's energy revenues and make it more difficult to find buyers for its oil’. More ships were to be sanctioned by the EU – and indeed were by the UK – and the oil price cap, the cause of such blatant and ongoing sanctions circumvention by Russia was to be essentially rendered redundant.

European nations were also displaying increased willingness to board – although not seize – tankers supporting Russia’s circumvention of oil-related sanctions, with action by France and Belgium and tough talk (but no action) from the UK too.

At this time the price of (Brent crude) oil was approximately $65 per barrel, Russia was making little profit from its sales and the global oil market was loose.

Fast forward six weeks, throw in an intense aerial bombardment of Iran by Israel and the US, retaliatory air strikes by Tehran against Israel and Arab neighbours (including against their energy production installations), and the effective closure of the world’s energy aorta, the Straits of Hormuz, despite a tentative ceasefire, and the picture – and decision calculus of the Western sanctions coalition – looks very different.

The most obvious change is the oil price, up by nearly 70% at one point, and hovering around $100 per barrel. For reference, when policymakers were designing the oil price cap against Russia in late 2022/early 2023, the global oil price was trading in a similar range, and the argument against a full oil embargo and maritime services ban was rooted in the ‘ tight ’ nature of the market at that time and the impact tougher measures would have on the energy security of countries far from the conflict in Europe.

Oil from elsewhere in the world, chiefly the Middle East, was anticipated to compensate for restrictions placed on Russia’s exports. While Gulf markets may have supported the needs of countries within the sanctions coalition, others – notably India – provided new sales capacity for Russia, increasing its purchases and funding of the Kremlin’s war from 2.5% of its annual need prior to the full-scale invasion, to a peak of nearly 40% in the years that followed.

The continued ability of Russia to sell its oil to fund its illegal war of aggression in Ukraine frustrated western policymakers. Even President Donald Trump, in his only meaningful sanctions move against Russia since his inauguration, designated Lukoil and Rosneft, two of Russia’s most significant oil producers, in October 2025.

Yet, events have conspired against Ukraine’s allies. First the continued disinterest of the White House in using its sanctions powers to support Ukraine; second the spoiling actions of Hungarian President Viktor Orban curtailed the EU’s ability to deliver its well-telegraphed 20th sanctions package to mark the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; and then the Netanyahu/Trump adventurism in the Middle East presented Western leaders with a dilemma: act harder against Russia’s main source of military funding and risk exacerbating the global energy crisis, or watch as the spiralling oil price provides Russia with an income windfall that boosts its military coffers.

So far, Europe’s response has been one of mere paralysis.

Help your search results show more from RUSI. Adding RUSI as a preferred source on Google means our analysis appears more prominently.

Receive a monthly newsletter and emails about upcoming events hosted by the Centre for Finance and Security Research Group

Get a weekly round-up of the latest commentary and research straight into your inbox.

While now may not be the time to ramp up further pressure on Russian oil and thus the global oil market, there is an obvious way forward – dedicated, renewed and increased effort to stopping Russia spending its funds.

Over the past four years, Western diplomats have travelled the globe, deploying diplomatic charm in an attempt to stop Russia using third countries to circumvent export controls. This has resulted in some success, but as Russia has ramped up its use of cryptocurrency to pay for much needed critical military items, primarily from China, the West has failed to adapt its response. Ad hoc sanctions have been brought forward, but a systematic effort to identify and disrupt the crypto-based payment methods used by Russia has been almost entirely absent. Why is this? There is certainly no shortage of evidence of Russia’s crypto activities.

A small and under-resourced band of investigators works tirelessly to uncover all the information needed to mount a concerted campaign of disruption against the wallets, exchanges and other tools involved in this Russian payment activity. It just needs the policymakers to show willingness to engage with this community, something that remains curiously absent. The extent to which crypto activity supports Russia’s war effort is clear, yet repeated initiatives to elevate the importance of opening a concerted line of effort on this issue are ignored. This must change.

The war in the Middle East has de-railed the active commitment of Ukraine’s allies to maintaining economic pressure on Russia. The Ukrainian people need more than words and visits of support , they need the Western sanctions coalition to rediscover its vision. The answer is simple: it is time to finally take Russia’s use of cryptocurrency seriously and apply the same effort to disrupting the Kremlin’s spending as it has done to its revenue raising.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

For terms of use, see Website Terms and Conditions of Use .

Have an idea for a Commentary you'd like to write for us? Send a short pitch to commentaries@rusi.org and we'll get back to you if it fits into our research interests. View full guidelines for contributors .

Centre for Finance and Security

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMikAFBVV95cUxOamc0VjBfeVRIcDVNWERWbTVCeFA0RU9qTXdld2ZXZEdFd0ZCV2F3Vm94dFhadWhrbmxpT3lhcHBtY1p2MmFCOXVFZlhQWjdLTlBPNXZTQzRPUFVRZGdheG5ra2FjMG03RzZXTDFaYmY0T2ZpNnpPOGxqSTN3MWEtZWdPbzMxdDFwQk1FVDRkMTQ?oc=5