핵심요약

• 미국은 고기술 방어 요격체 및 스탠드오프 무기에서 탄약 부족을 겪고 있습니다.
• 비축량 보충을 위해 아시아와 유럽의 무기가 중동으로 이전되었습니다.
• 이 부족 사태는 경쟁국들이 미국의 억지력을 의심하게 만들 수 있다는 지정학적 위험을 초래합니다.
• 전문가 보고서('Out of Ammo')는 미국 군수품 재건에 대한 긴급한 조치를 촉구합니다.

도입

본 기사는 미국의 군사 물자 부족 사태가 단순한 공급망 문제를 넘어, 국제 지정학적 역학 관계와 대외 억지력에 미치는 심각한 영향을 분석합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 군사적 불안정성이 장기적인 글로벌 안보 비용과 지정학적 리스크 프리미엄에 어떻게 반영될지 주목해야 합니다.

본문 1: 공급망 재편과 지정학적 압박

미국이 직면한 탄약 부족 문제는 단순히 생산 능력의 문제가 아니라, 글로벌 군수품 공급망의 재편과 지정학적 압박이 복합적으로 작용한 결과입니다. 기사에 따르면, 미군은 비축량 보충을 위해 아시아와 유럽에 보관된 무기를 중동으로 이전하는 조치를 취했습니다. 이는 기존의 군사적 협력 체계를 넘어, 특정 지역의 안보 요구에 따라 무기 이동이 발생하고 있음을 보여줍니다. 이러한 무기 이동은 중동 지역의 역학 관계를 변화시킬 수 있으며, 미국이 중동 지역의 안보를 확보하는 데 있어 새로운 외교적 도구를 활용하고 있음을 시사합니다. 이는 미국이 전통적인 동맹 관계를 넘어 다자간 안보 프레임워크 내에서 영향력을 행사하려는 전략적 움직임으로 해석될 수 있습니다.

본문 2: 기술적 제약과 전문가 분석

탄약 부족의 성격은 고기술 방어 요격체 및 스탠드오프 무기에 국한된다는 점이 중요합니다. 이는 단순한 재래식 무기 부족이 아닌, 첨단 기술 집약적 시스템의 유지 및 보수에 있어 병목 현상이 발생하고 있음을 의미합니다. 마이클 호로위츠(Michael Horowitz)와 같은 전문가들이 발표한 보고서('Out of Ammo: A Two-Year Sprint to Rebuild the American Arsenal and Deter China')는 이러한 기술적 재건이 얼마나 시급하며, 특히 중국과의 경쟁 구도에서 미국이 기술 우위를 유지하기 위한 전략적 우선순위를 제시합니다. 이러한 분석은 향후 국방 예산 배분과 기술 개발 방향에 있어 기술적 우위 확보가 가장 중요한 목표가 될 것임을 시사하며, 단순한 양적 보충을 넘어 질적 우위를 확보하는 것이 핵심 과제임을 강조합니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망과 정책적 함의

이러한 무기 부족 사태는 단기적인 공급 문제에 국한되지 않고, 장기적인 군사 전략과 정책적 함의를 내포합니다. 경쟁국들이 미국의 억지력을 의심하게 만들 수 있다는 레온 파네타(Leon Panetta)의 경고처럼, 군사적 역량의 불확실성은 국제 관계의 안정성에 직접적인 영향을 미칩니다. 따라서 향후 미국의 국방 정책은 무기 생산 속도 향상뿐만 아니라, 기술 혁신을 통한 방어 시스템의 자립도 강화와 글로벌 파트너십의 재정립에 중점을 두어야 합니다. 이러한 도전은 미국이 기술 패권 경쟁에서 우위를 점하기 위해 군사 기술과 외교 전략을 통합하는 포괄적인 접근이 필요함을 보여줍니다.

결론

미국의 군수품 부족 사태는 지정학적 압력과 기술적 한계가 교차하는 복잡한 문제입니다. 향후 미국 국방 정책은 공급망 안정화와 첨단 기술 자립이라는 두 가지 축을 중심으로 재편될 가능성이 높습니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 변동성과 기술 경쟁 심화가 장기적인 방위 산업의 수요와 정부 지출에 미치는 영향을 면밀히 관찰할 필요가 있습니다. 특히 기술 기반의 방어 시스템 개발과 글로벌 안보 협력의 변화에 주목해야 할 것입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiY0FVX3lxTFBSclQwNW5pYUM1a0NRQWw5bTF6emI1RnphUUdhLTAtaEIwYm5peDlJT1VxX1p1REJKbUwzRnUxQ3VlSDFabHpCcDBEQWR4NlFIVVZ2ZEMtMG9IU00xTENpeV9WSQ?oc=5

The U.S. Munitions Crisis - Council on Foreign Relations

Is the United States running out of weapons of war?

Stories that Operation Epic Fury has depleted U.S. weapons stocks have dominated the headlines in recent weeks. Things have gotten so bad that the Pentagon has transferred weapons stored in Asia and Europe to replenish stockpiles in the Middle East. Even then, a shortage of missile interceptors reportedly persuaded President Donald Trump last month to call off plans for a major attack on Iran.

The Trump administration has variously denied that the United States faces a shortage of critical munitions, said that the shortages developed because President Joe Biden gave too many weapons to Ukraine to fight Russia, and argued that weapons manufacturers will soon speed up production.

The stakes in the debate over the state of the U.S. arsenal are high. Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has warned that the United States now faces a “dangerous moment” because rivals may doubt it can deter their aggression. Which raises a question: how did the Pentagon find itself in a position in which military operations against a middle power could impair the U.S. ability to counter challenges from great powers?

To get a better understanding of the nature and extent of the munitions problem, I turned to my Council on Foreign Relations colleague Michael Horowitz . Mike is one of the country’s leading experts on how technology is remaking warfare. During the Biden administration, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development and Emerging Capabilities and Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office. He co-authored the CFR report, “ Out of Ammo: A Two-Year Sprint to Rebuild the American Arsenal and Deter China ,” which was published today.

We recorded our conversation for the latest episode of the CFR podcast, The President’s Inbox .

[Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zs4_0tdExwY ]

1. The munitions shortage is real, but it is limited to hi-tech defensive interceptors and stand-off offensive weapons . The U.S. military maintains expansive stockpiles of what might be called “ordinary” conventional weapons: mortars, artillery shells, gravity bombs, and the like. The war with Iran has not depleted those inventories.

Things look much different when it comes to missile interceptors and stand-off weapons. The numbers are eye-opening:

Patriot and THAAD missile interceptors are essential to defeating potentially catastrophic ballistic missile attacks, while Tomahawks, ATACMS, and PrSM enable the U.S. military to hit enemy targets from great distances. The U.S. military has many short-range weapons it can use. They, however, require pilots to fly close to their targets, where they risk being shot down.

2. It will take years to replenish the stocks of hi-tech weapons . Raytheon currently produces 600 Patriot interceptors a year. At that rate, it would take three years to replenish U.S. stocks. Lockheed Martin produces just 96 THAAD interceptors a year . At that rate, it would take two years to get stocks back to where they stood before the war with Iran began. Raytheon’s recent production rate of Tomahawks has been no more than two hundred missiles a year, and the projected lead-time for new missiles is thirty-four months.

The Trump administration has signed a series of framework agreements this year with defense contractors to speed up the production of these hi-tech weapons. Earlier this month, Deputy Defense Secretary Steve Feinberg took the additional step of giving defense contractors three weeks to generate plans “drive significantly faster, more aggressive delivery schedules and/or increased production for critical capabilities.” The Pentagon’s proposed $67 billion FY26 defense supplemental and its request for a 42 percent increase in defense spending in FY27 would steer funds to speed up the production of missile interceptors and stand-off weapons.

While more money will help, it will not necessarily solve the problem quickly. Weapons production rests on complex supply chains that are only as resilient as their weakest link. An inability to scale up any step of the production process, or a disruption anywhere in the supply chain, will slow down what can be built.

Even if the Pentagon greatly expands the annual production of hi-tech weaponry, the question will be whether that production rate will be sufficient to sustain military operations against a peer military competitor with a more extensive arsenal and defense industrial base than Iran. If not, a rival might conclude it can deplete critical U.S. weapons stocks just as Iran has and thereby neutralize the U.S. military. That hardly reinforces deterrence.

3. The Pentagon finds itself in its current predicament because the world changed faster than U.S. strategy and weapons acquisition did. The United States decided after the Cold War to emphasize quality over quantity and to focus on building on what Mike calls “exquisite, expensive, hard to produce weapons.” Why? The era of geopolitics had seemingly ended. No peer competitor existed. Real defense spending was set to decline. Focusing on building the best weapons rather than acquiring the most weapons made sense for a world where the greatest threats were thought to come from rogue states and terrorist groups.

But geopolitics has returned with a vengeance, as the first Trump administration to its credit recognized in its 2017 National Security Strategy . The rapid development and refinement of cheap drones has throne an additional wrench into the works. The trade-off between quality and quantity suddenly shifted. Using multi-million-dollar interceptors to shoot down drones that cost perhaps $50,000 to make is, as economists like to say, suboptimal.

The challenge now for the Pentagon, which has never distinguished itself as an agile and flexible organization, is to adapt, and to adapt quickly. That will mean not just rejuvenating the defense industrial base to speed up weapons production but also rethinking its strategy for a world in which quantity may have gained the upper hand over quality.

Mike and I discussed these and other aspects of the current munitions crisis, including why munitions orders often take a backseat to other defense priorities at budget time, whether a smaller defense budget would force the Pentagon to be more innovative, and how Congress contributes to the Pentagon’s weapons acquisition pathologies. I encourage you to give the episode a listen.

Oscar Berry and Jack Patton contributed to the preparation of this article.

This work represents the views solely of the author(s). The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiY0FVX3lxTFBSclQwNW5pYUM1a0NRQWw5bTF6emI1RnphUUdhLTAtaEIwYm5peDlJT1VxX1p1REJKbUwzRnUxQ3VlSDFabHpCcDBEQWR4NlFIVVZ2ZEMtMG9IU00xTENpeV9WSQ?oc=5