핵심요약

• 이스라엘 증시는 전쟁 기간 동안 기록을 세웠으며, 국방 산업은 전례 없는 수익을 기록했습니다.
• 이란의 대리 세력 네트워크는 현재 전쟁으로 인해 가장 큰 타격을 입고 있습니다.
• 헤즈볼라와 이라크 내 친이란 파벌들은 미국의 압력으로 인해 전략적 깊이를 상실했습니다.
• 중동 소비자들은 호르무즈 해협 폐쇄 비용을 흡수하고 있습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란과 이스라엘 간의 분쟁이 단순한 군사적 충돌을 넘어 경제적 비용과 지정학적 역학 관계에서 나타나는 흥미로운 역설을 제시합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 변화가 어떻게 특정 국가의 경제 성과와 산업 구조에 직접적인 영향을 미치는지 분석해야 합니다. 특히, 전쟁의 주체와 피해가 일치하지 않는 현상을 통해 지역 불안정성이 글로벌 자산 시장에 미치는 장기적 영향을 예측하는 것이 중요합니다.

본문 1: 지정학적 역학 관계와 비용 분담

이란 전쟁의 구조적 측면을 분석할 때, 비용 분담의 불균형이 핵심입니다. 이란의 미사일과 드론이 걸프 인프라에 타격을 입히고, 아시아 및 아랍 소비자들이 호르무즈 해협 폐쇄 비용을 흡수하는 반면, 이스라엘은 적의 방어 체계를 약화시키는 데 가장 적은 비용을 지불했습니다. 이는 전쟁의 직접적인 피해가 이스라엘에게는 최소화되었으나, 이스라엘의 국방 산업이 전례 없는 수익을 기록하며 경제적 이익을 취하고 있다는 점에서 주목할 만합니다. 이러한 현상은 지정학적 갈등이 어떻게 경제적 기회로 전환될 수 있는지 보여줍니다.

본문 2: 대리 세력 네트워크의 붕괴와 내부적 취약성

이란이 40년간 구축한 대리 세력 네트워크는 이란의 억지력과 팽창주의 정책의 핵심이었습니다. 그러나 현재의 전쟁은 이 도전에 가장 큰 타격을 입혔습니다. 레바논의 헤즈볼라가 이란을 대리하여 개입한 결과, 이스라엘의 강력한 대응에 직면했고, 미국은 레바논 정부에 압력을 가해 헤즈볼라의 군사 활동을 금지시키고 해체에 대한 논의를 촉발시켰습니다. 또한 이라크 내 친이란 파벌들 역시 미국의 공습으로 손실을 입었습니다. 이는 이란이 구축한 지정학적 레버리지가 현재의 충돌에서 심각한 약점으로 작용하고 있음을 의미하며, 이란의 억지력 구조가 해체되고 있음을 시사합니다.

본문 3: 지역 안정화의 장기적 전망과 투자 시사점

이란의 대리 세력 네트워크가 붕괴되는 과정은 지역 안정화에 장기적인 영향을 미칠 것입니다. 미국의 개입과 지역 파벌에 대한 압력은 이란의 지역적 영향력을 약화시키는 데 기여하고 있습니다. 향후 지역 안정화는 이란의 억지력 약화와 밀접하게 연관될 것이며, 이는 중동 전체의 에너지 및 무역 흐름에 변동성을 가져올 수 있습니다. 따라서 투자자들은 단기적인 군사적 충돌뿐만 아니라, 이란의 내부적 대리 관계 변화와 미국의 외교적 압력이 중동 경제에 미치는 장기적인 파급 효과를 면밀히 관찰해야 합니다.

결론

결론적으로, 이란 전쟁의 역설은 지정학적 충돌이 경제적 결과와 분리될 수 없음을 명확히 보여줍니다. 이스라엘의 경제적 성과는 지역 불안정성 속에서 나타난 특수한 결과이며, 이는 지정학적 리스크가 어떻게 새로운 경제적 기회로 전환될 수 있는지에 대한 통찰을 제공합니다. 향후 투자 관점에서는 이란의 대리 세력 네트워크 변화와 미국의 외교적 전략이 중동 지역의 에너지 및 무역 흐름에 미치는 영향을 지속적으로 주시해야 할 것입니다.

---

원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMikgFBVV95cUxNSlQ4LW5SNnhoNE03Wkh0eXg5RWdkREhtX3hrT0ZJd0xzb0xCOUJ3ay1UQjFDN2p6Q3VncFRvQkdkM3Z4UVZkWExPQUxCMW9DbENkSk1DR2M3X3VlSjRYTVZhM1pVaHJhSzdaa252MzRlQnhOMDdmdkVUc1VRdFVRemljby11Z2NiamNSU2t6QzVBUdIBlwFBVV95cUxOWmZJN1kzc0ZnUW8yMDJCcFpyOE83Sm5QQjJQLVd6aF9hdlUwalN3YW9tcC11b0J4dE9KRnRhSHc0azFXVFE5cnJXWk54NmJZQzZrYng5bTBNVm1HOFpVb3FwaXB6Q1ZrLXpDZXJGMVF4a0x6ekFEbHJ3WjV5b0RPdDhKYVlvTEtsY3diNjJCTkQ2TVQteERn?oc=5

Israel and the cost paradox of the Iran war - Al Jazeera

Since the breakout of war on February 28, the US-Israeli conflict with Iran has been framed as an existential for Tel Aviv and Tehran. Yet a calm, structural reading of the past five months of fighting and faltering truces reveals a striking paradox: the party that incited this war has become the one least exposed to its fire and the one collecting most of its returns.

While Iranian missiles and drones fall on critical Gulf infrastructure, while Asian and Arab consumers absorb the bill for the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and while American troops die in Iranian strikes, the Tel Aviv stock exchange keeps setting records, the shekel keeps rising, and Israel’s defence industries post unprecedented earning numbers.

Israel is bearing the least cost of a war that is eroding its adversary’s defences and devastating its neighbourhood.

A security doctrine Iran built for four decades is now unravelling. It was premised on moving confrontation away from Iranian territory through a network of proxies and allies, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen and various armed factions in Iraq.

That network was the core of Iranian deterrence and the lever of its expansionist policy. The current war has dealt this doctrine the harshest blow in its history.

Hezbollah entered 2026 already exhausted by its 2024 war with Israel and by the loss of strategic depth in Syria. In March, it committed a fatal error by intervening on Tehran’s behalf and drawing a devastating Israeli response. Then the United States put pressure on the Lebanese government to act against Hezbollah, leading to a prohibition on the group’s military activities and talk of disarmament.

The pro-Iranian Iraqi factions also intervened on behalf of their benefactor, but suffered losses in US strikes. The US managed to block the return of the pro-Iran Nouri al-Maliki to the prime minister’s post in Iraq and install a relatively unknown banker, Ali al-Zaidi. His government now is under severe pressure to move against pro-Iran factions and disarm them by the end of September or suffer punitive economic measures from the US.

The Houthis, having learned from Hezbollah’s fate and the cost of their previous rounds of confrontation with Washington, were reluctant to join the fray. They have now been compelled to act, but not against the US or Israel directly; they are targeting Saudi interests, thus facing off with one of the largest armies in the world, as well as Yemeni forces loyal to the internationally recognised government.

The net result is that Iran increasingly bears the burden of the war alone. Israel’s first and perhaps most important strategic gain lies here: the war is accelerating the erosion of the network Iran spent more than four decades building, and with it the strategic logic of surrounding Israel with multiple fronts.

At the beginning of the war, Israel did absorb direct Iranian missile barrages, but many of them were taken down by the Iron Dome and the additional air defence systems deployed by the US. By contrast, the Gulf states faced much more intense Iranian attacks that went beyond military targets and struck energy and civilian infrastructure.

In the current escalation, Iranian strikes have concentrated on civilian infrastructure across the Gulf states and Jordan, while deliberately avoiding both Israel and the American naval assets off the Iranian coast.

Tehran understands that striking US aircraft carriers would open the gates of hell upon it, and that hitting the Israeli interior again would widen the war at the very moment it is trying to preserve some space for talks with Washington. It has opted instead to pressure Washington through its Gulf neighbours.

The consequence is that Israel’s home front has effectively exited the target set. The cost of deterrence that Israel, as an instigator of this war, should be paying has been transferred to Gulf civilians who have no hand in it, some in states furthest removed from any normalisation with Israel.

As US air strikes continue to degrade Iranian missile capabilities, military infrastructure and senior command, Israel enjoys the strategic advantages of this sustained pressure without absorbing equivalent retaliation on its own territory.

While Israel is successfully transferring the military costs of war to the US and the Gulf, its economy is doing well. The Bank of Israel, even after cutting its forecast because of the war, still expects the economy to grow by 4 percent in 2026, ahead of most developed economies even in peacetime. The projected growth for 2027 is 5.5 percent.

The markets are more eloquent still. The shekel has appreciated by roughly 20 percent against the US dollar over the past year; the Tel Aviv-35 Index keeps setting records; and in March, at the height of the war, Google completed its $32bn acquisition of Israeli cloud cybersecurity startup Wiz.

Global capital, in other words, is pricing this war as an opportunity to reshape the region in Israel’s favour, not as a risk to it.

Then there is the direct war economy. In June, the Israeli Ministry of Defence announced that defence exports reached $19.2bn in 2025, up nearly 30 percent for a fifth consecutive record year, led by the missile and air defence systems whose chief marketing asset is precisely their battlefield performance. Every new engagement is, from the vantage point of Israel’s defence industries, a live demonstration before prospective clients.

In the energy sector, Israeli gas output from the Leviathan and Tamar fields is on track to exceed three billion cubic feet (85 million cubic metres) per day this year, with the surplus piped for export to Egypt, where it is liquified and sold on a global market with skyrocketing prices.

Israel’s shipping industry remains relatively untouched by the war, with its Mediterranean ports operating at capacity. Meanwhile, the blockade Iran imposes on the strait punishes the Gulf and their Asian partners.

None of this suggests that Israel is fighting a cost-free war. Defence spending has surged, economic output has fallen below its pre-war trajectory, and prolonged mobilisation imposes significant social and fiscal burdens.

But strategy is measured not by the absence of costs, but by the relationship between costs and gains, and by that measure Israel’s position appears far stronger than that of its principal adversary.

This is the central paradox of the current war. Israel’s greatest gains have not come from battlefield victories, but from the transformation of the regional strategic environment: accelerated pressure on Iran’s proxy architecture, dispersed Iranian military attention across multiple theatres, and a significant share of the war’s immediate costs shifted onto other regional actors. The distribution of those costs has become profoundly uneven.

Whether that asymmetry proves temporary or becomes the foundation of a new regional order remains to be seen. Preserving it will likely be the main goal of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as he visits Washington this week.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMikgFBVV95cUxNSlQ4LW5SNnhoNE03Wkh0eXg5RWdkREhtX3hrT0ZJd0xzb0xCOUJ3ay1UQjFDN2p6Q3VncFRvQkdkM3Z4UVZkWExPQUxCMW9DbENkSk1DR2M3X3VlSjRYTVZhM1pVaHJhSzdaa252MzRlQnhOMDdmdkVUc1VRdFVRemljby11Z2NiamNSU2t6QzVBUdIBlwFBVV95cUxOWmZJN1kzc0ZnUW8yMDJCcFpyOE83Sm5QQjJQLVd6aF9hdlUwalN3YW9tcC11b0J4dE9KRnRhSHc0azFXVFE5cnJXWk54NmJZQzZrYng5bTBNVm1HOFpVb3FwaXB6Q1ZrLXpDZXJGMVF4a0x6ekFEbHJ3WjV5b0RPdDhKYVlvTEtsY3diNjJCTkQ2TVQteERn?oc=5