핵심요약

• 6월 MOU는 양측의 전략적 목표를 조율하지 못하여 영구적 합의 경로를 만들지 못했습니다.
• 이란 강경파는 호르무즈 해협 통제권을 전략적 지렛대로 유지하려 했습니다.
• 이란의 IRGC는 상업 선박을 공격하며 해협 통제에 대한 주장을 관철했습니다.
• 이란 강경파는 해협을 '추가 통보 시까지 폐쇄'한다고 선언하며 군사적 긴장을 고조시켰습니다.

도입

본 기사는 6월 미국-이란 양해각서(MOU)가 양측의 전략적 목표를 달성하지 못하고, 오히려 군사적 긴장을 재점화하는 지정학적 상황을 보여줍니다. 투자자 관점에서 이는 단순한 외교적 실패를 넘어, 주요 에너지 통로의 불안정성이 글로벌 공급망과 에너지 시장에 미치는 직접적인 위협으로 해석되어야 합니다. 양측의 이해관계가 충돌하면서 잠재적 전쟁의 위험이 현실화될 가능성이 높아졌다는 점이 핵심입니다.

본문 1: 전략적 지렛대와 군사 행동

미국과 이란 간의 6월 MOU가 양측의 전략적 목표를 만족시키지 못했다는 점은, 현재의 협상 과정이 전략적 균형을 이동시키지 못했음을 의미합니다. 특히 이란 강경파가 호르무즈 해협 통제권을 핵심 전략적 지렛대로 간주하고 이를 고수하면서, 이는 군사적 행동으로 이어지는 직접적인 원인이 되었습니다. 이들은 MOU가 이란에게 해협 통행을 관리하도록 지시했다는 조항을 무시하고, 자신들의 이익을 우선시했습니다. 이러한 태도는 미국이 원하는 전략적 균형 변화를 이끌어내지 못했으며, 오히려 군사적 대립의 여지를 남겼습니다. 결과적으로, 이란의 IRGC가 상업 선박을 공격하여 해협 통행을 시도한 것은 이러한 전략적 지렛대를 관철하려는 시도로 해석됩니다. 이는 단순한 해상 활동이 아니라, 세계 경제에 대한 영향력을 확보하려는 정치적 메시지였습니다.

본문 2: 에너지 시장과 지정학적 변동성

호르무즈 해협의 폐쇄 위협은 국제 에너지 시장에 즉각적인 변동성을 야기합니다. 이 해협은 전 세계 석유 및 천연가스 수송의 주요 통로이므로, 이 지역의 불안정성은 유가 상승 압력으로 작용할 수 있습니다. 만약 이란의 행동이 지속되어 해협이 완전히 봉쇄될 경우, 글로벌 에너지 공급망에 심각한 차질이 발생하며 이는 인플레이션 압력과 경제 전반의 불확실성을 증폭시킬 수 있습니다. 따라서 투자자들은 지정학적 리스크가 에너지 가격에 미치는 연쇄 효과를 면밀히 분석해야 합니다. 이는 단순히 지역 분쟁을 넘어 글로벌 거시 경제에 영향을 미치는 구조적인 위험 요인입니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망과 위험 관리

해협 폐쇄와 같은 군사적 조치는 단기적인 시장 변동성을 확대할 뿐만 아니라, 장기적인 지역 안정성에 대한 근본적인 질문을 던집니다. 향후 이 지역의 안정은 미국과 이란 간의 외교적 채널 복원 및 국제 중재 노력에 달려 있습니다. 투자자들은 외교적 해결 노력이 군사적 행동보다 더 안정적인 장기적 전망을 제공할 수 있는지 평가해야 합니다. 또한, 지역 내 다른 아랍 걸프 국가들의 역할과 중재 노력이 향후 분쟁 확산 방지에 결정적인 변수가 될 것입니다. 이러한 지정학적 리스크를 관리하기 위해서는 다각적인 외교적 접근과 함께 에너지 공급망의 회복 탄력성을 동시에 고려하는 장기적인 시각이 필요합니다.

결론

미국과 이란 간의 협상 실패는 잠재적 전쟁의 위험을 재확인시켰으며, 호르무즈 해협의 통제권 문제는 여전히 심각한 지정학적 위험 요인으로 남아있습니다. 향후 상황은 외교적 노력과 군사적 행동 사이의 균형에 따라 변동될 가능성이 높습니다. 투자자들은 외교적 해결 노력이 군사적 충돌보다 더 안정적인 장기적 전망을 제공할 수 있는지에 초점을 맞추어 상황을 주시해야 할 것입니다.

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No End to the U.S.-Iran War in Sight - The Soufan Center

Intelbrief / No End to the U.S.-Iran War in Sight

To the frustration of U.S., regional, and global officials, the June U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) did not reconcile or satisfy the rival strategic objectives of either the U.S. or Iran. As a consequence, the MOU has not produced the expected pathway toward a permanent U.S. accord, or even ended the potential for a return to all-out warfare. There are no clear or palatable U.S. options that would shift the strategic balance away from Iran and compel its leadership to settle with Washington. At the same time, the fear of renewed warfare has motivated regional mediators to intensify their efforts to negotiate compromises that might recommit the combatants to de-escalation.

Iranian hardliners’ insistence on maintaining their principal source of strategic leverage gained in the war — essential control of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz — produced renewed U.S.-Iran exchanges over the past week, and set the stage for a return to major combat. On Tuesday and again on Saturday, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) units attacked commercial ships seeking to transit the Strait on routes that hug the Omani coast. The ships were attempting to transit without coordinating with Iran and under a measure of U.S. Navy protection. Iranian hardliners view the U.S.-backed traffic channel as undermining their leverage over the world economy — and U.S. President Donald Trump — as well as contradicting the article of the MOU they interpret as directing Iran to manage Strait traffic. The MOU assigns future Strait arrangements to be negotiated among Iran, Oman, and the other Arab Gulf states.

On Saturday, in concert with their strikes on shipping, the hardline IRGC, whose statements have expressed support for “revenge” for the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and for “punishing” the U.S. more broadly, announced that the Strait was “closed until further notice.” The announcement undermined and terminated the diplomacy underway between Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and his counterparts in the Sultanate of Oman , a key stakeholder in any final settlement of the Strait dispute. Iran’s actions suggest hardliners were energized by the strong public showing at last week’s funeral ceremonies for the slain Supreme Leader. His son and successor, Mojtaba Khamenei, who did not appear at any of the ceremonies, nonetheless issued a message declaring that “revenge is the demand of our nation and it will be carried out.” The call for revenge reflects views expressed by some IRGC commanders and civilian hardliners that Iran should not be negotiating with the U.S. at all. Amid analysis that Khamenei might be deceased or incapacitated, it is conceivable that his call for revenge was formulated by a coalition of IRGC and other hardliners acting in his name. Experts argue that, through their attacks, Iranian hardliners are messaging that they see escalation as yielding Iran greater benefits than engagement.

In response to the Iranian attacks early in the week, President Trump declared the ceasefire “over” and ordered significant — and escalating — retaliation, in some cases expanding the target set to civilian infrastructure such as bridges and energy processing facilities. On Saturday, U.S. retaliatory attacks struck 140 targets concentrated along the Iranian coast — a far larger strike package than on any day since the MOU was signed. The U.S. response also featured an economic component: Trump reimposed the sanctions on Iran that were lifted in accordance with the MOU, including re-imposing sanctions that block Iran from selling its oil and receiving proceeds in U.S. dollars. On Friday, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Iranian financial facilitator Ali Ansari, who oversees a sprawling global network of assets benefitting Iran’s regime elites — violating a clause in the MOU that commits the U.S. to avoid imposing any new economic sanctions on Iran. Washington’s responses reflect Trump’s frustration that the MOU did not accomplish his principal short-term goal — the full and unfettered reopening of the Strait. Trump considers achieving that goal essential to easing the political and economic pressure that resulted from his decision to launch Operation Epic Fury .

Global leaders fear not only the economic effects of renewed combat but also the impact on Iran’s civilian population, particularly those on the coast, and the military infrastructure, of which is being intensively targeted by the U.S. Iran responded to Saturday’s strikes with missile barrages on U.S. bases in all of the Arab Gulf states except Saudi Arabia, and on a U.S. base in Jordan. Regional observers expressed surprise that Iran’s attacks included Qatar and Oman, the two Gulf states seeking to mediate U.S.-Iran de-escalation. Iran launched an additional barrage against U.S. military targets in Kuwait on Sunday, claiming to hit long-range artillery systems firing on Iran from land. U.S. forces apparently continued to attack Iranian coastal targets on Sunday.

The combat over the past week raises questions for the future of the region. Although Iranian leaders appear willing to suffer consequences from escalation, neither they nor Trump appear to want to return to major conflict. Each side prefers a “no war, no peace” stalemate to politically risky capitulation or a return to all-out warfare. Yet the prospects for regional mediation, led by Qatar, Pakistan, and the Sultanate of Oman, to produce a return to the U.S.-Iran peace process appear bleak. As the funeral ceremonies for Khamenei concluded Friday, with the burial in his hometown of Mashhad, Qatari officials visited Tehran for talks. On Saturday, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited the Sultanate of Oman, whose coast on the Strait of Hormuz — and its close ties to Tehran — put the Gulf state at the core of forging an acceptable resolution of the U.S.-Iranian battle over the waterway. Trump publicly has backed continuing talks with Iran and U.S. officials told journalists indirect U.S.-Iran “technical talks” would continue. However, no U.S.-Iran meetings will likely resume unless, and until, differences over the Strait are bridged.

Even if mediators can return Washington and Tehran to a peace process, global leaders and experts remain skeptical that a permanent accord can be reached. Former senior National Security Council official Richard Haass characterized U.S. policy to journalists last week as “at something of a strategic dead end.” The analysis encapsulates a widespread view that no combination of economic incentives or escalation of pressure — military, economic, or otherwise — will compel the remaining regime leaders to accede to U.S. demands for a free and unfettered Strait and strict limits on its nuclear program. According to this argument, U.S. officials have no clear strategic alternatives that can bring the war to a permanent conclusion on terms acceptable to U.S. officials and the American public. On Wednesday, Vice President JD Vance sought to articulate the core of the ongoing U.S. strategy by saying: “So, the deal is very simple … If they shoot at ships, we’re going to knock the hell out of them.” However, the Trump team has yet to answer why it believes retaliation for Iranian attacks in the Strait — even on a scale as large as Saturday — will yield a different result than have previous U.S. strikes.

On the other hand, most of Iran’s civilian government leaders appear amenable to finding a compromise with Washington. Elected Iranian leaders such as President Masoud Pezeshkian and Majles (parliament) Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf have advocated negotiations with the Trump team in order to avoid further harm to the Iranian population, and to extract needed relief from U.S. sanctions. They appear to recognize that Trump and his team are considering not only broader air strikes but also the reimposition of the U.S. naval blockade that was lifted to implement the MOU. During his visit to Muscat on Saturday, Araghchi reportedly favored an Omani compromise under which Strait traffic would use two separately-controlled routes to transit the Strait — one along the Iranian coast and one along the Omani coast. However, the IRGC attacks on ships that day undermined the diplomacy, and the fate of Oman’s proposal is not clear. At the same time, civilian government leaders have echoed, at least in public, the arguments made by Iranian hardliners that the Trump team’s efforts to steer shipping to a route that hugs the Oman coast violates the MOU.

The continuing battle for control of the Strait augurs poorly for a resolution of the issue of core significance to U.S. officials — imposing strict limitations on Iran’s nuclear program. U.S. and Iranian negotiators have not discussed the issue since the MOU was signed. A senior U.S. official told journalists that if Iran cannot abide by the terms of the MOU — which gives Iran financial benefits in exchange for reopening the Strait — then there is little hope of reaching a far more complex nuclear deal.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiYkFVX3lxTE9iTFRuN1F2TFl5QURBRkQxc3hFWnI5NnBvc2lmVHVJTzYxU0otMkJnN3hQb0puT1p1aXNZbkYzTTlZN0NObUI1bEMyYU9LT0JjVTNSWlRqNjVmYUJEcFFuN2RB?oc=5