핵심요약

• 이란은 중선거까지 트럼프를 분쟁에 얽어매어 정치적 타격을 입히는 것을 목표로 합니다.
• 이란 당국자들은 트럼프에 대한 보복을 추구하며, 이는 2018년 핵 협정 파기 및 수레마니 암살과 같은 행위에 대한 불만에서 비롯됩니다.
• 핵 프로그램의 다음 단계 협상은 호르무즈 해협 통행로 합의 이후 2~4개월이 소요될 것으로 예측됩니다.
• 이란은 분쟁을 통해 트럼프의 지지율 하락과 유가 상승을 활용하려는 전략을 취하고 있습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란이 중선거를 목표로 트럼프 행정부를 정치적으로 약화시키기 위해 분쟁을 어떻게 활용하려 하는지에 대한 지정학적 전략을 조명합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 긴장 상태가 에너지 시장과 주요 무역 협정에 미치는 영향을 면밀히 분석해야 합니다. 이란의 전략적 움직임은 단순히 이란 내부의 복수심을 넘어, 미국의 외교 정책과 국제 안보 구조 전반에 걸친 변동성을 반영하고 있습니다.

본문 1: 지정학적 보복과 역사적 맥락

이란 당국자들은 트럼프 행정부에 대한 개인적인 적대감과 역사적 불만을 분쟁 지속의 동력으로 삼고 있습니다. 이는 단순히 현재의 안보 문제에 국한되지 않고, 1979년 혁명 이후 미국에 대해 누적된 적대감에서 기인합니다. 특히 트럼프 대통령이 2018년 핵 협정을 파기하고 카셈 술레이마니를 암살한 행위는 이란에게 심각한 불만으로 작용했습니다. 이러한 역사적 맥락은 현재의 협상 테이블에서 이란이 단순한 안보 문제를 넘어 정치적 보복을 추구하는 동기로 작용하고 있음을 보여줍니다. 이는 협상 과정에서 이란이 더 강경한 입장을 취할 수 있는 심리적 기반을 제공하며, 협상의 장기화에 대한 의지를 강화합니다.

본문 2: 협상 지연과 시장 영향

이란이 핵 프로그램의 다음 단계 협상을 위해 2~4개월의 시간을 요구하고 있다는 점은 국제 에너지 시장과 지정학적 리스크에 직접적인 영향을 미칩니다. 호르무즈 해협 통행로에 대한 합의 이후 핵 협상 재개까지의 지연은 에너지 공급망의 불안정성을 높이고 유가 변동성을 확대시킬 수 있습니다. 또한, 이란의 협상 전략은 미국 내에서 트럼프 행정부의 지지율 하락에 대한 대중의 인식을 활용하는 측면이 있습니다. 이는 미국 대선에 대한 대중의 심리가 외교 정책과 경제적 이해관계에 의해 어떻게 영향을 받는지 보여주는 사례이며, 이는 장기적인 투자 심리에 불확실성을 더합니다.

본문 3: 장기적 리스크와 전망

이란의 전략이 중선거 시점까지 지속될 경우, 국제 사회는 분쟁의 장기화와 잠재적인 군사적 충돌 가능성에 대해 더욱 높은 경계심을 갖게 될 것입니다. 이러한 장기적 긴장은 중동 지역의 안정성을 위협하며, 이는 글로벌 공급망과 자원 가격에 지속적인 압력을 가할 수 있습니다. 따라서 투자자들은 이란과 미국의 외교적 역학 관계가 단기적인 정치적 이벤트뿐만 아니라 장기적인 경제적 변수에도 깊이 연관되어 있음을 인식해야 합니다. 중선거 결과와 핵 협상 재개 시점은 향후 국제 정세와 에너지 시장의 주요 변곡점이 될 가능성이 높습니다.

결론

이란의 전략은 단순한 협상 지연을 넘어, 미국의 정치적 리더십에 대한 심리적 압박을 가하는 복합적인 지정학적 도구로 분석됩니다. 중선거 결과에 따라 이란의 전략적 목표 달성 여부가 달라질 수 있으며, 이는 향후 중동 지역의 안보 환경과 글로벌 에너지 시장의 변동성에 중요한 영향을 미칠 것입니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 변수를 고려하여 포트폴리오를 관리해야 합니다. 향후 핵 협상의 구체적인 진전과 미국 대선 결과에 대한 모니터링이 필수적입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMigAFBVV95cUxNMllaRG1YaWRad3lYVXJ0TkQtSGg1dDBXQk1HaUFiRV9kOWZzRi1mcEdEREVaZmlESEU2LXJ6MVh0VVl5MUJyNjY4aUFYbVA0Z2VGQTlJU0otT2NLX1VHY1h3NmtNQ2JqcXFnZC10bjlGRENiUUJpZ2VSaGltZzA5bA?oc=5

Iran hopes to deal Trump a blow at midterms by keeping him entangled in war - The Guardian

By dragging out talks, Tehran aims to damage the US president politically, but some fear a bruised and weakened Trump could only prolong the conflict

Tehran has set out a protracted negotiating timetable designed to keep Donald Trump embroiled in the Iran conflict until the midterm elections, in the hope of inflicting the same ruinous blow on his presidency as Jimmy Carter suffered over the 1979-81 US embassy hostage crisis.

For many inside Iran, inflicting meaningful revenge on Trump is a legitimate and self-standing war aim, reflected in the mood of those attending the funeral of the late supreme leader Ali Khamenei where demands for retribution were ubiquitous.

While Iranian officials since the 1979 Islamic revolution have never trusted the US, that animus is now also directed personally towards Trump. He not only tore up the painfully negotiated nuclear deal in 2018, but he also sanctioned the assassination of the military leader Qassem Suleimani and twice involved Iran in negotiations on its nuclear programme only to launch wars against it. He shows no remorse for the killing of the country’s supreme leader, or for the attempt on the life of Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian.

As the countdown to November’s midterm US elections begins, what could be the political demise of Trump has become a subject of obsessive speculation in Tehran. Iranian media track Trump’s waning ratings, attributing the decline to the war’s unpopularity and high oil prices . The changing politics of the Democrats is minutely examined.

But the focus on the midterms became more obvious this week when the deputy foreign minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, told the official IRNA news agency that after agreeing a route for commercial shipping through the strait of Hormuz, it would take two to four months to reach the second phase of negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. The original plan – to commence the nuclear phase of the talks within 30 days of signing June’s memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the US – had been jettisoned by the Trump administration, Gharibabadi said.

To get to that second stage, he laid out an obstacle course including the lifting of sanctions, the end of the US blockade of Iranian ports, the unfreezing of Iranian assets and new commitments on non-belligerence in a process that could last well beyond the midterms.

If Tehran gets its way on this timetable, Trump will be going to the polls with no Iranian commitment on nuclear weapons, only a hefty economic bill for a failed war. “This raises the very likely scenario of continued cycles of conflict between the US and Tehran over the strait,” said Jason Brodsky from United against a Nuclear Iran, an advocate of the war. “There won’t be any true quiet before the midterm elections – Tehran has no interest in giving this to the Trump administration […] It will continue to play games.”

Mehr News, an agency close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, published a piece saying Iran had given Trump a major dilemma. “Continuing the war could increase political and economic pressure on the government and exacerbate the decline in his popularity. On the other hand, backing down, or moving towards reducing tensions, could also be interpreted by some of Trump’s supporters as a retreat from his campaign slogans,” it said.

From this perspective, the outcome of this war will not be played out on the battlefield, but at the ballot box . The agency suggested the outcome could affect the course of American domestic and foreign policy for years to come.

Few in Iran take Trump’s statements at face value. But his denials that the midterms affect his Iran strategy are treated with special scepticism. Iranian media point to comments from Marc Zell, chair of Republicans Overseas Israel, who has said: “It’s all about the midterms […] the American public simply is tired of war and the administration is navigating the pre-election waters adroitly in order to avoid a Democratic takeover of Congress.”

Such remarks fuel the debate inside Iran about how much the midterms should be part of Iran’s calculus. Some believe the loss of Congress will inhibit him or lead to his impeachment, at the very least, it might mark the end of the war’s funding. Mostafa Zahrani, a former Iranian diplomat, argued electoral defeat “will make it inevitable that Trump will not be able to go back to war and will take the negotiations seriously”.

Others such as Nasser Hadian, a professor of international relations at Tehran University, disagree. An advocate of cashing in on Iran’s victories now rather than waiting for Trump to become weaker. “If he loses, he’ll have less incentive to reach an agreement with Iran, because in that case he’ll be weakened, and Israel and others will find it much easier to attack him – something they don’t dare do now,” he said. “Those who say we should wait for the midterm elections have no understanding of politics in America”.

The pleasure for Iran in seeing Trump defeated would indeed be reduced if feeling he has nothing left to lose, but its diplomats overall believe Trump’s freedom to act will indeed be constrained by the unpopularity of more conflict and by Republican presidential candidates anxious to wrap this up. Trump would also be at risk of seeing his whole second term consumed by a disastrous war.

The bigger question is what Iran itself wants to achieve. Agreeing to keep the dispute simmering until November is not an answer to that question – one that Iranians are better at debating than resolving.

Pezeshkian, working in alliance with Mohammad Ghalibaf, the chief negotiator, repeatedly says he does not want endless war, and insists that the vast majority of the supreme national security council concur. He still has faith in the MoU, saying it should be the cornerstone of Iran’s foreign policy.

But conservative newspaper Kayhan describes the memorandum as worthless since the US always breaks its commitments. “Accordingly, officials should know that the strait of Hormuz is not a bargaining chip and should not be opened as a passage for America,” it said.

Both hardliners and moderates envision the war leading to a new regional security architecture. But the hardliners put the emphasis on America’s expulsion and see this as something less to be negotiated and more to be enforced using control of the strait of Hormuz’s entry points as a lever to close US bases.

Pezeshkian says he sees a place for legitimate US investment in Iran while the former foreign minister Javad Zarif, in an essay this week, argued Iran in “a post-polar era would benefit from not depending solely on Russia and China in future”.

If Iran developed “a balanced and multifaceted foreign policy”, Tehran would not be forced into relationships based on necessity, he wrote. “Continuing uncontrolled tensions with the United States not only imposes direct costs on Iran, but also makes it more difficult for other countries, even close partners such as China and Russia, to cooperate with Iran”.

Just as Trump cannot resolve from one sentence to the next what he thinks of Iran, nor can Iran agree what it thinks it can get from America.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMigAFBVV95cUxNMllaRG1YaWRad3lYVXJ0TkQtSGg1dDBXQk1HaUFiRV9kOWZzRi1mcEdEREVaZmlESEU2LXJ6MVh0VVl5MUJyNjY4aUFYbVA0Z2VGQTlJU0otT2NLX1VHY1h3NmtNQ2JqcXFnZC10bjlGRENiUUJpZ2VSaGltZzA5bA?oc=5