핵심요약

• 호르무즈 해협 개방으로 연간 2,100억 달러(약 2.8조 원)의 석유 수출이 재개될 전망
• 60일 동안 이란의 핵 야망과 제재 완화 등 주요 이슈 해결을 위한 일정 수립
• MOU는 휴전으로 해석되며, 대형 협상이 진행되는 동안 무한히 연장될 수 있음
• 트럼프 대통령은 협상이 불만족스러우면 군사 행동을 재개할 것 강조

도입

이번 이란과의 협상은 글로벌 에너지 시장에 미치는 영향이 크며, 특히 중동 지역의 지정학적 불안정을 해소할 수 있는 기회로 평가됩니다. 투자자들은 이 협상이 장기적인 평화 프로세스로 이어질지, 아니면 일시적인 휴전일지에 대한 불확실성에 주목해야 합니다.

본문 1: 에너지 시장 안정화 및 석유 유통 재개

호르무즈 해협의 개방은 연간 2,100억 달러(약 2.8조 원)의 석유 수출이 재개될 전망입니다. 이는 글로벌 에너지 시장에 안정성을 가져올 것으로 예상되며, 특히 중동 지역의 석유 수출국들이 큰 혜택을 받을 것입니다. 그러나 이란의 핵 야망과 제재 완화 문제 해결이 60일 이내에 이루어지지 않으면, 다시금 에너지 시장에 불안정이 발생할 가능성도 있습니다.

본문 2: 지정학적 리스크 및 군사적 대응 가능성

트럼프 대통령은 협상이 불만족스러우면 군사 행동을 재개할 것이라고 강조했습니다. 이는 이란과의 협상이 일시적인 휴전일 뿐, 장기적인 평화 프로세스로 이어지지 않을 가능성을 시사합니다. 투자자들은 이란과의 군사적 충돌이 재발할 경우, 중동 지역의 지정학적 리스크가 다시 증가할 수 있음을 고려해야 합니다.

본문 3: 글로벌 경제에 미치는 영향

이번 협상은 글로벌 경제에 미치는 영향도 크며, 특히 에너지 가격 변동성과 국제 무역에 영향을 줄 수 있습니다. 만약 이란과의 협상이 성공적으로 진행된다면, 글로벌 경제에 안정성을 가져올 수 있지만, 만약 협상이 실패한다면, 다시금 에너지 가격 변동성과 국제 무역에 불안정이 발생할 수 있습니다.

결론

이번 이란과의 협상은 글로벌 에너지 시장에 안정성을 가져올 수 있는 기회로 평가됩니다. 그러나 60일 동안 주요 이슈를 해결하지 못하면, 다시금 지정학적 불안정이 발생할 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 이란과의 협상이 장기적인 평화 프로세스로 이어질지, 아니면 일시적인 휴전일지에 대한 불확실성에 주목해야 합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMikgFBVV95cUxNcTJTNDRKb2dtUE5HdjJCa1VMMC1BdlNIZXRwMFloN3d4YzVNdnFPcEs1LVJEMTF3WV80Wk5WdVVqRnZOMV9Ed3VvQ2RmcXpJWkczOHN5Y0RBZWtiS1FQaWQ1Qy1GU0JtalhkY3QyNnI5T3pFcVlyZHJmSlVTRDNSekloSHFrT2duSjVibGRrUExVUQ?oc=5

Trump’s Iran Deal Reopens the Strait. Much Remains to Be Done. - Council on Foreign Relations

On Sunday, U.S. President Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that “The Deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran is now complete. Congratulations to all! I hereby fully authorize the toll free opening of the Strait of Hormuz, and, simultaneously herewith, authorize the immediate removal of the United States Naval blockade. Ships of the World, start your engines. Let the oil flow!”

Details of the agreement were made public on Wednesday after a U.S. official read the text to reporters. It was later announced that Trump signed the deal while at the Palace of Versailles in France for the G7 summit. But this agreement is just a start, creating a process for opening the Strait of Hormuz in the short run and laying out a sixty-day timetable to address many of the remaining issues, including constraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the scope of sanctions relief and financial support for Iran. Surprisingly, the agreement does cover Israel’s war with Hezbollah in Lebanon and raises the prospect that the United States’ military presence in the region is open to negotiation.

Needless to say, there are a lot of details to be negotiated and, if the past is prologue, good reasons to be skeptical that a comprehensive peace, even if reached, will hold. Nonetheless, this could be seen as breaking a deadlock that has threatened the global economy, even if it puts on the table issues we may later come to regret.

Perhaps the memorandum of understanding (MOU) should be best understood as mostly a ceasefire. Such an arrangement could be extended indefinitely while a grand bargain is negotiated. As Trump said on the sidelines of a G7 summit in France, “It’s a memorandum of understanding. ​And if I don’t like it, we’ll go ​back to shooting at them, dropping bombs on ⁠their head. If I don’t like it, if they ​don’t behave, we’ll go right back to dropping bombs ​right smack in the middle of their head.”

As the dust settles, Iran knows how far the United States is willing to go. It also knows it can bring the Strait of Hormuz (and the global economy) to its knees with a barrage of missiles and drones. It will take time to see if the war in Iran was worth it .

Below is a roundup of what CFR’s leading regional experts have to say about the current state of play and how the deal is reverberating around the region:

Ray Takeyh is Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle East studies at CFR. His areas of specialization are Iran, U.S. foreign policy, and the modern Middle East.

Wars are defined by their narratives. The much-touted MOU between Iran and the United States is greeted differently in each country. The Americans are talking of peace; the Iranians of victory. The public release of the document did not give much clarity, given that so many essential issues are deferred to the later rounds.

For now, Iran and the United States have agreed to lift their blockades on maritime traffic through the Persian Gulf and then spend the next two months sorting out everything else. It is hard to see how this timetable is sustainable.

Thus far, the Iranians have partly succeeded in setting the agenda. The nuclear issue is not part of the agreement but Israel’s conduct in Lebanon is. Tehran has already made clear that it will not ship out its highly enriched uranium and it does not view the International Atomic Energy Agency as a neutral arbiter. If they stick to this position, any nuclear accord cannot be adequately verified. Nor has the Islamic Republic given up on monetizing its geography. Tolls can come in various forms, fees for transit or payment for not attacking the Gulf sheikhdoms. The first is a formal arrangement; the second is the prerogative of a tributary state.

There is a reason it is called the Persian Gulf.

Elliott Abrams is senior fellow for Middle East studies at CFR. He served as special representative for Iran in the first Trump administration.

Israelis do not like what they have heard so far for several reasons.

First, Israel wanted to end the Iranian nuclear weapons program. The agreement will allow Iran to continue to enrich uranium at some level, even if there is a temporary moratorium. Moreover, though Iran must give up or down blend its 60 percent enriched uranium, it may be able to keep very large amounts of uranium enriched to lower levels.

Second, Iran successfully linked this agreement with events in Lebanon, which is a defeat and great worry for Israel. Like Lebanon’s elected government, Israelis want Iran to butt out of Lebanon, but it seems that the agreement instead calls for an end to Israeli action there. Israelis believe the United States is tying their hands while Iran will continue to support Hezbollah, covertly if necessary. When Hezbollah fighters try to return to southern Lebanon and border areas—without initially firing a shot—they worry that any action against Hezbollah will create a crisis between the Israeli government and Trump’s administration.

Third, the removal of all sanctions on Iran and release of billions of dollars in frozen funds is of grave concern to Israelis. That could mean there are more resources available for Iran’s proxies like Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shia militias in Iraq because the agreement says nothing to stop this. It also remains silent on the Iranian missile program, which the recent war showed is extremely dangerous for Israel.

Finally, those financial resources will extend the life of the regime. In fact, the language that Trump is now using about the regime is friendly—at the exact moment when he is harshly criticizing Israel’s prime minister for actions in Lebanon. Far from supporting Iranians who want regime change, it seems that Trump now wants to work with the Iranian regime, legitimizing it despite its conduct (for example, killing thousands of protesting Iranians in January and attacking the Gulf Arab nations during the war). In fact, some leaks about the agreement say the United States will pledge not to “interfere in the internal affairs” of Iran, which means zero support for democrats there. Remembering U.S. support for people like the human rights campaigners Andrei Sakharov and Anatoly Scharansky in the Soviet Union, this pledge would be a complete abandonment of the democracy movement among Iranians.

While many Israelis are critical of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and will vote against him in the upcoming election, the complete change in tone in Washington about a regime that still calls for “Death to Israel” deeply concerns Israelis. They fear it means that for the remainder of his term, Trump will be more interested in protecting his agreement than in protecting Israel.

Elisa Ewers is a senior fellow for Middle East studies at CFR. Her expertise covers the Middle East and North Africa, security cooperation, Congress, and U.S. national security decision-making.

The White House says in its reported internal talking points on the U.S.-Iran MOU that one of the deal’s major accomplishments is “ending the fighting on every front, including Lebanon: no forever wars.” At the same time, it states that the “end of the fighting is not a hope. It is a precondition.”

Herein lies the paradox of what the MOU could mean for Lebanon, and why Lebanon might be the place where spoilers to the MOU will emerge. While the text of the agreement calls for the ceasefire to extend to Lebanon, there is no indication that it would require Israel to withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon. U.S. officials, including the president, have delivered conflicting remarks about how the MOU affects Israeli action in Lebanon, including Israel’s right to self-defense against Hezbollah attacks. Israeli politicians, including Netanyahu, have said a security buffer will remain in the south, along with Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in it. Iran and Hezbollah reject this. Attacks from both IDF and Hezbollah have continued since the weekend’s e-signing of the MOU.

The agreement grants Iran a win with respect to Hezbollah. Iran sought to protect its proxy in Lebanon and test the Trump administration’s resolve to keep Lebanon separate from MOU negotiations. Tehran learned that U.S. resolve can bend. Now, at minimum, Hezbollah earns a reprieve. At best, it may benefit from the economic relief that Iran stands to receive over the next sixty—or more—days of negotiations.

The Lebanese government is left in a difficult position going into the fifth round of direct talks with Israel next week. It will not be able to force an IDF withdrawal from the south despite the MOU. It will need to contend with Hezbollah’s continued provocations toward Israel while the militant group also seeks to undermine the government’s historic but fragile talks. And it still has the massive task of simultaneously pursuing its disarmament campaign of Hezbollah and a recovery plan for the displaced Lebanese who no longer have homes in the south.

With the sixty-day clock on U.S.-Iran negotiations started, Lebanon is the variable most likely to play spoiler to any long-term deal.

Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at CFR. He is an expert on Arab and Turkish politics as well as U.S.-Middle East policy.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMikgFBVV95cUxNcTJTNDRKb2dtUE5HdjJCa1VMMC1BdlNIZXRwMFloN3d4YzVNdnFPcEs1LVJEMTF3WV80Wk5WdVVqRnZOMV9Ed3VvQ2RmcXpJWkczOHN5Y0RBZWtiS1FQaWQ1Qy1GU0JtalhkY3QyNnI5T3pFcVlyZHJmSlVTRDNSekloSHFrT2duSjVibGRrUExVUQ?oc=5