핵심요약

• 재팔렐 스모트리치 장관은 사임 요구에도 불구하고 정부에 잔류하여 '라이징 라이언' 작전을 보존했다고 주장했습니다.
• '라이징 라이언' 작전은 6월 13일에 시작되었습니다.
• 그는 자신의 영향력이 탈퇴보다 가치가 있으며, 머무름의 대가가 공적인 영역에서 지불되고 사적인 영역에서 보상이 온다는 논리를 제시했습니다.
• 이 논리는 이스라엘 내 종교지파(Religious Zionism)의 3.25% 임계치에 대한 선거 논쟁에서 힘을 발휘하고 있습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이스라엘 내 정치적 리더십과 지정학적 위협 사이의 복잡한 상호작용을 조명합니다. 투자자 관점에서 이 기사는 단순히 정치적 논쟁을 넘어, 극심한 지정학적 불확실성이 국가 정책 및 경제적 안정성에 미치는 영향을 이해하는 데 중요합니다. 정치 지도자의 개인적 선택이 국가 안보 전략(Operation Rising Lion)의 실행에 어떻게 영향을 미치는지 분석함으로써, 시장이 평가하는 지정학적 위험 프리미엄의 근원을 파악할 수 있습니다.

본문 1: 정치적 영향력과 전략적 선택

스모트리치 장관의 주장은 정치적 영향력이 실제 외교적 결과에 미치는 영향을 명확히 보여줍니다. 그는 자신과 같은 인물이 정부에 잔류함으로써, 최고 지도자의 전략적 방향에 '심각한 제동'을 걸 수 있는 권한을 확보했다고 주장합니다. 이는 단순한 정치적 입장을 넘어, 외교적 협상 과정에서 주체적인 역할을 수행할 수 있는 힘을 의미합니다. 특히, 그가 '존재론적 위협', 즉 핵을 보유한 이란이라는 상황을 인식하고 정부에 남기로 결정한 것은, 정치적 생존이 안보 전략의 실행과 어떻게 결합되는지를 보여줍니다. 이는 정치적 결정이 물리적 현실에 직접적인 영향을 미치는 사례입니다.

본문 2: 지정학적 위험과 시장의 인식

'라이징 라이언' 작전의 실행은 중동 지역의 지정학적 위험 프리미엄을 반영합니다. 이 작전은 이란의 탄도 미사일 생산 가속화와 같은 실질적인 안보 위협에 대한 대응을 의미하며, 이는 중동 지역의 불안정성이 투자 심리에 미치는 영향을 증폭시킵니다. 시장은 이러한 지정학적 불확실성을 가격에 반영하며, 이는 에너지 시장과 지정학적 민감도가 높은 지역의 자산에 영향을 미칩니다. 따라서 정치적 리더십의 안정성이나 변화는 시장의 위험 평가에 중요한 변수로 작용합니다. 정치적 논쟁이 실제 군사적 행동으로 이어지는 과정은 시장이 인식하는 위험의 실질적인 크기를 측정하는 척도가 됩니다.

본문 3: 정책 실행의 위험과 장기적 전망

스모트리치 장관의 주장이 성공적인 결과로 나타났다는 점은, 정치적 목표가 실제 행동으로 전환될 때의 잠재적 위험과 기회를 시사합니다. 그러나 이러한 전략적 행동은 내부 정치 역학 관계에 따라 언제든 변화할 수 있는 유동적인 성격을 가집니다. 장기적인 관점에서 볼 때, 이러한 정치적 동력은 외교 정책의 일관성을 유지하는 데 필수적이지만, 내부 정치적 역학 관계의 변화는 정책의 지속 가능성에 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 따라서 투자자들은 정치적 안정성과 지정학적 위험 사이의 균형을 지속적으로 모니터링해야 합니다.

결론

결론적으로, 본 사례는 정치적 영향력과 지정학적 현실이 어떻게 교차하며 실제 외교적 행동을 형성하는지를 보여줍니다. 투자자들은 이러한 정치적 동력이 중동 지역의 안정성에 미치는 영향을 지속적으로 관찰해야 하며, 향후 정책 변화에 따른 지정학적 위험 프리미엄의 변동성을 예측하는 데 이 분석이 기초 자료로 활용될 수 있습니다. 향후 이스라엘의 외교 정책과 중동 지역의 역학 관계에 대한 지속적인 모니터링이 필요합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiaEFVX3lxTE1hZXl5ZzR1b0tid1VRUXpKSWs1WU1MZGxyd09QN0x0NVVSaWNlbDV4TnV6Q0M3bGlkTHdOejVmeUtuS25CbGR2aFBkVTBNVmktZ1ZVTHJuT0dBTWZmSk1LbEtVWVYtTmU2?oc=5

Bezalel Smotrich remained in government to preserve Operation Rising Lion, he claims - The Jerusalem Post

In January 2025, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich voted against the hostage deal, called the prisoners it released murderers with blood on their hands, and then did the one thing nobody in his camp expected. He stayed.The demands that he resign came from the people who had elected him. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir walked out and came back. Smotrich absorbed it, said little, and remained finance minister. Eighteen months later, at the Finance Ministry headquarters in Jerusalem on Wednesday, he explained why."I knew that we were going to a campaign to remove an existential threat, a nuclear Iran, an Iran that was tripling the pace of its ballistic missile production," he told The Jerusalem Post this week at the Finance Ministry headquarters in Jerusalem. Bringing down the government meant elections, and elections meant no campaign. So he stayed, and told nobody."I could not tell anyone about it. Not even my wife. Because it was a secret."Operation Rising Lion began five months later, on June 13.It is the cleanest illustration of the argument Smotrich has been making for three years and is now asking voters to buy one more time: that influence is worth more than exit, that the price of staying is paid in public and the return arrives in private, and that a man who has never resigned from this government has shaped it more than anyone who has. Ten weeks before the October 27 election, with Religious Zionism polling at or barely above the 3.25% threshold, that argument is on the ballot.Where he says the method workedThe most recent test came this month, over the Board of Peace's 15-point roadmap for Gaza, and Smotrich claims the outcome as his.His account of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is not flattering. The prime minister, he says, did not initially grasp what he had been handed. "He thought he could keep juggling it. And I think I managed to put a very serious brake on him."First came the public letter he and Settlements and National Missions Minister Orit Strock sent demanding the security cabinet reconvene and revoke its approval. Then came the private conversation. "I sat with him in the room and he understood the event."The record does not contradict him. On August 9 Netanyahu told the cabinet flatly that Israel rejects the 15-point document and that the IDF will not withdraw until Hamas is genuinely disarmed.What bothers Smotrich most is the international force. The ISF was supposed to enter Gaza and disarm Hamas, except that no country would send troops to fight it. "Suddenly it turns out the ISF is not supposed to fight Hamas at all. It is supposed to supervise us."His fear has a name, and it is not Gaza. "The great fear is that there will be a kind of Lebanonization of Gaza": a governing body on the surface, an armed faction underneath holding the weapons, the money, and the population. He never accepted the original 20-point plan either, because of the pathway to Palestinian statehood he reads into it, though he credits US President Donald Trump for keeping the destruction of Hamas as the stated aim.He wanted something else entirely, and did not get it: take the Strip, install a military government, encourage emigration. The cabinet chose not Hamas, not the Palestinian Authority, and not Israel, which left a vacuum nobody has filled. "Nobody will do the work for us. Nobody will come and shed their blood and disarm Hamas."Where it brokeThen there is the vote that cost him two members of his own faction, and possibly the election.Smotrich asked for several minutes before answering, and started with his family. Two sons in combat units, one of them seriously wounded in Givati and still in rehabilitation, the other finishing nearly three years in the Paratroopers. A cousin he grew up with like a brother, a father of five, who left everything on Simchat Torah and was killed five months later. Brothers, brothers-in-law, and nephews on extended reserve duty. A neighborhood where for long stretches of the war there were not enough men left to make a minyan (prayer quorum) on Friday night."I do not think anyone needs to convince me of the importance of the draft."His anger at the haredi (ultra-Orthodox) leadership is not in doubt and predates the legislation. Almost three years of war, he says, and they still have not found a way to say the one sentence that mattered: we are with you in this trouble. He describes pressing Shas leader Arye Deri on it repeatedly. "I told him, I do not need to prove that I am part of this war. I am there. My children are there. My family is there. You are not there." Where was the mass prayer rally? Why were the rabbis not in the rehabilitation wards every day?And yet he voted with them, and he will not accept that this makes him their instrument. What distresses him equally, he says, is what the issue has become: "a kind of hate campaign against the haredi public." They are not evading out of laziness. They are idealistic, modest in their needs, and wrong about the state in a way he calls ingratitude. "The State of Israel is the place with the greatest flourishing of Torah that has ever existed in the Jewish people. Who, if not the State of Israel?"His defense rests on a framework that does not exist. The bill he describes, the one he says justified everything, required haredi leadership to actively vote in favor rather than abstain, set a 50% enlistment target within five years, and imposed sanctions on daycare, housing, and transportation subsidies for failure. Its value was declarative: once the leadership votes yes and the rabbis assent, enlistment becomes legitimate, and legitimacy is the only thing he says a law can actually deliver.That bill never passed. Maximalists in his own camp, he says, refused anything short of 100%. "I said, friends, this is a process. Let us go with 80%. Not perfect, but 80%." Two years earlier, he argues, it would already have put thousands of haredim in uniform.What passed instead, in the Knesset's final days, was narrower and carried no sanctions at all. Basic Law: Torah Study cleared its final readings on July 13 by 63 to 52. The freeze on arrests of draft evaders passed the next day, 58 to 54, over the Knesset legal adviser's objection that it suspended enforcement while demanding nothing in return. Smotrich separates them. The Basic Law he defends outright, as protection for hesder yeshivas, which combine Torah study with military service, against a High Court petition he says is already written. The arrests measure he defends more narrowly: the arrests accomplish nothing except Jews fighting Jews on the roads.On that he turns on the attorney-general directly. "If she really wanted to draft haredim, she would send buses to the kiosks and to working haredim. She sent them to the yeshivas because she does not want to draft haredim. She wants to break up the national camp." Gali Baharav-Miara remains in office after the High Court unanimously annulled her dismissal in December.The cost arrived within days. Immigration and Absorption Minister Ofir Sofer, among the coalition figures who fought the legislation, announced he would not stand again. MK Moshe Solomon, who voted against the Basic Law and lost his committee seats for it, followed. Deputy Foreign Minister Sharren Haskel resigned her post.Smotrich will not say a bad word about Sofer, calling him an excellent minister with the largest soul in the government, and saying he tried to talk him out of it.What he wants instead of coercion is an operation: dedicated hesder yeshivas and pre-military academies for haredi recruits, funded by the state, youth movements, soldiers' houses built for men who cannot sleep in the existing ones. He told the General Staff on the first day of the war that anything haredi enlistment costs comes out of his budget. Three years on, he says, roughly 6,000 haredim registered for Shlav Bet, the track for older recruits, and the army took about 150.Quoting MK Simcha Rothman (RZP), he offers a definition of populism: "Deal now, hostages now, peace now, messiah now, draft now." Everything real is a process.The bill comes dueWhether any of this survives contact with voters is now the question, and the arithmetic is unforgiving.He will not run with Ben-Gvir. "I really do not want it. I do not think it is good." Ben-Gvir has ruled it out from his side too, telling 103FM the parties draw on different electorates and that one plus one does not always make two. Netanyahu has pushed for a merger for months, and Likud has not ruled out reserving a slot for Smotrich on its own list.He does not regret 2022. Fourteen seats produced the 64 that made him finance minister. But he concedes a cost that has nothing to do with Israeli politics: abroad, the two names are spoken in one breath, with no distinction drawn. "There is a price."Meanwhile, the ground he needs is being contested. Unity, launched on August 6 by Gilad Erdan and Yuli Edelstein, is running explicitly on universal conscription, aimed squarely at coalition voters who cannot stomach the exemptions. Yoaz Hendel and Chili Tropper have Zionist Home-The Reservists. A Kan poll on August 9 put both below the threshold, and neither bloc was at 61.Smotrich's answer is the oldest one in Israeli politics: do not throw your vote away. "Too much is at stake." He is preparing reserved slots on his list for groups he considers under-represented and promises new faces.The alternative, as he frames it, is Gadi Eisenkot, whom he treats with unusual care and unmistakable intent. "He is a dear man with many merits, a former chief of staff. And he is a man of the left. That is not an insult." Eisenkot left the government mid-war over Rafah, and had that view prevailed, Smotrich argues, Hamas would be back on the fences today. He also claims, with what he called responsibility, that European governments and figures in the US Democratic Party are already talking to Lapid, Bennett, and Eisenkot about reversing this term's settlement decisions. He offered nothing to support it.Where the record disagreesOn his own portfolio he is confident to the point of immovability, and this is where the interview strains hardest against the evidence.He grades himself highly on the war economy and points to the shekel, the stock exchange, foreign investment, employment, falling inflation, and the interest rate cut, against more than NIS 300 billion in war spending. Cost of living has one answer, repeated three times: competition. Break up the dairy producers, break up the importers. He blames what he calls the communists in Likud for killing the dairy reform.The personal import exemption is his favorite example and his clearest defeat. He raised it from $75 to $150; the Knesset struck the order down on February 24 by 59 to 25, with Likud members leading the revolt. He signed a replacement at $130, and the Knesset struck that down too, on June 1.On housing he says prices are falling faster than the state is willing to admit, putting the real decline near 15%. The Central Bureau of Statistics does not agree: its May release recorded an annual drop of about 1.2%, an average price around NIS 2.33 million, and new-build prices down about 3.8% over the year.And on Army Radio he insists nobody wants to close the station, only to privatize it, because an army broadcaster exists in Israel and North Korea and nowhere else. The government he sits in voted unanimously in December to shut it down by March 1, on Israel Katz's proposal and over the attorney-general's objections, with Netanyahu making the North Korea comparison himself. The petitions are still at the High Court.'I only have seven seats'For all the influence he claims, Smotrich is candid about the limit of it. Asked what he got wrong, he does not reach for the war."During the war there were many things that I thought at some point I should have done differently. And that's fine; in the end, I only have seven seats. I have enormous influence, but I'm not prime minister."On October 7 he takes a share and assigns the rest to the doctrine. "We also bear responsibility, along with many other actors, but mainly the conception of 20 or 30 years. This did not start on that morning." He offers his record as proof of consistency: fighting Oslo as a schoolboy, fighting the disengagement, three weeks in Shin Bet (Israeli Security Agency) detention, a 2017 article arguing Israel would have to retake Gaza, warnings in the 10 months before the attack that Hamas was not deterred.Pressed on where the fight over the courts ends, he draws one line without hesitation. "Since the Altalena we have shown responsibility and said that Jews do not raise a hand against Jews. We will always fight against that."Everything else, he insists, is a process. He has 10 weeks to persuade roughly 150,000 voters that they can afford to wait for it.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiaEFVX3lxTE1hZXl5ZzR1b0tid1VRUXpKSWs1WU1MZGxyd09QN0x0NVVSaWNlbDV4TnV6Q0M3bGlkTHdOejVmeUtuS25CbGR2aFBkVTBNVmktZ1ZVTHJuT0dBTWZmSk1LbEtVWVYtTmU2?oc=5