핵심요약

• 연간 1조 달러 이상 가치가 오가는 글로벌 무역의 12-15%가 레드해를 통과합니다
• 후티 반군이 2023년부터 선박 공격을 시작하며 해상 안정성이 악화되었습니다
• 최근 이스라엘 선박에 대한 완전한 금지 조치가 발표되며 갈등이 심화되고 있습니다
• 레드해의 불안정성은 공급망 지연과 에너지 가격 상승을 유발할 수 있습니다

도입

레드해의 안정성은 글로벌 투자자에게 중요한 이슈입니다. 이 지역을 통해 이동하는 무역량은 연간 1조 달러 이상에 달하며, 그 중 12-15%는 글로벌 경제에 필수적인 물류망을 형성합니다. 후티 반군의 최근 조치와 지리적 중요성으로 인해 이 지역은 새로운 지정학적 리스크 포인트로 부상하고 있습니다.

본문 1: 레드해의 경제적 중요성과 리스크

레드해는 연간 1조 달러 이상의 무역을 담당하는 핵심 해상 루트입니다. 이 지역을 통해 이동하는 화물은 글로벌 공급망의 중요한 부분을 차지하며, 특히 에너지 수출입에 있어 필수적인 역할을 합니다. 후티 반군의 공격이 지속되면서 이 지역의 안정성이 악화되고 있으며, 이는 에너지 가격 상승과 공급망 지연을 초래할 수 있습니다. 최근 이스라엘 선박에 대한 완전한 금지 조치가 발표되며 갈등이 더욱 심화되고 있습니다. 이는 글로벌 경제에 미치는 영향이 더 커질 가능성을 시사합니다.

본문 2: 지정학적 리스크와 글로벌 경제의 연동성

레드해의 불안정성은 글로벌 경제와 밀접하게 연결되어 있습니다. 이 지역의 갈등이 확대되면 에너지 가격 상승과 공급망 지연을 초래할 수 있으며, 이는 인플레이션 압력을 높이고 경제 성장을 억제할 수 있습니다. 특히 중동 지역은 에너지 수출의 중요한 거점이며, 이 지역의 불안정성은 글로벌 시장 변동성을 증가시킬 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 이 지역의 리스크를 고려하여 포트폴리오를 조정해야 할 필요성이 있습니다. 레드해의 안정성이 회복되기까지는 상당한 시간이 소요될 수 있으며, 이는 글로벌 경제에 장기적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망과 투자 전략

레드해의 안정성 회복은 글로벌 경제에 긍정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 그러나 현재 상황에서는 갈등이 지속될 가능성이 높으며, 이는 투자자에게 새로운 리스크를 초래할 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 이 지역의 리스크를 고려하여 포트폴리오를 다각화하고, 장기적인 관점에서 투자 전략을 수립해야 합니다. 특히 에너지 부문과 물류 부문에 대한 투자 수요가 증가할 수 있으며, 이는 새로운 투자 기회로 연결될 수 있습니다. 레드해의 안정성이 회복되면 글로벌 무역량과 경제 활동이 증가할 가능성이 높습니다.

결론

레드해의 안정성은 글로벌 경제에 중요한 영향을 미치는 요소입니다. 후티 반군의 최근 조치와 지리적 중요성으로 인해 이 지역의 리스크가 증가하고 있으며, 이는 에너지 가격 상승과 공급망 지연을 초래할 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 이 지역의 리스크를 고려하여 포트폴리오를 조정하고, 장기적인 관점에서 투자 전략을 수립해야 합니다. 레드해의 안정성이 회복되면 글로벌 경제에 긍정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있으며, 이는 새로운 투자 기회로 연결될 수 있습니다.

---

원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMijgFBVV95cUxPVGJwUm9MbzR1RUREblM3dEQxcEVsSG11NGVPN1JTczJwY1JhNlIwaDE4MVFrTWo2WWZ6RTI0SlBwNGNEV1pjWlJPZmZLUHZpd3RpWjJZWnJRdlV3akNLR2lrS0N0VlFPRWg5OHc1bVhFdWE1NUhzQW8zRVRVdW1fd1J0bWxtdGFTeVNCV1RR?oc=5

Another Hormuz? The Red Sea’s Threat to the Global Economy - Council on Foreign Relations

Although the Strait of Hormuz , which had been closed to shipping since late February, appears to be slowly reopening as part of a U.S.-Iran ceasefire agreement , concerns persist about the security of another regional maritime choke point: the Red Sea. On June 8, the Iran-backed Houthi rebels announced a complete ban on Israeli ships transiting the Red Sea, calling them “legitimate military targets.” The announcement came after Iranian officials threatened in April to obstruct trade in the waterway if the Trump administration upheld its naval blockade on Iran. The blockade has since been lifted, but worries linger about the waterway’s vulnerability.

The Red Sea, a 1,400-mile-long inlet between northeastern Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, is one of the world’s most important arteries for global shipping. Each year, approximately 12 to 15 percent of global maritime trade worth more than $1 trillion transits the waterway, which extends from the Suez Canal in the north to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the south.

Alongside the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea could form a critical economic pressure point in the Iran war. Experts say sustained interference in the Red Sea, especially by the Houthis, would trigger severe supply-chain delays, drive up energy prices, and further destabilize the global economy.

The waterway has been an active conflict zone since 2023, when the Yemen-based Houthis began attacking commercial and naval vessels in protest of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, significantly disrupting international shipping. The group’s entry into the Iran war in March by firing missiles at southern Israel underscored the Red Sea’s potential to become a new front in broader regional tensions. Its total ban on Israeli and Israel-linked shipping in the waterway threatens further escalation amid renewed hostilities between Israel and Iran.

[Interactive content — https://vallenato-media.cfr.org/vallenato/static/red-sea/index.html ]

The UN International Maritime Organization describes the Red Sea as “one of the most critical maritime routes enabling global trade.” Between 12 and 15 percent of international seaborne commerce and 30 percent of global container traffic pass through the waterway annually, ferrying agricultural products such as grains and fertilizers , raw materials like ores and metals, industrial components like electronics, automotive parts, and energy resources.

About 4.9 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil and petroleum products transited the Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline—both on the Red Sea’s northern end—in the first half of 2025, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Some 4.2 million bpd crossed through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, at the Red Sea’s southern end. Together, oil shipments via these three routes accounted for approximately 6 percent of all seaborne-traded oil during that time. By comparison, oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz averaged almost 21 million bpd in the same period.

The Red Sea is also considered a digital choke point, as an estimated 90 percent of undersea fiber optic cables linking Europe and Asia pass through the waterway. These cables “represent critical sovereign underwater infrastructure that is no less significant than oil and trade routes,” Abdullah Jaber AlZaidi, senior advisor on defense and security studies at the Gulf Research Center, wrote in a CFR global perspectives roundup . Previous damage to them has caused major disruptions to internet connectivity and cloud services across the region, as well as in Africa and Asia.

As disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz persist, experts say the Red Sea could become the war’s next choke point should Iran leverage the Houthis as a proxy force to blockade maritime traffic in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

“Historically, Washington’s protection of freedom of navigation went hand-in-hand with the core interest in ensuring the free flow of oil and gas from the Middle East,” said CFR expert Steven A. Cook. “The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the potential closure of the Bab el-Mandeb are a test for both.”

The twenty-mile-wide strait is the only point of entry to the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean and runs alongside Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen. While it’s unclear whether Iran would deploy its own forces to attack shipping in the strait, years of Iranian support has boosted the Houthis’ military prowess, enabling them to project force into the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the broader Red Sea.

Ali Akbar Velayati, senior advisor on international affairs to Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, wrote on social media in April that Iran’s “Resistance front”—referring to its coalition of Iran-aligned groups across the Middle East—“views Bab el-Mandeb as it does Hormuz.” He added that “if the White House dares to repeat its foolish mistakes, it will soon realize that the flow of global energy and trade can be disrupted with a single move.”

Houthi attacks on vessels in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have largely paused since Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire in Gaza in late 2025. However, experts say resumed attacks would only deepen the existing oil and economic crisis brought on by the Iran war and risk provoking a regional response from countries that rely on the strait, such as Saudi Arabia .

Saudi Arabia exports around four to five million bpd through a pipeline network connecting its oil fields to Red Sea ports, making access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait critical, according to CFR expert Edward Fishman. “But the Houthis, who are Iranian allies, could theoretically shut off the Bab el-Mandeb and basically make it so that Saudi Arabia doesn’t have any way to export oil,” he said.

Previous Houthi attacks on the Red Sea have highlighted the economic stakes. The group’s response to the Israel-Hamas war disrupted maritime traffic in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, causing oil shipments to fall by more than half, from 9.3 million bpd in 2023 to just 4.1 million bpd in 2024.

Several major regional and external actors are involved in the Red Sea, including:

Houthis. The Yemen-based group, considered an independent partner of Iran , began targeting Israeli and international shipping in the Red Sea in late 2023 in response to Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. The group announced a halt to attacks on non-Israeli vessels following the Gaza ceasefire, but experts warn that attacks on Red Sea shipping could resume if regional hostilities escalate or ceasefire efforts collapse.

Iran. Tehran uses the Red Sea to project power, disrupt global trade, and challenge Western influence in the region. In retaliation for the United States’ naval blockade on Iranian ports, Iranian officials have threatened to use the Houthis to shut down the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Iran is the group’s primary benefactor, providing them with security assistance including weapons transfers, training, and intelligence support.

Israel. The country has been a central target of Houthi attacks, which have significantly disrupted activity at the Port of Eilat, Israel’s only port on the Red Sea. Houthi aggression prompted Israel to launch retaliatory air strikes on Houthi-controlled ports and infrastructure in Yemen, though direct hostilities largely halted in late 2025. They have since resumed .

United States and allies. Washington and its allies have taken action to protect global shipping and restore freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. In response to the Houthis’ initial attacks in 2023, the Biden administration launched Operation Prosperity Guardian , a multinational security initiative that included forces from France, the United Kingdom, and other European countries. In March 2025, the Trump administration launched Operation Rough Rider , a more aggressive offensive targeting Houthi bases in Yemen. The operation ended in May 2025 after the United States reached a temporary ceasefire agreement with the Houthis. However, the agreement did not mandate the Houthis to stop attacking other countries’ ships—namely Israeli and Israeli-linked ones—and the ceasefire collapsed after two months.

In addition to disruptions to international shipping, experts warn that greater instability in the Red Sea could exacerbate existing crises in North and East Africa.

“There are already multiple, interconnected tensions in the region relating to the Nile waters, Ethiopia’s desire for port access, Sudan’s civil war, and Somalia’s political and security crises,” said CFR Africa expert Michelle Gavin. Many of these conflicts are being shaped by competition among Middle Eastern powers—including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—through strategic investments, military support , and security cooperation.

“The more heated the competition gets, the more it is likely to result in conflict on African soil,” Gavin added.

For Iran and the Houthis, entirely blocking off the Bab el-Mandeb Strait would be difficult. Unlike the Strait of Hormuz, which is the only maritime outlet from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean, ships that enter the Red Sea via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait could exit through the Suez Canal in the north. Even so, a simultaneous and prolonged disruption of both straits could disrupt oil transit routes carrying about 24 percent of global oil supply, according to EIA data, leaving countries with even fewer options to transport oil in and out of the region.

[Interactive content — https://vallenato-media.cfr.org/vallenato/static/red_sea_routes_map_2026/index.html ]

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMijgFBVV95cUxPVGJwUm9MbzR1RUREblM3dEQxcEVsSG11NGVPN1JTczJwY1JhNlIwaDE4MVFrTWo2WWZ6RTI0SlBwNGNEV1pjWlJPZmZLUHZpd3RpWjJZWnJRdlV3akNLR2lrS0N0VlFPRWg5OHc1bVhFdWE1NUhzQW8zRVRVdW1fd1J0bWxtdGFTeVNCV1RR?oc=5