핵심요약

• 하마스는 이스라엘의 공격으로 약화되었으며, 가자지대의 절반을 이스라엘이 통제하고 있습니다.
• 이란의 내부에서는 대규모 봉기가 있었으나, 이는 무력 진압으로 억눌렸습니다.
• 이란의 약화는 국내 반체제 민중의 분노와 결합되어 정권의 취약성을 드러냅니다.
• 트럼프 행정부는 이란을 더욱 약화시키거나 정권을 구원하는 양보 중 하나를 선택해야 하는 상황에 놓여 있습니다.

도입

본 기사는 중동 지역의 지정학적 변화가 이란의 내부적 취약성과 맞물려 트럼프 행정부가 직면한 외교적 딜레마를 분석합니다. 이는 단순한 지역 분쟁을 넘어, 이란이라는 주요 에너지 공급국의 정치적 안정성이 국제 유가 및 글로벌 공급망에 미치는 영향을 이해하는 데 중요합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 불확실성이 향후 에너지 시장과 중동 지역의 경제적 변동성에 어떤 영향을 미칠지 주목해야 합니다.

본문 1: 지역 분쟁의 파급 효과와 이란의 내부 취약성

하마스의 10월 7일 공격은 이란이 이스라엘을 포위하려는 오랜 노력의 결과였으며, 이로 인해 이스라엘을 둘러싼 '불의 고리'가 해체되었습니다. 이로 인해 하마스는 약화되었고, 레바논 정부와 군대는 헤즈볼라를 도발할 수 있는 상황이 되었습니다. 또한, 이란의 내부에서는 올해 초 대규모 봉기가 발생했으나, 이는 수만 명의 민간 시위대를 학살하는 방식으로 진압되었습니다. 이는 이란 체제의 폭압적이고 억압적인 성격에 대한 대중의 강한 반감을 보여줍니다. 이처럼 외부의 압력과 내부의 불만이 결합되어 이란 정권의 취약성이 심화되고 있습니다.

본문 2: 외교적 선택과 경제적 위험

트럼프 행정부가 이란에 대해 취해야 할 선택은 이란을 더욱 약화시키는 것인지, 아니면 정권을 구원하기 위한 신속한 양보를 제공하는 것인지에 달려 있습니다. 이란의 경제를 계속해서 미국이 석유 수출에 대한 봉쇄를 유지하는 것은 가능하지만, 이는 11월 대선 전에 결과를 가져오지 못할 수 있습니다. 이는 2006년 조지 W. 부시 대통령이 정치적 고려를 배제하고 행동했던 사례와 유사합니다. 즉, 외교적 압박만으로는 즉각적인 결과를 얻기 어려우며, 경제적 압박과 정치적 고려 사이의 균형점을 찾는 것이 중요합니다. 이란의 경제적 압박이 장기적으로 에너지 시장의 변동성을 높일 수 있다는 점을 고려해야 합니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망과 지정학적 위험

이란의 내부적 불안정성과 외부의 지정학적 압력이 결합되면서, 중동 지역의 불안정성은 장기적인 위험 요소로 남아 있습니다. 이란의 약화가 심화될 경우, 지역 내 다른 세력들의 영향력이 변화하고 이는 국제 에너지 시장에 예측 불가능한 변동성을 야기할 수 있습니다. 따라서 외교적 접근은 단기적인 정치적 목표뿐만 아니라, 중동 지역의 장기적인 안정과 에너지 공급망의 지속 가능성을 고려해야 하는 복잡한 과제입니다. 외교적 노력은 단기적인 협상 결과뿐만 아니라, 지역 전체의 안정성을 담보하는 방향으로 설계되어야 합니다.

결론

결론적으로, 이란 문제에 대한 접근은 단기적인 정치적 이익과 장기적인 지역 안정성이라는 두 가지 목표 사이의 균형을 찾는 데 중점을 두어야 합니다. 외교적 압박과 경제적 조치는 상호 보완적이어야 하며, 이란 정권의 변화보다는 지역 전체의 안정성을 우선하는 전략이 필요합니다. 향후 이란과 중동 지역의 역학 관계는 지속적으로 변화할 것이므로, 이러한 지정학적 변동성에 대한 면밀한 관찰이 요구됩니다. 투자자들은 이러한 복잡한 상황 속에서 지정학적 위험이 에너지 시장에 미치는 영향을 지속적으로 평가해야 합니다.

---

원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMisgFBVV95cUxPbm40NWplM0x5MVVOdFRNTmlGUks3bGh0Q1VmdFZoOXdwM3lCMXZxdl9KMTJLc1YxS2NxUjJ5dDRnQ21iMlR0ZXo2WHFjSmJ4bVpWVlBBbDctV0lnWVpQdFdNcFVEb2wxSW5QZWJ6R3JBMDVHYWVPN0FvaWtNekFnT0hLOHRRbWlrRGNOUHEtN0szRE5uWWF0OGJ5NzF4YVRsTV9fRFJiemNoWm1HRWZQZ0xB?oc=5

Trump's Iran Negotiations: Less Art of the Deal, More Art of Concealing Defeat - Council on Foreign Relations

Elliott Abrams served as deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor in the George W. Bush administration, where he supervised U.S. policy in the Middle East. He later served as special representative for Iran and Venezuela in the first Donald Trump administration.

Hamas’s assault on October 7, 2023, was the culmination of years of Iranian efforts to surround Israel with Tehran’s proxies. Hamas and Hezbollah controlled Gaza and Lebanon, Iran-backed Shia militias dominated Iraq, and the Iranian regime worked closely with the Houthis in Yemen and the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria to encircle Israel. Israel has since torn apart this so-called ring of fire.

Hamas is badly weakened and Israel has taken control of half of Gaza. Meanwhile, Hezbollah is so disrupted that the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Armed Forces can now contemplate challenging it. The Assad regime fell amid this regional chaos, and in Iraq, the government is pushing back against the Shia militias to bring them under some control. But Iran’s weakness is also domestic: a dramatic uprising took place earlier this year and was put down only through the slaughter of tens of thousands of unarmed civilian protesters, and by every indication, the great majority of Iranians loathe the brutal and repressive theocracy that controls their country.

The question now facing the Trump administration is whether to build on these changes by further weakening the Islamic Republic of Iran or to provide a quick accommodation that rescues the regime.

While President Donald Trump fancies himself a great negotiator, his obvious desire for a deal with Iran has weakened his hand. Battering the Iranian economy by continuing the U.S. blockade of Iranian oil exports is eminently possible, but it may not deliver results before the U.S. congressional elections in November. Faced with a similar problem in 2006, President George W. Bush dismissed political considerations and proceeded with the surge of U.S. troops in Iraq. Trump seems disinclined to put national security over politics.

But the president has no bargaining position if he won’t use more military force. He wants to end the confrontation with Iran so that oil quickly resumes flowing and oil prices drop fast—and that urgency puts him in the position of the building owner who needs cash fast and cannot afford to wait for a better price.

The price Iran is demanding would change the Middle East—and make any future challenge to Iran’s regional dominance far harder. The Iranian regime will be saved financially if it can monetize the Strait of Hormuz and export its own oil freely. The very fact that Iran had confronted the United States and emerged as the victor—and if Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, it will be seen as the victor—strengthens the regime and will allow it to demand tribute from oil-rich Gulf Arab states. Gulf oil producers’ reliance on the United States for their security will be replaced by deals with Iran and a search for other protectors, as we have just seen in the new defense pact Saudi Arabia signed with Pakistan and Turkey.

This raises the question of whether Gulf allies can rely on the United States in the future. In discussions about the Strait of Hormuz, too little attention is paid to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which is also known as U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and is headquartered in Bahrain. This naval element of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has been under missile and drone attack from Iran all year, and suffered severe damage. While it may well be sensible for NAVCENT (and for CENTCOM’s local headquarters in Qatar) to relocate farther away from Iran, that is different from relinquishing the Gulf to Iranian control. That move would quickly turn the Gulf into an Iranian lake, with the United States and its naval warships unable to enter. Such a step would, in effect, mean abandoning U.S. allies such as Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia to the tender mercies of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Thus far, the Trump administration appears unable to make a decision. The president clearly does not want more rounds of heavy fighting, and he wants a deal—even a bad one. The memorandum of understanding (MOU) negotiated in June was already a very bad one. It did not clearly state that the Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway open to all nations without tolling, and it legitimized Iran’s intrusions in Lebanon’s internal affairs (which is mentioned five times in the MOU’s first paragraph).

The MOU contained several unacceptable terms that should have elicited a steady Trump administration rejection. But there has been nothing steady about the administration’s or the president’s reactions. These have included threats of total destruction (delivered with crude and foul language) followed by no action, then more threats, then more inaction. It’s impossible for Americans or U.S. allies to judge what Trump’s bottom line is—or whether there actually is a bottom line.

This is a tragic position to be in for an administration that began to address the threat from Iran in June 2025 with Operation Midnight Hammer and then further strikes this year to destroy Iran’s nuclear program and weaken its hold on the Strait of Hormuz. The position of strength that the United States appeared to hold a year ago, and even as this year began, is being eroded and may be abandoned. It has only allowed Tehran to grow more brash in negotiations. Iran is now seeking even more conditions, such as U.S. reparations, that are obvious nonstarters.

Along with potential negotiations over Ukraine, negotiations with Iran are the most serious foreign policy test the Trump administration now faces. In the end, the facts will be impossible to paper over with vague language: Iran will either control the Strait of Hormuz or it will not. If it does, Iran will have effectively driven the United States out of the Persian Gulf, with a huge effect on every Gulf state and the entire Middle East.

Such an outcome will inevitably undermine U.S. commitments in Asia and Europe as well, by suggesting that the United States—at least while the Trump administration remains in power until January 2029—views commitments as temporary and sees negotiations as an exit strategy rather than a way to protect its interests. That’s not the art of the deal, but the use of negotiation to conceal defeat.

This work represents the views solely of the author(s). The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMisgFBVV95cUxPbm40NWplM0x5MVVOdFRNTmlGUks3bGh0Q1VmdFZoOXdwM3lCMXZxdl9KMTJLc1YxS2NxUjJ5dDRnQ21iMlR0ZXo2WHFjSmJ4bVpWVlBBbDctV0lnWVpQdFdNcFVEb2wxSW5QZWJ6R3JBMDVHYWVPN0FvaWtNekFnT0hLOHRRbWlrRGNOUHEtN0szRE5uWWF0OGJ5NzF4YVRsTV9fRFJiemNoWm1HRWZQZ0xB?oc=5