핵심요약

• 이란 내 '실용주의자(realists)' 진영은 경제적 비용을 줄이기 위해 전쟁 종식을 주장합니다.
• 이란 내에서는 경제적 어려움이 정권 안정성을 위협한다는 인식이 존재합니다.
• 이란 지도부는 경제적 어려움과 군사적 힘만으로는 국가를 유지하기 어렵다는 입장을 보입니다.
• 이란 지도층은 경제적 어려움과 금융 순환의 부재가 국가의 지속 가능성을 위협한다고 경고합니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란 전쟁 상황을 단순한 군사적 관점에서 벗어나, 내부의 경제적 현실주의와 정치적 분열이라는 복합적인 렌즈로 분석하는 데 중점을 둡니다. 투자자들은 이란의 정책 결정이 군사적 목표뿐만 아니라, 내부 경제적 생존 문제에 의해 어떻게 제약받는지 이해해야 합니다. 이는 이란의 외교적 행동과 지역 내 영향력 변화를 예측하는 데 필수적인 맥락을 제공합니다.

본문 1: 내부 분열과 경제적 현실주의

이란 내 지도층은 현재 두 개의 주요 영향력 그룹으로 명확히 나뉘어 있습니다. 하나는 경제를 관리하고 일반 국민의 표를 대변하는 '실용주의자' 진영이며, 여기에는 마수드 페제슈키안 대통령과 모하마드 바게르 갈리바프 의원 등이 포함됩니다. 이들은 경제적 어려움을 가장 큰 문제로 인식하며, 전쟁을 종식시켜 경제적 부담을 줄여야 한다는 입장을 취합니다. 반면, 이슬람혁명수비대(IRGC) 사령관인 아흐마드 바히디를 포함하는 다른 그룹은 협상에서 양보를 거부하며 미국의 완전한 항복을 요구하는 이념적인 입장을 취합니다. 이러한 분열은 외교적 협상 과정에서 이란의 정책 결정에 심각한 불확실성을 더합니다. 경제적 현실주의 그룹이 지배적인 입장을 취하고 있음에도 불구하고, 군사적 목표를 추구하는 다른 세력의 존재는 이란의 대외 정책에 복잡성을 추가하며, 외부 행위자들이 이란의 전략적 목표를 예측하는 데 어려움을 야기합니다.

본문 2: 경제적 압박과 정권 안정성의 연관성

'실용주의자' 지도층의 최근 발언은 경제적 고난에 대한 깊은 우려를 명확히 보여줍니다. 페제슈키안 대통령은 전쟁이 언젠가는 끝나야 하며, 지금 끝내는 것이 낫다고 주장하면서도 이란 국민이 지속적인 경제적 고난을 견뎌야 한다는 현실적인 요구를 병행했습니다. 갈리바프 의원 역시 이란이 군사적 힘이 강함에도 불구하고, 국민이 굶주리고 국가에 금융 순환, 경제 성장, 국내 생산이 부족한 상태에서는 어떠한 군사적 성과도 지속될 수 없다고 경고했습니다. 이는 군사적 승리나 외부의 경제적 압박만으로는 정권의 장기적인 안정성을 담보할 수 없다는 점을 강력하게 시사합니다. 즉, 경제적 안정성이 정치적 안정성의 핵심 기반이라는 점이 강조됩니다. 경제적 압박이 심화될수록 정권 내부의 합의와 정책 방향 설정에 있어 경제적 요인이 더욱 결정적인 변수로 작용할 것입니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망과 위험 요소

이러한 내부적 경제-정치적 긴장 상태는 장기적인 전망에 있어 여러 위험 요소를 내포하고 있습니다. 만약 경제적 어려움이 해소되지 않고 지속된다면, 이는 정권 내부의 결속력을 점진적으로 약화시키고 잠재적인 사회 불안정으로 이어질 수 있습니다. 특히, 경제적 자원의 부족은 외부의 추가적인 제재나 협상에서의 이란의 입장을 더욱 경직되게 만들 위험이 있습니다. 따라서 향후 이란의 외교 및 군사 전략은 단기적인 군사적 목표뿐만 아니라, 내부 경제적 생존 문제를 해결하는 방향으로 조정될 가능성이 높습니다. 이러한 내부적 제약 조건은 국제 사회가 이란에 가하는 압력의 효과와 지속성에 영향을 미칠 수 있으며, 이는 지역 전체의 지정학적 변동성에 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다.

결론

이란의 현재 상황은 군사적 역량과 더불어 심각한 경제적 현실주의적 제약에 의해 복잡하게 얽혀 있습니다. 내부의 분열된 지도층이 경제적 고난을 해결하기 위해 전쟁 종식을 모색하는 것은 불가피한 흐름으로 보입니다. 투자자들은 향후 이란의 정책 변화가 경제적 현실주의적 요구에 얼마나 민감하게 반응할지에 주목해야 하며, 내부적 안정성이 외부의 지정학적 위험보다 더 중요한 변수가 될 수 있음을 인식해야 합니다. 향후 이란의 경제 정책과 내부 정치 역학 관계를 면밀히 관찰하는 것이 중요합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMigwFBVV95cUxQcVBIckM0cFVQMUUwQjh3WTBxX1llRGNEak9EZk1DY2NGbEVTdENIN3hFWjNJMW1aWDlpSVZsYlNqcm1ZRk9kTnNzZ2tpZTZ1UjRmZ3Y5ZV9IOWl2TU16cnEwNG9kSm1hTHg2MEE0MEl4al9sTGo3dWNQS0JEdjVlSGtwVQ?oc=5

Iran Update, August 21, 2026 - Institute for the Study of War

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

Note : ISW-CTP will pause publishing weekend updates starting on August 15, 2026. ISW-CTP may publish special updates on Saturdays and Sundays if events warrant, however.

There is no indication that economic pressure on the regime has changed the anti-concessions position of some top Iranian officials, even while a group of Iranian officials responsible for managing the economy (“realists”) are increasingly warning that worsening economic pressure could threaten regime stability. These officials also appear to openly advocate ending the war to reduce the economic cost to the regime. [1] There appear to be two loose groups of Iranian leaders that have influence at this time. One, the pro-concessions or “realist” camp, is responsible for managing the economy and ostensibly answers to a voting constituency of everyday Iranians. These include Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, among others. A second group, which includes Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, does not favor any concessions in negotiations and seeks full US surrender. This group is relatively stronger and more ideological.

Recent statements by “realist” officials show their view of the situation, which revolves around major concerns over economic hardship. Pezeshkian said on August 21 that the war must end at some point and argued that “it would be better to end it now,” while still adding that Iranians must be prepared to endure the ongoing economic hardship.[2] Ghalibaf similarly warned on August 21 that Iran cannot endure, regardless of its military strength, if its population is hungry and the country lacks financial circulation, economic growth, and domestic production.[3] Central Bank Governor Abdol Nasser Hemmati, another adherent to realist thinking, acknowledged on August 19 that Iranian oil exports had nearly ceased and that Iran faces foreign-exchange shortages, reconstruction costs, and increased youth unemployment.[4] Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf have generally favored negotiations, and their statements do not represent a major change in their positions.[5] Their focus on the war’s economic costs suggests that they seek to convince senior regime officials to end the war before worsening conditions threaten regime stability.

Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf, Hemmati, and other officials responsible for managing the economy appear more likely than Vahidi and other anti-concession officials to view economic deterioration as a reason to change policy. It is notable that these officials also must answer, at least ostensibly, to the electorate, whereas figures like Vahidi do not. Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf, and Hemmati’s ability to change Iran’s policy remains limited, however. ISW-CTP previously assessed that the faction around Vahidi continued to guide negotiation policy, while the more pro-concession group around Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf, and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi had less influence and primarily disagreed with Vahidi’s faction over how to achieve shared regime objectives.[6]

The failure of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) appears to have further weakened the pro-concession, “realist” camp relative to Vahidi and other anti-concession officials. Pezeshkian had one notable success when he convinced Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei to approve the MoU in June, in part by emphasizing the economic consequences of the blockade.[7] Iranian officials appear to believe that the MoU collapsed due to US subversion, not because of IRGC interference, and have repeatedly accused the United States of violating agreements and acting in bad faith.[8] This failure weakened the pro-concession argument that compromise with the United States would produce economic relief and strengthened the argument that the United States cannot be trusted, which the anti-concession camp can use to justify continued coercion rather than another agreement.[9] IRGC-affiliated Fars News reinforced this argument on August 21, criticizing Pezeshkian’s call to end the war and arguing that conciliatory positions signal weakness, encourage further attacks, and repeat the same mistake Iran allegedly made by showing flexibility before the two most recent wars.[10] The result of this dynamic is that the hardline, anti-concessions camp can use the perceived US “dishonesty“ to argue that the “realist,“ pro-concessions camp is being unrealistic in engaging with the United States. This enables the ascendant hardliners to continue to use force to enforce their preferred arrangement in the strait and to maintain maximalist demands rather than make concessions.[11]

Vahidi’s faction therefore remains in a stronger position to argue that continued pressure on the United States, rather than Iranian concessions, can secure the regime’s objectives. ISW-CTP assessed on August 17 that Vahidi’s group would likely accept an agreement that meets Iran’s demands (and complete US surrender) but would risk continued conflict rather than accept one that falls short of Iran’s maximalist demands.[12] The “realist,” pro-concession group favors an arrangement similar to the original MoU to end the war and secure economic relief, while Vahidi and his allies seek broader aims, including continued Iranian control of the strait. The anti-concession faction also demanded that the United States lift the naval blockade and sanctions, withdraw US military forces from around Iran, pay war reparations, release frozen Iranian assets, and cease attacks on Iran’s regional proxies.[13]

Regime decision making may therefore take a long time to react to economic deterioration, even as the economy gets much worse. Vahidi and other anti-concession officials appear to have a higher tolerance for domestic unrest because they may calculate that the regime can contain and suppress renewed protests without changing course. ISW-CTP continues to assess that Vahidi’s faction may tolerate substantial economic costs and potential unrest if doing so enables Iran to achieve its core objectives and may instead respond to instability by securitizing society and seeking alternative economic channels.[14] This greater tolerance for economic pain and unrest helps explain the anti-concession camp’s preference for sustained pressure over compromise. Second Deputy Parliament Speaker Hamidreza Haji argued on August 20 that rising oil prices means “we are [the regime] winning,” adding that negotiations should not simply seek to end the war, and called on Gulf states to pressure the United States to accept Iran’s conditions.[15] Ultra-hardliner Paydari (Stability) Front-affiliated Parliamentarian Mahmoud Nabavian similarly stated on August 21 that calls for peace under current conditions amount to “surrender.”[16] The Paydari Front is fully anti-negotiations, not just concessions. The pro-concessions faction appears to view worsening economic conditions as a reason to compromise before deteriorating economic conditions threaten regime stability, while the hardline anti-concessions and anti-negotiations factions appear willing to tolerate greater economic and domestic instability. Economic pressure could therefore become severe enough to threaten regime stability before the officials who currently dominate decision making conclude that Iran must make meaningful concessions.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is resisting US efforts to economically isolate Iran, but Chinese economic engagement cannot offset the blockade if Iran cannot physically supply its largest oil customer. The PRC rejected sanctions and pressure on August 20 as a solution and reiterated its opposition to unilateral sanctions after the United States called on Beijing to cooperate with its economic pressure campaign.[17] The PRC bought more than 80 percent of Iran’s exported oil before the recent war. Chinese refiners still appear willing to purchase Iranian crude, but Reuters reported on August 21 that the amount of Iranian oil available for September and October delivery has fallen sharply as cargoes already outside the blockade are sold and Iran struggles to replace them.[18] Some Chinese refiners are consequently turning to Brazilian and Iraqi crude.[19] Iranian decision makers will likely monitor whether the PRC and other trading partners resist US pressure, but foreign demand will provide diminishing relief if the blockade continues to restrict Iranian exports.

Nothing significant to report.

The US Treasury re-designated Hezbollah as an IRGC Quds Force-affiliated group on August 20.[20] The US Treasury also sanctioned ten Hezbollah-affiliated individuals involved in an international money-laundering operation for the group to avoid US sanctions and obtain foreign currency on August 20.[21] A US official told Reuters on August 20 that the redesignation is intended to demonstrate that Hezbollah is operating on Iran and the IRGC Quds Force’s ”behalf.”[22] US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos stated that the redesignation also demonstrated US resolve to counter “terror financing networks“.[23] The US Treasury re-designation comes amid repeated reports in recent months that the IRGC has reorganized Hezbollah since 2024 to incorporate a decentralized command and control structure and fill command positions within the group’s units.[24] The Israel Defense Forces has killed multiple IRGC Quds Force officers advising Hezbollah in various roles throughout the current Israeli campaign in Lebanon since March 2.[25]

The Lebanese government is continuing to balance the need to disarm Hezbollah with the latent threat that Hezbollah poses. Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mirti told Emirati media on August 21 that the Lebanese government will not “back down” from implementing the Trilateral Framework Agreement, which includes disarming Hezbollah.[26] Mirti stated that the Lebanese government does not want to undertake any decisions that would require using force against Hezbollah, which could “endanger national unity.”[27] Senior Lebanese officials, including Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, have repeatedly emphasized the need to maintain Lebanese stability and avoid violence with Hezbollah.[28] Aoun told Lebanese media about the necessity of ”cooperating with Hezbollah” to disarm the group on July 10, for example.[29] Aoun and Mitri’s caution is understandable, given the risks to Lebanese stability implicit in any violent flare-ups between the government and Hezbollah. Any disarmament efforts that rely on cooperating with Hezbollah will almost certainly fail, however, because Hezbollah will not disarm of its own volition.[30]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq is likely attempting to superficially comply with the Iraqi federal government’s disarmament initiative by handing over unarmed drones and other unspecified weapons. A source familiar with Iraqi militias claimed on August 21 that Asaib Ahl al Haq handed fewer than 10 unarmed drones and other unspecified weapons to the Iraqi disarmament committee on August 19.[31] The source stated that Asaib Ahl al Haq had stored these weapons in one of its headquarters in Yusufiyah District, Baghdad Province.[32] The report is consistent with Shia Coordination Framework officials’ July 9 claim that militias handed over “scrap” missiles and inoperable drones while retaining functional heavy weapons.[33] The unarmed drones and unspecified weapons that Asaib Ahl al Haq reportedly handed over to the committee almost certainly constitute a fraction of the militia’s total arsenal, however. The source added that Asaib Ahl al Haq did not hand over any missiles, even though the disarmament committee reportedly requires the militias to hand over short-range missiles.[34] Asaib Ahl al Haq controls several headquarters and bases across Iraq, at which the militia stores weapons including drones and missiles.[35] ISW-CTP has previously assessed that Asaib Ahl al Haq possibly announced its willingness to disarm in order to gain access to the 35,000 jobs in Iraq’s security establishment that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi has reportedly set aside for militia members willing to disarm.[36]

[1] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-18-2026/ [2] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6922951 [3] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6922785 [4] https://www.irna dot ir/news/86240378/ [5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-special-report-july-11-2026 [6] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-28-2026/ [7] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/04/world/middleeast/iran-supreme-leader-funeral-divisions.html [8] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-insists-right-control-shipping-strait-hormuz-after-ship-hit-near-oman-2026-06-26/ ; https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/28777 ; https://en.mfa dot ir/portal/newsview/790842 [9] https://x.com/yarbatman/status/2082397962949312880?s=20 [10] https://farsnews dot ir/politics/1787340534690444247 [11] https://t.me/Tasnimnews/432816 https://x.com/shoaam_ir/status/2086084909488062483?s=20 [12] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-17-2026/ [13] https://x.com/shoaam_ir/status/2086084909488062483?s=20 ; https://tasnimnews dot ir/fa/news/1405/05/20/3669144 [14] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-17-2026/ [15] https://farsnews dot ir/MaryamKarami/1787224100472755000 [16] https://x.com/nabaviantwt/status/2090720544723279977?s=20 [17] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iranian-oil-offers-chinese-buyers-fall-us-blockade-bites-sources-say-2026-08-21 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-treasury-secretary-bessent-hold-press-conference-iran-on-monday-2026-08-20/

[18] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iranian-oil-offers-chinese-buyers-fall-us-blockade-bites-sources-say-2026-08-21/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-treasury-secretary-bessent-hold-press-conference-iran-on-monday-2026-08-20/ [19] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iranian-oil-offers-chinese-buyers-fall-us-blockade-bites-sources-say-2026-08-21/ [20] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0611 ; https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=4697 [21] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0611 [22] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-targets-hezbollah-with-fresh-sanctions-emphasizes-ties-iranian-government-2026-08-20/ [23] https://x.com/US_SrAdvisorAF/status/2090538742129770732 [24] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-irans-irgc-rebooted-lebanons-hezbollah-be-ready-war-2026-03-21/ ; https://www.mako dot co.il/pzm-magazine/Article-d68bcf56b36be91026.htm [25] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2032047103006892283 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2032818929807016408 [26] https://www.skynewsarabia dot com/middle-east/1887338-متري-دول-مستعدة-لمساعدة-الجيش-اللبناني-المناطق-التجريبية [27] https://www.skynewsarabia dot com/middle-east/1887338-متري-دول-مستعدة-لمساعدة-الجيش-اللبناني-المناطق-التجريبية [28] https://x.com/ALJADEEDNEWS/status/2073663608269980151?s=20 ; https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/2071592126240952637?s=20 ; https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/2072203643822932280?s=20 ; https://www.almanar dot com.lb/article/990757/ ; https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/321198-what-will-aoun-tell-trump-about-hezbollah-s-weapons ; https://x.com/TheNationalNews/status/2074791339267666221 [29] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/321198-what-will-aoun-tell-trump-about-hezbollah-s-weapons [30] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-august-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-10-2026/ [31] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/مسي-رات-محلية-و-يرانية-تفاصيل-تسليم-سلاح-عصا-ب-هل-الحق-للدولة-حصري [32] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/مسي-رات-محلية-و-يرانية-تفاصيل-تسليم-سلاح-عصا-ب-هل-الحق-للدولة-حصري [33] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-10-2026/ ; https://almadapaper dot net/442723/ [34] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/مسي-رات-محلية-و-يرانية-تفاصيل-تسليم-سلاح-عصا-ب-هل-الحق-للدولة-حصري [35] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/irans-expanding-militia-army-iraq-new-special-groups/ ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PolicyFocus163-KnightsMalikTamimi-v3%281%29.pdf ; https://x.com/obretix/status/2032573490021224552 ; https://964media dot com/660887/ [36] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-10-2026/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/خاص-الزيدي-يقترح-مقايضة-سلاح-الفصا-ل-بمشاريع-ميركية ;https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/خاص-الزيدي-يقر-خطة-دمج-الفصا-ل-35-لف-فرصة-عمل-مقابل-تسليم-السلاح ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D8%A8-%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B9%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D8%A8-%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%83-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-2-2026/

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