핵심요약

• 이란 연계 민병대 네트워크는 카셈 솔레이마니에 의해 약 17년 동안 구축되었습니다.
• 이들은 장거리 미사일과 대공 무기를 포함한 무기고를 보유한 강력한 대리 군대로 기능합니다.
• 이들의 주된 목표는 분쟁을 이란에서 이라크로 이동시켜 이란의 국경을 넘어선 충돌을 유발하는 것입니다.
• 미국과 사우디아라비아는 이들 민병대를 이란 군대의 일부로 인정하고 대응의 대상을 변경했습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란의 대리 세력인 이라크 민병대의 지정학적 역할과 군사적 의미를 조명합니다. 이들 민병대가 단순한 지역 무장 세력이 아니라 이란 혁명수비대(IRGC)의 확장된 군사적 팔로서 기능한다는 점이 중요합니다. 투자자 관점에서 이는 중동 지역의 군사적 역학 관계 변화가 향후 국제 안보 및 에너지 시장에 미치는 영향을 분석하는 데 필수적인 정보입니다.

본문 1: 대리 군대의 형성 배경과 군사적 역량

이란-이라크 민병대 네트워크는 카셈 솔레이마니의 지휘 아래 이란의 외부 작전과 비밀 활동을 담당하기 위해 구축되었습니다. 이 과정은 2003년 미국 주도의 이라크 침공부터 솔레이마니의 사망(2020년)까지 약 17년이 소요되었습니다. 이 기간 동안 이들은 이란의 군사적 잠재력을 보강하는 데 중요한 역할을 수행했습니다. 이들은 이란의 재정적, 군사적 지원을 받아 장거리 미사일과 대공 무기를 포함하는 무기고를 축적했습니다. 이러한 무력은 이들이 미국 및 아랍 국가들과 장기적이고 비용이 많이 드는 분쟁에 참여할 수 있는 강력한 대리 군대로서의 역할을 가능하게 합니다. 이는 이란 본토의 분쟁을 회피하면서도 이란의 영향력을 확대하려는 솔레이마니의 전략적 의도가 반영된 결과입니다.

본문 2: 지정학적 전략과 외부 개입의 의미

이러한 민병대 네트워크의 핵심 목적은 분쟁의 초점을 이란 본토에서 이라크로 이동시키는 것입니다. 기사에 따르면, 이들 민병대의 주된 임무는 이란의 적들을 국경 너머로 이끌어내어 분쟁을 이란 자체로부터 멀어지게 하는 것입니다. 미국과 사우디아라비아가 이란을 직접 겨냥하는 대신 이라크 기반 민병대들을 공격한 것은 이러한 전략이 성공적으로 작동하고 있음을 시사합니다. 이는 이란이 직접적인 군사 개입의 위험을 최소화하면서도 지역 내에서 영향력을 행사하는 새로운 형태의 지정학적 전략을 구사하고 있음을 보여줍니다. 이는 중동 지역의 세력 균형을 변화시키고, 이란의 영향력이 국경을 넘어 확대되는 결과를 낳습니다.

본문 3: 향후 위험 및 전망

이러한 대리 군대의 존재는 중동 지역의 불안정성을 지속적으로 증가시키는 요인입니다. 이들 민병대가 보유한 무력은 잠재적으로 미국과 아랍 국가들 간의 충돌을 더욱 격화시킬 수 있는 위험을 내포하고 있습니다. 향후 이들 세력의 활동은 지역 안보 환경에 직접적인 영향을 미칠 것이며, 이란의 외부 정책이 중동의 안정성에 미치는 장기적인 영향에 대한 지속적인 관찰이 필요합니다. 특히, 이들 세력의 군사적 역량이 확대될 경우, 지역 내에서 예측 불가능한 충돌 가능성이 높아질 수 있습니다.

결론

이란 연계 민병대 네트워크는 이란의 군사적 목표를 달성하기 위해 구축된 강력한 대리 군대로서, 지정학적 갈등을 이란 외부로 전이시키는 전략적 도구로 해석됩니다. 향후 이들 세력의 군사적 활동과 국제 사회의 대응 방식에 따라 중동 지역의 역학 관계가 변화할 가능성이 있습니다. 따라서 이들 세력의 동향을 면밀히 주시하며 지역 안보 환경의 변화를 예측하는 것이 중요합니다.

---

원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiV0FVX3lxTE9nR0FuNkpIeHEwMHdySllvNjJlSjNfZl80S3lGYmY3Q2xvUTNWbWpWR1RHaWkybktlblBwMk9lUzBJMmhMYVFPemJtNm5YeEhYdl9Bek1uUQ?oc=5

Iran’s Iraq militias are a proxy army built for war - The Jerusalem Post

A network of Iran-linked Shi'ite militias is operating in Iraq. Taken together, they are an extremely powerful military force.When the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps launched ballistic missiles at US forces in Jordan on July 28, the US, in association with Saudi Arabia, did not aim its response at the IRGC directly. They struck a number of the Iraq-based militias instead, accusing them of past attacks on US forces and of carrying out drone strikes on Saudi oil facilities – acting under the direction of the IRGC.In short, the US and its allies have recognized that the militias are, in effect, an integral part of the Iranian military, a functioning wing of the IRGC.This network of Shi'ite militias, spread across Iraq, was put together by Qasem Soleimani, the one-time commander of the IRGC's Quds Force.Responsible for Iran's external operations and covert activities, it took him roughly 17 years – from the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq until his death in 2020 by a US drone on the orders of US President Donald Trump – to build the network up.It has since become an invaluable adjunct to Iran's military potential. The militias, with Iranian financial and military support, have accrued arsenals that include long-range missiles and anti-aircraft weapons. They are, to put it briefly, a formidable proxy army capable of engaging the US and Arab countries in a long, costly conflict.That was precisely Soleimani's intention. The militias were built to fight Iran's enemies beyond its borders, dragging conflict away from the Islamic Republic itself. With the US and Saudi Arabia striking Iraq instead of Iran, Soleimani's plan appears to be working.The UK's Daily Telegraph reported a Tehran-based analyst's opinion of the militias. “They have the potential to expand the war to Iraq and add more actors into it. Their main job is to move the war from Iran to Iraq.”“If America wants to destroy them, it is a matter of one week,” the analyst continued. “But that would officially bring the war to Iraq, and this is what Iran wants. More actors and fronts will make it expensive and hard for Trump to carry on.”Most of these Iran-aligned factions are nominally part of the Iraqi state's Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF as a whole is an umbrella organization comprised of dozens of militias that were mobilized in 2014 to fight ISIS. In 2016, Iraq formally incorporated the PMF, which numbers well over 200,000 personnel, into the state's security structure. It remains separate from the army and operates through its own command framework under the Iraqi government. In practice, however, the framework is loose, and the main factions retain their own chains of command, intelligence networks, missile and drone arsenals, and political organizations, giving them substantial autonomy from the Iraqi state.The principal Iran-aligned militia organizations operating within Iraq include Kataib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, the Badr Organization, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada. They are estimated to field around 50,000 frontline fighters.Despite recent US and allied strikes, which have damaged their facilities and killed commanders, they remain militarily formidable. They possess rockets, ballistic missiles, armed drones, anti-tank weapons and sophisticated intelligence capabilities.Several have extensive combat experience from Iraq, Syria and, more recently, operations linked to the wider Iran-Israel-US confrontation.Militia organizations' embedding into Iraqi societyMoreover, rather like the position that Hezbollah in its heyday achieved within Lebanon, the militia organizations have embedded themselves deeply in Iraq's political, economic, and social fabric. Many militia leaders also head political parties represented in parliament, and hold ministerial portfolios or influence appointments throughout the security bureaucracy. Further, they command substantial financial resources through various economic enterprises, border crossings, and reconstruction contracts.Not all the money acquired is illicit. Many PMF units are officially part of Iraq's security apparatus and receive government funding. Salaries, equipment, and operational budgets come from the Iraqi state budget and are legal.But Iraq's borders with Iran, Syria, and other neighbors handle billions of dollars in trade annually. Notably, reports from Iraqi officials, researchers, and international organizations have described militia influence at certain border crossings, where groups allegedly extract unofficial “fees” from importers and truckers, facilitate smuggling operations, manipulate customs procedures, and gain control over transportation and logistics services.After the war against ISIS, Iraq set aside large amounts of funding for rebuilding damaged cities and infrastructure. Militia-linked businesspeople and companies have been accused of winning government contracts through political influence. They demand kickbacks from contractors seeking permits or security access, and control local economic activity in areas where the militia is dominant.Consequently, the Iran-linked militias function not merely as armed groups, but as an entrenched political-economic network embedded within the Iraqi state.This is a situation that Iraq's recently elected Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi – very much like Lebanon's President Joseph Aoun – finds intolerable. Both have declared their intention to bring all non-state military groups within their respective nation's control. Al-Zaidi has gone so far as to set September 2026 as a target for significant progress. His pledge enjoys support from Washington and from many Iraqis who wish to strengthen national sovereignty.He faces formidable obstacles. The strongest militias reject complete disarmament. With powerful parliamentary allies and independent sources of finance, they are in a position to frustrate any attempt by al-Zaidi to bring them under government authority. In any case, many of those within the groups do not see themselves as part of Iraq's security forces, but as integral to Iran's wider Axis of Resistance.A complete dismantling of these organizations therefore appears unlikely in the short term. Al-Zaidi may succeed in reducing their autonomy, but not in eliminating their independent military and political influence.An Iranian official is reported in the Daily Telegraph as describing the militias as “indispensable.”“They are the backbone of the resistance forces in the region,” he said, “and their nature of multiple groups and closeness to Iran are their biggest strengths.” He added that “some of them were in Iran during the war to help our armed forces control the streets” – that is, to subdue anti-government protesters – an indication of how deeply the militias are woven into Iran's war machine.For the foreseeable future, Iran can continue to rely on this substantial external military power to bolster its own military capacity.The writer, a former senior civil servant, is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiV0FVX3lxTE9nR0FuNkpIeHEwMHdySllvNjJlSjNfZl80S3lGYmY3Q2xvUTNWbWpWR1RHaWkybktlblBwMk9lUzBJMmhMYVFPemJtNm5YeEhYdl9Bek1uUQ?oc=5