이란 전쟁이 소말리아에 미치는 지정학적 영향과 경제적 파장
Somalia in the Crosshairs: the Consequences of the Iran War on Somalia - African Arguments
소말리아의 지opolitical 갈등으로 인해 단기적으로 특정 주식에 대한 명확한 영향은 없지만, 불안정한 요인이 작용하고 있습니다.
핵심 요약
2000년대부터 소말리아 해역의 석유 전망이 지역 강국들의 영향력 다툼을 촉발했습니다.
핵심요약
- 2000년대부터 소말리아 해역의 석유 전망이 지역 강국들의 영향력 다툼을 촉발했습니다.
- 아랍에미리트, 에티오피아, 튀르키예, 이집트 등 4개국이 소말리아의 내정에 개입하며 갈등을 부추기고 있습니다.
- 소말리아의 연방 구성국들은 자체적으로 항구와 공항을 개발하며 독립성을 강화하고 있습니다.
- 바브엘만데브 해협의 전략적 중요성이 이란 전쟁으로 더욱 부각되고 있습니다.
도입
이란 전쟁이 소말리아에 미치는 영향은 단순한 지역 갈등을 넘어 글로벌 경제와 지정학적 안보에까지 파장을 미치고 있습니다. 특히 석유 자원과 해상 교역로의 통제권을 둘러싼 경쟁이 소말리아의 내정 불안정을 심화시키고 있어, 투자자들에게는 새로운 리스크와 기회가 동시에 제시되고 있습니다.
본문 1: 석유 자원의 전략적 가치와 영향력 다툼
2000년대부터 소말리아 해역의 석유 전망이 보고되면서, 이 지역을 둘러싼 영향력 다툄이 더욱 치열해졌습니다. 아랍에미리트, 에티오피아, 튀르키예, 이집트 등 지역 강국들이 소말리아의 내정에 개입하며, 항구와 공항 건설을 지원하고 있습니다. 이러한 개발은 소말리아의 내정 불안정을 더욱 악화시키며, 평화적 해결을 위한 노력을 방해하고 있습니다. 석유 자원의 전략적 가치가 높아짐에 따라, 소말리아의 해안선 통제권은 글로벌 강국들의 관심사 중 하나로 부상하고 있습니다. 이는 소말리아의 경제 발전에 긍정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있지만, 동시에 정치적 불안정을 초래할 가능성도 있습니다.
본문 2: 연방 구성국의 독립성과 지역 갈등의 심화
소말리아의 연방 구성국들은 자체적으로 항구와 공항을 개발하며 독립성을 강화하고 있습니다. 이는 중앙 정부의 권한을 약화시키며, 지역 갈등을 더욱 심화시키고 있습니다. 특히 소말릴란드 정부와 에티오피아 간의 협력 모의는 이러한 갈등을 상징적으로 보여주는 사례입니다. 중앙 정부의 약화와 연방 구성국의 독립성 강화는 소말리아의 정치적 불안정을 지속시킬 가능성이 있습니다. 이는 투자자들에게는 추가적인 리스크를 의미하며, 소말리아의 경제 발전에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다.
본문 3: 바브엘만데브 해협의 전략적 중요성과 글로벌 경제 영향
바브엘만데브 해협은 글로벌 교역의 핵심 통로 중 하나로, 이란 전쟁으로 그 전략적 중요성이 더욱 부각되고 있습니다. 소말리아의 해안선 통제권은 이 해협의 안보를 좌우하는 핵심 요소 중 하나로 부상하고 있습니다. 이는 글로벌 경제에 미치는 파장을 고려할 때, 투자자들에게는 새로운 리스크를 의미합니다. 특히 석유 수출과 수입에 의존하는 국가들은 이 지역의 안정성에 대한 관심이 높아지고 있습니다. 이는 소말리아의 경제 발전에 긍정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있지만, 동시에 정치적 불안정을 초래할 가능성도 있습니다.
결론
이란 전쟁이 소말리아에 미치는 영향은 단순한 지역 갈등을 넘어 글로벌 경제와 지정학적 안보에까지 파장을 미치고 있습니다. 특히 석유 자원과 해상 교역로의 통제권을 둘러싼 경쟁이 소말리아의 내정 불안정을 심화시키고 있어, 투자자들에게는 새로운 리스크와 기회가 동시에 제시되고 있습니다. 향후 소말리아의 정치적 안정성과 경제 발전에 대한 관심은 계속 높아질 전망입니다.
Original Article
Somalia in the Crosshairs: the Consequences of the Iran War on Somalia - African Arguments
The US-Israel war on Iran has had global ramifications in the cost of daily life and geopolitical calculations. Because of geographical proximity, political instability, and relative poverty of countries in the Horn of Africa, the spillover and the impact of this war on this region is particularly consequential. In this piece, we take a closer at the potential geopolitical ramification and the impact on the cost of living of the Iran War in Somalia.
For many, the Iran war has underscored the significance of maritime chokepoints for the global economy, but Somalia’s politics has been enmeshed and shaped in recent times by global competition for control of coastlines and chokepoints for trade and military purposes. Somalia is nestled geostrategically along the Indian Ocean , with an extensive coastline that abuts the critical Bab el-Mandab Strait leading to the Red Sea. The global competition over this important maritime chokepoint has resulted in contest for influence and control over Somalia’s coastline, which has increasingly shaped domestic politics. Reports of the prospects of finding oil in Somalia’s waters since the 2000s have only added to the scramble for influence.
The regional and global competition for Somalia’s coastline and ports has embroiled the country in competitive and escalatory proxy dynamics, undermining progress towards the peaceful resolution of domestic grievances. Regional actors have raced to construct commercial/military ports across Somalia’s coastline and invested in its domestic politics, including the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Turkiye, Egypt and others. These dynamics have overlapped with the relative autonomy that Somalia’s regions – Federal Member States – have acquired over the past decade or more, as decentralised governments have developed their own ports and airports, often with the assistance of outside powers. These tensions and dynamics are exemplified in the now outdated MoU of Somaliland government with Ethiopia for the lease of its coast, and the Israeli recognition of Somaliland (a region that the Federal Government of Somalia and the rest of the world view as part of Somalia’s sovereign territory) in December 2025 that included the establishment of an Israel military base. The UAE has also been a major investor in Berbera port in Somaliland. Simultaneously, Turkiye, an important partner to the Somali Federal Government, has sent its first deep sea drilling vessels to Mogadishu this week, and has made significant investments in the seaport and airport at Mogadishu over the last 10-15 years as well as in a military base in the Somali capital .
Foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa (2019). GIGA
Materially, the increasing footprint of regional states could draw Somali territory into intensified competition. The Iran War and the blockade of the Straits of Hormuz has further underlined the importance of critical maritime chokepoints, such as Bab el-Mandab. This is likely to generate further scrambling by regional and global powers for influence and military presence in the countries around Bab el-Mandab, including Somalia. As well as the recent Israeli recognition of Somaliland, and the potential lifting of sanctions on Eritrea by the U.S . is part of this playbook. This will further exacerbate political fragmentation in Somalia and undermine the fragile statebuilding efforts.
In central Somalia, a women’s rights NGO finalising a recreation pitch for youth is feeling the effects of the Iran War – the price of nails has skyrocketed. Tuk-tuk drivers, ubiquitous in Somalia’s bigger towns and cities, have raised prices for short trips reflecting increases in fuel prices . As an economy that relies on imports of food, fuel, and most commodities for everyday life, ordinary Somalis are feeling the effects of another war, only this one is outside the Somali territory.
The immediate impact of this war, like in many regions of the world, will be most keenly felt in how people carry out their livelihoods, especially for the poorest and most vulnerable populations as the cost-of-living rises. The ongoing Iran impasse will play out across the Somalia economy and peoples’ livelihoods in different ways.
Prior to the Iran war, due to poor seasonal rains and dramatic cuts to international aid, concerns were already high regarding the potential for increased food insecurity, mortality and famine conditions to develop in Somalia . This, in a country that has had two major famines in the last 35 years (in 1992 and 2011). One of the consequences of the aid cuts for example, has been a reduction in the number of health centres in the country, thereby increasing risk of disease loads.
Food supply itself has been minimally disrupted by the war as traders can still source commodities, so far, but prices are being affected by increased transportation costs due to both rising fuel and insurance prices. A major importer to Somalia reported that freight costs from India, the primary source of rice, sugar and wheat flour for the country, has roughly doubled in recent weeks. Similarly, the same importer estimated that goods coming from Turkey, another important source of imported food and clothes, through the Suez Canal have now been shifted to larger container ships which are travelling around the entire African continent, and where the cost of using containers has tripled since the start of the Iran war.
While some analysts were privately warning that the risk of famine was being over-stated, rising prices will no doubt push a greater number of people into hardship and increased hunger. The most vulnerable communities, including internally displaced persons, are likely to bear the brunt of volatile price hikes. These populations have moved from rural areas over the years due to insecurity, recurrent drought and the attraction of towns for services, job opportunities and access to aid.
There are however some mitigating factors. An estimated 30-50% of Somalia’s GNP comes from remittances ,. A significant proportion of households in Somalia – an estimated 40% – receive some form of remittance , directly or indirectly. and so these flows should not be directly affected by the Gulf war and will continue to flow. However, the populations that are considered most vulnerable to food insecurity, such as the displaced, will tend to have the least access to remittances and so will find it harder to absorb the effects of price increases.
Somalia is famed for the export of its livestock, having large numbers of camel, cattle, sheep and goats which provide food (milk and meat) as well as income for pastoralists/nomads and farming populations. While some of these animals are sold for domestic consumption, a greater share is for export. A major market for livestock is the Gulf countries, particularly the annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia, which took place just last month. Although there were concerns that the Hajj would be disrupted due to the Iran war numbers were very similar to last year – an estimated 1.5m travelled . Sales of Somali livestock – particularly sheep – have remained relatively stable.
As with the rest of the world, the Iran war will be most immediately felt in Somalia in the increased cost of living. While this immediate impact should be a priority for policymakers, the potential medium to long-term impact of this conflict is important to recognise. The total or partial closure of the Straits of Hormuz and the significant impact this is having on the global economy, may well further intensify the competition over another significant chokepoint of global maritime trade, Bab el-Mandab. As one of the countries whose shores abut Bab al-Mandab, Somalia and its domestic politics could be further entangled in this global geopolitical competition. We have recently seen evidence of this in Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and the subsequent condemnations and diplomatic manoeuvres by Mogadishu and regional powers. Somalia is already highly fragmented in political and territorial terms ; the Iran war may deepen this further.