EU, 러시아에 대한 21번째 제재 패키지 발표
Ukraine war: EU increases pressure on Russia with latest sanctions - International Bar Association | IBA
유럽연합의 제21차 러시아 제재는 시장에 미치는 영향이 명확하지 않은 정기적인 업데이트입니다. 따라서 중립적인 입장을 유지하는 것이 적합합니다.
핵심 요약
유럽연합은 러시아에 대한 21번째 제재 패키지를 발표하며, 금융과 암호화폐 분야를 타겟으로 삼았습니다.
핵심요약
- EU는 2022년 우크라이나 전면 침공 이후 21번째 제재 패키지를 발표했습니다.
- 이번 제재에는 키르기스스탄으로의 특정 제품 수출을 금지하는 회피 방지 도구가 포함되었습니다.
- 20번째 제재 패키지는 3개월 전 도입되었으며, EU는 지속적으로 러시아 경제에 압력을 가하고 있습니다.
- 중동 갈등과 에너지 공급망 교란으로 인한 압력이 완화된 상황에서도 제재의 강도를 유지하려는 목적입니다.
도입
이번 EU의 21번째 제재 패키지 발표는 투자자들에게 러시아 경제에 대한 지속적인 압박이 계속될 것임을 시사합니다. 특히 키르기스스탄을 통한 제재 회피를 방지하기 위한 새로운 조치가 도입된 점은 러시아의 경제적 고립이 더욱 심화될 가능성을 높입니다. 이는 러시아 관련 주식과 채권 시장에 영향을 미칠 수 있는 중요한 사건입니다.
본문 1: EU 제재의 확대와 러시아 경제에 미치는 영향
EU는 이번 제재 패키지에서 금융기관과 암호화폐 플랫폼을 타겟으로 삼았습니다. 이는 러시아가 국제 금융 시스템으로부터 더 큰 고립을 경험할 수 있음을 의미합니다. 특히 암호화폐 플랫폼을 타겟으로 한 제재는 러시아가 국제 금융 시스템을 우회하여 자금을 조달하는 방법을 제한할 것입니다. 이는 러시아의 경제 활동에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 가능성이 높습니다.
본문 2: 제재 회피 방지 조치의 효과와 한계
이번 제재 패키지에서 처음으로 키르기스스탄으로의 특정 제품 수출을 금지하는 회피 방지 도구가 활성화되었습니다. 이는 러시아가 제재를 우회하기 위해 사용하던 경로를 차단할 수 있을 것입니다. 그러나 이러한 조치가 실제로 러시아의 제재 회피를 완전히 차단할 수 있을지는 불확실합니다. 러시아는 새로운 회피 경로를 발견할 수 있는 능력과 경험이 있습니다.
본문 3: 중동 갈등과 에너지 공급망 교란의 영향
중동 갈등과 에너지 공급망 교란으로 인한 압력이 완화된 상황에서도 EU는 제재의 강도를 유지하려는 목적을 가지고 있습니다. 이는 러시아가 국제 사회로부터 더 큰 고립을 경험할 수 있음을 의미합니다. 그러나 이러한 상황은 러시아가 새로운 시장과 파트너를 발견할 수 있는 기회를 제공할 수도 있습니다. 이는 러시아의 경제 활동에 긍정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있는 가능성을 높입니다.
결론
EU의 21번째 제재 패키지 발표는 러시아 경제에 대한 지속적인 압박이 계속될 것임을 시사합니다. 그러나 러시아가 새로운 회피 경로를 발견할 수 있는 능력과 경험이 있으며, 중동 갈등과 에너지 공급망 교란으로 인한 상황 변화도 고려해야 합니다. 앞으로 러시아 경제에 대한 제재의 효과와 영향은 계속 모니터링되어야 할 것입니다.
Original Article
Ukraine war: EU increases pressure on Russia with latest sanctions - International Bar Association | IBA
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen delivering a press statement on the proposals for the 21st package of sanctions against Russia, 9 June 2026. © European Union, 2026 / Source: EC - Audiovisual Service / Photo: P-069974
In June, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen announced the latest package of sanctions against Russia. It includes new measures targeting financial institutions, cryptocurrency platforms and shadow fleet vessels, all of which aims to squeeze the Russian economy and weaken Putin’s war machine.
‘The conflict in the Middle East and disruptions to global energy supply chains have eased some pressure on Russia,’ says von der Leyen. ‘So, the objective of our package could not be clearer. We want to maintain the full intensity of our sanctions.’
This will be the 21st set of sanctions since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. These latest proposals follow the introduction of the EU’s long-stalled 20th sanctions package three months ago, signalling the intention to continually and incrementally increase pressure on the Russian economy. For the first time, the EU activated its anti-circumvention tool by banning the export of numerical control machines or radios to Kyrgyzstan, where there’s a high risk of products being diverted to Russia.
Yves Melin, Co-Chair of the IBA International Trade and Customs Law Committee, says the 20th sanctions package went further than previous measures regarding circumvention. He says the election of a more pro-EU government in Hungary in April is likely to have emboldened the EU. ‘Without being a game changer, it’s moving in the direction where the use of sanctions is going to be more effective,’ says Melin, a partner at Cattwyk in Brussels.
Anna Olejniczak-Michalska, legal counsel at Wardyński i Wspólnicy in Warsaw, says that the outright ban of the export of certain products to Kyrgyzstan and the increased listings of sanctioned individuals and entities helps provide predictability and clarity for businesses. ‘Before the EU was almost exclusively relying on operators to do their own due diligence. It was a huge burden and not very effective because different operators would conduct different levels of due diligence,’ she says.
Yves Melin Co-Chair, IBA International Trade and Customs Law Committee
The introduction of the EU’s 20th sanctions package came alongside the EU approving a €90bn loan to Ukraine, which the former Hungarian administration had blocked. Ukraine has also seen significant gains on the battlefield in 2026, which have been attributed to technological innovation and advances in its defence industry. ‘Sanctions are not going to decide the end of the war on their own, but all of these things together mean that the pressure is going to stay increased on Russia,’ says Melin.
There is still room for improvement and experts who spoke to Global Insight said the main challenge is enforcement. Enforcement of the EU’s sanctions regime is carried out by individual Member States that are responsible for investigating and prosecuting breaches and circumvention by companies and individuals. While the EU introduced a Sanctions Directive in 2024 to criminalise sanctions violations and harmonise penalties, the level of resources, expertise and political will to enforce the law varies greatly between the Member States.
Joydeep Sengupta, Head of Global Compliance and Investigations at Dentons in Paris, believes that the EU should introduce a centralised sanctions enforcement and licencing authority to handle prosecutions of sanctions violations and permissions for allowing certain transactions to take place. ‘Sanctions investigations are specialised, technical, cross-border and require significant forensic resources,’ he says. ‘Many of the small countries don’t have the expertise, resources, or capacity to handle these unilaterally, including gathering evidence across borders.’
The EU has seen a recent trend towards creating centralised criminal enforcement authorities. The European Public Prosecutors Office was introduced in 2021 to investigate and prosecute crimes that harm the finances of the EU and the Anti-Money Laundering Authority came into effect in 2024.
Łukasz Lasek, a partner at Wardyński i Wspólnicy, supports the creation of an EU-wide sanctions authority and says that it would be most practical if it focused on the most serious and complex crimes, at least initially. ‘We have seen that the European Public Prosecutors Office has been very effective with prosecutors from different Member States working within one institution on cross-border investigations,’ he says. ‘And cooperation is more efficient.’
Following the war in Iran, and the subsequent spike in oil prices, von der Leyen has stressed that this is not ‘the moment to relax sanctions on Russia’. She says enforcing the oil price cap – which prevents EU businesses from facilitating the transport of Russian crude sold above $44 a barrel – will help stabilise global markets and limit Putin’s oil revenues. Announcing proposals for the 21st package of sanctions, von der Leyen said the Commission intends to pause the oil cap adjustment mechanism until January, which follows market trends, to avoid Russia benefiting from the rise in oil prices. In March, Russia’s oil export revenues raised from $9.3bn to $19bn, according to the Kyiv School of Economics Institute.
Outside the EU, responses to the Iran war have varied, with the need to limit energy price shocks often prioritised. The US administration introduced waivers for sanctions on Russian seaborne oil already loaded onto vessels, which were heavily criticised. The UK government responded by amending a raft of sanctions on Russia, removing plans to ban imports of diesel and jet fuel made from Russian oil in third countries.
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