핵심요약

• 호르무즈 해협 통제권 분쟁은 양측이 원하는 것은 해협 재개이며, 통제권에 대한 이견이 핵심입니다.
• 군사적 옵션은 제한적이며, 지속적인 폭격은 이스라엘 및 후티 공격을 포함하는 더 큰 전쟁으로 이어질 위험이 있습니다.
• 이란에게 해협은 생존의 상징이자 경제적 마비의 무기로 작용하며, 이는 미국의 대이란 전쟁에 대한 신중함을 요구합니다.
• 2024년 4월 휴전 협정 당시 이란은 해협을 '완전히 개방'한다고 선언했으나, 미국은 해상 봉쇄를 주장하며 갈등이 지속되었습니다.

도입

본 기사는 미국과 이란 간의 호르무즈 해협 분쟁이 단순한 군사적 대립을 넘어 글로벌 에너지 및 무역 흐름에 미치는 지정학적 의미를 분석합니다. 투자자들은 이 분쟁이 어떻게 글로벌 해상 물류 비용과 에너지 가격에 영향을 미칠지, 그리고 잠재적인 군사적 확전 위험이 시장에 어떤 불확실성을 야기할지 주목해야 합니다. 이는 단기적인 지정학적 리스크가 장기적인 글로벌 공급망 안정성에 미치는 영향을 이해하는 데 필수적입니다.

본문 1: 지정학적 리스크와 군사적 한계

양국의 분쟁은 해협 통제권을 둘러싼 전략적 목표의 차이에서 발생합니다. 이란에게 호르무즈 해협은 미국과 이스라엘에 대한 승리의 상징이자 생존 보장이며, 이는 단순한 통로 이상의 의미를 가집니다. 이란은 해협을 통제함으로써 전 세계 경제에 대규모 혼란을 야기하는 무기로 활용하며, 이는 잠재적인 군사적 억지력으로 작용합니다. 그러나 기사는 양측 모두 군사적 옵션이 제한적이며, 지속적인 폭격이 이스라엘 인프라나 홍해의 다른 해상로를 차단하는 더 큰 전쟁으로 확대될 위험이 있음을 지적합니다. 이는 군사적 해결책이 한계에 도달했으며, 외교적 접근이 필수적임을 시사합니다.

본문 2: 외교적 역동성과 전략적 변화

과거의 협상 과정은 군사적 충돌과 외교적 유연성이 어떻게 상호작용하는지를 보여줍니다. 2024년 4월 휴전 협정에서 이란이 해협을 '완전히 개방'하겠다고 선언했으나, 미국이 해상 봉쇄를 주장하면서 갈등이 재점화되었습니다. 이러한 상반된 입장은 외교적 노력에도 불구하고 군사적 긴장이 해소되지 않았음을 의미합니다. 이란이 이후 '페르시아만 해협 당국(Persian Gulf Strait Authority)'을 설립한 것은 이러한 외교적 압력에 대한 전략적 대응으로 해석됩니다. 이는 군사적 통제 대신 제도적 통제권을 확보하려는 시도로 보이며, 향후 해협 관리의 새로운 틀을 제시할 가능성이 있습니다.

본문 3: 글로벌 공급망 및 에너지 시장에 미치는 영향

호르무즈 해협의 불안정성은 글로벌 공급망과 에너지 시장에 직접적인 영향을 미칩니다. 이 해협을 통과하는 선박의 통행 제한이나 위험 증가는 유류 및 원자재의 운송 비용을 상승시키고 물류 지연을 초래합니다. 이러한 비용 증가는 최종 소비자 가격에 전가되어 인플레이션 압력을 가중시킬 수 있습니다. 또한, 해협의 불안정성은 지정학적 불확실성을 높여 투자 심리를 위축시키고, 에너지 공급망의 취약성을 부각시킵니다. 따라서 이 지역의 안정화는 글로벌 경제의 안정에 중요한 변수로 작용합니다.

결론

미국과 이란의 호르무즈 해협 분쟁은 군사적 해결책의 한계를 보여주며, 외교적 협상과 제도적 틀 마련이 장기적인 해결책임을 시사합니다. 향후 시장은 양국의 외교적 역동성과 해협 통제에 대한 국제적 합의 노력에 따라 변동성을 보일 가능성이 높습니다. 투자자들은 지정학적 리스크가 에너지 및 해운 부문의 비용에 미치는 영향을 지속적으로 모니터링해야 할 것입니다. 특히, 양측이 제안하는 새로운 통제 메커니즘의 실현 가능성에 주목해야 합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMikwFBVV95cUxNbHNhRElpQ1hvS2duRC1vME5BakV1R1ZwRTRoNWpsQUxYek9TRkxHYmJLX3M0eTQ0MzF3Y0lrNUdWMFBndUVrZGQ5eFpIZjBLZ3pfckhLYTRralBxWU50YTZXMDlWYXkyUkpEUW9HcUZTeW9ZTW9leEZKdG1nVFp2bV9QeVFRdUhHXzNWRGRtdEhwU3c?oc=5

How the United States and Iran Can Solve Hormuz - Foreign Policy

Fees for passage through the strait are likely inevitable.

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The United States and Iran are back in war mode over the flow of ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Fundamentally, however, the two sides have the same strategic end goal: to reopen the strait in both directions. Their dispute is over how much control each side will wield in the postwar management of this global shipping choke point. The gaps are bridgeable, and it would be highly reckless for the United States and Iran to continue their bombing.

The wars of the past year have already demonstrated to both sides that military options are limited. As they jockey to strengthen their hand over the Strait of Hormuz, they risk a larger war that might include Israeli strikes on critical Iranian infrastructure and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, effectively closing another major shipping route.

For the Iranian regime, the strait has become a symbol of triumph over the United States and Israel and a guarantee of its survival. Its ability to cut off access to the strait has proved to be a weapon of mass disruption to the global economy—and arguably its strongest deterrent against future attacks. Any U.S. president will need to think twice before pursuing a regime-change war against Iran.

The more U.S. President Donald Trump has doubled down on maximum pressure against Iran, the more Tehran has hardened its position over the strait. In the early days of the April cease-fire, Iran declared the strait “completely open” to all commercial shipping through a “coordinated route,” signaling it would lift the de facto tolls imposed during the war and ease passage. But the same day, Trump asserted the United States would continue its naval blockade, prompting a backlash from Iran’s military, which viewed this as a cease-fire violation. Iran reversed course, temporarily closed the strait, and established a new “Persian Gulf Strait Authority” in May to more formally manage commercial transit.

A similar tug-of-war followed the recent memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the two countries. Iran interpreted article 5 as providing it with the right to oversee navigation in the strait during the 60-day truce period. By contrast, the United States expanded support for ships using a southern route through Omani territorial waters, already employed discreetly during the shaky cease-fire period to bypass Iranian waters. But Tehran realized that Washington was establishing this route as the new normal, reducing Iranian control over the strait, its leverage in negotiations, and its future deterrence. Iran responded by firing at vessels using the Omani route.

In doing so, Iran was willing to run the risk of collapsing the MOU. As one Iranian commentator close to the negotiating team recently explained on state television, “Either we hold on to this strait, or we go and become martyrs for it one by one.” Indeed, this triggered the biggest U.S. bombardment inside Iran in months, prompting Trump to declare the end of the cease-fire.

While maintaining control over the strait is now a red line for Tehran, it has already shown openness to negotiating with Oman over the degree of that control. Ultimately, Iran understands a compromise is necessary. Unless shipping returns to normal, Iran itself will remain constrained by the U.S. naval blockade that Trump has reimposed. China, which purchases close to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports, also depends on the strait reopening and has not endorsed Iran’s approach to controlling the passageway. Beijing is therefore likely to be the most influential party in nudging Tehran toward a middle way. Moreover, the longer Iran disrupts the strait, the more it diminishes its future value as other countries diversify away from it.

These factors open space for compromise. Mediation efforts should first focus on establishing a temporary transit arrangement for the next four to six weeks until a permanent, regionally backed solution can be found. One option would be a new joint Omani-Iranian control center (with a U.S. green light) providing security clearance for equal numbers of ships to use the strait’s northern and southern routes without fees, as envisaged under the MOU. Another key step would be a public U.S.-Iran agreement to de-conflict in the strait, including pausing military vessel transits that might quickly trigger renewed fighting.

During this confidence-building period, the United States and Iran should agree on a system for mine clearance in the original traffic separation scheme adopted by the U.N.’s International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1968. Before the war, this scheme was the preferred route because of its safety and depth. However, ships have avoided it since Iran declared it unsafe, amid concerns that the area was mined by Iran.

Iran rejected demining by the European-led maritime mission, despite its advanced capabilities already positioned for quick deployment to the strait. Tehran is unlikely to hand over such a sensitive task to NATO militaries. Instead, it may accept support from states it considers neutral or friendly, including Japan , which has advanced mine-sweeping capabilities. A third party—trusted by the global shipping sector—would need to guarantee the strait is mine-free before shipping resumes.

In the long run, a regional service fee structure—which benefits Iran and reflects its role—may be inevitable. Trump has legitimized this concept by announcing an extortionate 20 percent price tag for ships wanting to transit through Hormuz. While he quickly backtracked after a push by U.S. partners in the Middle East, Trump is likely to insist the United States also participate in any future regional fee arrangement.

To be workable, this will need to be in line with international law, with fees covering services such as pollution response, security, and navigation support. Politically, it will also need to have regional backing and actively involve the littoral states of the strait. International actors should encourage Tehran and Washington to accept third-party oversight of such a fund. The IMO, which already administers a trust fund for the Strait of Malacca, would be well placed to perform this role.

Using a third-party entity would give a management system for the Strait of Hormuz greater credibility and durability. Iran should also be open to such a structure because it would improve the chances of securing the U.S. sanctions exemptions needed for commercial operators to pay fees to Iran.

The longer the strait remains a point of contention, the more entrenched the two sides become—trapping Tehran and Trump in a continuing cycle of war. It would be foolish for either side to abandon the MOU and continue the high-stakes fighting of recent days. Neither appears likely to gain what a year of intermittent bombing has failed to achieve. Ultimately, both sides will have to return to diplomacy, but only after wasting more resources and lives while potentially weakening the leverage they currently hold.

Ellie Geranmayeh is the deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations. She is also author of the Iran nuclear monitor . X: @EllieGeranmayeh

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Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMikwFBVV95cUxNbHNhRElpQ1hvS2duRC1vME5BakV1R1ZwRTRoNWpsQUxYek9TRkxHYmJLX3M0eTQ0MzF3Y0lrNUdWMFBndUVrZGQ5eFpIZjBLZ3pfckhLYTRralBxWU50YTZXMDlWYXkyUkpEUW9HcUZTeW9ZTW9leEZKdG1nVFp2bV9QeVFRdUhHXzNWRGRtdEhwU3c?oc=5