이란 쿠르드 세력을 활용한 전쟁 계획, 왜 실패했나?
Why Did the Plan to Bring Iran’s Kurds into the War Collapse Before It Even Began? - studies.aljazeera.net
지정학적 분석은 배경 정보를 제공하지만 단기적인 주식 움직임을 위한 즉각적이고 실행 가능한 재무 데이터는 부족합니다.
핵심 요약
이란 쿠르드 세력을 이용한 전략은 시리아와 이란의 상황 차이를 간과하여 실패했습니다.
핵심요약
- 이란 쿠르드 세력 활용 계획은 시작 단계에서 실패했습니다.
- 이스라엘은 이란의 정치 시스템과 대중 지지에 대한 오판을 했습니다.
- 시리아의 성공 사례(바샤르 알-아사드 정권 전복)를 이란에 적용하려는 시도는 실패했습니다.
- 쿠르드 무장 세력은 전국적인 사회적 기반이 부족하다는 점이 주요한 한계였습니다.
도입
본 기사는 이스라엘이 이란 내 쿠르드 반군을 이용하려 했던 전략이 어떻게 실패했는지 분석하며, 이는 지정학적 목표 달성에 있어 현지 정치 및 사회 구조에 대한 이해 부족이 얼마나 치명적인지를 보여줍니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 불확실성이 중동 지역의 에너지 및 안보 시장에 미치는 장기적인 영향을 주목해야 합니다.
본문 1: 전략적 가정의 오류
이스라엘은 전쟁 초기부터 정권 교체를 주 목표로 설정하고 이란의 핵 프로그램 파괴를 부차적인 목표로 간주했습니다. 이러한 전략의 핵심은 이란 내 쿠르드 세력을 주요 전술적 요소로 활용하는 것이었습니다. 이스라엘은 이라크, 이란, 시리아의 쿠르드 집단들과 수십 년간 정보 관계를 구축해 왔으며, 이들이 정권 교체에 기여할 것이라는 계산을 했습니다. 그러나 이러한 전략은 이란의 내부 정치적 현실과 쿠르드 세력의 사회적 기반을 과소평가한 결과였습니다. 이스라엘은 쿠르드 무장 세력이 이란 내에서 대규모 대중 봉기를 이끌어낼 수 있는 전국적인 사회적 기반을 가지고 있다는 점을 간과했습니다.
본문 2: 비교 분석을 통한 실패 원인
시리아에서 바샤르 알-아사드 정권을 단 2주 만에 무너뜨린 조직화된 무장 반군의 성공은 이스라엘에게 유사한 전략이 이란에서도 성공할 것이라는 자신감을 심어주었습니다. 그러나 이 두 사례는 근본적인 차이가 존재합니다. 시리아의 반군은 광범위한 대중 봉기의 맥락에서 움직였던 반면, 이란 쿠르드 무장 세력은 소수 민족의 일부에 불과했으며 전국적인 사회적 기반이 부족했습니다. 이러한 사회적 기반의 차이는 쿠르드 세력이 이란 전체의 정권 교체를 이끌어낼 수 있는 동력이 부족하다는 점을 의미하며, 이는 전략의 실행 가능성에 중대한 결함을 초래했습니다.
본문 3: 장기적 위험과 전망
이러한 실패는 지정학적 개입 시 현지 사회 구조와 민족적 정체성을 고려하지 않은 전략은 장기적으로 지속 가능하지 않다는 점을 시사합니다. 향후 이란과 주변 지역의 정치적 변화를 예측할 때, 무력 개입의 성공 여부는 군사적 역량뿐만 아니라 내부 사회적 동원력과 민족적 연대라는 비군사적 요인에 크게 좌우될 것입니다. 따라서 이란 내 분쟁 지역의 역학 관계를 분석할 때는 민족적, 종교적, 사회적 기반의 차이를 반드시 고려해야 합니다.
결론
결론적으로, 이란 쿠르드 세력을 활용한 전략은 현지 사회적 맥락에 대한 깊은 이해 부족으로 인해 좌절되었습니다. 향후 중동 지역의 안보 환경 변화를 예측할 때는 군사적 계산뿐만 아니라 민족적, 사회적 기반이라는 비군사적 변수를 반드시 반영해야 할 것입니다. 이러한 복합적인 요인들을 고려하지 않은 전략은 목표 달성의 가능성을 현저히 낮춥니다. 따라서 향후 전략 수립에는 현지 사회 동원력에 대한 정밀한 평가가 필수적입니다.
Original Article
Why Did the Plan to Bring Iran’s Kurds into the War Collapse Before It Even Began? - studies.aljazeera.net
Israel’s plan to use Iranian Kurdish opposition groups as an armed force in the war against Iran failed before it could be implemented, largely because of serious miscalculations about Iran’s political system, Kurdish opposition groups, and the level of popular support for regime change. From the outset of the war, regime change appeared to be the principal Israeli and American objective, while other aims, including the complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear programme, were viewed as secondary and expected to follow from the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. The participation of Iranian Kurdish forces was therefore considered an important component of the strategy.
Israel had spent decades developing intelligence relationships with Kurdish groups in Iraq, Iran and Syria. Although the precise timing and intermediaries involved in establishing regular contacts with Iranian Kurdish opposition groups remain unclear, Iranian Kurdish militants appear to have long figured in Israeli calculations against the Islamic Republic. Serious consideration of regime change reportedly returned to the Israeli leadership’s agenda in the summer of 2024. At that stage, the emerging concept appears to have involved Israeli-linked Iranian agents encouraging a popular uprising, followed by Kurdish armed groups crossing into Iran to support the protesters and advance toward Tehran.
The rapid overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria in December 2024 may have reinforced Israeli confidence in this approach. The success of an organised armed opposition in defeating a deeply rooted government in less than two weeks seemingly encouraged the belief that a comparable strategy could work in Iran. This assumption, however, overlooked major differences between the two countries. The Syrian opposition operated in the context of a broad popular uprising, whereas Iranian Kurdish armed groups represented only a portion of an ethnic minority and lacked a comparable nationwide social base.
Israeli efforts to prepare Iranian Kurdish groups intensified during 2025. Israeli officials reportedly visited militant camps in Iraqi Kurdistan and supplied weapons, while connections with Iranian opposition figures, merchants and businessmen were strengthened. These efforts appear to have been linked to the expectation that a new wave of popular protests would create an opening for armed intervention. Economic protests that began on 28 December 2025, did expand and were joined by armed elements that attacked government institutions and security forces. However, their involvement gave the Iranian authorities grounds to respond forcefully. Beginning on 8 January 2026, the government suppressed the protests; and within two days, the movement had been completely extinguished, with several hundred people reportedly killed.
The failure of the uprising prompted a major revision of the Kurdish strategy. Rather than waiting for a domestic rebellion to create the conditions for an armed advance, Israel envisaged using an Israeli-American war to weaken the Iranian state first. The expectation was that attacks would eliminate senior leaders, disrupt command-and-control structures, and weaken security and military institutions, particularly in Iran’s Kurdish-majority western provinces. This would supposedly allow Kurdish armed groups to cross the border and establish a secure route toward Tehran.
Netanyahu’s meeting with Donald Trump in Washington on 11 February 2026, appears to have been important in securing American support for this concept. Although subsequent American reports denied that Washington had given prior approval for Kurdish participation, Trump continued to refer to a Kurdish role during the first week of the war and mentioned weapons being supplied to Kurdish groups. He did not explicitly reject their participation until 7 March 2026, the eighth day of the war.
A central weakness of the strategy was the fragmented nature of the Iranian Kurdish opposition. Israel reportedly believed that Kurdish groups could mobilise around 15000 fighters and attract additional recruits as they advanced into Iran. Israeli planners recognised that the groups were divided but apparently assumed that a new coalition could overcome their rivalries. On 22 February 2026, five Kurdish political and armed organisations announced the formation of the Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan coalition following negotiations involving seven groups. The coalition consisted of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), the Kurdistan Struggle Organisation (KHABAT), and Komala of the Toilers of Kurdistan. Yet none possessed significant influence throughout the Kurdish provinces, and several had only limited political or military capabilities. Their activities were largely confined to particular regions, while ideological and organisational divisions remained significant.
The Kurdish option was still being considered in Washington shortly before its abandonment. On 3 March 2026, Trump spoke by telephone with PDKI leader Mustafa Hijri, while Israeli media reported that tens of thousands of Kurdish fighters were gathered on the Iraqi side of the border. At the same time, Iranian Kurdish-majority provinces were subjected to intensive airstrikes against security, police, Basij and intelligence facilities, apparently in preparation for a possible armed incursion.
The strategy nevertheless collapsed before the Kurdish forces entered Iran. Israeli sources close to Netanyahu attributed the reversal partly to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who they claimed had persuaded Trump, during a conversation between the two in the first days of the war, that Kurdish participation was both dangerous and futile. However, because neither Erdoğan nor Trump disclosed the contents of their conversation, the accuracy of this account is difficult to verify.
Ankara understood that an external Kurdish invasion was unlikely to succeed and could instead produce a massacre of Iranian Kurds, particularly Sunni Kurds, while plunging Iran into prolonged armed instability. Turkey may also have sought to influence Iranian Kurdish groups, especially the PDKI, to distance themselves from the Israeli plan. Abdullah Öcalan reportedly warned the Iranian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party against becoming an instrument of outside powers.
More decisive, however, was the assessment conducted by American officials after the war began. According to reports, US officials visited Kurdish groups in northern Iraq and met their leaders directly. They concluded that claims of tens of thousands of armed Kurdish fighters were greatly exaggerated and found no evidence that Kurdish forces would receive broad popular support in Iran’s Kurdish-majority provinces. They also determined that Iranian military and security forces were prepared for an external invasion.
The failure of the strategy reflected a broader pattern of Israeli overconfidence and misjudgement. Israel underestimated the complexity of Iran’s political structure, the distribution of power among its numerous governing and security institutions, and the resilience of its military and security apparatus. It also failed to distinguish between popular dissatisfaction with government policies and an actual desire to overthrow the Islamic Republic or divide Iran. Even reports of contacts with figures around former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would indicate little more than connections with peripheral actors within a highly complex political system.
The Kurdish component was based on equally questionable assumptions. Most of the groups prepared to cooperate with Israel were small and lacked substantial political or military weight, while their actual popular support among Iranian Kurds was uncertain. Crucially, at least 35 percent of Iranian Kurds are Shiite, many of whom are integrated into state institutions, and several prominent figures within the Iranian establishment have Kurdish Shiite backgrounds. Consequently, there was no basis for assuming that Iran’s Kurdish population as a whole would welcome an armed invasion.
The collapse of the regime-change strategy and the Kurdish intervention plan therefore demonstrated the depth of the gap between Israeli perceptions and the realities of Iran and its surrounding region. The failure was not simply a consequence of the strength of the Iranian state or the weaknesses of Kurdish organisations. It exposed a broader inability within Israeli strategic thinking to understand the political, social, and historical complexities of the Arab and Muslim societies in its regional environment.
*This is a summary of a policy brief originally written in Arabic available here .