핵심요약

• 미국과 이란 간의 분쟁은 6개월 동안 진행되었으며, 150만 파운드의 폭격이 발생했습니다.
• 미국은 이란의 핵 프로그램 폐쇄 및 탄도 미사일 능력 해체라는 초기 목표를 달성하지 못했습니다.
• 이란은 호르무즈 해협을 무기화하여 글로벌 경제에 압력을 가하는 비대칭적 능력을 사용했습니다.
• 분쟁 기간 동안에도 이란은 대립 세력에 대한 탄압을 계속했으며, 이는 장기적인 지정학적 불안정성을 야기합니다.

도입

본 기사는 미국과 이란 간의 군사적 충돌이 6개월 후에도 미국에게 전략적 패배로 귀결되었음을 조명합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 변화가 국제 에너지 시장의 변동성과 주요 해상 무역로의 안정성에 미치는 영향을 면밀히 분석해야 합니다. 즉, 군사적 개입의 결과가 장기적인 정책 목표 달성 실패로 이어졌을 때, 이는 글로벌 경제의 예측 가능성에 중대한 영향을 미칩니다.

본문 1: 군사적 목표와 현실의 괴리

미국이 이란에 대해 추구했던 초기 목표, 즉 이란의 핵 프로그램 폐쇄와 탄도 미사일 능력 해체는 6개월 후에도 실현되지 않았다는 점이 핵심입니다. 이란 측은 미국의 개입에도 불구하고 비대칭적 능력을 활용하여 국제 사회에 압력을 가하는 데 성공했습니다. 특히 이란이 호르무즈 해협을 봉쇄함으로써 지정학적 지리적 요소를 무기화하고, 미국의 개입이 초래한 상황을 자신들에게 유리하게 활용했습니다. 이는 군사적 승리가 곧 전략적 목표 달성으로 이어지지 않는다는 점을 보여줍니다. 미국은 군사적 행동을 통해 특정 목표를 달성하려 했으나, 상대방의 회복력과 비대칭적 대응으로 인해 전략적 우위를 확보하지 못했습니다. 이는 군사력 투입이 장기적인 외교적, 경제적 목표 달성으로 직결되지 않을 수 있음을 시사합니다.

본문 2: 에너지 시장의 취약성과 해상 무역로의 리스크

군사적 충돌의 결과는 에너지 시장과 주요 해상 무역로에 직접적인 영향을 미쳤습니다. 이란이 호르무즈 해협에 대한 통제권을 주장하고 탱커를 계속 공격하는 행위는 국제 유가 및 천연가스 가격의 변동성을 지속적으로 높이는 요인입니다. 비록 외교적 합의가 이루어지더라도, 이란이 해협 통제권을 유지하려는 시도는 에너지 공급망의 취약성을 심화시킵니다. 따라서 투자자들은 분쟁의 장기화 가능성과 해상 운송의 안전성에 대한 리스크 프리미엄을 가격에 반영해야 합니다. 이는 단순히 지정학적 위험을 넘어 실물 자산 가격에 직접적인 영향을 미치는 요소입니다.

본문 3: 장기적 정치적 안정성과 대리 세력의 역할

분쟁의 장기적인 전망은 이란 내부의 정치적 안정성과 대립 세력의 활동에 달려 있습니다. 이란 정부가 반대파에 대한 탄압을 계속하고 내부의 사회적 불안정을 관리하는 데 집중하는 것은 외부의 군사적 압력에도 불구하고 내부적인 정치적 결단이 우선함을 의미합니다. 이러한 내부적 역학 관계는 외부의 군사적 개입이 가져온 단기적 변화를 넘어 장기적인 정책 목표 달성 여부에 결정적인 영향을 미칩니다. 따라서 향후 이란의 정치적 움직임과 대리 세력의 역할 변화를 지속적으로 모니터링하는 것이 중요합니다. 이는 분쟁의 종결 시점과 향후 중동 지역의 안정성에 대한 예측의 정확도를 높이는 데 기여할 것입니다.

결론

결론적으로, 6개월간의 군사적 개입은 미국에게 전략적 패배로 해석될 수 있으며, 이는 군사적 성과가 반드시 외교적, 경제적 목표 달성으로 이어지지 않음을 보여줍니다. 향후 시장은 이란의 지정학적 행동과 에너지 공급망의 안정성에 대한 변동성에 더욱 민감하게 반응할 것입니다. 투자자들은 군사적 충돌의 단기적 결과뿐만 아니라, 이란 내부의 정치적 역학과 해상 무역로의 지속적인 리스크를 종합적으로 고려하여 장기적인 포트폴리오 전략을 수립해야 할 것입니다. 특히 에너지 가격과 해상 운송 관련 지표에 대한 면밀한 관찰이 필요합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMingFBVV95cUxNbzk1V081emVFMFlFelhwSFd3akN2Q0RKaFVBZnBiZkVjbVNtOFZJbk9FOXdRcWE1VG5TaXVENjlfN2s2c3dsV2FYV0Nha2t5bGhSN2dpekxXc0U5dEd5bm56RXVnYlA4UGlfQ0I3SmZQREU3TDQtOV9XWUV0ck5QNlVGU09RV2czbm42SGMtelZkcFlCdVQ2UjVUTjEzZw?oc=5

After Six Months of War, Trump Is Still Losing to Iran - The New Yorker

Spare a thought, too, for the Iranian people, who have been on the receiving end of 1.5 million pounds of ordnance dropped, in some ten thousand sorties, by the forces aboard the Lincoln since late February, when Trump started a war, alongside Israel, to topple the Islamic Republic. Six months later, it’s hard to view the outcome of the conflict as anything other than a profound strategic defeat for the United States. The year had begun with mass anti-government protests in cities across Iran, spurred by the theocratic regime’s mismanagement of the economy, which has also been saddled for years with crippling U.S. sanctions. The protests were brutally quashed by authorities. Then came the bombardments by U.S. and Israeli forces, which assassinated Iran’s octogenarian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and a number of his cadre; degraded its Air Force and Navy; and struck schools, universities, and health facilities, while killing more than three thousand civilians in the first weeks of the campaign. The surviving regime, in turn, hunkered down and used its asymmetric capabilities to close the crucial Strait of Hormuz, weaponizing the country’s geography in ways it hadn’t done before, in order to exact its own toll on the global economy and heap pressure on Washington. Now none of the initial aims touted by Trump—including the shuttering of Iran’s nuclear program and the dismantling of its ballistic-missile capabilities—have been realized; instead, the U.S. finds itself trying to figure out how to deprive Iran of a tool—the strait—that is in play only because of Trump’s intervention. Despite recently reported initiatives by Trump and his allies, oil and other critical supplies are still not moving freely through the waterway, and gas prices remain high. Iran still strikes at tankers, and expects some form of control over the strait to endure even after a diplomatic settlement. Iran has also continued its crackdown on the opposition; according to the United Nations, executions of political prisoners and dissidents are surging. Trump told Iran’s citizens early on that “help is on its way,” but all that has come for them has been destruction, deeper economic pain, and the renewed repression of a regime that knows, better than anything else, how to preserve itself. Trump came into the war on a high. The relative ease of his operation to remove Nicolás Maduro, the Venezuelan President, from office likely convinced him of the overwhelming primacy of American power. The conflicts that unfurled in the wake of the war in Gaza had also exposed Iran’s many vulnerabilities: Iranian proxies were toppled in Syria and humbled in Lebanon, and Israeli intelligence has repeatedly conducted successful assassination and sabotage missions within Iran. But Trump was overconfident and now finds himself unable to end a war that none of Iran’s neighbors wanted him to start. American power has also been perceptibly diminished. The U.S. has burned through inventories of precision-guided and air-defense munitions, and seen its array of military bases in the region come under significant Iranian fire—which has also inflicted damage to civilian and energy infrastructure across the region. Some countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, have no love for Tehran, but recognize that Trump’s current belligerence may not be doing them any favors. A new tripartite defense alliance between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan—though publicly welcomed by Trump—is emblematic of a region thinking beyond the United States, and hedging against the uncertainty posed by both a resilient Iran and an aggressive Israel. “The larger shift is that Gulf capitals are no longer comfortable simply aligning behind maximum pressure. They increasingly want autonomy from both Washington and Tehran,” Alex Vatanka, the director of the Iran program at the Middle East Institute, a Washington think tank, told me. According to Nasr, “Everybody now sees America as less than it was before.” He views Trump’s travails as part of a “precipitous collapse of American power and American prestige” and says that “once this war is over, the U.S. is going to find the rest of the world much more difficult to herd around any coherent policy.” The war is already deeply unpopular in the United States and has become a weight on Republican electoral prospects in the upcoming midterms. “Trump has trapped himself into an unwinnable war for America,” Ellie Geranmayeh, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told me. “He seems shackled now by the sunk-cost fallacy that, because America has expended heavy resources, ammunition, and reputation in this war, it cannot pull back before a decisive win.” But Tehran seems to believe it can both outfox and outlast Trump. “Iran is now confident that it can absorb U.S. bombings, which seriously weakens any military threats the U.S. may issue in the future,” Gregory Brew, an expert on Iran and energy at the Eurasia Group, a political-risk consultancy, told me. “In addition, the U.S. now looks broadly deterred from attempting more aggressive action against Iran, cowed by the risk of sweeping Iranian retaliation.” This week, a sixty-day deadline for the United States and Iran to resolve larger differences—set in June as part of an earlier memorandum of understanding—elapsed with little fanfare. It was a mark of the fragility (and, frankly, the unseriousness) of the diplomatic round between the two sides. On Tuesday, Trump fumed in the Oval Office, demanding Iran raise “the white flag of surrender,” while threatening Oman—a key diplomatic intermediary—with military strikes because of its parallel negotiations with Iran over the handling of the Strait of Hormuz. He also lashed out at South Korea, justifying an astonishing decision to draw down military exercises with the country over Seoul’s apparent unhelpfulness in supporting Trump’s war in the Middle East. And then, in perhaps the most glaring illustration of his frustration, the President posted a bizarre map on Truth Social labelling the Strait of Hormuz as “U.S. territory.” But Trump cannot “Gulf of America” his way out of this disaster. It is a blow that some analysts have already likened to the calamities of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars, and Iran’s leadership seems happy to continue this game of brinkmanship. “Stop waiting for the clown crew to pull a rabbit out of their hat and clean up the mess you made,” Ghalibaf said on social media, in response to new threats of maximum pressure from Trump’s Cabinet officials. Ordinary Iranians, many of whom are desperate for a change in their domestic politics and for a rapprochement with the West, have to wait. Gissou Nia, an Iranian American human-rights lawyer, lamented the absence of any “greater political strategy” from Trump that would have supported Iran’s opposition and embattled civil society—of “anything that would incentivize defections or really be able to crack this regime, which is what all of those protesters were looking for and what they risked their lives for,” she told me. Instead, Nia said, “it became clear that the only strategy from this Administration was to bomb the country.” And that strategy has failed. ♦

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMingFBVV95cUxNbzk1V081emVFMFlFelhwSFd3akN2Q0RKaFVBZnBiZkVjbVNtOFZJbk9FOXdRcWE1VG5TaXVENjlfN2s2c3dsV2FYV0Nha2t5bGhSN2dpekxXc0U5dEd5bm56RXVnYlA4UGlfQ0I3SmZQREU3TDQtOV9XWUV0ck5QNlVGU09RV2czbm42SGMtelZkcFlCdVQ2UjVUTjEzZw?oc=5