핵심요약

• 이란은 미국의 해상 봉쇄 해제, 호르무즈 해협 통제 인정 등 최대 요구사항에 대한 양보를 거부하고 있습니다.
• 이란은 인터넷 케이블에 대한 선제공격, 쿠웨이트 내 지상 작전 등 추가적인 군사적 확전을 위한 새로운 계획을 구상하고 있습니다.
• 이란 군 최고 사령관들은 이란이 '공격적 자세'로 전환하고 미국 해상 봉쇄를 깨기 위한 공격을 감행할 것이라고 경고했습니다.
• 이란 당국자들은 미국 및 동맹국에 대한 공격의 범위와 심각성을 확대할 수 있음을 시사했습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란이 미국의 최대 요구사항에 대해 양보하지 않고 오히려 군사적 확전을 모색하고 있음을 보여줍니다. 이는 단순한 외교적 입장을 넘어, 인터넷 공격 및 지상 작전과 같은 구체적인 군사적 행동 계획이 수립되고 있음을 의미합니다. 따라서 투자자들은 현재의 지정학적 긴장 상태가 향후 에너지 시장, 글로벌 공급망, 그리고 중동 지역의 안보 환경에 미칠 파급 효과를 면밀히 분석해야 합니다.

본문 1: 지정학적 압박과 요구사항의 본질

이란 정권은 미국의 제재 해제, 호르무즈 해협 통제 인정, 지역 협력 중단 등 최대 요구사항에 대해 어떠한 실질적인 양보도 하지 않겠다는 입장을 명확히 했습니다. 이는 이란이 현 상황을 단순한 협상 테이블로만 보지 않고, 군사적 우위를 확보하기 위한 전략적 목표로 설정하고 있음을 보여줍니다. 이란 당국이 이러한 요구사항을 고수하는 것은 국제 사회의 압력을 견디고 자국의 최대 이익을 관철시키려는 의도로 해석됩니다. 특히, 미국이 주도하는 제재 체제를 무력화하고 지역 내 영향력을 강화하려는 목표가 이들의 행동의 핵심 동인으로 보입니다. 이러한 입장은 미국 및 서방 동맹국들에게는 지역 안보에 대한 심각한 도전으로 인식되며, 이는 향후 중동 지역의 지정학적 변동성(volatility)을 가중시키는 요인으로 작용할 것입니다.

본문 2: 군사적 확전 계획과 잠재적 위험

이란의 이란혁명수비대(IRGC)가 인터넷 케이블에 대한 선제공격, 쿠웨이트 및 바레인과 같은 시아 공동체 국가 내 국내 불안정 조장, 그리고 쿠웨이트 내 잠재적 지상 작전 등 추가적인 군사적 확전 계획을 구상하고 있다는 보고는 매우 심각한 위험을 내포합니다. 이러한 계획들은 기존의 대리전 양상을 넘어 물리적 충돌로 이어질 가능성을 높이며, 이는 지역 전체의 안보 환경에 즉각적인 위협을 가합니다. 특히, 인터넷 인프라에 대한 공격은 글로벌 통신망에 영향을 미쳐 경제적 혼란을 야기할 수 있으며, 지상 작전의 가능성은 지역 내 기존 동맹국들의 안보에 직접적인 위협을 가하게 됩니다. 이러한 군사적 움직임은 단순한 국지적 충돌이 아닌, 국제적 개입 가능성을 높이고 전 세계적인 에너지 및 공급망 불안정을 심화시킬 수 있는 잠재력을 가지고 있습니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망과 시장의 해석

이란의 '공격적 자세' 전환은 중동 지역의 역학 관계를 근본적으로 변화시킬 잠재력을 가지고 있습니다. 만약 이란이 제시한 군사적 옵션들을 실제로 실행에 옮긴다면, 이는 기존의 국제 질서와 지역 안보 구조에 중대한 변화를 가져올 것입니다. 투자 관점에서 볼 때, 이러한 확전 가능성은 에너지 가격의 급등, 주요 국제 무역로의 위험 증가, 그리고 글로벌 금융 시장의 심각한 변동성 증가로 이어질 수 있습니다. 따라서 시장은 이란의 행동에 대한 예측과 함께, 미국 및 서방 동맹국들의 대응 전략을 지속적으로 주시해야 합니다. 단기적으로는 지정학적 리스크로 인한 위험 회피 심리가 강화될 수 있으며, 장기적으로는 지역 내 권력 균형의 재편이 예상됩니다. 이러한 불확실성은 특정 지역의 자원 및 에너지 자산에 대한 투자 결정에 중대한 영향을 미칠 것입니다.

결론

이란의 최대 요구사항에 대한 양보 거부와 군사적 확전 계획은 현재 중동 지역이 매우 높은 지정학적 위험에 직면해 있음을 시사합니다. 이란이 구상하는 인터넷 공격 및 지상 작전 등의 행동은 지역 안보에 즉각적인 위협을 가하며, 이는 글로벌 공급망과 에너지 시장에 직접적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 따라서 투자자들은 이란의 군사적 움직임과 서방 동맹국들의 대응을 면밀히 관찰하며, 지정학적 변동성 증가에 대비하여 포트폴리오의 리스크 관리 전략을 재검토해야 할 필요가 있습니다. 향후 몇 주간의 사건들은 글로벌 시장에 큰 영향을 미칠 것으로 전망됩니다.

---

원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilwFBVV95cUxOVVdJbkRYZE1DUFhOUzBFaDc3ek90b0k2TVBXdnBBdzFnUWFhOVlVRzZVRG9DclY0dkMzdU5PNXNKM013MExVbk1EaWF1c0NtVTJQNVJ5V2pvOEJDSkRYT1ZKQTJOZnUteW5NTDRxYmdDeW5WTlg2MGlsZkRKTF9UYTVaYjIzWU00MlgxRFZiUldZVjlkcHp3?oc=5

Iran Update Special Report, August 17, 2026 - Institute for the Study of War

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

Note : ISW-CTP will pause publishing weekend updates starting on August 15, 2026. ISW-CTP may publish special updates on Saturdays and Sundays if events warrant, however.

The Iranian regime is signaling that it would prefer to continue or even escalate fighting with the United States and its regional partners rather than make any serious concessions regarding its maximalist demands if the regime cannot force them to accede to Iran’s demands. The regime is signaling that it could expand the scope and severity of its attacks against the United States and its allies if they do not acquiesce to Iran’s maximalist demands, which include lifting the US naval blockade and US sanctions, securing recognition of Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz, and stopping regional cooperation on policies the regime deems hostile to its interests, among others. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has reportedly devised new plans for further escalation, including preemptive strikes on internet cables in the Persian Gulf, fomenting domestic unrest in countries with Shia communities like Kuwait and Bahrain, and “potentially” ground operations in Kuwait, according to Iranian officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and public statements.[1] Iranian officials’ decision to publicize these plans to WSJ was likely meant to have an informational effect, even if the regime is seriously considering these options. Senior Iranian military commanders, including IRGC Political Deputy Yadollah Javani, have warned in recent days that Iran is shifting to an “offensive posture.”[2] A senior Iranian official similarly told Reuters on August 17 that Iran will adopt a “fully offensive” posture and conduct an attack to break the US naval blockade if diplomatic efforts to lift the blockade fail.[3] These threats are likely intended to coerce the United States to surrender to Iranian demands as well as to restore deterrence vis-à-vis the United States and its regional partners by signaling the regime’s willingness to expand the scope of its attacks and conduct preemptive attacks.

The regime is likely simultaneously preparing to try to make fighting more costly for the United States should there be a renewal of hostilities. The WSJ report added that the IRGC “used the calm created by the [memorandum of understanding (MOU)]” to coordinate attack plans with its partners and proxies in the region.[4] Officials familiar with Arab intelligence findings said that the Iranian regime sent advisers to Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon to discuss plans, including a plan for confrontation with Saudi Arabia in coordination with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthis.[5] The IRGC reportedly supervised the deployment of “missiles, naval weapons, and drone launchers” to positions around the Red Sea, provided the Houthis with intelligence and target lists, including Saudi ports and energy facilities, and advised the Houthis on how to defend against Saudi retaliation.[6] ISW-CTP has repeatedly assessed that the Houthis’ attacks on Saudi Arabia as well as its blockade on Saudi ports advance Iranian efforts to impose economic costs on the United States and its regional partners to erode their willingness to continue the war and force them to give in to Iranian demands. Arab intelligence officials similarly told WSJ on August 17 that Iran’s hardline leadership, which ISW-CTP has assessed since March 2026 is dominated by IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, is preparing the Iranian armed forces to “widen the war” and “raise costs” for the United States and its allies.[7] This report is consistent with a New York Times (NYT) report on August 1 that senior IRGC Quds Force officers held calls with Hezbollah, Houthi, and Iraqi militia commanders during the ceasefire to coordinate efforts to expand the conflict with the United States.[8]

Vahidi and his inner circle would likely accept a deal with the United States if the United States surrendered to the regime’s demands. Axios reported on August 17 that the United States tried to establish a diplomatic backchannel with Vahidi in May 2026 to determine whether the Iranian negotiating team’s position accurately reflected Vahidi and his faction’s demands, according to three sources with direct knowledge of the matter.[9] Vahidi reportedly communicated to the United States that he “fully” supported Iran’s negotiating delegation and would “prefer to solve this crisis through negotiations.”[10] Vahidi previously presumably approved the US-Iran MoU in April 2026, given his outsized role in decision-making in recent months and reports that Iranian negotiators did not have the independent authority to approve the MoU.[11] Iranian leaders have interpreted the MoU differently from the United States, particularly its fifth clause regarding the Strait of Hormuz. The regime has interpreted the clause to mean that Iran would maintain control over the Strait of Hormuz, which diverges from the US interpretation.[12] Iran has since attacked ships that have attempted to bypass Iranian control in the strait to enforce its interpretation of the MoU. These actions suggest that Vahidi and his faction would likely accept a deal that meets their demands but are unlikely to accept one that falls short, even if failing to reach an agreement would risk renewed conflict.[13]

Vahidi’s faction may be willing to accept some economic costs and potential unrest if doing so enables them to achieve their core objectives. Some Iranian officials and media have expressed concerns in recent weeks about Iran’s worsening economic conditions and the potential for domestic unrest. Regime media outlet Mehr News Agency argued on August 17 that anti-regime media is trying to “create a perception of a nationwide crisis” by highlighting Iran’s economic problems.[14] Mehr argued that this reporting is a “psychological operation” intended to amplify grievances among dissatisfied groups and encourage the belief among these groups that protests are the only way to solve the economic crisis.[15] Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref separately stated on August 16 that the regime needs to confront US economic pressure through proper planning and policies and called for the regime to prepare for “worst-case scenarios,” possibly referring to domestic unrest.”[16] The recent Winter 2025-2026 protest wave was the largest wave of protests in Iran in recent years and stemmed from discontent about Iran’s economic situation.[17] It is unclear whether the risk of internal unrest would be sufficient to drive Vahidi to make concessions to receive economic relief, however. Vahidi may prefer to take other actions, such as securitizing society and seeking alternative export routes, to mitigate the risks of domestic unrest and economic collapse.

Reports of growing regime concerns about Iran’s economic conditions and the possibility of domestic unrest come amid Hossein Taeb’s appointment as Basij commander on August 10.[18] Taeb has decades of experience in repressing anti-regime activities as a former Basij commander and the head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization.[19] Taeb led the Basij’s brutal suppression of the 2009 Green Movement, for which the United States sanctioned him in 2010, for example.[20] Taeb’s appointment may, in part, reflect the regime’s anticipation of potential unrest amid mounting economic pressure.

Nothing significant to report.

Iran reportedly launched two drones targeting Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s office and the KRG’s intelligence chief’s residence in Erbil on August 17, according to the KRG . [21] The KRG security agency announced on August 17 that an unknown actor had launched two drones from Iranian territory at Barzani’s home but did not clarify whether the drones hit their intended target.[22] The agency reported that the attack did not cause any casualties.[23] Neither Iran nor any Iranian-backed group has claimed responsibility for the attacks at the time of this writing. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, speaking to his Iraqi counterpart Fuad Hussein, and a senior Iranian official, speaking to Hezbollah-affiliated media, both denied Iran’s involvement in the attacks.[24] The senior Iranian official claimed that Iran’s adversaries conducted the attacks as a “false flag” operation.[25] Neither Iran nor Iranian-backed Iraqi militias claimed responsibility for a similar attack on KRG President Nechirvan Barzani’s house on March 28.[26] Several militias condemned the attack at the time.[27] Iraqi militias have conducted several drone attacks on targets in Erbil since the beginning of the war on February 28, but these attacks have largely been concentrated on US positions.[28]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah commanders following a Hezbollah drone attack that injured three IDF soldiers operating in Ali al Taher, Nabatieh Governorate, on August 14.[29] The IDF reported that it killed Hezbollah Radwan Force battalion commander Ali Samir al Haj Hassan in an airstrike targeting a Hezbollah command facility in Ansar, Nabatieh Governorate, on August 14 in response to a Hezbollah first-person view (FPV) drone attack in Ali al Taher.[30] The Radwan Force is Hezbollah’s elite special operations unit that conducts cross-border infiltrations and attacks on Israeli positions.[31] The IDF reported that it also killed senior Hezbollah Badr Unit commander Ali Muhammad Fakhr al Din in a separate airstrike in Deir el Zahrani, Nabatieh Governorate, on August 15.[32] The Badr Unit is one of Hezbollah’s geographic units and is responsible for the area north of the Litani River, particularly around Nabatieh District and the southern Bekaa Valley. The Badr Unit is one of the main Hezbollah units that has engaged Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.[33] Hezbollah claimed that the IDF strikes killed 11 people, including civilians, but did not acknowledge that its fighters were killed.[34] Hezbollah also has not claimed responsibility for the drone attack on August 14 at the time of this writing. The recent escalation in southern Lebanon has centered around control over Ali al Taher, which serves as a key reconnaissance position and launch site for Hezbollah. The area is also advantageous for the IDF to observe Hezbollah ground force movements given its high elevation.[35] An unspecified political source close to Hezbollah’s leadership told UK-based, Saudi-owned media on August 17 that Hezbollah is prepared to fight “in full force” if the IDF attempts to seize Hezbollah’s positions in Ali al Taher.[36] The IDF took “complete control” of the territory surrounding Ali al Taher in late June 2026, but the area still contains one of Hezbollah’s largest underground command-and-control (C2) facilities and approximately 15 trapped Hezbollah fighters.[37] Israeli media reported on August 16 that the IDF seeks to kill the remaining Hezbollah fighters and destroy infrastructure in the area. The IDF has also blocked recent Hezbollah efforts to resupply its trapped fighters.[38]

The recent escalation in southern Lebanon may stall ongoing diplomatic efforts between Lebanon and Israel. Unspecified Lebanese military and diplomatic sources told Lebanese media on August 15 and 16 that Lebanon will not participate in direct negotiations with the United States and Israel in Rome in September 2026.[39] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun separately claimed on August 15 that the IDF strikes violated the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement.[40]

There appear to be fissures within the Iranian-backed Badr Organization over its support for Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s efforts to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Badr Organization Political Bureau head Mohammad Naji Mohammad issued a statement on August 14 that criticized Zaydi’s disarmament efforts.[41] Mohammad added that no one, including the Iraqi prime minister, should be allowed to disarm the militias because doing so would cause “internal strife.” Mohammad’s comment completely disregards the militias’ role in causing such strife by conducting attacks on US interests in Iraq and neighboring countries.[42] The militias’ attacks in Iraq undermine Iraqi sovereignty and the Iraqi federal government’s efforts to stay out of Iran’s conflicts with the United States and Israel. Mohammad, also known as Abu Jassim al Askari, led Badr’s Inspection and Investigations Directorate in the early 2000s, according to a Saddam Hussein-era Iraqi intelligence report on the Badr Organization.[43] Some Iraq analysts have also noted that Abu Jassim led several Badr units that facilitated attacks on the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in March and April 2026.[44] Mohammad’s August 14 statement on disarmament notably appears to contradict Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri’s position on the issue. Ameri has played a key role in the Iraqi federal government’s disarmament efforts in recent months, including by serving on the Shia Coordination Framework’s disarmament committee.[45] The Badr Organization’s media office denied the existence of that committee in early June, however, which could have been a response to internal Badr opposition to Ameri’s involvement in the committee.[46]

The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) arrested Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba reconnaissance unit leader Abbas Hussein Yaqubi in Dhi Qar Province on August 17.[47] A security source told Iraqi media on August 17 that CTS forces raided the Harakat Hezbollah reconnaissance unit leader’s home in Dhi Qar Province.[48] The Iraqi Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee chairman confirmed to Kurdish media on August 17 that CTS Special Forces arrested Yaqubi, who is also the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Baghdad Belt Operations Command intelligence director.[49] The PMF is an Iraqi security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, such as Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[50] This operation follows several recent Iraqi government attempts to crack down on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including an attempted raid on a Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba base in Jurf al Naddaf in late July 2026.[51] The arrest also comes amid indicators that the Iraqi federal government is preparing to use force to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[52] Yaqubi’s arrest could be part of a broader effort to set conditions for such an operation.

Some Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are portraying Iranian-backed Iraqi militias as defenders of Iraq’s sovereignty to justify their continued existence, likely in an effort to build public support amid the Iraqi government’s efforts to disarm the militias.[53] Iranian-backed Badr Organization Political Bureau head Mohammad Naji Mohammad stated on August 14 that Iraqi “resistance” was established to defend the “state.”[54] A member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political wing similarly stated on August 14 that the militias fought for Iraq’s sovereignty and retain strong popular support.[55] These claims come as the Iraqi federal government has taken steps to crack down on the militias amid continued US pressure to curb Iranian influence in Iraq.[56] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militia officials likely calculate that framing the militias as defenders of Iraqi sovereignty could generate public support for their continued armament and justify their continued existence.

Unspecified sources speaking to Saudi media on August 17 claimed that unspecified Iraqi armed factions are planning to assassinate Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zaidan in response to the Iraqi government’s disarmament efforts.[57] The sources indicated that the threats are directly related to the Iraqi government’s militia disarmament and anti-corruption campaigns.[58] Zaidan has previously supported efforts to restrict weapons to the state.[59]

The Houthis are framing their attack on a Yemeni civilian vessel near the Bab al Mandeb Strait as a strike on Saudi-coalition naval vessels, likely to try to deter the Saudi-led multinational maritime defense coalition from operationalizing its mission to protect Red Sea maritime trade by signaling that the Houthis could target the coalition’s vessels.[60] The Houthis claimed that they struck five Saudi-coalition naval vessels with ballistic missiles in the Red Sea near Mocha Port, Taiz Governorate, on August 17.[61] The Houthis added that they sank one Saudi-coalition landing craft and four nearby patrol boats.[62] Multiple Yemeni sources reported on August 17 that the Houthi strikes only targeted the AMIR KHAN , a Yemeni-owned civilian vessel docked in Al Ardi Port, near the Bab el Mandeb Strait, however.[63] The strike reportedly caused severe damage to the vessel and the harbor’s berth but did not cause casualties.[64] The Houthi claim follows Saudi Arabia’s July 2026 formation of a multinational maritime defense coalition tasked with protecting Red Sea shipping from Houthi and Iranian threats to the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[65] The Houthis’ attempt to frame their recent attack on a Yemeni civilian vessel as an attack on the coalition’s vessels likely served as an implicit threat and intended to signal the group’s willingness to target Saudi-coalition naval vessels to deter the coalition from operationalizing its mission. ISW-CTP previously assessed that the Houthis likely view the coalition as a threat to their blockade of Saudi ports and vessels and the broader Houthi campaign to coerce Saudi Arabia into lifting its blockade of Houthi-controlled ports and airports.[66]

[1] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-plan-escalate-war-cc657664?st=RXaQT6

[2] https://t.me/defapress_ir/65633/ ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-plan-escalate-war-cc657664?st=RXaQT6

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-threatens-go-offensive-strait-hormuz-if-diplomacy-with-us-fails-2026-08-17/

[4] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-plan-escalate-war-cc657664?st=RXaQT6

[5] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-plan-escalate-war-cc657664?st=RXaQT6

[6] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-plan-escalate-war-cc657664?st=RXaQT6

[7] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-plan-escalate-war-cc657664?st=RXaQT6 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-august-10-2026/

[8] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/01/world/middleeast/iran-proxies-war-oil.html

[9] https://www.axios.com/2026/08/16/iran-backchannel-trump-gabbard-barzani-war

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilwFBVV95cUxOVVdJbkRYZE1DUFhOUzBFaDc3ek90b0k2TVBXdnBBdzFnUWFhOVlVRzZVRG9DclY0dkMzdU5PNXNKM013MExVbk1EaWF1c0NtVTJQNVJ5V2pvOEJDSkRYT1ZKQTJOZnUteW5NTDRxYmdDeW5WTlg2MGlsZkRKTF9UYTVaYjIzWU00MlgxRFZiUldZVjlkcHp3?oc=5