적색해의 불안정성, 글로벌 경제에 미칠 영향
Another Hormuz? The Red Sea’s Threat to the Global Economy - Council on Foreign Relations
레드해 지역의 불안정성이 공급망 지연과 에너지 가격 상승으로 이어질 수 있어, 글로벌 무역에 의존하는 기업들의 주가 하락 가능성을 시사합니다.
핵심 요약
적색해는 연간 1조 달러 규모의 무역이 이동하는 중요한 수로이지만, 후티 반군의 공격으로 불안정해지고 있습니다.
핵심요약
- 연간 1조 달러 규모의 글로벌 해상 무역이 적색해를 통해 이동합니다
- 후티 반군들이 이스라엘 선박의 통행을 완전히 금지함에 따라 공급망 지연 우려가 커지고 있습니다
- 적색해는 2023년부터 가자 지구의 이스라엘 군사 캠페인에 항의하는 후티 반군들의 공격으로 활발한 갈등 지역이 되어 왔습니다
- 지속적인 간섭은 에너지 가격 상승과 글로벌 경제 불안정화로 이어질 수 있습니다
도입
적색해의 불안정성은 글로벌 공급망과 에너지 시장에 직접적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 이 지역에서의 갈등이 글로벌 무역과 경제에 미칠 잠재적인 영향을 주의 깊게 모니터링해야 합니다.
본문 1: 적색해의 경제적 중요성
적색해는 연간 1조 달러 규모의 글로벌 해상 무역이 이동하는 중요한 수로입니다. 이 수로는 수에즈 운하에서 바브엘만드 해협까지 연결되어 있으며, 이 지역의 불안정성은 글로벌 무역에 큰 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 특히, 후티 반군들의 공격으로 인해 이스라엘 선박의 통행이 금지됨에 따라 공급망 지연과 에너지 가격 상승 우려가 커지고 있습니다. 이는 글로벌 경제에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있는 중요한 요소입니다.
본문 2: 갈등의 확대 가능성
후티 반군들은 2023년부터 가자 지구의 이스라엘 군사 캠페인에 항의하는 형태로 공격을 시작했습니다. 이 지역의 갈등이 확대될 경우, 적색해의 안정성이 더욱 위협받을 수 있습니다. 이는 글로벌 무역과 에너지 시장에 추가적인 불안정성을 초래할 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 이 지역의 갈등이 확대되는 경우, 글로벌 경제에 미칠 영향을 주의 깊게 모니터링해야 합니다.
본문 3: 장기적 전망
적색해의 불안정성은 글로벌 경제에 장기적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 특히, 공급망 지연과 에너지 가격 상승은 글로벌 경제에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있는 중요한 요소입니다. 투자자들은 이 지역의 갈등이 장기화되는 경우, 글로벌 경제에 미칠 영향을 주의 깊게 모니터링해야 합니다.
결론
적색해의 불안정성은 글로벌 경제에 중요한 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 이 지역의 갈등이 글로벌 무역과 에너지 시장에 미칠 잠재적인 영향을 주의 깊게 모니터링해야 합니다. 향후 이 지역의 갈등이 확대되는 경우, 글로벌 경제에 미칠 영향을 주의 깊게 모니터링해야 합니다.
Original Article
Another Hormuz? The Red Sea’s Threat to the Global Economy - Council on Foreign Relations
Although the Strait of Hormuz , which had been closed to shipping since late February, appears to be slowly reopening as part of a U.S.-Iran ceasefire agreement , concerns persist about the security of another regional maritime choke point: the Red Sea. On June 8, the Iran-backed Houthi rebels announced a complete ban on Israeli ships transiting the Red Sea, calling them “legitimate military targets.” The announcement came after Iranian officials threatened in April to obstruct trade in the waterway if the Trump administration upheld its naval blockade on Iran. The blockade has since been lifted, but worries linger about the waterway’s vulnerability.
The Red Sea, a 1,400-mile-long inlet between northeastern Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, is one of the world’s most important arteries for global shipping. Each year, approximately 12 to 15 percent of global maritime trade worth more than $1 trillion transits the waterway, which extends from the Suez Canal in the north to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the south.
Alongside the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea could form a critical economic pressure point in the Iran war. Experts say sustained interference in the Red Sea, especially by the Houthis, would trigger severe supply-chain delays, drive up energy prices, and further destabilize the global economy.
The waterway has been an active conflict zone since 2023, when the Yemen-based Houthis began attacking commercial and naval vessels in protest of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, significantly disrupting international shipping. The group’s entry into the Iran war in March by firing missiles at southern Israel underscored the Red Sea’s potential to become a new front in broader regional tensions. Its total ban on Israeli and Israel-linked shipping in the waterway threatens further escalation amid renewed hostilities between Israel and Iran.
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The UN International Maritime Organization describes the Red Sea as “one of the most critical maritime routes enabling global trade.” Between 12 and 15 percent of international seaborne commerce and 30 percent of global container traffic pass through the waterway annually, ferrying agricultural products such as grains and fertilizers , raw materials like ores and metals, industrial components like electronics, automotive parts, and energy resources.
About 4.9 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil and petroleum products transited the Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline—both on the Red Sea’s northern end—in the first half of 2025, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Some 4.2 million bpd crossed through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, at the Red Sea’s southern end.
Together, oil shipments through these three routes accounted for approximately 11 percent of all seaborne-traded oil during that time. By comparison, oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz averaged almost 21 million bpd in the same period.
The Red Sea is also considered a digital choke point, as an estimated 90 percent of undersea fiber optic cables linking Europe and Asia pass through the waterway. These cables “represent critical sovereign underwater infrastructure that is no less significant than oil and trade routes,” Abdullah Jaber AlZaidi, senior advisor on defense and security studies at the Gulf Research Center, wrote in a CFR global perspectives roundup . Previous damage to them has caused major disruptions to internet connectivity and cloud services across the region, as well as in Africa and Asia.
As disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz persist, experts say the Red Sea could become the war’s next choke point should Iran leverage the Houthis as a proxy force to blockade maritime traffic in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
“Historically, Washington’s protection of freedom of navigation went hand-in-hand with the core interest in ensuring the free flow of oil and gas from the Middle East,” said CFR expert Steven A. Cook. “The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the potential closure of the Bab el-Mandeb are a test for both.”
The twenty-mile-wide strait is the only point of entry to the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean and runs alongside Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen. While it’s unclear whether Iran would deploy its own forces to attack shipping in the strait, years of Iranian support has boosted the Houthis’ military prowess, enabling them to project force into the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the broader Red Sea.
Ali Akbar Velayati, senior advisor on international affairs to Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, wrote on social media in April that Iran’s “Resistance front”—referring to its coalition of Iran-aligned groups across the Middle East—“views Bab el-Mandeb as it does Hormuz.” He added that “if the White House dares to repeat its foolish mistakes, it will soon realize that the flow of global energy and trade can be disrupted with a single move.”
Houthi attacks on vessels in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have largely paused since Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire in Gaza in late 2025. However, experts say resumed attacks would only deepen the existing oil and economic crisis brought on by the Iran war and risk provoking a regional response from countries that rely on the strait, such as Saudi Arabia .
Saudi Arabia exports around four to five million bpd through a pipeline network connecting its oil fields to Red Sea ports, making access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait critical, according to CFR expert Edward Fishman. “But the Houthis, who are Iranian allies, could theoretically shut off the Bab el-Mandeb and basically make it so that Saudi Arabia doesn’t have any way to export oil,” he said.
Previous Houthi attacks on the Red Sea have highlighted the economic stakes. The group’s response to the Israel-Hamas war disrupted maritime traffic in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, causing oil shipments to fall by more than half, from 9.3 million bpd in 2023 to just 4.1 million bpd in 2024.
Several major regional and external actors are involved in the Red Sea, including:
Houthis. The Yemen-based group, considered an independent partner of Iran , began targeting Israeli and international shipping in the Red Sea in late 2023 in response to Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. The group announced a halt to attacks on non-Israeli vessels following the Gaza ceasefire, but experts warn that attacks on Red Sea shipping could resume if regional hostilities escalate or ceasefire efforts collapse.
Iran. Tehran uses the Red Sea to project power, disrupt global trade, and challenge Western influence in the region. In retaliation for the United States’ naval blockade in the Gulf of Oman, which has since been lifted and which the Pentagon projected in May had cost Iran nearly $5 billion in lost oil revenue, Iranian officials have threatened to use the Houthis to shut down the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Iran is the group’s primary benefactor, providing them with security assistance including weapons transfers, training, and intelligence support.
Israel. The country has been a central target of Houthi attacks, which have significantly disrupted activity at the Port of Eilat, Israel’s only port on the Red Sea. Houthi aggression prompted Israel to launch retaliatory air strikes on Houthi-controlled ports and infrastructure in Yemen, though direct hostilities largely halted in late 2025. They have since resumed .
United States and allies. Washington and its allies have taken action to protect global shipping and restore freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. In response to the Houthis’ initial attacks in 2023, the Biden administration launched Operation Prosperity Guardian , a multinational security initiative that included forces from France, the United Kingdom, and other European countries. In March 2025, the Trump administration launched Operation Rough Rider , a more aggressive offensive targeting Houthi bases in Yemen. The operation ended in May 2025 after the United States reached a temporary ceasefire agreement with the Houthis. However, the agreement did not mandate the Houthis to stop attacking other countries’ ships—namely Israeli and Israeli-linked ones—and the ceasefire collapsed after two months.
In addition to disruptions to international shipping, experts warn that greater instability in the Red Sea could exacerbate existing crises in East Africa.
“There are already multiple, interconnected tensions in the region relating to the Nile waters, Ethiopia’s desire for port access, Sudan’s civil war, and Somalia’s political and security crises,” said CFR Africa expert Michelle Gavin. Many of these conflicts are being shaped by competition among Middle Eastern powers—including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—through strategic investments, military support , and security cooperation.
“The more heated the competition gets, the more it is likely to result in conflict on African soil,” Gavin added.
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