핵심요약

• ICE 요원들은 이란 정부와 협력하여 100명 이상의 이란 국적자를 추방하는 데 관여했습니다.
• 이민 당국은 이란의 요청에 따라 미국 내에 있던 세 명의 특정 인물을 송환 조치했습니다.
• 이메일 기록은 트럼프 행정부의 대이란 전쟁 계획과 연관된 세 차례의 논란적인 이란행 차터 비행 계획을 입증합니다.
• 이 계획들은 미국과 이스라엘의 현재 전쟁 발발 직전에 이행되었습니다.

도입

본 기사는 미국 이민 당국이 이란 정부와 협력하여 이란인들을 추방하는 과정에서 발생한 내부 소통 기록을 통해 지정학적 위험을 조명합니다. 이는 단순한 이민 정책 문제를 넘어, 대외 정책 결정 과정에서 이민 통제와 국제 안보가 어떻게 교차하는지를 보여줍니다. 투자자들은 이러한 내부적 행정 조치가 향후 미국 대외 정책 및 중동 지역의 안정성에 미칠 영향을 면밀히 분석해야 합니다.

본문 1: 이민 정책과 지정학적 압력

ICE 내부 이메일은 미국 정부가 대이란 전쟁을 준비하는 상황에서 이란인들에 대한 이민 정책이 어떻게 변화했는지 보여줍니다. 과거에는 박해의 두려움으로 인해 이란인들이 미국에 체류할 수 있었으나, 이제는 미국이 이란에 대한 군사적 행동을 계획하는 상황에서 이민 통제와 추방이 외교적 목표와 결합되고 있음을 시사합니다. 이는 이민 정책이 단순한 법적 절차를 넘어, 지정학적 이해관계에 따라 동원될 수 있는 도구로 활용될 수 있음을 의미합니다. 특히 이란인들에 대한 추방이 미국의 대이란 정책과 연계되어 진행되었다는 점은 이민 시스템이 국제 안보 환경 속에서 재편되고 있음을 보여주는 중요한 지표입니다.

본문 2: 내부 조정과 정보의 흐름

이메일 기록은 ICE 요원들이 이란 당국 및 카타르 중개자를 통해 정보를 교환하고 협력했음을 명확히 보여줍니다. 이러한 내부 조정은 공식적인 외교 채널을 벗어나 비공식적인 경로를 통해 민감한 정보를 공유하고 실행하는 행정 관행이 존재함을 드러냅니다. 이러한 비공식적인 협력은 외교 정책의 실행력을 높이는 동시에, 국제 사회의 감시를 피하려는 시도로 해석될 수 있습니다. 또한, 이메일에서 ICE 요원들이 실수로 잘못된 인물을 추방 비행에 탑승시킨 사례는 행정 절차의 복잡성과 잠재적인 오류 가능성을 보여주며, 이는 정책 집행 과정에서 내재된 위험 요소를 드러냅니다.

본문 3: 장기적 위험과 전망

이러한 행정적 조치와 비공식적 협력은 미국과 이란 간의 관계가 더욱 복잡하고 불안정해질 수 있음을 시사합니다. 이민 통제와 군사적 행동이 결합될 때, 이는 지역 안보에 대한 예측 불가능성을 높이고 잠재적인 갈등의 불씨가 될 수 있습니다. 향후 이민 정책과 외교적 협력의 연관성을 면밀히 관찰해야 하며, 이러한 비공식적 채널을 통한 정보 교환이 국제 관계의 변동성에 어떤 영향을 미칠지 지속적으로 분석할 필요가 있습니다. 이는 장기적으로 양국 간의 관계 안정화에 중요한 변수로 작용할 것입니다.

결론

결론적으로, 이 사건은 미국 이민 및 국경 관리 시스템이 국제 지정학적 압력에 의해 어떻게 재편되고 있는지를 보여줍니다. 행정부의 내부 계획이 이민 실행과 결합될 때, 이는 국제 안보 환경에 중대한 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 향후 미국과 이란 간의 관계는 이민 문제와 군사적 대립이라는 두 축을 중심으로 더욱 복잡하게 전개될 가능성이 높습니다. 따라서 이러한 지정학적 맥락을 고려하여 향후 정책 변화에 대한 신중한 전망이 요구됩니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMie0FVX3lxTFBYcjZkRmI2NDIwMTBCN1RuQ2lTU0NUZW9iN0xRdkI4T2p2ZFNoVVM2WXBvOFNYUmVYSHQwWDhvVUdHa2lOSWtMaWl5aE9xdlhKc05HcWdUUUp0R2ZVMGk1c3RxVWJreC0wcUJ3aFBtSGNCMXJ1X2ZFWXZxQQ?oc=5

ICE Worked With Iranian Regime to Set Up Deportation Flights as Trump Laid Plans for War - The Intercept

Immigrations and Customs Enforcement agents appear to have worked directly with government officials in Iran to deport over 100 Iranian nationals as the United States prepared to bomb their home country, according to a newly released trove of internal emails from ICE.

In the process, immigration officials indicate they complied with an Iranian request to repatriate three specific people who were living in the United States.

Hundreds of emails spanning from May to November of last year show ICE officials, operating under the orders of then-Acting Director Todd Lyons, scrambling to put together plans for three controversial charter flights to Iran in the clearest picture yet of the Trump administration’s behind-the-scenes planning for the trips.

The flights delivered more than 100 people to an uncertain fate in Tehran just months or weeks before the U.S. and Israel launched their current devastating war , which has to date killed thousands of Iranians. While Israel and the United States bombed Iran during the Twelve-Day War last year, the flight planning remained ongoing. The coordination marked a reversal in decades of immigration policy toward Iranians, who were typically allowed to remain in the United States, even with a final removal order, due to fear of persecution from a regime U.S. leaders have accused of wantonly murdering its own citizens.

The emails, which were released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from the National Iranian American Council, or NIAC, and provided exclusively to The Intercept, show heavy pressure from high-ranking Trump administration officials to make the flights happen; discussion of coordination between ICE and Iranian officials, often through Qatari intermediaries but at times directly; and even an apparent mix-up in which ICE officials accidentally put the wrong person on a deportation flight bound for Iran.

Iranians were already under increased targeting by ICE , according to data obtained by NIAC . The timing of the about-face from long-standing policy was particularly cruel, said Jamal Abdi, the group’s president.

“It seemed clear that Iranians were under the microscope all of a sudden,” Abdi told The Intercept. “And we now know that it was actually in the middle of the [Twelve-Day] war where the White House was directing ICE to start removing Iranians.”

Each flight arrived in Tehran carrying at least a dozen deportees, including political activists and ethnic and religious minorities who had good reason to fear persecution upon arrival. Many of the people flown to Tehran were transported against their will, including one man who later told the New York Times that he attempted suicide before the flight and ICE agents physically forced him onto the plane.

The bulk of the emails released to NIAC illustrate the planning and execution of the first mass deportation to Iran on September 29, 2025.

Most of the correspondents have their identities and contact information redacted, with the exception of officials such as then-acting director Lyons, head of removal operations Marcos Charles, then-deputy director Madison Sheahan, and Joshua Coster, whose email signature identifies him as the ERO — Enforcement and Removal Operations — attaché at the agency’s U.S. Embassy branch office in Tel Aviv. In the run-up to the flight, Coster appears to have acted as the primary liaison with the Qatari government in back-and-forths over landing permits, passenger manifests, and details of the transfer in Doha to the final leg of the journey on a Qatar Airways charter. His level of involvement, Abdi said, “reveals how integral the ICE office in Tel Aviv has been to this transnational network of ICE officers removing people from America.”

In one of the most confounding episodes that took place during the first flight, Coster informed his colleagues that an Iranian national not included on the final list of deportees somehow wound up on the plane to Doha.

“An Iranian national not included on the final manifest we sent to Qatari MOI was boarded on the flight,” Coster wrote to colleagues on September 30, 2025. “This is unfortunate.”

“I have no idea how the case/person got through to the plane,” one of Coster’s colleagues responded.

After the stopover in Doha, the accidental passenger was sent to Iran anyway.

A spokesperson for the Department of Homeland Security, the parent agency of ICE, declined to comment on the apparent mix-up.

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Formal diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran have been severed since 1979 , and communications between the two nations have typically taken place either through intermediaries or through Iranian representatives operating out of the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, D.C. That made the issuance of travel documents necessary for deportation nearly impossible, and Iranians were often allowed to remain in the country indefinitely.

Yet the move to begin deporting Iranians took place at a time in which relations between the U.S. and Iran were at a particularly low point.

The so-called Twelve-Day War was in full swing when, on June 19, 2025, the orders came down to ICE officers to begin putting plans into motion.

In an email sent from his BlackBerry to Charles and Sheahan that day, Lyons directed his underlings to “launch target cases as a priority.” Less than an hour later, Charles forwarded Lyons’s missive to several ICE officials and included marching orders of his own.

“Please begin working on a plan to remove all removable FO [final order] Iranians in custody,” Charles wrote. “We need a plan forward ASAP.”

In a series of emails among ICE officials, all of whose names were redacted, the pressure to develop a plan was clear. One staffer, whose email signature listed them as an assistant director of the ERO’s removal division, appeared pessimistic about the timing.

“Unfortunately I do not have great news,” wrote the staffer. “I’ve learned from the team that Iran is currently uncooperative and does not issue [travel documents] in a timely manner.”

As a result, the staffer told Charles, “removal will prove difficult.” To make matters worse, “due to the current conflict, the airspace in Iran is closed to all ( not just U.S.) until further notice,” wrote the official. “Neighboring land borders are also a challenge.”

Still, in other emails, the assistant director urged colleagues to press ahead with the orders.

“Please initiate conversations with [the Department of] State first this [sic] tomorrow,” the official wrote in an email forwarding the commands to his colleagues. “They need to help us identify a solution for this WH [White House] priority.”

Just 24 hours later, however, an ICE official wrote with good news.

“The team has come together and developed a few viable options for removals to Iran,” the official wrote. All of the plans were redacted.

Lyons, Charles, and Sheahan did not respond to requests for comment. When The Intercept contacted Coster at his official ICE email address, the reporter received an automatic out-of-office reply indicating that Coster’s area of focus had shifted to North Africa.

For years, Iranians facing deportation from the U.S. have been protected by two realities: the lack of diplomatic relations between the two nations and the threat of retribution at home.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMie0FVX3lxTFBYcjZkRmI2NDIwMTBCN1RuQ2lTU0NUZW9iN0xRdkI4T2p2ZFNoVVM2WXBvOFNYUmVYSHQwWDhvVUdHa2lOSWtMaWl5aE9xdlhKc05HcWdUUUp0R2ZVMGk1c3RxVWJreC0wcUJ3aFBtSGNCMXJ1X2ZFWXZxQQ?oc=5