핵심요약

• 2026년 6월 11일, CUPET가 SDN 명단에 추가됨
• 새로운 제재 프로그램 EO 14404가 기존 CACR와 병행 적용
• 비미국 기업과 에너지 부문에 대한 제재 강화
• 2024년 5월, OFAC가 CACR 개정해 쿠바 민간 부문 지원 확대

도입

이번 제재 강화는 쿠바 경제에 직접적인 영향을 미칠 뿐만 아니라, 글로벌 에너지 시장과 금융 시스템에 파장을 일으킬 가능성이 높습니다. 특히 비미국 기업들이 쿠바와 관련된 거래를 신중히 고려해야 할 필요가 생겼습니다.

본문 1: 새로운 제재 프로그램의 특징

2026년 5월 1일 발효된 EO 14404는 기존 CACR와 별도로 쿠바에 대한 새로운 제재 프로그램을 도입했습니다. 이 프로그램은 IEEPA를 기반으로 하며, 비미국 기업과 금융 기관에 대한 제재를 강화하는 것이 특징입니다. 특히 에너지 부문에 대한 타겟팅이 강화되어, CUPET의 SDN 명단 추가는 이 새로운 제재 프로그램의 첫 번째 적용 사례가 되었습니다. 이는 쿠바 경제에 대한 미국의 제재 전략이 더 공격적으로 전환되었음을 보여줍니다.

본문 2: 기존 CACR와의 차이점

CACR는 1963년 Trading with the Enemy Act 하에 도입된 전통적인 제재 프레임워크로, 쿠바에 대한 포괄적인 금수 조치를 규정하고 있습니다. 그러나 EO 14404는 CACR와 달리 비미국 기업과 금융 기관에 대한 제재를 강조하며, 특히 에너지 부문에 대한 타겟팅을 강화하고 있습니다. 이는 미국이 쿠바 경제에 대한 제재를 더욱 세분화하고, 특정 부문에 대한 압력을 강화하려는 의도를 반영한 것으로 보입니다.

본문 3: 국제적 반응과 영향

이번 제재 강화는 국제 사회의 반응을 불러일으킬 가능성이 높습니다. 특히 쿠바와 경제적 관계를 유지하고 있는 국가들은 새로운 제재 프로그램에 대한 대응 방안을 마련해야 할 것입니다. 또한, 글로벌 에너지 시장에 대한 영향도 고려해야 하며, 쿠바의 석유 수출에 대한 제재가 에너지 가격 변동성에 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다.

결론

미국의 쿠바에 대한 제재 강화는 쿠바 경제뿐만 아니라 국제 사회와 에너지 시장에도 파장을 일으킬 가능성이 있습니다. 특히 비미국 기업들은 새로운 제재 프로그램에 대한 신중한 접근이 필요하며, 쿠바와 관련된 거래를 신중히 고려해야 할 것입니다. 향후 미국의 제재 정책 동향과 국제 사회의 반응을 주의 깊게 관찰할 필요가 있습니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMivAFBVV95cUxNdVhEVks2Y1RUYWplUVY5STBlUlZCaFNBTVoteFF3bjBYaWRDeHRuVm52YWljZGRPc3lwMmQ0SEg0Z2RwRFRjZnc1dUJwLUtabHdwVTE3ampvWERoS2NJQkZnUTJya09mUFJ6a1JMTXVTaUlEeHczaDR5NnBGYms0UXZGOWhEMEVMSG55UEFod1V2ZHNwV1A1SXpLT2R3UnA5NXdldFpwdkROS3RwdlpxcUw5dG4wVHVkSEVfdQ?oc=5

The US is changing Cuba sanctions architecture | United States | Global law firm - Norton Rose Fulbright

On June 11, 2026, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added Unión Cuba Petróleo (CUPET), Cuba’s state-owned oil and gas company, to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) under Executive Order 14404 . The US Department of State explained that CUPET was designated pursuant to Section 2(a)(i)(A) of E.O. 14404 for “operating or having operated in the energy sector of the Cuban economy.”

At one level, the CUPET designation may appear incremental. After all, Cuba has been subject to a comprehensive US embargo for decades under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), and US persons were already heavily restricted from engaging in Cuba-related trade and financial transactions. But the CUPET action is significant because it marks the use of a new, parallel Cuba sanctions program—one built on IEEPA-based blocking sanctions and carrying a distinctly more aggressive posture toward non-US actors, foreign financial institutions and energy sector-based targets than the traditional CACR framework.

The CACR remain the backbone of US sanctions on Cuba. Administered under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the CACR impose a broad embargo on Cuba and Cuban nationals, with a patchwork of general licenses and exemptions for specified activities. In May 2024, OFAC amended the CACR to increase support for the Cuban people and independent private-sector entrepreneurs, including through expanded financial and internet-related authorizations. Those amendments reflected a calibrated policy of permitting selected activity that supports private Cuban economic actors rather than the Cuban state.

The long-standing framework changed materially on May 1, 2026, with the issuance of Executive Order 14404, creating a new Cuba-related sanctions program under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), separate from and in addition to the CACR. OFAC’s own FAQ 1251 states expressly that E.O. 14404 is a distinct sanctions program and that it “broadens US sanctions on Cuba” by authorizing sanctions not only on Cuban actors, but also on non-Cuban foreign persons and foreign financial institutions that provide support to blocked persons or conduct significant transactions involving them.

The architecture of E.O. 14404 is important. Section 2(a)(i) authorizes blocking sanctions on foreign persons determined, among other things, to operate in specified sectors of the Cuban economy—including the energy, defense and related materiel, metals and mining, financial services and security sectors—or to act for, support, own, control or be owned or controlled by blocked persons or the Government of Cuba. In practical terms, this means the US government has moved from a traditional embargo model to a more modern sanctions model that resembles programs targeting Iran, Venezuela and Russia, sectoral sanctions and SDN designations under a secondary sanctions framework. OFAC FAQ 1251 notes that E.O. 14404 does not disturb licenses issued under the CACR and points to Cuba-related General License 1, issued on May 7, 2026, which authorizes transactions prohibited by E.O. 14404 where those transactions are otherwise authorized or exempt under the CACR. Accordingly, rather than superseding the CACR, E.O. 14404 layered a new sanctions authority on top of the regulations.

The State Department’s June 11 press statement is unusually explicit about the government’s rationale for the designation—Secretary Rubio asserted that “energy has long been weaponized by Cuba’s Communist government” as a tool of “repression and self-serving regime kleptocracy,” and alleged that Cuba’s leadership has diverted energy resources for the benefit of the military, intelligence services and elite interests while ordinary Cubans have endured blackouts and fuel shortages. The statement also emphasized that key CUPET assets had been “unlawfully expropriated from American owners years ago.”

Legally, however, CUPET was not designated for past expropriation claims or alleged human rights abuses. It was designated under the comparatively straightforward authority in Section 2(a)(i)(A) of E.O. 14404 because it “operates in the energy sector of the Cuban economy.” Public reporting consistently describes CUPET as controlling or overseeing much of Cuba’s energy value chain, including domestic production, refining, storage and fuel distribution infrastructure. Therefore, the designation of CUPET targets the operational core of Cuba’s fuel system.

The practical significance of the CUPET designation becomes clearest when viewed against the broader context of the Administration’s evolving use of energy restrictions as a central instrument of pressure on Cuba. Since early 2026, US policy has moved toward what is functionally an energy denial strategy—not through a single comprehensive statutory embargo, but through a combination of measures designed to restrict Cuba’s access to oil and petroleum products from both US and non-US sources.

These measures include the national emergency declared in January 2026 ( E.O. 14380 ), the threat or imposition of tariffs on countries supplying oil to Cuba, targeted designations of shipping networks and state-affiliated actors and—critically—the expansion of sanctions authorities under E.O. 14404 to reach foreign actors supporting Cuba’s energy sector. Together, these actions aim to constrain the Cuban government’s ability to secure fuel imports and monetize energy resources, thereby targeting what the US government views as a core source of regime control and revenue.

Meanwhile, US policy in early 2026 reflected an effort to preserve a narrow humanitarian and economic carveout. On February 25, 2026, OFAC issued FAQ 1238 , announcing a “favorable licensing policy” for specific license applications seeking authorization to resell Venezuelan-origin oil for use in Cuba, provided that the transactions support the Cuban people—in other words, the Cuban private sector—and do not involve or benefit Cuban military, intelligence, government institutions, Cuba Restricted List entities or Cuban-owned financial institutions. OFAC also stated that present and future financial transactions had to be structured to avoid those excluded parties, including through non-Cuban banking channels.

Separately, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued updated guidance on February 24, 2026 explaining that exports and reexports of US-origin gas and other petroleum products to Cuban private-sector entities or individuals could, under certain conditions, be authorized under License Exception Support for the Cuban People (SCP), 15 C.F.R. § 740.21. BIS’s guidance stated that exporters should instead rely on License Exception SCP where available. BIS was explicit, however, that such exports had to be both for use by the Cuban private sector and for private-sector activities, including improving living conditions and supporting independent economic activity.

These February measures created a narrowly conditioned pathway for fuel-related activity involving non-state Cuban actors. But that policy always rested on a difficult, perhaps unrealistic, assumption: that one could supply fuel to Cuba’s private sector without materially involving the Cuban state. The CUPET designation exposed the limits of that assumption. Private sector customers in Cuba lack independent large-scale logistics and often require access to storage tanks, terminals, trucking and other infrastructure controlled by CUPET or other state actors. Therefore, once CUPET itself became an SDN, that already fragile compliance theory collapsed.

BIS’s subsequent March 4, 2026 determination suspending the availability of License Exception SCP for transactions involving the deposit of foreign funds into Cuban-owned banks further illustrates the government’s concern that even ostensibly private-sector transactions could generate revenue for or support the Cuban state. BIS justified that suspension by pointing to the role of Cuban banks in the regime’s financial infrastructure and the risk that such transactions would primarily benefit the government, contrary to the purpose of SCP. That logic applies with even greater force to CUPET, which sits at the center of the island’s fuel infrastructure.

It is tempting to say that the CUPET designation changes little because Cuba and Cuban state entities were already deeply restricted. That view misses the operational significance of putting the energy monopoly itself on the SDN List. Before June 11, many US and non-US participants could at least ask whether a carefully structured transaction supporting Cuba’s private sector might fit within CACR authorizations, BIS license exceptions, or OFAC’s favorable licensing posture. After June 11, any transaction that directly or indirectly touches CUPET is far more difficult to defend because it now involves a specifically blocked person under a sanctions program explicitly designed to deter foreign support.

For non-US persons, the development of a dedicated Cuba sanctions program that expressly contemplates sanctions on foreign actors dealing with blocked Cuban entities will predictably chill financing, shipping, insurance, port services and commodity trading involving Cuba’s fuel system. From a compliance perspective, institutions that may once have approached Cuba as a difficult embargo jurisdiction will now increasingly evaluate CUPET exposure through the same lens they apply to Iranian, Venezuelan or Russian SDNs: near-zero tolerance, heightened due diligence and strong US pressure to disengage.

The designation also has broader doctrinal significance. By targeting CUPET under Section 2(a)(i)(A), the Administration has signaled that sector participation alone can justify blocking sanctions in Cuba sanctions cases. That creates a usable template for future designations involving other strategic state-linked enterprises in energy, transportation, finance, telecommunications, logistics or mining. The pattern already points in that direction: OFAC and State previously used E.O. 14404 to designate GAESA and other actors operating in the financial services, metals and mining and security-related sectors of the Cuban economy. CUPET confirms that the Administration is operationalizing the order sector by sector.

The Administration is trying to maintain the rhetorical distinction between supporting the Cuban people and pressuring the Cuban regime, while simultaneously designating the very infrastructure through which many civilian-support transactions would have to pass. That tension is not unique to Cuba. It is a recurring feature of sanctions regimes targeting state-dominated economies, and it is particularly acute where the state controls ports, banks, refineries, pipelines, telecom networks and food distribution channels. The US concludes that CUPET is a state-controlled chokepoint that itself is a strategic source of regime power and sanctions it on that basis even at the cost of narrowing or negating earlier carveouts.

In light of these developments, companies, banks, insurers, and logistics providers may need to look beyond the stated purpose of a transaction and consider how it is implemented in practice. In particular, attention is likely to focus on whether the transaction, directly or indirectly, involves a designated entity or infrastructure owned or controlled by such an entity. Given CUPET’s role across Cuba’s energy supply chain—including import, storage, and distribution—participants in this sector should be mindful that even transactions intended to support private-sector activity may nonetheless intersect with state-controlled systems, and therefore require careful structuring and compliance analysis.

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Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMivAFBVV95cUxNdVhEVks2Y1RUYWplUVY5STBlUlZCaFNBTVoteFF3bjBYaWRDeHRuVm52YWljZGRPc3lwMmQ0SEg0Z2RwRFRjZnc1dUJwLUtabHdwVTE3ampvWERoS2NJQkZnUTJya09mUFJ6a1JMTXVTaUlEeHczaDR5NnBGYms0UXZGOWhEMEVMSG55UEFod1V2ZHNwV1A1SXpLT2R3UnA5NXdldFpwdkROS3RwdlpxcUw5dG4wVHVkSEVfdQ?oc=5