핵심요약

• 7월 24일과 25일 사이에 사우디 주도의 연합이 예멘 내 후티 목표물에 공습을 가했습니다.
• 사우디군은 7월 25일에 예멘의 자우프 및 마립 지방에서 후티의 드론 및 미사일 발사 기지로 타격했습니다.
• 후티 및 후티 관련 매체는 사우디가 홍해 지역의 해상 운송을 위협하기 위해 행동했다고 주장했습니다.
• 사우디 연합 대변인은 항구에 대한 공습을 부인했습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란 분쟁의 최신 군사적 전개 상황을 분석하여 투자자들이 지역 안보 위험과 공급망에 미치는 영향을 이해하는 데 중요합니다. 지정학적 긴장이 고조되는 상황에서, 이러한 군사 행동은 에너지 시장의 변동성과 글로벌 물류 비용에 직접적인 영향을 미치기 때문에 해당 정보는 시장 평가에 필수적입니다.

본문 1: 지정학적 충돌의 군사적 역학 관계

7월 24일과 25일의 사건은 사우디 주도의 연합과 후티 세력 간의 군사적 역학 관계를 명확히 보여줍니다. 사우디 연합이 예멘 내 주요 목표물에 공습을 가한 행위는 후티 세력의 해상 및 인프라에 대한 압박을 가하는 전략적 목표를 반영합니다. 특히 후티 및 후티 관련 매체는 사우디 행동이 홍해 지역의 해상 운송을 위협하기 위한 조치였다고 주장하며, 이는 해상 무역로의 안전성에 대한 우려를 증폭시킵니다. 이러한 군사적 상호작용은 단순히 지역 분쟁을 넘어, 국제 해상 무역로의 안정성에 대한 잠재적 위협으로 해석됩니다. 사우디군이 7월 25일에 요르단 지역의 특정 지방에서 후티의 군사 시설을 타격한 것은, 분쟁의 영향이 육상 및 공중 영역으로 확산되고 있음을 시사하며, 이는 지역 전체의 안보 환경에 복잡한 영향을 미칩니다.

본문 2: 공급망 위험과 에너지 시장의 변동성

군사적 충돌은 직접적으로 에너지 공급망과 물류 비용에 영향을 미칩니다. 홍해 지역의 해상 운송로에 대한 위협은 유라시아를 잇는 주요 해상 무역로의 안정성을 저해하며, 이는 원유 및 천연가스의 운송 비용 상승으로 이어질 수 있습니다. 사우디와 이란 간의 긴장은 국제 에너지 시장의 변동성을 증가시키며, 이는 국제 유가 및 관련 상품 가격에 직접적인 영향을 미칩니다. 이러한 지정학적 위험은 글로벌 공급망의 취약성을 드러내며, 특히 원자재 수입에 의존하는 국가들의 경제적 안정성에 불확실성을 더합니다. 따라서 투자자들은 이러한 군사적 활동이 에너지 가격과 글로벌 무역 흐름에 미치는 파급 효과를 면밀히 분석해야 합니다.

본문 3: 장기적 안보 전망 및 전략적 고려 사항

장기적인 관점에서 볼 때, 이란 분쟁의 지속은 지역 안보의 복잡성을 심화시킬 것입니다. 이란이 공격을 보복적이고 방어적인 행동으로 규정하고 있다는 점은, 분쟁의 목표가 단기적 충돌을 넘어 전략적 이익을 달성하는 데 있음을 암시합니다. 이러한 장기적인 군사적 목표는 지역 강대국들의 개입과 연관되어 있으며, 이는 향후 수년간의 지정학적 지형 변화를 예측하는 데 중요합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 장기적 관점에서 분쟁이 지역 경제 및 국제 관계에 미치는 구조적 영향을 고려하여 포트폴리오를 조정해야 합니다. 특히, 지역 내 주요 인프라와 에너지 자원의 안정성은 향후 몇 년간의 투자 결정에 있어 핵심적인 변수가 될 것입니다.

결론

결론적으로, 7월 24일과 25일의 군사적 교환은 지역 안보 환경에 즉각적인 불안정성을 야기했으며, 이는 에너지 시장과 글로벌 공급망에 직접적인 변동성을 초래합니다. 향후 상황은 이란과 사우디 간의 전략적 목표 달성 여부에 따라 달라질 것이므로, 지정학적 위험에 대한 지속적인 모니터링이 필수적입니다. 투자자들은 이러한 군사적 동향이 장기적인 경제적 파급 효과로 어떻게 전환될지 예측하며 신중하게 접근해야 합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilAFBVV95cUxPN3pYOHVKcXlhVFVvNThsdE5VMG52VDJRekZOb1g5TkxMcnpTMmhCTnNPdk10XzhDNlhrLUwzS05ySU95eU9fMzNlZTc2WnpxY2c4MmdRdDI1WW9IMFpxRVBVQmg2ZGx2WG9kVXQ3UzBUV0ZDSk9sbHJncDdQQXEzbk5qUkZmTF9QeXAyRGhoYlVPQWIx?oc=5

Iran Update Special Report, July 25, 2026 - Institute for the Study of War

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

Note : ISW-CTP will publish abbreviated updates on Saturdays and Sundays covering the Iran conflict and Axis of Resistance developments directly related to the conflict starting on July 18, 2026.

Note : ISW-CTP has revised its update structure due to the resumption of war between the United States and Iran. Iran is currently engaged in an information effort to frame its attacks on US bases and regional states as retaliatory and defensive. Iran is not merely responding to US strikes on Iran, however, but is engaged in proactive military operations to achieve discrete objectives. The revised update structure reflects some of these key objectives.

The Saudi-led coalition struck several Houthi targets across Yemen on July 24 and 25 in order to degrade the Houthis’ capabilities to threaten Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea and strike Saudi critical infrastructure. [1] The Houthis and Houthi-affiliated media claimed that Saudi-led forces struck Hudaydah Port, a telecommunications building in Hudaydah City, and an unspecified target on Karaman Island near Salif Port, northwestern Yemen, on July 24.[2] Anti-Houthi Yemeni media claimed that the strikes targeted Houthi barracks near Hudaydah Port.[3] Geolocated imagery showed a fire burning at Hudaydah Port on July 24 after the alleged Saudi strikes.[4] A spokesperson for the Saudi-led coalition denied that the coalition conducted any strikes targeting the port. [5] Saudi forces later struck likely Houthi drone and missile launch sites in Jawf and Marib provinces on July 25 in response to Houthi attacks on Saudi critical infrastructure in Yanbu and Jizan on July 24.[6]

The Houthis attacked Saudi vessels and Red Sea ports on July 24 to coerce Saudi Arabia into abandoning its air campaign against Houthi ports and infrastructure.[7] The Houthis fired missiles and drones targeting Saudi state-owned oil infrastructure in Yanbu and Jizan on the Red Sea coast.[8] An open-source intelligence account on X confirmed that Houthi munitions impacted in Jizan, and Reuters reported that Greek-operated Saudi air defenses intercepted two Houthi ballistic missiles targeting Yanbu.[9] The Houthis claimed that their forces conducted the attacks in response to Saudi airstrikes on Houthi sites several hours earlier.[10] International media reported that Houthi forces also attacked a Saudi vessel, the NCC Masa , in the Red Sea on July 24.[11] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea warned on July 25 that the Houthis will continue to enforce their blockade on Saudi ports and vessels and will “not hesitate” to escalate or expand the group’s targeting in response to Saudi attacks.[12] A US-based Yemen analyst reported on July 25 that the Houthis may expand their targeting of Saudi infrastructure, including energy and maritime assets.[13] Houthi attacks on oil infrastructure in major Red Sea port cities compound the tactical effects of the group’s blockade on Saudi Arabia, which raises the cost for Saudi Arabia to continue air operations in Houthi-controlled territory.[14] Saudi Arabia heavily depends on Yanbu as an oil export hub in light of Iranian attacks on vessels and oil infrastructure in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.[15] Houthi attacks on Yanbu and other Saudi Red Sea ports also advance Iranian interests by eliminating Saudi alternatives to accepting Iran’s demand for recognized control over the Strait of Hormuz.[16]

The United States did not conduct a wave of overnight strikes in Iran for the first time in 13 days. An Iranian health ministry spokesperson confirmed that the United States had not conducted any attacks in Iran since July 24.[17] US President Donald Trump met with senior advisers at the White House on July 24 to discuss US options for operations in Iran, including reportedly the possibility of expanding US military operations.[18] Trump reportedly ordered the US military to hold strikes on Iran several hours after an Omani delegation arrived in Tehran to discuss efforts to re-open the Strait of Hormuz with the Iranians.[19] Trump told reporters that the United States “is talking” with the Iranians.[20]

The United States has conducted nightly waves of strikes in Iran since July 12 targeting Iranian military command centers, drone storage facilities, communications networks, coastal surveillance sites, maritime capabilities, and military logistics infrastructure. [21] US military officials said that US forces have struck over 1,000 targets.[22] The United States struck 13,000 targets in 38 days during the previous phase of the war.[23]

Iran has only conducted one attack targeting a US base in Bahrain since CTP-ISW’s last data cut-off on July 24, which suggests that Iran is calibrating attacks on US positions in response to US activity.[24] A likely Iranian attack triggered alarms in Bahrain on July 24.[25] Iran has conducted daily attacks on states hosting US bases—particularly Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan—since the US resumed daily strikes on Iran on July 12.[26] The sharp reduction in Iranian attacks on US bases overnight between July 24 and 25 may reflect the absence of US strikes in Iran during the same period. Iran is using its attacks on US bases to inflict a steady number of US casualties at US regional bases in order to impose US domestic pressure that would force the US government to halt its airstrike campaign on Iran.[27] Iran also aims to raise the cost for US regional allies of hosting US forces and pressure US allies to urge the United States to end its strike campaign on terms favorable to Tehran.

A “credible” Iranian-linked threat prompted US President Donald Trump to switch to a more secure plane for his return flight from the NATO summit in Ankara on July 8.[28] Multiple people briefed on the matter told the New York Times on July 24 that US officials determined that “Iranian proxy forces” posed a “credible threat” to Trump and Air Force One.[29] Sources briefed on the matter said that the threat that prompted Trump to change planes was ”separate” from a recent Iranian threat attributed to Israeli intelligence.[30] Israel recently shared intelligence with the United States that Israel said indicated that an Iranian plan to kill Trump, according to the Wall Street Journal on July 9.[31]

US forces disabled a vessel that violated the US blockade in the Gulf of Oman on July 24. [32] A CENTCOM spokesperson said that US forces fired into the engine room of the Lavine after the crew did not comply with US warnings after at least four previous attempts to run the blockade.[33]The Lavine was attempting to transport Iranian liquefied petroleum gas, according to Iranian media.[34] Iranian media reported that the attack killed two sailors.[35] CENTCOM acknowledged the reports of casualties.[36] The Lavine is the second ship that US forces have disabled since the United States re-imposed the blockade on July 14.[37]

Iran has fired advanced variants of the Kheybar Shekan medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) at regional US bases during the current conflict that have evaded US defenses, according to US officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal .[38] The US officials stated that Iran has launched Kheybar Shekan missiles along different flight paths and at varying speeds and maneuvers in attempts to circumvent US air defenses. [39] One US official stated that some of these missiles have successfully evaded US defenses. Unspecified analysts and officials told the Wall Street Journal that some Kheybar Shekan variants have a detachable warhead-bearing nosecone that can adjust its trajectory during the terminal phase at speeds of up to 6,000 miles per hour.[40] A military analyst added that Iran can rapidly fuel and load these missiles onto mobile launchers, which allows Iran to reduce its vulnerability to strikes targeting fixed Iranian launch sites. The United States and Israel estimated that Iran possessed approximately 2,500 Kheybar Shekan MRBMs before the US-Iran war began in February 2026. A missile expert told the Wall Street Journal that Iran may be currently assembling more Kheybar Shekan missiles using components stored in underground facilities.[41] The expert added that previous US-Israeli strikes have destroyed Iranian facilities used to assemble the missile’s engine, however.

Nuclear expert David Albright assessed on July 24 that the degraded state of Iran’s nuclear program following the June 2025 Israel-Iran war will continue to pose significant barriers to Iran’s development of a post-fission nuclear weapon. [42] The New York Times reported on July 24 that US intelligence agencies assess that Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has more interest in developing a nuclear weapon than former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, according to officials briefed on the assessments. [43] The officials said that this assessment relies primarily upon Mojtaba’s public statements and intercepted communications before US and Israeli strikes in Iran in February and April 2026. US officials told the New York Times that Mojtaba supports the development of a thermonuclear warhead that Iran could miniaturize for deployment on a long-range ballistic missile.[44] Albright suggested that Mojtaba is unlikely to pursue developing thermonuclear weapons at this time, given the current status of Iran’s targeted nuclear weaponization-related sites.[45] US and Israeli airstrikes in 2026 targeted Iranian nuclear weaponization sites, following June 2025 strikes that disabled Iran’s uranium enrichment infrastructure and buried at least a majority of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile.[46] Albright stated that the June 2025 war significantly reduced Iran’s capacity to produce a nuclear weapon while increasing both the likelihood of detection and the risk of technological failure. [47]

Nothing significant to report.

[1] https://t.me/army21ye/3594 ; https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2080784707357180324/photo/1; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/2080956969649615001 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2080980011226366077?s=20

[2] https://t.me/army21ye/3594 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/2080987012048318691 ; https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/2080756968403480618

[3] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/2080753037992202259?s=20

[4] https://x.com/LayBay_ish/status/2080752164159312180?s=20

[5] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2080784707357180324/photo/1

[6] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/2080956969649615001 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2080980011226366077?s=20

[7] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2080948398375453128?s=20 ; https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-hormuz-strait-war-25-july-2026-df3790320c595f3e599fb1dd69423e77 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-vessel-sustains-minor-hull-damage-after-red-sea-attack-state-news-agency-2026-07-24/

[8] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2080948398375453128?s=20 ; https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-hormuz-strait-war-25-july-2026-df3790320c595f3e599fb1dd69423e77

[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-strikes-target-yemens-hodeidah-says-houthi-run-al-masirah-tv-2026-07-24/ ; https://x.com/john_marquee/status/2080890037558984957?s=20

[10] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2080986931974787307?s=20

[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-vessel-sustains-minor-hull-damage-after-red-sea-attack-state-news-agency-2026-07-24/

[12] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/2080986931974787307?s=20

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilAFBVV95cUxPN3pYOHVKcXlhVFVvNThsdE5VMG52VDJRekZOb1g5TkxMcnpTMmhCTnNPdk10XzhDNlhrLUwzS05ySU95eU9fMzNlZTc2WnpxY2c4MmdRdDI1WW9IMFpxRVBVQmg2ZGx2WG9kVXQ3UzBUV0ZDSk9sbHJncDdQQXEzbk5qUkZmTF9QeXAyRGhoYlVPQWIx?oc=5