핵심요약

• 이라크 정부의 미온적 대응은 지역 전쟁으로 이어질 수 있는 위험을 내포하고 있습니다.
• 이라크 국가의 구조적 취약성과 의사결정 권한의 분열이 지역적 대립 발생 시 위험을 증폭시킵니다.
• 무장 단체들이 공식 보안 기관 밖에서 활동하며 '중립' 구호를 무시하고 있다는 점이 불안정성을 가중시킵니다.
• 이라크 정부는 무장 단체의 군사적 힘이 군사, 정치, 의회, 경제 영역 전반에 걸쳐 확장되는 상황에 직면해 있습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란-미국 간의 군사적 긴장이 확대되는 상황에서 이라크 정부의 대응 미흡이 지역적 불안정을 심화시킬 수 있다는 점을 지적합니다. 투자자 관점에서 이는 중동 지역의 지정학적 리스크가 에너지 시장과 지역 경제에 미치는 파급 효과를 분석하는 데 중요한 근거를 제공합니다. 특히 이라크 내의 구조적 취약성이 외부 충격에 어떻게 반응할지 예측하는 것은 지역 투자 전략 수립에 필수적입니다.

본문 1: 국가 구조적 취약성과 의사결정의 분열

이라크 국가의 가장 큰 위험 요소는 정부의 구조적 취약성과 의사결정 권한의 분열입니다. 기사는 이라크가 다가오는 지역적 대립 상황에 효과적으로 대응하지 못하는 이유는 이러한 근본적인 구조적 문제에서 비롯된다고 분석합니다. 정부가 근본적인 위기 원인보다는 피상적인 조치에 머물러 있다는 점은 위기 관리 능력이 부족함을 의미합니다. 이처럼 국가 시스템이 분열되어 있을 때, 외부의 군사적 압력은 중앙 정부의 통제력을 약화시키고 지역 분쟁의 확산으로 이어질 가능성이 높습니다. 이는 잠재적인 투자 환경에 예측 불가능한 변동성을 추가하는 요인입니다.

본문 2: 무장 단체의 역할과 '중립' 구호의 무력화

지역 불안정의 또 다른 동인은 무장 단체들의 행태입니다. 일부 무장 단체들은 이라크 공식 보안 기관이 설정한 메커니즘 외부에서 활동하며, '중립'이라는 구호를 무시하고 있습니다. 이들은 외세의 철수 시한(9월)을 활용하려는 듯 암시적인 신호를 보내고 있으며, 이는 정부의 통제 밖에 있는 강력한 무장 세력의 부상을 의미합니다. 이러한 무장 세력의 힘이 군사, 정치, 경제 영역 전반에 걸쳐 확장되고 있다는 점은 정부의 통제력 상실을 시사하며, 이는 지역 경제의 안정성에 직접적인 위협이 됩니다. 무장 세력의 행동은 단순한 지역 갈등을 넘어 국제적 개입과 연관될 수 있는 지정학적 리스크를 증대시킵니다.

본문 3: 잠재적 위험의 장기적 파급 효과

만약 지역적 대립이 전면전으로 확대되거나 무장 단체들이 무장 해제를 거부할 경우, 이라크는 통제 불능의 상황에 직면하게 됩니다. 이러한 시나리오는 지역 내 에너지 공급망의 불안정화, 인프라 파괴, 그리고 국제적 개입의 복잡성을 증가시킬 것입니다. 장기적으로 볼 때, 이러한 불안정성은 지역 경제의 성장 동력을 약화시키고, 외국인 투자자들에게 높은 위험 프리미엄을 요구하게 만들 것입니다. 따라서 지역 투자자들은 단기적인 군사적 소식뿐만 아니라, 이라크 국가의 내부 정치적, 경제적 안정성을 장기적인 투자 판단 기준으로 삼아야 합니다.

결론

결론적으로, 이라크의 미온적 대응은 지역적 분쟁을 통제하지 못하고 오히려 더 큰 얽힘을 초래할 위험을 안고 있습니다. 이라크의 구조적 취약성과 무장 단체의 확산은 단기적인 안보 문제뿐만 아니라 장기적인 경제적 불확실성을 심화시킵니다. 향후 지역 정세 변화에 따라 이라크와 중동 지역의 투자 환경에 대한 지속적인 모니터링이 요구됩니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 변동성이 지역 자산에 미치는 영향을 면밀히 분석해야 합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMipwFBVV95cUxNUkYzeGpJbzhzenBldVZpYlZheXVHTWNuMlMxQkRxMEJia1Z2UlpHZmdWbW5ldi1PdFNZdEdGTTg1VmdlY2J0TFM0ZXl3VkdTWkpKbHVUbzhfTmNWdWdOS1Vua3FIdVZzT3FRaDlYNGx3SmQ4Y3liLUFBTWlnaW5HR1JrTVZJWktRSS1MU2h4bUh4TjNtZVBxWFZvMkZCTlZwZ2dyLWI4TQ?oc=5

As Iran War Spreads, Baghdad’s Slow Response Risks Unwanted Entanglement - Middle East Council on Global Affairs

The tepid response of Ali al-Zaidi's new Iraqi government to outlaw militias' involvement in the fighting could drag the country into a disastrous regional war.

The ongoing military escalation between Washington and Tehran could be a prelude to an open-ended confrontation with even more dangerous regional consequences. Such a prospect should compel regional states to raise their level of preparedness to protect their political, economic, and security interests. Yet Baghdad—the capital most exposed to the repercussions of these developments—remains governed by a political system mired in peripheral disputes and superficial measures that fail to address the root causes of the grave, multifaceted crises looming ahead. Baghdad’s lack of preparedness stems from several factors, including the war’s effects on the government’s financial resources. Most notably, however, the structural fragility of the Iraqi state and the fragmentation of its decision-making authority are a stark reminder of the dangers that could materialize should a full-scale regional confrontation erupt. Some armed groups remain capable of operating outside the mechanisms established by Iraq’s official security institutions, and they pay little heed to the rhetoric of “neutrality,” treating it as a slogan that can be disregarded without consequence. Outlaw armed militias have recently rejected calls to surrender their weapons outright, while some have issued cryptic signals in an apparent attempt to exploit the anticipated September deadline—the date agreed upon for the “complete withdrawal” of foreign forces. Baghdad now appears headed for an increasingly difficult confrontation with an emboldened militia establishment whose power extends across the military, political, parliamentary, and economic spheres. Yet no plan exists to contain a departure from the established course—whether under a scenario of open confrontation, a refusal by the militias to disarm, or a decision by the U.S. administration not to withdraw its troops, justified by the need to protect companies and uphold agreements, some of them signed during Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s recent visit to Washington. Iraq’s “domestic resilience” suffers from an underlying weakness, particularly in the aftermath of what became known as the “Dawn Offensive,” a sweeping anti-corruption campaign launched by al-Zaidi that has led to the arrest of dozens of individuals, including current and former lawmakers. The campaign created deep fissures within the ruling political establishment, leading some forces to believe that they alone were being targeted while others feared that they would be next. The result has been a crisis of confidence within Iraq’s political blocs—one that could translate into institutional disarray and an inability to manage state bodies or maintain control over critical decisions. Against this backdrop, Baghdad has plunged into a profound and alarming economic crisis. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the sharp decline in Iraqi oil exports, which account for roughly 90 percent of the state’s budget, have left the government unable to devise swift solutions to avert public anger that could erupt at any moment—particularly if the crisis begins to affect the salaries of public-sector employees and pensioners, as well as the vast numbers of Iraqis dependent on social welfare. Externally, tensions in Iraq’s relations with the international community and neighboring countries—particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—are increasingly apparent, as reflected in recent Saudi and American responses. These strains coincide with recurring allegations that attacks against those countries have been launched from Iraqi territory. Taken together, these crises present a dangerous outlook: should the region slide into another war, Baghdad could find itself virtually isolated abroad and bereft of leverage at home. Meanwhile, the United States is intensifying its military build-up in the Middle East, with dozens of strikes concentrated around the Iranian city of Ahvaz, near the Iraqi border and close to the Gulf states. Israel has also raised its level of military readiness, potentially laying the groundwork for a return to direct participation in the war. Another development—whose dangers to the region have received comparatively little attention—is the formal launch of Israel’s election campaign following the dissolution of the Knesset. Israel has now entered a decisive 90-day period leading up to the vote. With Benjamin Netanyahu facing mounting and multifaceted domestic pressure over his political future, he could resort to major escalatory measures as a means of escaping his predicament at home. An Israeli return to the fight would deepen the conflict’s complexity and could prompt Iran to mobilize affiliated groups across the region, particularly in Iraq—among the countries most exposed to the fallout of further escalation. This risk is compounded by the presence of U.S. interests on Iraqi soil and by outlaw militias’ continued possession of missiles and drones that could be used against American assets or Gulf states. During the initial 40-day phase of the war, Baghdad failed to prevent the outlaw militias from joining the escalation, raising the prospect that they could repeat the scenario in any future confrontation. Al-Zaidi—who held lengthy talks with U.S. President Donald Trump and made numerous commitments to rein in the militias and bring all weapons under state control—would face a serious predicament: all his assurances to Washington could unravel the moment the first drone is launched from Iraqi territory. Trump, who is seeking swift results, may then conclude that the Iraqi government is being evasive and merely buying time, without asserting effective control or taking tangible action on the ground. These developments, for which Baghdad appears wholly unprepared, could plunge the country into a sovereignty crisis no less dangerous than those it has faced in the past. Should drones or missiles be launched from Iraqi territory, the United States and Israel would have a pretext to strike inside Iraqi cities, as occurred previously when the headquarters, weapons depots, and commanders of armed militias were targeted. The Iraqi government would also face diplomatic and economic pressure, and potentially U.S. sanctions against individuals and institutions believed to support militia activities. The danger is no longer hypothetical. The attacks on Kuwait’s Abdali area—particularly amid allegations that Iraqi groups were responsible—along with other attacks that Saudi Arabia and Jordan allege were launched from Iraqi territory, place Baghdad on a direct collision course with its Gulf neighbors. Baghdad’s tendency to respond to such complaints by merely forming investigative committees exposes the official establishment’s inability to exercise control on the ground. It also sends an unmistakable signal that decisions of war and peace lie beyond the authority of state institutions—particularly if the escalation reaches a level at which Iran considers every option to be on the table. The problem is not confined to the official authorities; it extends to political forces as well, particularly the Coordination Framework, a council of major Shia parties that has so far demonstrated its inability to rein in the outlaw militias refusing to surrender their weapons. The bloc’s already strained relationship with the government, amid the latter’s anti-corruption campaign, could become a further liability if Washington concludes that Iraq’s assurances are not matched by concrete action on the ground. The Iraqi government’s reliance on limited, reciprocal strikes against these groups is a potentially disastrous gamble that could unravel rapidly. Baghdad must recognize that the current moment no longer allows for verbal assurances to external parties and cautious observation. It requires an immediate shift toward strategic planning and urgent action, free from the miscalculations that have consistently left Iraq reacting to events rather than anticipating them and protecting its national interests. An “open confrontation” scenario requires Baghdad to establish a high-level crisis center immediately and raise its readiness to protect critical infrastructure such as airports, oil installations, and diplomatic missions. It must also tighten surveillance along the borders and at suspected missile- and drone-launch sites; conduct a transparent investigation into the Abdali incident in coordination with Kuwait; activate direct channels of communication with Washington, Tehran, and the Gulf capitals to reaffirm that Iraqi territory may not be used to launch attacks; and mobilize a unified domestic political position that confronts those internal forces unilaterally dragging the country into war. The coming hours and days will be a genuine test of the new government’s ability to defend Iraq’s sovereignty, prevent the country from becoming an arena for settling regional scores, and retain control over decisions of war and peace. Rapid developments on the ground demand that the government move beyond merely monitoring events, by developing emergency plans and building the resilience needed to withstand the storms ahead. The turbulent history of this region—and Iraq’s own experience—has taught us that regional crises do not permit cost-free neutrality. A state that cannot deny the use of its airspace and territory, that fails to strengthen its “domestic resilience,” and that is deemed incapable of exercising effective authority will inevitably share the cost of the conflict and become one of its victims. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.

Baghdad’s lack of preparedness stems from several factors, including the war’s effects on the government’s financial resources. Most notably, however, the structural fragility of the Iraqi state and the fragmentation of its decision-making authority are a stark reminder of the dangers that could materialize should a full-scale regional confrontation erupt. Some armed groups remain capable of operating outside the mechanisms established by Iraq’s official security institutions, and they pay little heed to the rhetoric of “neutrality,” treating it as a slogan that can be disregarded without consequence.

Outlaw armed militias have recently rejected calls to surrender their weapons outright, while some have issued cryptic signals in an apparent attempt to exploit the anticipated September deadline—the date agreed upon for the “complete withdrawal” of foreign forces. Baghdad now appears headed for an increasingly difficult confrontation with an emboldened militia establishment whose power extends across the military, political, parliamentary, and economic spheres. Yet no plan exists to contain a departure from the established course—whether under a scenario of open confrontation, a refusal by the militias to disarm, or a decision by the U.S. administration not to withdraw its troops, justified by the need to protect companies and uphold agreements, some of them signed during Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s recent visit to Washington.

Iraq’s “domestic resilience” suffers from an underlying weakness, particularly in the aftermath of what became known as the “Dawn Offensive,” a sweeping anti-corruption campaign launched by al-Zaidi that has led to the arrest of dozens of individuals, including current and former lawmakers. The campaign created deep fissures within the ruling political establishment, leading some forces to believe that they alone were being targeted while others feared that they would be next. The result has been a crisis of confidence within Iraq’s political blocs—one that could translate into institutional disarray and an inability to manage state bodies or maintain control over critical decisions.

Against this backdrop, Baghdad has plunged into a profound and alarming economic crisis. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the sharp decline in Iraqi oil exports, which account for roughly 90 percent of the state’s budget, have left the government unable to devise swift solutions to avert public anger that could erupt at any moment—particularly if the crisis begins to affect the salaries of public-sector employees and pensioners, as well as the vast numbers of Iraqis dependent on social welfare.

Externally, tensions in Iraq’s relations with the international community and neighboring countries—particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—are increasingly apparent, as reflected in recent Saudi and American responses. These strains coincide with recurring allegations that attacks against those countries have been launched from Iraqi territory. Taken together, these crises present a dangerous outlook: should the region slide into another war, Baghdad could find itself virtually isolated abroad and bereft of leverage at home.

Meanwhile, the United States is intensifying its military build-up in the Middle East, with dozens of strikes concentrated around the Iranian city of Ahvaz, near the Iraqi border and close to the Gulf states. Israel has also raised its level of military readiness, potentially laying the groundwork for a return to direct participation in the war.

Another development—whose dangers to the region have received comparatively little attention—is the formal launch of Israel’s election campaign following the dissolution of the Knesset. Israel has now entered a decisive 90-day period leading up to the vote. With Benjamin Netanyahu facing mounting and multifaceted domestic pressure over his political future, he could resort to major escalatory measures as a means of escaping his predicament at home.

An Israeli return to the fight would deepen the conflict’s complexity and could prompt Iran to mobilize affiliated groups across the region, particularly in Iraq—among the countries most exposed to the fallout of further escalation. This risk is compounded by the presence of U.S. interests on Iraqi soil and by outlaw militias’ continued possession of missiles and drones that could be used against American assets or Gulf states.

During the initial 40-day phase of the war, Baghdad failed to prevent the outlaw militias from joining the escalation, raising the prospect that they could repeat the scenario in any future confrontation. Al-Zaidi—who held lengthy talks with U.S. President Donald Trump and made numerous commitments to rein in the militias and bring all weapons under state control—would face a serious predicament: all his assurances to Washington could unravel the moment the first drone is launched from Iraqi territory.

Trump, who is seeking swift results, may then conclude that the Iraqi government is being evasive and merely buying time, without asserting effective control or taking tangible action on the ground.

These developments, for which Baghdad appears wholly unprepared, could plunge the country into a sovereignty crisis no less dangerous than those it has faced in the past. Should drones or missiles be launched from Iraqi territory, the United States and Israel would have a pretext to strike inside Iraqi cities, as occurred previously when the headquarters, weapons depots, and commanders of armed militias were targeted. The Iraqi government would also face diplomatic and economic pressure, and potentially U.S. sanctions against individuals and institutions believed to support militia activities.

The danger is no longer hypothetical. The attacks on Kuwait’s Abdali area—particularly amid allegations that Iraqi groups were responsible—along with other attacks that Saudi Arabia and Jordan allege were launched from Iraqi territory, place Baghdad on a direct collision course with its Gulf neighbors. Baghdad’s tendency to respond to such complaints by merely forming investigative committees exposes the official establishment’s inability to exercise control on the ground. It also sends an unmistakable signal that decisions of war and peace lie beyond the authority of state institutions—particularly if the escalation reaches a level at which Iran considers every option to be on the table.

The problem is not confined to the official authorities; it extends to political forces as well, particularly the Coordination Framework, a council of major Shia parties that has so far demonstrated its inability to rein in the outlaw militias refusing to surrender their weapons. The bloc’s already strained relationship with the government, amid the latter’s anti-corruption campaign, could become a further liability if Washington concludes that Iraq’s assurances are not matched by concrete action on the ground.

The Iraqi government’s reliance on limited, reciprocal strikes against these groups is a potentially disastrous gamble that could unravel rapidly. Baghdad must recognize that the current moment no longer allows for verbal assurances to external parties and cautious observation. It requires an immediate shift toward strategic planning and urgent action, free from the miscalculations that have consistently left Iraq reacting to events rather than anticipating them and protecting its national interests.

An “open confrontation” scenario requires Baghdad to establish a high-level crisis center immediately and raise its readiness to protect critical infrastructure such as airports, oil installations, and diplomatic missions. It must also tighten surveillance along the borders and at suspected missile- and drone-launch sites; conduct a transparent investigation into the Abdali incident in coordination with Kuwait; activate direct channels of communication with Washington, Tehran, and the Gulf capitals to reaffirm that Iraqi territory may not be used to launch attacks; and mobilize a unified domestic political position that confronts those internal forces unilaterally dragging the country into war.

The coming hours and days will be a genuine test of the new government’s ability to defend Iraq’s sovereignty, prevent the country from becoming an arena for settling regional scores, and retain control over decisions of war and peace. Rapid developments on the ground demand that the government move beyond merely monitoring events, by developing emergency plans and building the resilience needed to withstand the storms ahead.

The turbulent history of this region—and Iraq’s own experience—has taught us that regional crises do not permit cost-free neutrality. A state that cannot deny the use of its airspace and territory, that fails to strengthen its “domestic resilience,” and that is deemed incapable of exercising effective authority will inevitably share the cost of the conflict and become one of its victims.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMipwFBVV95cUxNUkYzeGpJbzhzenBldVZpYlZheXVHTWNuMlMxQkRxMEJia1Z2UlpHZmdWbW5ldi1PdFNZdEdGTTg1VmdlY2J0TFM0ZXl3VkdTWkpKbHVUbzhfTmNWdWdOS1Vua3FIdVZzT3FRaDlYNGx3SmQ4Y3liLUFBTWlnaW5HR1JrTVZJWktRSS1MU2h4bUh4TjNtZVBxWFZvMkZCTlZwZ2dyLWI4TQ?oc=5