핵심요약

• 첨단 방어 요격체와 근접 항공 경고(stand-off) 공격 무기가 부족한 상황입니다.
• 미국은 비축량 보충을 위해 아시아와 유럽에서 중동으로 무기를 이전했습니다.
• 무기 부족은 이란에 대한 주요 공격 계획 취소와 같은 지정학적 결정에 영향을 미쳤습니다.
• 미국은 경쟁국들이 미국의 억지력을 의심할 수 있다는 '위험한 순간'에 직면해 있습니다.

도입

본 기사는 미국의 군수품 부족 사태가 어떻게 글로벌 지정학적 환경과 미국 국방 정책에 영향을 미치는지 분석합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 군사적 불확실성이 글로벌 에너지 시장, 방위 산업, 그리고 국제 관계의 변동성에 미치는 영향을 면밀히 살펴볼 필요가 있습니다.

본문 1: 군수품 부족의 본질과 지정학적 파급 효과

미국이 겪고 있는 군수품 부족 사태는 단순한 재고 문제가 아니라, 국제 안보 환경의 근본적인 변화를 반영합니다. 기사에 따르면, 부족 현상은 주로 첨단 방어 요격체와 근접 항공 경고(stand-off) 공격 무기에 한정되어 있으며, 이는 미래 전쟁 양상의 변화와 기술 패권 경쟁의 심화를 시사합니다. 이러한 기술적 격차는 미국이 대외적으로 주장하는 억지력(deterrence)의 신뢰도에 의문을 제기하며, 이는 라이벌 국가들의 행동 예측을 변화시키는 결과를 낳습니다. 실제로 무기 부족으로 인해 이란에 대한 대규모 공격 계획이 취소된 사례는, 군사적 역량의 불균형이 외교적 협상과 전략적 행동에 직접적인 제약을 가할 수 있음을 보여줍니다. 이는 군사력의 양적 우위가 질적 우위와 기술적 접근성을 포함하는 복합적인 요소로 변화하고 있음을 의미합니다.

본문 2: 미국 정부의 대응과 장기적 도전

미국 행정부는 무기 부족에 대해 일관되게 부인하며, 부족 현상이 러시아와의 분쟁에서 우크라이나에 대한 무기 지원에 사용된 이유 때문이라고 주장했습니다. 그러나 이러한 설명에도 불구하고, 전직 국방장관이 경고했듯이, 경쟁국들이 미국의 억지력을 의심하게 만드는 '위험한 순간'에 놓여 있다는 점은 간과할 수 없는 리스크입니다. 이는 미국이 군사적 우위를 유지하는 동시에, 국제 사회에서 그 우위를 효과적으로 입증해야 하는 이중 과제를 안고 있음을 의미합니다. 또한, 군수품 생산 속도에 대한 기대와 실제 공급망의 현실 사이의 괴리는 향후 국방 예산 집행의 효율성과 예측 가능성에 대한 의문을 제기합니다. 이는 기술 발전 속도와 군사적 수요를 따라잡기 위한 공급망의 재편이 필수적임을 시사합니다.

본문 3: 기술 패권 경쟁과 공급망 재편의 전망

미국이 직면한 군수품 문제는 궁극적으로 기술 패권 경쟁의 맥락에서 이해되어야 합니다. 마이클 호로위츠와 같은 전문가들이 강조하는 것처럼, 기술이 전쟁 방식을 재편하고 있으며, 군사적 우위는 더 이상 단순히 무기의 양에만 의존하지 않습니다. 따라서 향후 미국 국방 전략은 첨단 기술의 생산 능력과 공급망의 안정성을 확보하는 데 중점을 둘 것입니다. 아시아와 유럽에서 중동으로의 무기 이전은 이러한 공급망의 지리적 재편을 보여주는 구체적인 사례입니다. 장기적으로 볼 때, 미국은 첨단 기술의 자립적인 생산 체계를 구축하고, 글로벌 공급망의 취약점을 보완하는 데 투자해야 할 것입니다. 이는 단순한 군사적 대응을 넘어, 경제적 안정성과 기술적 리더십을 동시에 확보하는 전략적 접근이 필요함을 의미합니다.

결론

미국의 군수품 사태는 단기적인 공급 문제 이상의 의미를 가지며, 첨단 기술 패권 경쟁 속에서 군사력의 질적 우위와 공급망 안정성이 얼마나 중요한지를 명확히 보여줍니다. 앞으로 미국은 기술 혁신과 글로벌 공급망 재편을 통해 이러한 도전에 대응해야 할 것입니다. 투자자들은 지정학적 불안정성이 방위 산업 섹터와 글로벌 공급망에 미치는 장기적인 영향을 면밀히 관찰할 필요가 있습니다.

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The U.S. Munitions Crisis - cfr.org

Is the United States running out of weapons of war?

Stories that Operation Epic Fury has depleted U.S. weapons stocks have dominated the headlines in recent weeks. Things have gotten so bad that the Pentagon has transferred weapons stored in Asia and Europe to replenish stockpiles in the Middle East. Even then, a shortage of missile interceptors reportedly persuaded President Donald Trump last month to call off plans for a major attack on Iran.

The Trump administration has variously denied that the United States faces a shortage of critical munitions, said that the shortages developed because President Joe Biden gave too many weapons to Ukraine to fight Russia, and argued that weapons manufacturers will soon speed up production.

The stakes in the debate over the state of the U.S. arsenal are high. Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has warned that the United States now faces a “dangerous moment” because rivals may doubt it can deter their aggression. Which raises a question: how did the Pentagon find itself in a position in which military operations against a middle power could impair the U.S. ability to counter challenges from great powers?

To get a better understanding of the nature and extent of the munitions problem, I turned to my Council on Foreign Relations colleague Michael Horowitz . Mike is one of the country’s leading experts on how technology is remaking warfare. During the Biden administration, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development and Emerging Capabilities and Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office. He co-authored the CFR report, “ Out of Ammo: A Two-Year Sprint to Rebuild the American Arsenal and Deter China ,” which was published today.

We recorded our conversation for the latest episode of the CFR podcast, The President’s Inbox .

[Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zs4_0tdExwY ]

1. The munitions shortage is real, but it is limited to hi-tech defensive interceptors and stand-off offensive weapons . The U.S. military maintains expansive stockpiles of what might be called “ordinary” conventional weapons: mortars, artillery shells, gravity bombs, and the like. The war with Iran has not depleted those inventories.

Things look much different when it comes to missile interceptors and stand-off weapons. The numbers are eye-opening:

Patriot and THAAD missile interceptors are essential to defeating potentially catastrophic ballistic missile attacks, while Tomahawks, ATACMS, and PrSM enable the U.S. military to hit enemy targets from great distances. The U.S. military has many short-range weapons it can use. They, however, require pilots to fly close to their targets, where they risk being shot down.

2. It will take years to replenish the stocks of hi-tech weapons . Raytheon currently produces 600 Patriot interceptors a year. At that rate, it would take three years to replenish U.S. stocks. Lockheed Martin produces just 96 THAAD interceptors a year . At that rate, it would take two years to get stocks back to where they stood before the war with Iran began. Raytheon’s recent production rate of Tomahawks has been no more than two hundred missiles a year, and the projected lead-time for new missiles is thirty-four months.

The Trump administration has signed a series of framework agreements this year with defense contractors to speed up the production of these hi-tech weapons. Earlier this month, Deputy Defense Secretary Steve Feinberg took the additional step of giving defense contractors three weeks to generate plans “drive significantly faster, more aggressive delivery schedules and/or increased production for critical capabilities.” The Pentagon’s proposed $67 billion FY26 defense supplemental and its request for a 42 percent increase in defense spending in FY27 would steer funds to speed up the production of missile interceptors and stand-off weapons.

While more money will help, it will not necessarily solve the problem quickly. Weapons production rests on complex supply chains that are only as resilient as their weakest link. An inability to scale up any step of the production process, or a disruption anywhere in the supply chain, will slow down what can be built.

Even if the Pentagon greatly expands the annual production of hi-tech weaponry, the question will be whether that production rate will be sufficient to sustain military operations against a peer military competitor with a more extensive arsenal and defense industrial base than Iran. If not, a rival might conclude it can deplete critical U.S. weapons stocks just as Iran has and thereby neutralize the U.S. military. That hardly reinforces deterrence.

3. The Pentagon finds itself in its current predicament because the world changed faster than U.S. strategy and weapons acquisition did. The United States decided after the Cold War to emphasize quality over quantity and to focus on building on what Mike calls “exquisite, expensive, hard to produce weapons.” Why? The era of geopolitics had seemingly ended. No peer competitor existed. Real defense spending was set to decline. Focusing on building the best weapons rather than acquiring the most weapons made sense for a world where the greatest threats were thought to come from rogue states and terrorist groups.

But geopolitics has returned with a vengeance, as the first Trump administration to its credit recognized in its 2017 National Security Strategy . The rapid development and refinement of cheap drones has throne an additional wrench into the works. The trade-off between quality and quantity suddenly shifted. Using multi-million-dollar interceptors to shoot down drones that cost perhaps $50,000 to make is, as economists like to say, suboptimal.

The challenge now for the Pentagon, which has never distinguished itself as an agile and flexible organization, is to adapt, and to adapt quickly. That will mean not just rejuvenating the defense industrial base to speed up weapons production but also rethinking its strategy for a world in which quantity may have gained the upper hand over quality.

Mike and I discussed these and other aspects of the current munitions crisis, including why munitions orders often take a backseat to other defense priorities at budget time, whether a smaller defense budget would force the Pentagon to be more innovative, and how Congress contributes to the Pentagon’s weapons acquisition pathologies. I encourage you to give the episode a listen.

Oscar Berry and Jack Patton contributed to the preparation of this article.

This work represents the views solely of the author(s). The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiY0FVX3lxTFBSclQwNW5pYUM1a0NRQWw5bTF6emI1RnphUUdhLTAtaEIwYm5peDlJT1VxX1p1REJKbUwzRnUxQ3VlSDFabHpCcDBEQWR4NlFIVVZ2ZEMtMG9IU00xTENpeV9WSQ?oc=5