핵심요약

• 파키스탄의 중재는 미국과 이란 간의 위기를 해결하는 데 기여했습니다.
• 최고 군사 지도자인 아심 무니르 장군이 중재를 통해 휴전 협상을 이끌어냈습니다.
• 미국 부통령 JD Vance는 이스라마바드에서 이란 협상가들과 20시간 이상 직접 접촉했습니다.
• 파키스탄은 주요 강대국 지위나 민주주의 기준을 갖추지 못했음에도 지정학적 영향력을 발휘했습니다.

도입

본 기사는 전통적인 지정학적 자격이 부족한 국가가 어떻게 국제 분쟁 해결에 기여하며 영향력을 행사하는지를 보여줍니다. 이는 현재의 다극화되는 국제 시스템에서 국가의 영향력이 전통적인 경제력이나 군사력 외의 다른 요소들로 재편되고 있음을 시사합니다. 투자자 관점에서 볼 때, 이러한 지정학적 중재 능력은 에너지 무역로와 지역 안정성에 직접적인 영향을 미치므로, 특정 국가의 외교적 역할 변화가 글로벌 자산 시장의 위험 프리미엄에 반영될 수 있습니다.

본문 1: 지정학적 자격의 재정의

파키스탄의 중재는 기존의 국제 질서 속에서 국가의 영향력이 어떻게 재정의되는지를 보여주는 중요한 사례입니다. 기사는 파키스탄이 주요 강대국 지위, 경제적 무게, 자유주의적 규범, 또는 다른 주요 국가에 대한 회의 권한을 갖추지 못했음에도 불구하고 중재에 성공했다는 점을 강조합니다. 이는 국제 정치에서 영향력이 더 이상 전통적인 기준에 의해 결정되지 않으며, 비전통적인 경로를 통해 달성될 수 있음을 의미합니다. 즉, 국가의 영향력은 핵보유 여부나 민주주의 수준 같은 전통적인 자격보다 실질적인 중재 능력과 현장 리더십에서 비롯될 수 있다는 점이 핵심입니다. 이는 지정학적 리스크 분석 시, 국가의 공식적인 지위뿐만 아니라 비공식적인 영향력 네트워크를 평가해야 함을 시사합니다.

본문 2: 다극화 시대의 새로운 권력 구조

이러한 파키스탄의 사례는 다극화 경쟁으로 형성된 국제 시스템이 전통적인 지정학적 자격이 없는 국가들을 새로운 권력의 축으로 수용하고 있음을 보여줍니다. 중국, 프랑스, 독일, 인도, 영국 등과 같은 지정학적 강대국들이 주도하는 시스템에서, 국가의 영향력은 더 이상 단일 강대국의 지배에 의해 결정되지 않고, 다양한 행위자들의 상호작용과 중재 역할에 의해 형성됩니다. 이는 국제기구들이 전통적인 권위 외에 현장 경험과 중재 역량을 가진 국가들의 역할을 인정하기 시작했음을 의미합니다. 따라서 향후 국제 분쟁 해결 과정에서는 전통적인 세력 균형뿐만 아니라, 다양한 행위자들이 어떻게 협력하고 갈등을 관리하는지에 대한 이해가 중요해질 것입니다. 이는 국제 에너지 시장이나 공급망의 안정성 예측에도 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다.

본문 3: 지역 안정성과 에너지 경로의 위험

이란과 미국 간의 분쟁이 호르무즈 해협이라는 핵심 에너지 무역로와 연결되어 있다는 점은 지정학적 위험을 극대화합니다. 파키스탄의 중재가 성공적으로 휴전을 이끌어냈다는 것은, 비록 일시적일지라도, 이 핵심 에너지 경로의 즉각적인 붕괴를 막는 데 중요한 역할을 했음을 의미합니다. 만약 이러한 중재가 실패했다면, 에너지 시장의 급격한 변동성과 공급망 불안정으로 인해 국제 유가에 심각한 변동성이 발생했을 것입니다. 따라서 중재 행위는 단순한 외교적 성과를 넘어, 글로벌 에너지 공급망의 안정성을 유지하는 데 있어 실질적인 위험 완화 조치로 평가되어야 합니다. 이는 지정학적 불안정성이 금융 시장의 변동성으로 이어지는 메커니즘을 명확히 보여줍니다.

결론

파키스탄의 중재 역할은 국제 정치에서 영향력의 기준이 변화하고 있음을 명확히 보여줍니다. 전통적인 권위 외에 실질적인 중재 역량이 새로운 지정학적 자격으로 부상하고 있습니다. 앞으로 국제 분쟁 해결 과정에서 이러한 비전통적인 행위자들의 역할이 더욱 중요해질 전망이며, 이는 글로벌 경제 시스템의 안정성에 있어 지정학적 변수가 더욱 중요하게 작용할 것임을 시사합니다. 향후 글로벌 자산 시장을 분석할 때, 이러한 비전통적 행위자들의 외교적 역량과 지역 안정화 노력을 핵심적인 변수로 고려해야 할 것입니다.

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Pakistan Won the War in Iran - Foreign Affairs

On April 7, as the deadline approached for U.S. President Donald Trump’s ultimatum to the Iranian government to open the Strait of Hormuz or face the destruction of “a whole civilization,” a Pakistani general placed a phone call that helped avert disaster. Field Marshal Asim Munir—the chief of Pakistan’s army, the country’s most powerful institution—pressed Trump and Iran’s surviving leadership to stop the war. Within hours, Washington and Tehran announced a cease-fire. Trump and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi publicly thanked Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Days later, U.S. Vice President JD Vance sat across from Iranian negotiators in Islamabad for more than 20 hours, the highest-level direct contact between the two countries since the 1979 revolution.

The future of the resulting cease-fire, and the formal truce and plans for a broader settlement that followed, is now deeply uncertain. But Pakistan’s mediation was nevertheless a remarkable development. For most of the postwar era, the attributes that made countries geopolitically influential were settled: they included major-power status, economic weight, liberal normative credentials, and convening authority over other major states. At no point during its history did Pakistan meet these criteria. It was a nuclear-armed country on the fringes of the Western order, associated more often with regional instability than with conflict resolution, with a limited economy and few liberal democratic bona fides. And yet, during the most dangerous Middle East crisis in a generation, Pakistan did what China, France, Germany, India, the United Kingdom, and other geopolitical heavyweights could not.

Islamabad’s efforts are emblematic of a broader shift in global politics. A disordered international system shaped by multipolar competition is starting to reward different kinds of states that lack traditional geopolitical credentials. With the United Nations and other multilateral bodies proving unable to mitigate modern conflicts, nontraditional powers, including Pakistan, Qatar, Turkey, and others, are beginning to fill the gaps by engaging in order-stabilizing statecraft. The ability of these states to foster trust across geopolitical blocs and open channels of communication between adversaries who cannot or choose not to engage has allowed them to mediate hostage and prisoner releases, negotiate the opening of commercial corridors, and open meaningful political dialogue, all in service of managing conflicts before they spiral out of control. In the coming decade, this type of statecraft will make them invaluable geopolitical assets.

Not all of these states will pass the litmus tests the United States typically uses to sort partners, such as democratic credentials, liberal governance, or political distance from China. Washington may believe that it should rely only on established allies and partners who share its values and strategic objectives in its competition with Beijing. But if the United States wants to keep itself out of costly conflicts around the world, it may have no choice but to forge closer ties with the new stabilizing powers.

In his second term, Trump has largely dispensed with the conventions of traditional American diplomacy: its emphasis on alliances, multilateral institutions, and the promotion of liberal values abroad. But even before his return to the White House, the limits of the traditional diplomatic toolkit had become evident. The instruments the United States and its allies have used to influence partners and compel adversaries—alliance structures, military aid, economic sanctions, summits, appeals to international law—have proved insufficient to end the wars of this era. Neither the most comprehensive Western sanctions regime ever assembled against a major economy nor billions of dollars in military assistance have forced an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine, now in its fifth year. Israel and Hamas repeatedly defied multiple rounds of U.S. pressure and UN Security Council diplomacy, prolonging the war in Gaza for nearly three years. Western naval coalitions were unable to stop the Houthis from launching missiles at ships passing through the Red Sea, disrupting trade in one of the world’s most important commercial arteries.

The war in Iran was the latest example of the failure of major powers to stop conflicts. European powers, despite suffering dire economic effects from Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, contributed little to the war’s termination beyond perfunctory statements of concern. China, having brokered the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 and having long touted its military and economic inroads into the Middle East, nevertheless stayed on the sidelines. Even India, with its self-proclaimed multialigned foreign policy, declined a role. Into this void stepped Pakistan.

A few increasingly valuable attributes made Islamabad an effective mediator between Tehran and Washington, with whom it is neither a treaty ally nor an adversary. For one, it was able to hold meaningful relationships across divides that traditional powers cannot. Pakistan maintains a strategic relationship with China while also consistently seeking one with the United States, even when Washington has refused out of deference to India. It is tightly aligned with Saudi Arabia but also tied to Iran by geographical proximity and religious affiliation. That cross-cutting position made Pakistan useful to Washington and Tehran when each needed a party the other could accept as an intermediary.

Islamabad also had leverage in the form of credible coercive power. A mutual defense pact between Islamabad and Riyadh meant that when Iran began firing missiles at targets across the Gulf, Pakistan could have intervened in defense of Saudi Arabia if the conflict had escalated. Pakistani participation, in turn, could have catalyzed other Muslim-majority states, most of which were either hedging or showing restraint in their responses to Iranian attacks, to fully enter the war. That prospect, much more than the American and Israeli strikes, would have threatened the existence of the Iranian regime and Iran’s regional position, since Tehran would have been isolated in the Muslim world.

Leverage and flexible relationships, however, would have meant little without leaders willing to accept the political risks of using them. Leaders stake their credibility on successful mediation, and they may incur domestic political costs and damage to their foreign relationships if their attempts fail. Most leaders of traditional powers, bound by the bureaucratic structures of the foreign ministries beneath them, are too risk-averse to attempt this kind of principal-led geopolitical brokerage. But Pakistan’s leadership fit the bill. Munir was willing to expend political capital on an uncertain diplomatic opening, believing that Trump could still be amenable to negotiating an end to hostilities in the region.

For most of the past two decades, Pakistan was in no position to take on such a role. The country’s part in the U.S. war on terror was a source of persistent friction between Islamabad and Washington. The relationship deteriorated further when the United States withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021. By the time Munir took command of the army in 2022—which made him Pakistan’s de facto leader—many analysts believed Pakistan was in terminal drift. Its relationship with the United States had not recovered, its domestic politics were still in turmoil, its economy neared default, and it faced a metastasizing insurgency backed by Afghanistan’s new Taliban regime.

But Munir managed to steer a different course, particularly in international affairs. He rebuilt the relationship with Washington. The May 2025 war with India proved a turning point in this effort. Pakistan stood its ground and counterpunched against its much bigger adversary, helping Munir win Trump’s appreciation and, with it, a warmer, more personal rapport than any Pakistani leader has had with a U.S. president in a generation. He signed the mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia and strengthened diplomatic channels with Iran, further elevating Islamabad’s regional standing and expanding its access.

Pakistan is not the only nontraditional power now practicing order-stabilizing statecraft. Qatar, which hosts both Hamas’s political bureau and the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East, mediated a cease-fire and the release of hostages and prisoners between Hamas and Israel. In the same conflict, Egypt leveraged its control of the Rafah crossing—the main conduit for aid into and refugees out of Gaza—to press both sides toward a deal. Turkey used its ties to Washington and Hamas and its standing in the Muslim world to shape the terms of the Gaza truce and, before that, exploited its rare ability to talk to both Moscow and Kyiv to host the negotiations among Russia, Ukraine, the UN, and others that yielded the Black Sea grain deal and averted a global food crisis. De-escalation of the Houthis’ attacks on ships passing through the Red Sea came through discreet diplomacy by Saudi Arabia and Oman.

The United States cannot afford to ignore this trend. U.S. foreign policy has long been organized around the courtship of allies and partners: NATO members, Asian treaty partners, a small circle of regional pillars. That alliance-centric architecture, anchored in shared values, served the United States well during the Cold War and the unipolar decades that followed, when a more settled international order kept conflicts local. The United States worked with countries outside its core circle of allies and partners in this period, but it tended to treat such relationships as outliers—transactional, provisional, and secondary to its alliances. Even today, Washington may be tempted to file away Pakistan’s role in brokering the cease-fire with Iran as a useful but minor episode, especially if the truce fully collapses.

But as both the Biden and Trump administrations have learned at great cost, modern conflicts cannot be walled off. Alliance-centric strategies, which promise that pooling the military and economic weight of many states will deter threats and, if necessary, defeat adversaries, have proved incapable of preventing or ending wars in Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran. In a disordered world, that rigid approach is a liability. Creating pockets of stability requires flexibility of the kind practiced by Pakistan and its peers.

To foster relationships with these mediators, the United States must show the same willingness to cross divides that the mediators themselves have displayed. Until 2024, a near consensus in Washington held that because the United States needed strong ties with India to balance China, it would have to shut out Pakistan. Trump defied that logic and took a personal interest in the relationship with Islamabad. When the crisis came, that departure proved valuable.

It might also prove instructive. If the last decade is any guide, future presidents will also benefit from flexibility as they deal with new and long-running conflicts. European security remains unsettled and the Red Sea a vulnerable chokepoint. Even in the best possible case, the situation in Iran and the Gulf will continue to be volatile. A broad portfolio of relationships with mediator states that do not fit the familiar rubric of friends and foes will help the United States navigate these challenges. Washington should still have allies and partners in the traditional sense. But maintaining order will also depend on states well outside that circle.

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Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMibkFVX3lxTE13WmxtVnNjeDU1b2JGRlE2cEpEU196X0pURC02MlBLd21PanpGQU1vY0xCWkswVVJFZlNmdmJuLWNFWHFJNEpVYWRkYWlaRTJobG1WckNCbVFYQlpjYWJJLTlxXzA5N21jb0JkeGtB?oc=5