이란-미국 분쟁 관련 공중 방어 사건 분석 및 안보 환경 변화
IRAN WAR WEEK 25, day #2: Kuwaiti air defense hits US F-15s but not Iranian F-5s - Daily Kos
지정학적 군사 교류는 변동성을 야기하지만, 광범위한 주식 시장에 대한 명확한 단기 방향성 편향을 제공하지는 않습니다.
핵심 요약
이란-미국 분쟁 중 공중 방어 사건은 공중 방어 시스템의 한계와 지정학적 위험을 보여줍니다.
Original Article
IRAN WAR WEEK 25, day #2: Kuwaiti air defense hits US F-15s but not Iranian F-5s - Daily Kos
Two events might signify the entire war’s incompetence: Pete “tiny stones” Hegseth does need to be asked about these two discrete air defense events, despite the limited Pentagon reporting about the war and an impending $1.5 trillion Defense Department budget. The US sold F-5s as trainers and fighters for lesser developed countries. F-15s were the US air-superiority fighter of the next generation after the F-5. Three Iranian F-5s bombed a US base in Kuwait; three US F-15s were shot down by Kuwait air defense. Meanwhile Trump’s delusions get worse, implying that Wall Street is all that matters in the US economy.
“Let’s be clear, we got our rear-end handed to us from drones and other vehicles, aerospace vehicles, if you will, including three F-5s that took off in Iran and flew low level and dropped bombs on an airbase,” retired U.S. Air Force Gen. Glen VanHerck just declared during a panel discussion today centered on counter-drone defenses at the annual Space & Missile Defense (SMD) Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, at which TWZ is in attendance. Before his retirement in 2024, VanHerck served as head of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
“That’s embarrassing as an airman to me to say that happened,” VanHerck added, noting that this was the first time in decades U.S. forces had been subjected to an aerial attack of this kind.
A series of reports, as well as unconfirmed claims from Tehran, state that Iranian F-5s targeted Camp Buehring in Kuwait on an extremely dangerous low-level bombing mission. The attack reportedly came on or around March 1, just three days after U.S. and Israeli forces began launching combined strikes on Iran .
The PressTV report also claimed that pilots followed a route specifically designed to avoid Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries and other air defenses at Camp Buehring. Though this remains unconfirmed, it is worth noting that Patriot has known limitations when it comes to its engagement envelope. New capabilities are being developed for the system now to expand its flexibility to address targets approaching from different vectors, as well as ones that have already passed overhead. Without the aid of some type of look-down sensor capability , ground-based air defense systems more broadly cannot see through the horizon or topography, either.
T he Northrop F-5 is a third-generation fighter that were used as MiG-28s in Top Gun. The Navy utilizes the F-5 as an aggressor aircraft at TOPGUN to simulate enemy aircraft. The F-5 is excellent in its role as a training tool, but it is not the synthesis of current threats. Modern adversaries include dense ground-to-air networks, long-range missiles, drones, aggressive jamming, and sensor fusion.
The F-15 Eagle is an all-weather, extremely maneuverable, tactical fighter designed to gain and maintain air superiority in aerial combat. The Eagle’s air superiority is achieved through a mixture of unprecedented maneuverability and acceleration, range, weapons and avionics.
Iran continues to use force against commercial shipping to impose costs on regional states and enforce its claimed control over the Strait of Hormuz.
The United Arab Emirates accused Iran of attacking two Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) tankers transiting the strait with drones on August 13.[11] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations separately reported on August 14 that two vessels—likely the ADNOC tankers—sustained minor damage from drone strikes in the strait.[12] ADNOC has disabled vessel transponders, staggered secretly timed transits, and used ship-to-ship transfers off the coast of Fujairah to move its tankers through the strait undetected.[13]
Some clerics close to the Supreme Leader’s office appear to be trying to contain intra-regime polarization over negotiations with the United States.
Supreme Leader Political-Ideological Office head Ali Saeedi warned on August 14 that framing Iran’s choices as “negotiation or war” could deepen political polarization.[14] Saeedi stressed that negotiations can serve Iran’s interests if conducted under Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s supervision and alongside continued “resistance and steadfastness.”[15] Saeedi’s remarks suggest that some officials close to Mojtaba’s office may be trying to keep intra-regime debates over negotiations from developing into a broader political confrontation. Tehran Interim Friday Prayer Leader Ahmad Khatami similarly rejected both an “only war” and “only peace” approach on August 14, arguing that Iran should combine “active resistance” with “intelligent diplomacy,” including ceasefires when they serve Iran’s interests.[16]
Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias fired drones targeting unspecified targets in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, on August 14. An Iraqi security source told Saudi media that air defense systems in Erbil intercepted six drones that unspecified actors launched from Ninewa Province.[17] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias repeatedly launched attacks from positions in Ninewa Province targeting US interests in Iraqi Kurdistan in Spring 2026.[18] Informed sources told Iraqi media in late July 2026 that Iran has pressured the Iraqi federal government not to identify the militias responsible for recent attacks in Iraqi Kurdistan and regional countries.[19]
A member of Iranian-backed militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political wing stated on August 14 that no actor within or outside of Iraq should be able to prosecute Iraqi militias under Iraq’s Anti-Terrorism Law.[20] The Sadiqoun member’scomments follow reports that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is planning to present a new draft law to parliament that would support restricting arms to the state.[21] It remains unclear how this draft law would differ from existing laws that limit militia activity outside of the state, including Article Nine of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution.[22] The Sadiqoun member additionally argued that there are unspecified justifications for the militias to possess weapons and that the Iraqi government should not set a deadline for disarming the militias until US forces withdraw from Iraq.[23] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continued to use a variety of excuses to retain their arms. The Sadiqoun member also claimed that the militias have strong popular support.[24] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have engaged in human rights violations in numerous instances, however. The militias helped the Iraqi state suppress the 2019 Tishreen Uprising protests and have refused to allow residents to return to multiple areas of Iraq, including Jurf al Sakhr, after helping the Iraqi government free these areas from Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) control.[25] The Sadiqoun member’s comments notably conflict with other Asaib Ahl al Haq-affiliated figures’ previous statements supporting efforts to restrict arms to the state.[26] The member’s statement is an indicator of possible internal fissures within Asaib Ahl al Haq on the issue of disarmament.
A member of former Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s coalition claimed on August 13 that all militias, including Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, agreed to restrict weapons to the state during a State Administration Coalition meeting.[27] Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba have continuously refused to disarm.[28] These militias are among the most closely tied to Iran, and Iranian officials have also consistently opposed militia disarmament efforts.[29] ISW-CTP has not observed any indicators that Kataib Hezbollah or Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba have changed their stance on disarmament.
The member of Sudani’s coalition also claimed that the militias’ only disagreement at this time is over the mechanism for handing over weapons to the state.[30] It is unclear if the militias are expected to hand over their weapons to the PMF or another Iraqi state institution. A Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on August 9 that the militias will hand over their weapons to the PMF before the September 30 disarmament deadline.[31] It is also unclear which weapons the militias would hand over to the state. Unspecified Shia Coordination Framework sources and sources close to the militias have previously told Iraqi and regional media that some militias intend to surrender small arms and inoperable weapons while keeping operational heavy weapons. [32] Such a reality would effectively circumvent efforts to disarm the militias.
Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) customs authorities seized two caches of electronic components that could be used for first-person view (FPV) drones at Yemeni ports and land crossings on August 13.[33] ROYG authorities seized 23 fiber-optic cable spools at the Wadiah crossing in Hadramawt Governorate, on the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border, according to Yemeni media.[34] Yemeni media also reported that ROYG authorities confiscated nearly 3,700 “dual-use” electronic components at the port of Aden, which authorities claimed could be used to assemble drones or for other illicit purposes.[35] A US-based Yemen analyst suggested that the Houthis were responsible for the smuggling attempt and reported that the equipment was intended to be used to assemble fiber-optic FPV drones.[36] ISW-CTP cannot confirm whether the Houthis were responsible for the smuggling attempt or what the intended use of the equipment was, however. Houthi-affiliated smugglers have previously used the Wadiah crossing to traffic drugs and other contraband into Saudi Arabia.[37]
The smuggling incidents follow the Houthis’ recent first deployment of a fiber-optic FPV drone in combat, which ROYG forces captured in Marib Governorate on August 11.[38]
Members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, including Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, have adopted and proliferated FPV drones as strike platforms to attack US and Israeli forces and military assets in the region since March 2026.[39]
A Houthi military source told Houthi media on August 14 that the Houthis launched a drone targeting Saudi oil infrastructure in Najran, near the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border.[40] The source claimed that the Houthis attacked Saudi Aramco facilities in Najran in retaliation for Saudi aircraft overflights in Houthi-controlled Saada Province, in northwestern Yemen.[41] A Houthi military source previously told Houthi media on August 13 that Houthi drones targeted and struck the Saudi Aramco refinery at the Red Sea port of Jizan.[42] ISW-CTP continues to assess that the Houthis have threatened and attacked Saudi oil infrastructure in order to raise the political and economic costs of the Saudi blockade on Houthi ports and vessels and compel Saudi Arabia to cease its kinetic activity in Yemen.[43]