트럼프의 이란 협상, 이스라엘의 관심사 우선시해야 한다는 지적
Trump’s Iran deal shows why Israel must put its own interests first - The Jerusalem Post
이스라엘의 정치적 반응이 단기 시장 분위기에 영향을 미칠 수 있지만, 직접적인 경제적 촉매가 없어 중립적인 입장을 유지하는 것이 타당합니다.
핵심 요약
트럼프의 이란 협상이 이란의 핵 프로그램과 탄도 미사일 보유량에 미칠 영향에 대한 우려를 제기하고 있다.
핵심요약
- 지난 일주일 동안 트럼프를 비판하는 기사가 다수 게재되었습니다.
- 이란의 핵 프로그램, 탄도 미사일 보유량, 고농축 우라늄의 운명, 헤즈볼라와 하마스의 지원이 주요 우려 사항입니다.
- 이스라엘의 감정적 반응은 트럼프의 행동이 이스라엘을 위해 한 것이라는 기대에서 비롯되었습니다.
- 아비그도르 리버만 전 국방부 장관은 미국 대통령의 결정이 미국 국가안보와 지역 안정성에 기반한다고 주장했습니다.
도입
트럼프의 이란 협상이 이스라엘의 안보와 경제에 미칠 영향은 투자자에게 중요한 관심사입니다. 이 협상이 이란의 핵 프로그램과 탄도 미사일 보유량에 미칠 영향, 그리고 헤즈볼라와 하마스의 지원을 둘러싼 우려를 고려할 때, 이스라엘의 방어 산업과 에너지 부문에 투자하는 기업들의 전략적 결정에 영향을 줄 수 있습니다.
본문 1: 이란 협상이 이스라엘의 안보에 미치는 영향
이란의 핵 프로그램과 탄도 미사일 보유량 증가는 이스라엘의 안보에 직결되는 문제입니다. 특히 고농축 우라늄의 운명이 불분명하다는 점에서, 이스라엘은 지속적인 위협에 직면해 있습니다. 헤즈볼라와 하마스의 지원을 받는 이란의 활동이 증가할 경우, 이스라엘의 군사 비용과 방어 산업에 대한 투자가 증가할 가능성도 있습니다. 이는 이스라엘의 국방 산업 기업들의 매출 증가로 이어질 수 있습니다.
본문 2: 미국의 전략적 관심사와 이스라엘의 기대 차이
트럼프의 이란 협상은 미국 국가안보와 에너지 시장의 안정화를 목적으로 하고 있습니다. 그러나 이스라엘은 이 협상이 미국과 이스라엘의 이해관계가 충돌할 수 있다는 점에서 우려를 표하고 있습니다. 특히, 이스라엘의 안보가 미국 정부의 정책 결정에 완전히 의존하는 것은 위험할 수 있다는 점에서, 이스라엘은 자체적인 안보 전략을 수립해야 한다는 주장이 제기되고 있습니다.
본문 3: 이스라엘의 경제적 대응 전략
이스라엘은 이란 협상의 결과에 따라 경제적 대응 전략을 수립해야 합니다. 특히, 방어 산업과 에너지 부문에 대한 투자를 늘리는 것은 이스라엘의 경제적 안보를 강화하는 데 중요한 역할을 할 것입니다. 또한, 미국과의 협력 관계를 유지하면서도, 이란과의 관계 개선을 통해 경제적 이익을 추구하는 전략도 고려해야 합니다.
결론
트럼프의 이란 협상이 이스라엘의 안보와 경제에 미칠 영향은 여전히 불확실합니다. 그러나 이스라엘은 이란의 핵 프로그램과 탄도 미사일 보유량 증가를 방지하기 위해 지속적인 노력을 기울여야 합니다. 또한, 미국의 전략적 관심사와 이스라엘의 기대 차이를 고려하여, 이스라엘은 자체적인 안보 전략을 수립하고 경제적 대응 전략을 마련해야 합니다. 향후 이란 협상의 진행 상황과 이스라엘의 대응 전략을 주시할 필요가 있습니다.
Original Article
Trump’s Iran deal shows why Israel must put its own interests first - The Jerusalem Post
The number of articles published over the last week accusing Donald Trump of “betraying” Israel by signing an MoU and now entering negotiations with Iran deserves a serious conversation.Not because criticism of the deal is illegitimate – there are real and troubling questions about what this agreement will mean for Iran’s nuclear program, its ballistic missile arsenal, the fate of the highly enriched uranium, and the regime’s continued sponsorship of Hezbollah and Hamas. Those concerns are justified. But the emotional reaction in Israel to what Trump has done reveals something deeper: an expectation that Trump’s actions regarding Iran were somehow about Israel.It is as if everything Trump did over the past year and a half was understood through one lens and one lens only: Israel. It is as if none of it had to do with American national security, freedom of navigation, energy markets, regional stability, or the broader Western interest in preventing Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold. It was all supposedly done on behalf of one country and its 10 million citizens.That is why the language being used now has become so overheated. Yediot Ahronot ran an op-ed titled “Trump betrayed Israel. Netanyahu must not blink.”Israel Hayom published a piece under the headline, “You could have been the greatest president of all, but you failed.” On Channel 14, one of the leading anchors declared, “Trump betrayed the State of Israel. We won the war, and the US lost it.”US prioritises its own interestsPeople are entitled to be angry about the deal and are entitled to believe that Trump stopped it prematurely and that the terms are too soft. But this sense of emotional betrayal – as if Trump owed Israel something and then broke a personal promise – is absurd. It reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of how alliances work, and of how American presidents make decisions.Former defense minister Avigdor Lieberman put it well in an op-ed in The Wall Street Journal this week. He argued that while the deal may be bad, and while Israel will still need to do what is necessary to defend itself, there is no reason to come up with claims against the US. Washington, he explained, acts according to American interests, not Israeli ones. That should be obvious. But in the current atmosphere, it is worth repeating.This matters because it helps explain what happened over the course of the war. When the joint campaign began on February 28, the interests of Israel and the United States were aligned almost completely.Both countries wanted to strike Iran hard, degrade its military, damage its missile program, and try to topple a regime that had spent years destabilizing the region while racing toward nuclear power.Once Iran effectively weaponized the Strait of Hormuz, though, the interests diverged. Trump’s focus shifted, and his priority was no longer regime change or even the degradation of Iran’s military. It became about reopening Hormuz, stabilizing energy markets, and ending a conflict that was taking too long and was becoming more expensive than he had imagined at the outset.That was the moment Israel should have recognized that the two countries were no longer operating under the same interests. It should have understood that there was a divergence and that the mission now needed to shift to preserve operational gains and minimize the strategic damage of an eventual American decision to stop.Instead, Israel appears to have kept pushing for more strikes and to keep trying to weaken the regime. The problem was that Trump was no longer there. He was looking for an exit ramp.This is what makes the Israeli handling of the last phase of the war so perplexing. Two weeks ago, senior officials in the Prime Minister’s Office were still trying to downplay the tension with Washington.They insisted there was no real divide, that relations had not changed, and that any disagreements were technical rather than substantive. That is obviously not the case. Officials in Washington are now speaking openly about growing frustration and anger with the Israeli side.None of this should have been hard to predict. Trump was never built for long, drawn-out military adventures. He likes quick operations, dramatic shows of force, and clean endings he can easily sell as victories. He is far more comfortable with a Venezuela-style in-and-out strike than with a protracted regional campaign.The immediate challenge is obvious. Israel has to ensure that whatever emerges from the deal does not erode its operational freedom, particularly in Lebanon. It has to prevent a situation in which a ceasefire there is dictated by Iran and then enforced by Trump.But there is also a larger strategic question, and it is one Israel should already be asking: what opportunities exist now, precisely because the war is winding down and because the US is looking for a new regional framework?One obvious place to start is I2U2 – the forum that brings together India, Israel, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates.Established after the Abraham Accords, I2U2 was supposed to serve as a platform for joint economic, energy, and infrastructure initiatives linking South Asia, the Gulf, and Israel.It never fulfilled its promise. But now, after the Hormuz crisis underscored just how vulnerable the region’s trade routes remain, it needs to be urgently revived.At the center of that effort should be IMEC, the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor. The basic idea is straightforward: create a route for goods, energy, and commerce to move from India through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, into Israel, and from there to the Mediterranean and Europe.In other words, reduce dependence on choke-points like the Hormuz by creating a new economic route through the region.This is exactly the kind of initiative Israel should be championing right now. It would increase Israel’s value to the US and the Gulf not only as a military partner, but as a logistical and economic hub. It would allow Israel to say that its role in the region is not just about fighting wars, but also includes building the infrastructure of a more connected Middle East.And yet, there is still no one in the Israeli government actually in charge of it. Ask around, and you will get a different answer depending on the ministry.There is someone at the Foreign Ministry, someone at the Transportation Ministry, someone at the Defense Ministry, someone at the National Security Council. Everyone is involved, which in Israel usually means no one is in charge.That matters because IMEC is a massive bureaucratic, legal, logistical, and diplomatic undertaking.If rail cargo enters Israel from Jordan through the Jordan Valley, who handles customs? Who is responsible for security screening? How does the cargo reach the ports? What tax regime applies? What regulatory framework governs transit? This requires a coordinator with the authority and mandate to bring the different ministries together, negotiate the bilateral and multilateral agreements that will be needed, and drive the project to execution.There are other opportunities as well. Last year, the Azerbaijani company SOCAR bought a stake in Israel’s Tamar gas field, creating an important partnership linking Azerbaijan, the UAE, and Israel. Azerbaijan has long tried to play a mediating role between Israel and Turkey.Before October 7, those efforts were beginning to bear fruit – Netanyahu met Erdogan on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Herzog visited Ankara, and there were plans for additional high-level meetings in Asia in the weeks that followed.Since October 7, of course, Israeli-Turkish relations have reached new lows, and while they might seem lost, there may also be room for de-escalation. Economic interests have a way of reopening doors, and Azerbaijan – because of its ties to both countries and stake in Israel’s strategic gas field – could be uniquely positioned to help lower the temperature and eventually rebuild some channel of communication.These are only two examples, but they point to the larger lesson. Israel cannot remain trapped in the language of betrayal. It cannot spend the next six months nursing grievances over what Trump did or did not do. What Israel needs now is a plan to preserve its freedom of action and to use the new regional situation not only to fight better wars, but to create a stronger strategic position for the years ahead.The writer is a co-founder of the MEAD Forum, a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute, and former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post. His latest book (with Amir Bohbot), While Israel Slept, is a bestseller in the United States.