파키스탄, 미국-이란 중재 성공으로 국제적 영향력 확대 시도
Will Pakistan’s Iran Gamble Pay Off? - Foreign Policy
파키스탄의 지opolitical gambit은 즉각적인 시장 영향력이 부족합니다.
핵심 요약
파키스탄은 세계 5번째로 인구가 많은 국가로 미국과 이란 간의 중재 성공을 국제적 영향력 확대에 활용하려 하고 있습니다.
핵심요약
- 파키스탄은 세계 5번째로 인구가 많은 국가입니다
- 미국-이란 중재 성공을 국제적 영향력 확대에 활용하려 합니다
- 경제적 영향력이 제한적이며, 도널드 트럼프 대통령의 정책 변화 가능성에 직면해 있습니다
- 중동은 파키스탄의 외교 정책에서 여전히 중요한 지역입니다
도입
이 기사는 파키스탄이 국제적 영향력을 확대하려는 시도를 분석하며, 투자자에게 파키스탄의 전략적 위치를 이해하는 데 중요한 정보를 제공합니다. 파키스탄의 중재 성공이 장기적인 경제적 이익으로 이어질 수 있을지, 또는 다른 국가들의 경쟁에 밀려날 위험이 있는지 평가하는 것이 중요합니다.
본문 1: 파키스탄의 국제적 영향력 확대 시도
파키스탄은 미국-이란 중재 성공을 통해 국제적 영향력을 확대하려는 시도를 하고 있습니다. 그러나 파키스탄은 경제적 영향력이 제한적이며, 도널드 트럼프 대통령의 정책 변화 가능성에 직면해 있습니다. 이는 파키스탄이 장기적으로 국제적 영향력을 유지하기 어렵다는 것을 의미합니다. 또한, 중동 지역에서의 안정화는 인도 등 다른 국가들의 경쟁을 강화할 수 있습니다.
본문 2: 파키스탄의 경제적 제약 조건
파키스탄은 경제적 영향력이 제한적이며, 주요 수출품이 없는 상태입니다. 이는 파키스탄이 국제적 영향력을 확대하는 데 어려움을 겪을 수 있음을 의미합니다. 또한, 도널드 트럼프 대통령의 정책 변화 가능성은 파키스탄의 국제적 영향력에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 따라서 파키스탄은 경제적 제약 조건을 극복하기 위해 새로운 전략을 마련해야 합니다.
본문 3: 중동의 전략적 중요성
중동은 파키스탄의 외교 정책에서 여전히 중요한 지역입니다. 중동 지역에서의 안정화는 파키스탄의 경제적 이익을 증대시킬 수 있습니다. 그러나, 중동 지역의 안정화는 인도 등 다른 국가들의 경쟁을 강화할 수 있습니다. 따라서 파키스탄은 중동 지역의 전략적 중요성을 고려하여 외교 정책을 수립해야 합니다.
결론
파키스탄은 미국-이란 중재 성공을 통해 국제적 영향력을 확대하려는 시도를 하고 있지만, 경제적 제약 조건과 중동 지역의 전략적 중요성을 고려하여 외교 정책을 수립해야 합니다. 장기적으로 파키스탄의 국제적 영향력이 유지될 수 있을지, 또는 다른 국가들의 경쟁에 밀려날 위험이 있는지 평가하는 것이 중요합니다.
Original Article
Will Pakistan’s Iran Gamble Pay Off? - Foreign Policy
Islamabad could leverage its success as a mediator to secure its own interests.
Welcome to Foreign Policy ’s South Asia Brief.
The highlights this week: Pakistan hopes to capitalize on the success of its Iran mediation efforts , Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman makes a significant trip to China, and Indian Home Minister Amit Shah has a rare meeting with the U.S. ambassador in New Delhi.
Pakistan Looks to Grow Its Global Influence
When the United States and Iran reached a framework peace deal this month, one of the first public announcements came from Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. The agreement capped weeks of mediation by Pakistan, which has long sought to convince the world that it is an influential and positive player on the global stage.
The question is if Islamabad can capitalize on its newfound prominence. Pakistan is the world’s fifth-most populous country, and it occupies strategic real estate as a gateway to both the Middle East and East Asia. But it has limited leverage: It’s not a major economy and doesn’t boast a critical global export, such as oil or microchips.
Further, U.S. President Donald Trump’s backing, which helped Pakistan secure its chief mediator role, may not last. Trump is notoriously fickle and might conclude that Islamabad’s utility isn’t so great, especially if conflict in the Middle East winds down and commercial opportunities in Pakistan (like those concerning critical minerals) don’t pan out.
Pakistan also risks being crowded out by more significant global actors. For example, enduring peace in the Middle East could advantage its rival India, which is a big part of the emerging geoeconomic architecture poised to take shape in the region, such as the India-Middle East-Europe corridor and the India-Israel-United Arab Emirates-United States quad.
Still, the Middle East remains Islamabad’s foreign-policy comfort zone, and it will be imperative that it maintains a strong focus on the region. Many of Pakistan’s closest friends are in the Middle East, several million Pakistanis work there, and it has a mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia. Its cachet in the region stands to grow.
Moving forward, Pakistan can leverage its achievements in mediation to help secure its interests. For example, in future negotiations with its Gulf donors to get more favorable loan terms, it can point to its successful efforts to stop a war that hit them hard.
Pakistan must address the internal problems that have sullied its image, including political repression and terrorism. Global acclaim could shield Islamabad from some international criticism or even embolden it to accelerate steps that anger the Pakistani public, such as crackdowns on dissent. But issues at home will limit Islamabad’s policy bandwidth abroad.
In the long term, sustained global influence will also require a stronger economy. Pakistan has made some headway on this front, particularly in its small technology sector . Still, it has work to do to compete: With global markets prioritizing semiconductors and clean energy infrastructure, Pakistan still emphasizes its textiles and agricultural goods.
Strengthening the economy would not only bolster Pakistan’s global influence, it would also reduce its dependence on external financing and give it more space to pursue an independent foreign policy.
Even before its recent successes, Islamabad exerted agency on the global stage, participating in a range of multilateral organizations, expanding long-standing partnerships, and leading multi-country military exercises. Pakistan’s mediation of the Iran deal presents it with an opportunity to expand its global footprint. But it will involve hard work, both abroad and at home.
Tarique Rahman in China. Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, who took office in February, is in China this week after a stop in Malaysia. His agenda for the three-day visit includes high-level engagements in Beijing and a World Economic Forum event in Dalian. That Rahman traveled to China during his first trip abroad as prime minister—and not India—is significant.
Beijing is a close partner of Dhaka, and they have expanded economic and security cooperation in recent years. Meanwhile, Bangladesh-India ties have sputtered since the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2024. Some Bangladesh Nationalist Party leaders have suggested a desire to explore rapprochement with India; an early visit from Rahman would have sent a strong signal.
In the end, Rahman’s decision to go to China instead makes sense. There is strong anti-India sentiment among the Bangladeshi public, and strong and early outreach to India would have posed political risks for the new government.
Amit Shah meets U.S. ambassador. A day after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Trump in France last week, Indian Home Minister Amit Shah hosted Sergio Gor, the U.S. ambassador, in New Delhi. At first glance, this may seem inconsequential; since taking the post in January, Gor has had a series of high-level engagements seeking to get the U.S.-India relationship back on track.
But the meeting was unusual. Shah, who has a reputation as a hard-nosed enforcer, doesn’t typically do diplomacy. (He last traveled abroad 20 years ago .) When he does meet foreign diplomats, they tend to be minister-level. Shah’s only other recent engagements with U.S. ambassadors were a meeting with Eric Garcetti in 2023 and Kenneth Juster in 2019.
The Gor meeting focused on bilateral counterterrorism and counternarcotics cooperation. It might be tied to Shah’s political aspirations. He has been cited as a possible successor to Modi, and he may want to show that he is comfortable with foreign dignitaries—in contrast to his reputation as a parochial politician.
Measles outbreak in Bangladesh. One of the biggest immediate challenges for the Rahman government is public health. The country faces a serious measles outbreak, and new cases are still rising. Figures released on Tuesday by the Directorate General of Health Services reported 1,009 new suspected cases over a 24-hour period, increasing the total number to 94,764.
Nearly 80,000 people have been hospitalized with suspected measles since April 10, and 593 people have died. Experts have blamed the outbreak on delays in vaccinations after Hasina’s ouster. They also warn that the situation in Bangladesh could pose risks for other countries, including the United States.
Measles is just one of several serious public health challenges that Bangladesh is grappling with: Dengue fever, transmitted by mosquitoes, has also hit the country hard in recent years.
Last Friday, Afghanistan said it carried out airstrikes in Pakistan targeting the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), one of the Taliban’s only militant rivals. The Taliban regime said the strikes hit facilities being used in collusion with “certain hostile intelligence circles” to plan attacks against Afghanistan.
The Taliban statement presumably referred to Pakistani intelligence, though Pakistan also considers IS-K a threat and has targeted the group previously. Pakistan’s ministry of information quickly posted on X and rejected the Taliban’s claims and said that all IS-K facilities are located in Afghanistan. Both sides have otherwise remained silent on the issue.
A few things stand out about this development.
First, Afghanistan does not have a proper air force; the arms that the Taliban seized in 2021 were largely for ground activities. Any air operations in Pakistan would have been modest in intensity—drawing on a small number of aircraft, helicopters, and drones that don’t seem sufficient for a successful cross-border operation.
Further, amid the periodic Afghanistan-Pakistan violence in recent months, most of the Taliban’s kinetic actions have targeted Pakistani border troops in retaliation for airstrikes in Afghanistan. Preemptive counterterrorism strikes by the Taliban in Pakistan, if they took place, would mark a new phase in tensions between the countries.
That neither side has said anything else publicly on this matter is another indication that the Taliban claims could be wrong or exaggerated.
A Daily Star editorial slams Bangladesh’s government for ordering an expansion of hospital beds without addressing a shortage of medical personnel. “The government’s priority should be fulfilling the existing demand for doctors, nurses, and workers and expediting planned recruitments,” it argues.