핵심요약

• 이란은 6월 25일 오만 남동쪽 8해리 해상에서 싱가포르 국적 화물선을 드론으로 공격했습니다.
• 미국은 6월 26일 호르무즈 해협과 케슈미섬에 위치한 이란의 4개 미사일 및 드론 저장 시설에 타격을 입혔습니다.
• 6월 27일 이란은 바레인 내 미국 군사 시설을 드론으로 공격했으며, 바레인 방공망은 1대의 드론을 요격했습니다.
• 영국 해상 무역 운영 센터(UKMTO)는 6월 27일 오만 해안에서 불특정 물체가 탱커를 타격했다고 보고했습니다.

도입

이란과 미국 간의 호르무즈 해협 갈등이 급속도로 심화되고 있습니다. 이 지역의 안보 불안정성은 국제 유가 변동성에 직접적인 영향을 미칠 수 있으며, 에너지 시장 및 해상 운송 업계에 대한 투자 결정에 중요한 고려 사항이 될 수 있습니다.

본문 1: 호르무즈 해협의 전략적 중요성과 갈등의 영향

호르무즈 해협은 세계 석유 수출의 약 30%가 통과하는 중요한 해상 경로입니다. 이란의 최근 공격은 이 지역을 통해 이동하는 선박에 대한 위험을 크게 증가시켰습니다. 특히 6월 25일 싱가포르 국적 화물선 공격은 국제 사회가 이란의 호르무즈 해협 통제 시도와 맞서기 위해 새로운 안전 경로를 모색하는 계기가 되었습니다. 그러나 이란의 대응 공격은 미국과 동맹국들의 군사적 대응을 초래하며, 지역 안보 상황을 더욱 악화시키고 있습니다. 이는 에너지 시장의 변동성을 높이고, 해상 운송 비용을 증가시킬 가능성이 있습니다.

본문 2: 국제 사회의 대응과 그 한계

국제 해사 기구(IMO)와 오만은 6월 23일 호르무즈 해협의 남쪽 경로를 통해 hundreds of stranded vessels을 이동시키기 위한 합동 노력을 발표했습니다. 그러나 6월 25일 이란의 공격 이후 이 노력은 일시 중단되었습니다. 이는 국제 사회가 이란의 통제 시도와 맞서기 위한 협력 체계가 아직 완성되지 않았음을 보여줍니다. 미국과 동맹국들의 군사적 대응은 이란의 공격에 대한 즉각적인 대응이 가능하지만, 장기적인 해결책으로서는 부족합니다. 이는 에너지 시장과 해상 운송 업계에 대한 불안정성이 지속될 가능성이 높다는 것을 의미합니다.

본문 3: 장기적인 전망과 투자 고려 사항

호르무즈 해협의 갈등은 단기적인 변동성을 초래할 수 있지만, 장기적으로는 에너지 시장 구조에 변화를 가져올 수 있습니다. 특히 신흥 경제국들이 에너지 수급 안정화를 위해 다양한 경로를 모색할 가능성이 높아지고 있습니다. 이는 새로운 에너지 인프라 투자 기회가 발생할 수 있음을 의미합니다. 그러나 지역 안보 상황의 불확실성은 투자 결정에 대한 리스크 요인으로 작용할 수 있습니다. 따라서 투자자들은 지역 안보 동향을 지속적으로 모니터링하고, 다각화된 포트폴리오 전략을 수립하는 것이 중요합니다.

결론

호르무즈 해협의 갈등은 에너지 시장과 해상 운송 업계에 대한 중요한 리스크 요인이 될 수 있습니다. 단기적으로는 변동성이 증가할 가능성이 높지만, 장기적으로는 새로운 투자 기회가 발생할 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 지역 안보 동향을 지속적으로 분석하고, 리스크 관리 전략을 수립하는 것이 중요합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilAFBVV95cUxQMkpxcXBPSW84SElGOUt6WXc1YVZpRnRTdENrQ3ZlZ3RSUkxQTXhQcnJsbjVNQkRvdVNMY0VUajBHSEYtd3dmUEdNVThMaFdYZUFnMC1fcDJrSWItbVQ2Q1AwTjJZRUN1S0RBeVZGZm1YTG1sREo3QUlscHY0dEo4SXBsWm14ZnlyZ2NYV0l5UzZLazFF?oc=5

Iran Update Special Report, June 27, 2026 - Institute for the Study of War

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.

Iran has continued to use force to try to deter the United States from undermining Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz . Iran conducted a drone attack targeting a Singapore-flagged cargo ship approximately eight nautical miles southeast of Dahit, Oman, on June 25.[1] A US official told the New York Times on June 26 that US forces struck four Iranian missile and drone storage facilities along the strait and on Qeshm Island in response.[2] Iranian forces then conducted a drone attack against US positions in Bahrain on June 27.[3] Bahraini air defenses intercepted one drone, while a second drone landed in a remote area.[4] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) subsequently reported on June 27 that an unspecified projectile struck a tanker off the coast of Oman.[5] Iran likely attacked the vessel because it was presumably using the southern route along Oman’s coast to transit through the strait instead of Iran’s illegitimate traffic separation scheme (TSS).[6] The international community has recently attempted to circumvent Iran’s TSS, undermining Iranian efforts to establish control over the strait. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Oman announced a joint effort on June 23 to move hundreds of stranded vessels through the strait through a designated safe route along the Omani coast.[7] The IMO paused this effort on June 26 after Iran attacked the Singapore-flagged cargo ship on June 25, however.[8] The Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC), which operates under the US-led Combined Maritime Forces, told UKMTO on June 27 that the southern route in the Strait of Hormuz has been expanded to accommodate simultaneous inbound and outbound traffic.[9] It is unclear whether the southern route described by the JMIC is distinct from the IMO-Omani route.

Iran’s strikes against Bahrain may also be part of an ongoing Iranian effort to coerce the Gulf states to accept Iran’s control of the strait and deter them from supporting US efforts to undermine Iran’s control. The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry responded to the US retaliatory strikes against Iran on June 26 by warning Gulf states not to allow the United States to attack Iran from bases within their territory.[10] Iran’s attack against Bahrain comes after the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the United States explicitly rejected on June 25 any Iranian attempts to assert control over the strait, including by charging tolls.[11] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry called the US-GCC statement “interventionist, irresponsible, and provocative.”[12] Iran’s attack on Bahrain may have been, in part, intended to signal to the Gulf states that Iran could take military action against them if they support US efforts to undermine Iranian attempts to control the strait. Multiple Gulf states condemned Iran’s drone attack against Bahrain.[13]

The Israel-Lebanon-United States Trilateral Framework challenges Iranian and Hezbollah efforts to facilitate an Israeli capitulation in Lebanon and threatens Hezbollah’s existence as an armed group. The US State Department released the full text of the framework agreement on June 26.[14] The agreement seeks the disarmament of all non-state armed groups in Lebanon, particularly Hezbollah.[15] The second and third clauses of the agreement confirm that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will “gradually” reassert control over all of southern Lebanon and that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will “progressively redeploy” out of mutually determined “pilot zones.”[16] These clauses assert that the LAF will assume full security responsibility for areas where armed groups have been successfully disarmed and dismantled, suggesting that the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon is contingent upon Hezbollah’s disarmament.[17] The fourth clause of the agreement emphasizes that the LAF will completely disarm all non-state groups and ensure that they possess “no armed capabilities anywhere in Lebanon,” which would include Hezbollah’s weapons north of the Litani River.[18] Hezbollah has long resisted disarmament north of the Litani River because the group has stockpiled much of its weapons in the Bekaa Valley.[19] The seventh clause of the agreement clarifies that Israel and Lebanon retain the right to self-defense, which similarly challenges Iran’s demand that the IDF cease all military activity in Lebanon.[20] The eleventh clause of the agreement stipulates that the United States and Lebanon will restrict the flow of unspecified funds to any entity affiliated with Lebanese non-state armed groups.[21] Such funds presumably include Iranian funding for Hezbollah. International media reported on June 17 that Iran would use potential economic relief gained from the memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the United States to fund and reconstitute Hezbollah.[22]

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reiterated on June 27 that the IDF will maintain its “security zone” in southern Lebanon amid continued Israeli strikes on Hezbollah targets.[23] An Israeli military correspondent reported on June 27 that Katz lauded the “historic” deal between Israel and Lebanon but said that the IDF will not “entirely withdraw” from Lebanon and that Israeli forces will maintain their “security zone,” including the Beaufort Castle ridge area.[24] He also directed the IDF to prepare for a prolonged deployment in the “security zone” and to continue to protect northern Israel from Hezbollah attacks.[25] The IDF continued strikes on Hezbollah targets on June 27. Lebanese media reported multiple IDF airstrikes on Nabatieh el Fawqa, Nabatieh District, on June 27.[26] The IDF told Reuters that one of the strikes targeted an individual who posed a threat to IDF forces but did not provide further details.[27] Lebanese media separately reported an Israeli strike near Tallouseh, Marjaayoun District, on June 27.[28] A Hezbollah-aligned journalist also claimed on June 27 that the IDF had advanced toward the outskirts of Kfarchouba, Hasbaya District, but the IDF has not confirmed this report at the time of this writing.[29]

Hezbollah is conducting an information operation to weaken the Lebanese government’s resolve to disarm Hezbollah by threatening renewed civil war in Lebanon if the government attempts to implement the framework agreement. Hezbollah Parliamentarian Hassan Fadlallah denounced the tripartite agreement on June 26 and warned that attempts by the Lebanese government to implement the agreement could reignite civil war in Lebanon.[30] Fadlallah said that Hezbollah will retain its weapons and confront any Lebanese government action to disarm the group. Fadlallah also claimed that the LAF is militarily incapable of disarming Hezbollah.[31] Hezbollah supporters protested against the framework agreement in the Beirut area on June 26 and 27 in line with Fadlallah’s threat that the group would mobilize the Lebanese “street” to stop the government from implementing the agreement.[32] Hezbollah has long leveraged the threat of renewed civil war to deter the Lebanese government from attempting to disarm the group. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem threatened in August 2025 to organize mass anti-government protests and said that there would be “no life” in Lebanon if the LAF attempted to disarm Hezbollah, for example.[33] Other Hezbollah figures have attempted to delegitimize the framework agreement by deeming it unlawful and spreading disinformation about the agreement’s provisions. Hezbollah parliamentary bloc leader Mohammad Raad alleged that the tripartite agreement is a “cover up” for a permanent Israeli military presence in Lebanon, despite Israel’s affirmation in the agreement that it has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon.[34] Various Hezbollah officials, including Qassem, called the framework agreement unconstitutional and a violation of the sensitive, sectarian National Pact, which suggests that Hezbollah is trying to depict the agreement as both illegal and liable to inflame sectarian tensions.[35]

The Iranian regime likely views the framework agreement as contravening the Lebanon-related clause of the US-Iran MoU and may attempt to use the agreement as a pretext to further delay nuclear negotiations with the United States. Iranian state media claimed that the framework agreement is illegitimate because it exists separately from the MoU and US-Iran negotiations and preserves the IDF’s freedom of movement in Lebanon.[36] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a statement on June 27 that characterized continued Israeli military action in Lebanon as a violation of the first clause of the MoU, which stipulates the “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon.”[37] The Iranian regime likely views the framework agreement, which permits Israel’s continued ground presence until Hezbollah is completely disarmed and enables Israel to act against Hezbollah in self-defense, as contravening the first clause of the MoU.[38] Fadlallah claimed on June 26 that Iran would not sign any agreement with the United States until Israel withdraws from Lebanese territory entirely.[39] ISW-CTP has repeatedly assessed that Iran has attempted to condition US-Iran nuclear negotiations on the United States compelling Israel to halt operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon and withdraw from Lebanese territory as part of its efforts to preserve Hezbollah and delay nuclear negotiations.[40]

Nothing significant to report.

The Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) appointed Haqqi Ismail al Khalidi as the PMF Anbar Operations Command commander on June 24.[41] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the prime minister.[42] Khalidi replaced Haider al Hammouri, who temporarily held the position after US-Israeli combined force strikes killed former PMF Anbar Operations Command Commander Dawai al Baiji in March 2026.[43] The PMF has also characterized Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated Qasim Musleh al Khafaji as the PMF Anbar Operations Command commander.[44] It is unclear how Khafaji and Khalidi’s responsibilities differ.

[1] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2070160682264269241

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/26/world/middleeast/strait-of-hormuz-iran-attack.html

[3] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/06/27/world/us-iran-strikes-hormuz

[4] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/06/27/world/us-iran-strikes-hormuz

[5] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2070804115509190704/photo/1

[6] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2070804115509190704/photo/1

[7] https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/pressbriefings/pages/imo-accounces-evacuation-plan-in-strait-of-hormuz.aspx

[8] https://www.npr.org/2026/06/26/nx-s1-5871963/un-agency-pauses-evacuation-of-ships-through-strait-of-hormuz-after-attack-vessel ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2070160682264269241

[9] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2070809278235963514/photo/1

[10] https://t.me/defapress_ir/62001

[11] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/joint-statement-following-the-ministerial-meeting-of-the-united-states-and-the-gulf-cooperation-council-gcc/

[12] https://t.me/MFAIran/35625

[13] https://www.foxnews.com/world/gulf-countries-strongly-condemn-irans-drone-attack-bahrain-rising-tensions-threaten-mou

[14] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/trilateral-framework-between-the-united-states-of-america-the-state-of-israel-and-the-republic-of-lebanon/

[15] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/trilateral-framework-between-the-united-states-of-america-the-state-of-israel-and-the-republic-of-lebanon/

[16] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/trilateral-framework-between-the-united-states-of-america-the-state-of-israel-and-the-republic-of-lebanon/

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMilAFBVV95cUxQMkpxcXBPSW84SElGOUt6WXc1YVZpRnRTdENrQ3ZlZ3RSUkxQTXhQcnJsbjVNQkRvdVNMY0VUajBHSEYtd3dmUEdNVThMaFdYZUFnMC1fcDJrSWItbVQ2Q1AwTjJZRUN1S0RBeVZGZm1YTG1sREo3QUlscHY0dEo4SXBsWm14ZnlyZ2NYV0l5UzZLazFF?oc=5