핵심요약

• 2026년 한광 훈련은 현실성과 새로운 역량 확보에 중점을 두었습니다.
• 훈련은 대통령 대만 탈환 임무 훈련과 인터넷 단절 상황에서의 민간 대응 테스트를 포함했습니다.
• 대만은 드론 부문 등 공급망 회복력 개선에 집중했습니다.
• 훈련은 사이버 공격 및 해저 케이블 차단에 대한 방어 능력을 시험했습니다.

도입

본 기사는 대만의 안보 훈련이 단순한 군사적 움직임을 넘어, 지정학적 압박 속에서 경제적 공급망 안정성과 사이버 안보를 어떻게 통합하고 있는지를 보여줍니다. 이는 대만 관련 산업의 장기적인 안정성과 투자 환경에 중대한 영향을 미치므로 투자자들이 주목해야 합니다.

본문 1: 안보 훈련의 현실성 제고와 공급망 회복력 강화

대만은 중국의 압박에 대응하여 과거 훈련의 비현실성을 개선하고 실전적 시나리오를 도입하는 데 집중하고 있습니다. 2026년 한광 훈련은 이러한 노력의 결과로, 대통령의 대만 탈환 임무 훈련과 같은 고위급 시나리오를 포함했습니다. 이는 단순한 군사적 방어를 넘어, 국가적 위기 상황에서의 민간 및 정부 기능의 연속성을 확보하는 데 중점을 둡니다. 특히, 드론 부문 등 핵심 산업의 공급망 회복력을 강화하려는 노력은 지정학적 불안정성이 경제적 취약점으로 직결됨을 시사합니다. 이는 대만 경제가 외부 충격에 얼마나 취약한지를 보여주는 중요한 지표입니다.

본문 2: 사이버 및 해상 안보 위협에 대한 시험

이번 훈련은 물리적 방어뿐만 아니라, 사이버 및 해상 통신 인프라에 대한 취약점 점검을 포함했습니다. 대만은 인터넷 연결 단절 상황에서 민간 서비스가 유지되는지 테스트함으로써, 중국이 군사적 상황에서 해저 인터넷 케이블을 차단하거나 통신 인프라를 사이버 공격으로 마비시킬 수 있다는 현실적 위협에 대비하고 있습니다. 이는 물리적 국경뿐만 아니라 디지털 영역에서의 안보가 현대 전쟁의 핵심임을 명확히 보여줍니다. 중국이 이미 이러한 수단을 사용하여 대만의 섬들로 연결된 케이블에 대해 행동을 취한 선례가 있음을 고려할 때, 통신 인프라의 물리적/디지털 방어 능력은 국가 안보의 최우선 과제가 되었습니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망과 투자 시사점

이러한 훈련 결과는 대만 경제가 지정학적 위험에 매우 민감하게 반응하며, 물리적 방어와 디지털 인프라의 통합적 보안이 필수적임을 강조합니다. 앞으로 대만 관련 기술 및 제조 산업에 대한 투자는 단순히 군사적 역량에만 의존할 것이 아니라, 공급망의 다변화와 사이버 복원력 강화라는 장기적인 관점에서 접근해야 합니다. 중국의 군사적 압박이 지속될 경우, 대만의 경제적 안정성은 기술적 독립성과 강력한 인프라 복원력에 의해 결정될 것입니다. 따라서 투자자들은 대만의 기술 생태계가 외부 충격에 얼마나 효과적으로 대응할 수 있는지, 그리고 해당 산업이 중국의 디지털/물리적 간섭으로부터 얼마나 독립적으로 운영될 수 있는지에 대한 지속적인 모니터링이 필요합니다. 이는 대만 관련 기술주와 인프라 관련 기업의 장기적인 밸류에이션에 영향을 미칠 것입니다.

결론

대만의 안보 훈련은 현실적 위협에 대한 실질적인 대비책을 마련하고 있음을 보여줍니다. 앞으로 대만 경제의 안정성은 군사적 방어 능력뿐만 아니라, 공급망의 다각화와 디지털 인프라의 복원력 확보라는 통합적 전략에 달려 있습니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 환경 변화 속에서 대만 관련 기업들의 회복탄력성과 기술적 독립성을 핵심 척도로 삼아 장기적인 전망을 분석해야 할 것입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMijwFBVV95cUxNU3l3QS03a2cxdi1MV1U1YVBqMGczdDNhazA4c1hKalR1dXBRMXZydEdmQUhjXzVZVXpoN1JDTG5sOFp5dzFrWDR4RklxUk9wMnowSDNEcFdNQlNwa3hwOTJIZTZJSlpVOG9YRHVfZFRrSHltdzZTWER6cDBpR3g4NEczZHg5VHJIUlJJMEhpaw?oc=5

China & Taiwan Update, August 14, 2026 - Institute for the Study of War

Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang defense exercises continued to emphasize resilience and realism, focusing on real-world contingencies and incorporating new capabilities. Taiwanese and foreign observers have criticized past Han Kuang exercises for being too scripted and lacking realism. Taiwan has sought to improve the realism of its exercises in recent years amid increasing short-of-war coercion by the PRC.[1] The 2026 Han Kuang exercise included a number of new drills. Taiwanese President William Lai announced an end to the drills on August 14 and emphasized Taiwan’s continuing efforts to improve supply chain resilience, particularly in the drone sector.[2]

This year’s Han Kuang exercise practiced an evacuation mission for President William Lai Ching-te amid a mock decapitation strike.[3] This was the first time Lai participated in such a drill. ISW-CDOT has previously reported on possible PRC efforts to practice decapitation strikes using “mock Taipei” complexes that mimic Taiwan’s Presidential Office and other significant government buildings.[4]

Taiwan also tested civilian responses to disruptions in internet connectivity for the first time.[5] Multiple Taiwanese counties participated in the drill, which emphasized maintaining public services throughout the internet slowdown.[6] The PRC may attempt to interfere with Taiwan’s connectivity during a military contingency, including cutting subsea internet cables. PRC-crewed ships have already used these abilities against cables connecting Taiwan to its outlying islands.[7] The PRC could also target Taiwan’s telecommunications and infrastructure using cyberattacks.[8]

Taiwan also practiced deploying electronic warfare vehicles to the mouth of the Tamsui River, where the PRC could enter to access Taipei, for the first time on August 5.[9] Taiwan’s Coast Guard Authority (CGA) also worked with the Taiwanese navy to enact an anti-blockade drill for the first time on August 12.[10] These drills illustrate Taiwan’s increasing commitment to addressing potential PRC contingencies.

Taiwan also incorporated its new Littoral Combat Command (LCC) into the exercises. The LCC gave an order for an Anping-class vessel to lead four missile boats in a simulated encounter with PRC amphibious assault vessels during an August 8 drill.[11] Taiwan inaugurated the LCC in 2026 to streamline the management of coastal radar and anti-ship missile capabilities. The LCC will maintain Hsiung Feng missiles — some of which have ranges capable of striking the PRC’s coast — for Taiwan’s coastal defense.[12] The LCC will play a similar role in integrating drone warfare into Taiwan’s coastal defenses if Taiwan passes a special budget, which would cover the acquisition of thousands of attack and reconnaissance drones.[13] Taiwan incorporated drones in multiple Han Kuang 2026 exercises, including an August 13 drill that simulated the defense of a tunnel to block adversary forces from entering Taipei.[14]

PRC state-affiliated media downplayed and criticized the Han Kuang exercises, using them to advance typical critiques of Lai and Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The PRC Ministry of Defense (MoD) during an August 14 press conference called Han Kuang a “charade” and accused the DPP of creating “panic.”[15] State-owned tabloid Global Times published an article arguing that Lai’s participation in the decapitation drill, as well as Taiwan’s incorporation of whole-of-society resilience drills, reflected the “militarization” of Taiwanese society.[16] An August 5 Global Times article cited a PRC military analyst who called the exercises “political show staged by the DPP.”[17] The same article called “resisting unification by force” a “dead end,” framing Taiwan’s self-defense efforts as escalatory.[18] Such rhetoric reflects typical PRC information operations meant to delegitimize Lai and the DPP.

The PRC may have used typhoon conditions to experiment with expanding its law enforcement jurisdiction over Taiwanese and international waters in the Taiwan Strait. The PRC’s Guangdong Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) announced a traffic control scheme for northbound vessels entering the Taiwan Strait between August 6 and 9, in anticipation of a typhoon entering the East China Sea.[19] The MSA announcement said that passing ships must “strictly comply with traffic control requirements” and “obey the instructions of on-site maritime management agencies.”[20] Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the CGA condemned the MSA announcement and stated that the Taiwan Strait consists of international waters and the PRC has no right to control traffic there.[21] The CGA urged commercial ships passing through the strait to disregard broadcasts from PRC authorities and notify Taiwanese authorities if they received such broadcasts.[22]

Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council (OAC) Deputy Minister Sung Cheng-en also criticized the PRC for monitoring a Japanese Coast Guard ship that sought refuge from the typhoon in the Taiwan Strait from August 6 to 10.[23] Sung said that Taiwan allows vessels of all nationalities, including PRC ships, to seek shelter in Taiwan-administered waters in emergencies.[24] Ship-tracking data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence showed that China Coast Guard (CCG) ship 2307 approached Japanese coast guard ship Urado in the southern part of the Taiwan Strait and kept pace with Urado as it sailed up and down the Strait between August 6 and 10.[25] The CCG ship operated in international waters and did not cross into Taiwan’s contiguous zone or territorial sea.

The PRC is escalating its campaign to bring Taiwan’s surrounding waters under its jurisdiction and may be testing the willingness of foreign vessels to comply with PRC authorities in disputed waters. These exploratory steps erode Taiwan’s sovereignty while allowing the PRC to calibrate its approach to a future blockade or quarantine of Taiwan. The MSA previously conducted a “maritime law enforcement” mission east of Taiwan from June 6 to 10 in which it hailed passing commercial ships to assert its jurisdiction.[26] CCG ships have continuously patrolled east of Taiwan since June 1 and have periodically patrolled some of Taiwan’s outlying islands since 2024.[27] The PRC likely intends to expand its de facto control around Taiwan as much as possible through means short of war, which erodes Taiwan’s sovereignty, strains Taiwan’s resources, and sets favorable conditions for future PRC military operations against Taiwan.

PRC state media framed a combined PRC-Indonesian naval navigation exercise east of Taiwan as a demonstration of PRC sovereignty over Taiwan’s eastern exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The PRC and Indonesian navies conducted what the PRC MoD described as a “naval navigational exercise” on August 12.[28] PLA Navy (PLAN) guided-missile frigate Honghe and Indonesian Navy frigate KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai practiced maritime communication and coordination with one another but did not practice any warfighting capabilities.[29] PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times reported that the exercise marked the first time the PLAN and a foreign navy had conducted naval exercises in the Taiwanese EEZ east of the island.[30] Global Times quoted frequent PRC military commentator Zhang Junshe, who stated that the exercise demonstrated that the PRC “has sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the exclusive economic zone east of Taiwan Island.”[31]

Taiwan’s MAC argued that the PRC’s framing of military exercises in Taiwan’s EEZ east of the island is attempting to create “a false impression” that the PRC has jurisdiction over the waters.[32] The MAC called the exercise a “military provocation.”[33] Indonesian navy spokesperson First Admiral Tunggul stated that I Gusti Ngurah Rai was conducting bilateral exercises with Russia in Vladivostok and would conduct drills “with countries that it passes by” as it returns, including the PRC, Japan, and the United States.[34] PRC state media’s framing of the exercise supports the broader PRC campaign to assert sovereignty and jurisdiction east of Taiwan. The Indonesian statement appeared to downplay the relevance of the exercise to Taiwan, by contrast, suggesting that Indonesia may not have intended the “routine” exercise to bolster Beijing’s political signaling.

Taiwanese authorities indicted a former secretary to a top county official for leaking the official’s travel itinerary to a CCP member. PRC intelligence is likely spying on Taiwanese politicians’ overseas travel to monitor and disrupt Taiwan’s international relationships. Taiwanese prosecutors indicted Shih Liang-yen, the former secretary to Yunlin County Magistrate Chang Li-shan, on August 6 for leaking Chang’s travel itinerary for her July 2024 visit to Japan.[35] Shih passed information about Chang’s flights, accommodations, and meeting schedule to a CCP official surnamed Mu in exchange for paid travel to the PRC.[36] Taiwanese authorities indicted Chang’s former legislative assistant, Lee Yi-hsien, on national security charges in August 2020 for allegedly passing Taiwanese government personnel lists and other sensitive documents to Huang Guanlong, a PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) agent.[37]

PRC espionage operations likely seek detailed information on Taiwanese politicians’ overseas travel to monitor the politicians’ contacts overseas and inform the PRC’s efforts to disrupt Taiwan’s diplomacy. Czech authorities indicted Yang Yiming, a suspected MSS agent, in June for gathering blackmail material on European politicians who travelled to Taiwan or had connections to Taiwan.[38]

PRC intelligence agencies may also be seeking opportunities to harass or assault Taiwanese politicians abroad. Convicted PRC agent Yaoning “Mike” Sun tracked then-Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen during her visit to California in 2023 and sent real-time updates on her location to a PRC consular official.[39] PRC agents also tailed Taiwanese Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim during her visit to Czechia in March 2024 and reportedly planned (but did not carry out) a staged car accident targeting Hsiao during her visit, according to Czech military intelligence officials.[40]

Taiwanese authorities sentenced one retired soldier to prison and indicted another for leaking military secrets to PRC intelligence agents. PRC spies are increasingly using financial incentives to target low-ranking Taiwanese military personnel for espionage recruitment. The Taichung District Court sentenced a former Taiwanese Navy private surnamed Tsai on August 6 to two years and seven months in prison for passing documents on Taiwan’s Hsiung Feng II missile launcher vehicles and other classified military information to a PRC People’s Armed Police (PAP) intelligence officer in exchange for payment.[41] Taiwanese prosecutors in Kaohsiung indicted a retired Private First Class in the Taiwanese Army surnamed Hsu on August 7 for allegedly sending military secrets to a suspected PRC intelligence agent.[42] Prosecutors accused Hsu of transmitting military operational plans and other classified information via Telegram to an individual or group known as “PPRIT,” whom the prosecutors suspect to be linked to PRC intelligence, in exchange for money to invest in cryptocurrency and pay off debts.[43] Hsu allegedly received payment through former CTi News anchor Lin Chen-you, whom Taiwanese prosecutors indicted in May for bribing six other Taiwanese military personnel to leak military secrets to the PRC.[44]

PRC intelligence agents are likely targeting low-ranking Taiwanese military personnel for recruitment to expand PRC spy networks in Taiwan and acquire sensitive military information. Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) Director-General Tsai Ming-yen stated in April that the PRC has shifted from recruiting mid-level Taiwanese military officers to focus on noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel.[45] The PRC exploits financial insecurity among low-ranking Taiwanese soldiers by using financial enticements to recruit them for espionage.[46]

PRC state media attributed Ugandan immigration authorities’ refusal of entry to Taiwanese individuals as a response to the DPP’s push to internationalize “the Taiwan question.”[47] Ugandan authorities cited the one-China principle and confiscated Taiwanese passports, refusing to return them until provided PRC passports.[48] Ugandan authorities confiscated the passport of one Taiwanese individual upon his arrival and still have not returned it at time of writing. The individual was working in Uganda with a valid work permit.[49] The authorities sent another individual, a tourist, back to Taiwan.[50] PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times published an article framing the issue as ‘“Taiwanese independence” forces’ getting narrower room on the international stage,” though at that time, there were no explicit indicators linking the immigration policy to changes in Uganda’s Taiwan policy.[51]

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) announced that Ugandan immigration authorities also confiscated passports from three Taiwanese travelers on August 12, telling them to show PRC passports in order to have their Taiwanese passports returned.[52] MOFA also warned Taiwanese nationals against travelling to Uganda and revealed the one-China principle as the basis for Uganda’s actions.[53] The Ugandan government has not issued any official changes in entry or visa requirements for Taiwanese nationals at the time of writing, however.[54] The Ugandan decision follows Morocco’s suspension of visa processing services for Taiwanese travelers in July, effectively cutting off Taiwanese travel to Morocco.[55] Taiwan responded by suspending visa processing for Moroccan nationals.

Dozens of newly promoted PLA generals and lieutenant generals have replaced purged PLA leaders in the Central Military Commission (CMC), PLA services, and PLA Theater Commands. These promotions have thus far prioritized those who demonstrated political reliability and trust and individuals who would be involved in operations in Beijing and Taiwan. The PRC has conducted a wide-ranging military purge that has removed over half of its top generals since 2023, including five out of seven members of the CMC.[56] Hong Kong-based media outlet South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported on August 5 that there are only six active, publicly visible full generals in the PLA.[57] The report stated a total of 38 full generals have either been placed under investigation or disappeared from public view.[58] The PLA promoted four officers to theater commanders and generals since December 2025, including three air force generals and one discipline inspector, leadership roles within the entities of the PLA with the fewest purges. The promoted officers lacked ties to the networks of purged CMC Vice Chair Zhang Youxia or purged CMC Political Work Department Director Miao Hua, who were previously decisive in promoting generals.[59] Twenty-one of the 27 total positions at theater commander-grade and above in the PLA and PAP are currently unoccupied.[60] SCMP reported that dozens of lieutenant generals are currently covering the portfolios of purged generals, including many officers who have been lieutenant generals for less than a year.[61]

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping is likely prioritizing promotions within the PLA based on criteria of political loyalty and trust and may be beginning with the PLA departments least impacted by the purges, such as the PLA air force and discipline inspection apparatus.[62] Xi may also be prioritizing promoting individuals within the Central and Eastern Theater Commands as he seeks to replace purged officers.[63] The Central and Eastern Theater Commands are responsible for protecting Beijing and for operations and deployments relevant to Taiwan, respectively, and they are the only two out of the five theater commands that currently have active publicly visible commanders.[64] The PLA elevated new Central and Eastern Theater Commanders in December 2025.

A cybersecurity researcher uncovered an unsecured PRC police surveillance database in Zhangjiakou targeting foreigners and PRC citizens, shedding light on surveillance operations in the PRC and presenting national security implications for Taiwanese and US citizens who travel to the PRC. The “Dynamic Control Platform for Overseas Personnel,” likely made for the Zhangjiakou Public Security Bureau, reportedly contained detailed surveillance records on nearly 12,000 people.[65] The database included records of over 700 foreign residents of Zhangjiakou and more than 300 foreign journalists, international students, individuals from Taiwan and Hong Kong, and PRC activists and fugitives.[66] Some of the individuals identified in the database had never been to Zhangjiakou.[67] The database listed each individual’s passport number, cellphone number, nationality, occupation, birth date, marital status, children’s names, and sometimes religion.[68] The data also included photos and facial recognition data from surveillance cameras, medical records, bills, flight and train information, movements around Zhangjiakou, frequent locations they visited, and any connections with other individuals in the database.[69]

The Zhangjiakou surveillance database provides a much more detailed picture of the PRC’s surveillance apparatus and raises security concerns for Taiwanese, US, and other foreign citizens in the PRC as well as broader national security concerns. The PRC could use this surveillance data to gather information on sensitive foreign national security, technology, or trade matters by monitoring foreign travelers involved in these issues. The PRC could also use this surveillance data to persecute or coerce Taiwanese citizens, especially those it accuses of supporting “separatism” and those with personal involvement or family connections in Taiwanese politics and important institutions. Zhangjiakou is a prefecture-level city in the PRC’s northwestern Hebei province. It is likely that Zhangjiakou’s police surveillance database is indicative of the level of surveillance against foreigners, including Taiwanese and US nationals, outside of PRC major cities, implying that similar police surveillance databases may be further widespread across other PRC cities.

PRC global rare earth exports from January to June 2026 declined by 16 percent compared with the same period in 2025. This decrease may reflect the PRC’s restriction of rare earths as a tool of economic coercion. Japanese media outlet Nikkei reported that PRC exports of seven rare earths to Japan fell by 51 percent and exports of rare earths to the United States fell by 28 percent in compared to the first half of 2025.[70] The seven restricted rare earths include samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium.[71] The PRC accounts for 70 percent of the global production of rare earths used in electric vehicles, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, radar systems, and thermal barrier coatings for jet engines.[72]

The PRC uses its dominance over rare earths exports to pressure consumer nations into creating a more favorable market environment for the PRC.[73] The PRC has demonstrated this coercive approach over the past year, restricting rare-earth exports to the United States in April 2025 in retaliation for a US 34 percent tariff increase on PRC goods.[74] The PRC can also leverage supply chain dependencies to coerce other countries into reducing support for Taiwan. The PRC tightened controls on Japan’s access to PRC rare earths in January amid tensions over Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s November 2025 remarks indicating that Japan could intervene militarily in a Taiwan contingency.[75]

South Korean police arrested two PRC nationals, who were formerly PLA enlisted officers, for allegedly engaging in espionage targeting the United States Forces Korea (USFK). South Korea is expanding its legal options to punish PRC spies and infiltrators. The South Korean Gyeonggi Nambu Provincial Police announced on August 11 that they had arrested a PRC national for spying on military communications near Gunsan Airport.[76] Gunsan Airport is a multipurpose airport where USFK and Korean Air Force personnel are stationed.[77] The PRC national reportedly intercepted military radio communications between the control tower and fighter jets in April using a unidirectional Software-defined Radio (SDR).[78] South Korean police confirmed that the suspect entered South Korea multiple times on a tourist visa since January 2024, including during active US-South Korea combined air exercises.[79] South Korean police concurrently arrested another PRC national who leveraged long-term residency in South Korea to recruit an insider at the USFK Headquarters to exfiltrate military intelligence.[80] The suspect, who operated a private military store near the base, recruited a South Korean civilian employee working inside the base to gather intelligence on the US-South Korea Ulchi Freedom Shield combined military exercise, internal personnel records, weapon movements, and military leadership from November 2021 to May 2026.[81] Police verified that the suspects in both cases previously served in the PLA but are still investigating their connections to PRC authorities.[82]

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMijwFBVV95cUxNU3l3QS03a2cxdi1MV1U1YVBqMGczdDNhazA4c1hKalR1dXBRMXZydEdmQUhjXzVZVXpoN1JDTG5sOFp5dzFrWDR4RklxUk9wMnowSDNEcFdNQlNwa3hwOTJIZTZJSlpVOG9YRHVfZFRrSHltdzZTWER6cDBpR3g4NEczZHg5VHJIUlJJMEhpaw?oc=5