트럼프 대통령, 의회의 이란 전쟁 반대 시도를 무력화
What We Learned From the Short-Lived Congressional Revolt Against Trump’s War With Iran - Slate Magazine
미국 의회가 트럼프 대통령의 이란 전쟁 정책에 대한 반발이 briefly 발생했지만, 빠르게 종결된 것으로 보여, 시장 영향력은 경미할 것으로 예상됩니다.
핵심 요약
전쟁권한법은 132차례 호출되었지만 의회는 실질적으로 반대하지 않았습니다.
핵심요약
- 전쟁권한법은 1973년 제정 이후 132차례 호출되었습니다
- 의회가 실질적으로 반대하지 않은 것은 단 한 번, 1973년 제정 직후뿐입니다
- 트럼프 대통령은 의회의 이란 전쟁에 대한 반대 시도를 효과적으로 무력화시켰습니다
- 전쟁권한법은 미국 대통령의 전쟁 권한을 제한하는 데 효과적이지 않았습니다
도입
이 기사는 미국 대통령의 전쟁 권한에 대한 의회의 통제력이 얼마나 약한지를 보여주는 중요한 사례입니다. 투자자들에게는 미국 정부의 외교 정책과 군사 행동이 시장 변동성에 미칠 수 있는 영향을 이해하는 데 도움이 됩니다. 특히, 중동 지역에서의 군사적 긴장이 기업의 운영 환경과 수익성에 미칠 수 있는 영향을 고려할 때, 이 기사의 내용은 매우 유의미합니다.
본문 1: 전쟁권한법의 역사적 맥락
전쟁권한법은 1973년 베트남 전쟁과 워터게이트 스캔들이 배경이 되었습니다. 리처드 닉슨 대통령은 이 법에 거부권을 행사했지만, 의회는 이를 두 번의 2/3 다수로 폐기했습니다. 이후 민주당은 의회에서 압도적인 다수를 차지하며, 베트남 전쟁에 대한 자금 지원을 중단시키고, 앙골라의 공산 반군과의 전쟁에 대한 자금 지원을 금지시켰습니다. 그러나 이 법은 이후에 거의 적용되지 않았으며, 대통령들이 법을 준수하지 않아도 의회가 실질적으로 대응하지 않았습니다. 이는 미국 대통령의 전쟁 권한이 의회에 의해 효과적으로 제한되지 않음을 보여줍니다.
본문 2: 트럼프 대통령의 이란 정책과 시장 영향
트럼프 대통령은 의회가 이란 전쟁에 대한 반대 시도를 무력화시켰습니다. 이는 중동 지역의 군사적 긴장이 지속될 가능성을 높입니다. 이는 에너지 시장에 대한 영향을 고려할 때, 투자자에게는 중요한 고려 사항입니다. 특히, 이란의 석유 수출이 중단될 경우, 원유 가격이 상승할 가능성이 있습니다. 이는 에너지 기업의 수익성에 긍정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있지만, 동시에 에너지 의존도가 높은 기업들에게는 부담이 될 수 있습니다.
본문 3: 전쟁권한법의 미래 전망
전쟁권한법의 역사적 맥락과 최근의 상황을 고려할 때, 이 법이 미국 대통령의 전쟁 권한을 효과적으로 제한하는 데는 한계가 있을 것입니다. 그러나 의회가 더 적극적으로 역할을 수행할 가능성도 배제할 수 없습니다. 특히, 중동 지역의 군사적 긴장이 지속될 경우, 의회가 더 적극적으로 개입할 가능성이 있습니다. 이는 미국 정부의 외교 정책과 군사 행동이 시장 변동성에 미칠 수 있는 영향을 고려할 때, 투자자에게는 중요한 고려 사항입니다.
결론
이 기사는 미국 대통령의 전쟁 권한이 의회에 의해 효과적으로 제한되지 않음을 보여줍니다. 이는 중동 지역의 군사적 긴장이 지속될 가능성을 높이며, 에너지 시장과 기업의 운영 환경에 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 미국 정부의 외교 정책과 군사 행동이 시장 변동성에 미칠 수 있는 영향을 고려하여, 포트폴리오를 구성하는 것이 중요합니다.
Original Article
What We Learned From the Short-Lived Congressional Revolt Against Trump’s War With Iran - Slate Magazine
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President Donald Trump crushed a looming congressional revolt against the war in Iran last week, though the rebellion was more posed than real and would likely have petered out on its own.
The reason is that the War Powers Act , the 1973 law that slim majorities in the House and Senate invoked in a joint resolution , has rarely been taken seriously on Capitol Hill. In fact, except for the first few years after the passage of the act—which was meant to put muscle and teeth on the legislature’s responsibilities under Article 1 of the Constitution—it has never been taken seriously enough to matter.
When the act was passed, the Vietnam War was unwinding, and Richard Nixon’s presidency was collapsing in the wake of the Watergate scandal. Sentiment against the war—and against excessive executive power—was so widespread and deep that after Nixon vetoed the War Powers Act, both houses of Congress mustered the two-thirds majority to override the veto .
The following year, Nixon would resign to avoid impeachment, and Democrats would enlarge their veto-proof majorities in Congress. Soon after, they would stop the flow of money to the war in Southeast Asia, bar the use of funds to fight communist rebels in Angola, and place restraints on the CIA and the National Security Agency.
But that was pretty much it. The War Powers Act requires presidents to notify Congress when they send troops into battle. Presidents have done so 132 times ; each time, Congress has assented or at least not objected in any tangible way. President Barack Obama went past the 60-day limit in Libya, but argued that the act didn’t apply because authority had been transferred to NATO. President Bill Clinton exceeded the deadline in his bombing campaign against Kosovo, but he said Congress had funded the bombing, which he took as authorization for the war. A Republican congressman sued the president, but a D.C. Circuit judge, in Campbell v. Clinton , ruled that this was a political matter, not to be decided by the judiciary. (The courts have consistently ruled in favor of the president, citing his powers under Article 2 of the Constitution.)
The fact is, most members of Congress don’t want the responsibility of weighing in on matters of war and peace. They especially don’t want to be blamed if the war goes south. Even during the height of the Iraq War, after the 2006 midterm elections, when Democrats recaptured the House and Senate, mainly because of disfavor over George W. Bush’s war, Congress voted down several measures to cut, much less end, funding for the war—thus declining their constitutional power of the purse.
To quell the impending flak over the Iran war, in which four Republican senators had joined all but one Democrat, Trump didn’t bother citing legal subtleties. Rather, he yelled at them in a private meeting , complaining that by threatening to stop the war, they were wrecking his bargaining power in the ongoing peace talks. He made the same charge in a subsequent social media post on Tuesday:
So, I have Iran on the “ropes,” ready to go down for the fall, willing to give us practically anything, and for the first time in decades, respecting the hell out of the United States and its President, ME, and the U.S. Senate decides to have a poorly timed and meaningless War Powers Act Vote, telling the Number One Sponser of Terror in the World that the United States doesn’t like what I am doing to them, and I must stop, and by so doing has provided aid and comfort the Enemy. Four Republican Losers voted with the Dumocrats, and Iran asked my people, “what does that all mean?” These Senators have just made my job more difficult, but I will get it done, one way or the other, because I always get it done!
In one sense, this is gibberish. First, in no way does Trump, or his inexperienced emissaries, have Iran on the ropes. To the contrary, the memorandum of understanding that they signed gives Iran immense benefits up front—including the waiving of sanctions on oil exports and the lifting of frozen assets—while extracting no costs from Tehran. Meanwhile, despite the MOU’s provisions, Iran continues to control the Strait of Hormuz, in at least one case firing on a large cargo ship passing through.
Second, the Iranian leaders don’t need a congressional vote to tell them that “the United States doesn’t like” what Trump is doing. They’re perfectly capable of reading the news reports and the polls. Finally, Trump himself wrecked his bargaining leverage by repeatedly threatening to resume the bombing if the Iranians didn’t do X, Y, or Z—then backpedaled when they did X, Y, and Z .
Nonetheless, two of those four Republican senators were so swayed by the argument—or perhaps shaken by his charge of treason (saying they have provided “aid and comfort [to] the enemy”) and the implicit political attacks to follow—that in a subsequent vote to proceed to more binding legislation, they switched their votes .
Then again, Trump was right in calling the vote “meaningless.” The joint resolution that the House and Senate passed the previous week had, by nature, no binding effect. The vote to proceed with debate on a second motion, which was killed under Trump’s pressure, might have resulted in a real law. But the law would merely have required Trump to seek congressional approval to continue the war—which, given the historical pliancy of Congress and the slavish obeisance of this Congress, was well assured. Finally, if Congress had gone ahead with the motion, then voted to approve binding restrictions, Trump could have vetoed it—and, unlike the case in 1973, the anti-war members comprise nowhere near a two-thirds majority to override it.
The whole sequence of events was political drama. The Democrats and not quite a handful of Republicans (some of whom no longer cared about Trump’s pressures after he successfully endorsed more pro-MAGA opponents in recent primaries) showed that they were in alignment with public opinion on a deeply unpopular war. Trump showed that, even so, he can still do pretty much whatever he wants.