핵심요약

• 미국은 이란의 석유 및 가스 시설, 발전소, 교통 및 담수화 시설 등 핵심 인프라를 공격하는 '머리로 눈을 맞바꾸는' 전략을 고려할 수 있습니다.
• 이러한 공격은 이란 내 인도주의적 위기를 초래하고 미국의 도덕적 입지를 훼손하며, '전면전'으로 확대될 위험을 내포합니다.
• 미국이 호르무즈 해협 인접 지역을 확보하거나 하르그 섬을 점령하는 등의 군사 작전은 수천 명의 미군과 해군 자산을 위험에 빠뜨릴 수 있습니다.
• 전쟁의 결과는 에너지 시장의 변동성 확대와 중동 지역의 지정학적 불안정성을 심화시킬 것입니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란 전쟁의 종결 방식에 대한 논의를 통해 지정학적 위험이 투자 환경에 미치는 영향을 분석합니다. 현재의 논쟁은 단순히 군사적 승패를 넘어, 인프라 공격과 같은 극단적 선택이 초래할 수 있는 인도주의적 재앙과 국제적 도덕성이라는 비군사적 비용을 포함합니다. 따라서 투자자들은 지정학적 리스크가 에너지 공급망과 글로벌 경제에 미치는 장기적인 영향을 면밀히 평가해야 합니다.

본문 1: 인프라 공격의 위험과 논리

미국이 이란의 핵심 인프라를 공격하는 전략은 이란 경제와 사회에 혼란을 야기할 수 있다는 논리에서 출발합니다. 기사에서 언급된 바와 같이, 석유 및 가스 시설, 발전소, 교통 인프라, 담수화 시설을 공격하는 것은 이란 내에 인도주의적 위기를 초래할 수 있으며, 이는 미국의 도덕적 입지를 훼손할 수 있습니다. 이러한 접근 방식은 단순히 군사적 목표 달성을 넘어, '전면전'으로 확대될 경우 걸프 국가들의 핵심 인프라와 민간 지역이 표적이 될 수 있는 '판도라의 상자'를 열 위험이 있습니다. 이는 군사적 개입이 예상치 못한 광범위한 지역의 불안정성을 야기하여 국제적 비용을 증가시키는 결과를 낳습니다.

본문 2: 군사적 개입의 현실적 위험

군사적 목표를 달성하기 위해 미군이 육로에 진입하거나 하르그 섬을 점령하는 등의 행동은 직접적인 군사적 위험을 수반합니다. 이러한 작전은 수천 명의 미군 병력과 귀중한 해군 자산을 위험에 노출시킵니다. 이러한 군사적 행동은 단기적인 목표 달성 외에도, 지역 내에서 추가적인 충돌을 유발하여 현 상태의 교착 상태를 더욱 악화시킬 수 있는 잠재적 위험을 안고 있습니다. 즉, 군사적 해결책이 오히려 장기적인 불안정성을 심화시키는 역설적인 결과를 초래할 수 있다는 점을 고려해야 합니다.

본문 3: 장기적 지정학적 파급 효과

전쟁의 최종 결과는 단기적인 군사적 상황을 넘어 장기적인 에너지 시장과 국제 관계에 영향을 미칩니다. 만약 갈등이 지속되거나 극단적인 무력 충돌로 이어진다면, 중동 지역의 에너지 공급망과 해상 무역로의 안정성이 심각하게 위협받게 됩니다. 이는 국제 유가 변동성을 극대화하고 글로벌 공급망에 심각한 차질을 초래할 것입니다. 따라서 투자자들은 지정학적 불확실성이 에너지 및 원자재 가격에 미치는 파급 효과를 장기적인 관점에서 분석해야 합니다.

결론

이란 사태의 해결은 군사적 충돌보다는 국제적 도덕성과 경제적 비용을 최소화하는 데 초점을 맞추어야 합니다. 극단적인 무력 사용은 인도주의적 재앙과 국제적 비난이라는 막대한 비용을 발생시키므로 지양해야 합니다. 향후 상황은 협상과 외교적 노력을 통해 긴장을 완화하는 방향으로 나아갈 가능성이 높으며, 투자자들은 이러한 외교적 경로를 주시하며 지정학적 변동성에 대비해야 할 것입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiZEFVX3lxTE5CdHBPSVNzWUJhT1o4aUxNVXFjTWI2V0pBLUdURGZCNF9GUDN2SU1vU213UzZDZXNHdExQTkdRMjZYSkwxVFZfdHF6WFF3SDdDM18tejNUOFBfYWlIOGg2ck5MSGM?oc=5

How Does the Iran War End? - Council on Foreign Relations

Much of the commentary on the war in Iran has focused on whether the mounting costs of Operation Epic Fury are worth it. The most common question I hear now, though, is how does this all end? The choice now before President Donald Trump may be to pick between the lesser of three unattractive options: a dramatic escalation, a conciliatory deescalation, and a continuation of today’s messy stalemate.

The first approach would be to shoot our way out. Trump is reportedly giving this serious thought , having said earlier this week that he is considering a restart to sustained and high-intensity strikes akin to the start of Operation Epic Fury. In his own words, “[Iran hasn’t] received enough pain yet.” Or, as Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it yesterday , the United States could pursue a strategy of a “head for an eye.”

The United States could strike Iranian critical infrastructure—including oil and gas facilities, power plants, critical transportation infrastructure, and desalination facilities—in the hopes of wreaking further havoc on the Iranian economy and society. But the cruel logic of this approach is obvious, and we have avoided it for good reason. Strikes of this nature could cause a humanitarian crisis in Iran, stain the United States’ moral standing, and would by no means guarantee capitulation from the regime. That is to say nothing of the Pandora’s box that a “total war” might open, placing the Gulf states’ critical infrastructure, energy and power facilities, civilian population centers, as well as desalination plants at the top of Iran’s target list.

Trump could also put boots on the ground, including to seize Kharg Island—which facilitates the lion’s share of Iran’s oil exports—and secure a strip of Iranian territory adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz to ensure safe passage for vessels transiting the strait. But such operations would put thousands of U.S. warfighters and prized naval assets at risk.

The United States could also begin to re-target senior Iranian leaders. But the regime has proved remarkably adept at replenishing itself, if not stiffening its resolve, in the wake of such strikes. As Ray Takeyh and Reuel Marc Gerecht aptly observed in a recent essay for the Wall Street Journal , “Tehran has a wartime advantage over Washington because the ruling Iranian elite wants to fight and has been willing to endure far more pain than Donald Trump.” That said, Rubio noted that “they’re probably not ready to do a deal yet, but they will be soon because the price they’re paying is very high despite their tough talk and their flowery language.”

That brings me to the second option that the president could consider: deescalation. In practice, this runs the risk of looking like capitulation. The United States could significantly scale back its military presence, declare victory (again) with respect to most of Operation Epic Fury’s stated military objectives, and accept—at least to some degree—Iran’s grip on the Strait of Hormuz.

The costs of the war are already high, and it’s not clear whether the president nor the American people have an appetite for such costs. Three U.S. military service members were killed in Iran’s recent attack on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Azraq, Jordan, bringing the total to eighteen service members killed and nearly 450 wounded. New polling shows 68 percent of Americans believe the Iran war was not “worth fighting.” Then there are the strategic costs, namely a further and accelerated draw-down of munitions, which are already in short supply, and the repositioning of forces from priority theatres, such as the Indo-Pacific, which could invite opportunistic actions from China in the Taiwan Strait.

This option would be a hard sell politically. If the United States were to implement the provisions of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding as written, Iran would remain in a position to continue to choke off the Strait of Hormuz at will—or at least charge a toll for passage while kicking down the road any real discussion of unresolved issues around its nuclear program. A unilateral deescalation would also shatter the confidence of our partners in the region—not to mention partners elsewhere—in the United States as a trustworthy guarantor of security.

Suffice it to say that both the escalatory and deescalatory options before Trump are both unappealing. That is why he has understandably tried to chart a middle course: a tit-for-tat strategy of strikes and new deal offers playing out simultaneously in the military and diplomatic domains. But it remains to be seen whether this approach is likely to succeed on either front.

The costs mount every day, and the ultimate outcome is far from clear, but given the perils of a significantly more dovish or hawkish approach, the current conflict in the strait may become the new status quo.

The Strait of Hormuz is neither fully open nor closed. The ceasefire is punctuated by attacks almost daily, though it might be producing “ shooting in a more moderate manner ” to borrow the president’s own words. And the price of oil is high, though seemingly not crippling to the global economy, at least as of today. In the absence of a breakthrough on either the military or diplomatic front, this state of affairs is calcifying.

So, how long could this all last? The astrophysicist J. Richard Gott offered an infamous rule of thumb: absent better information, the odds are even that a phenomenon will endure at least as long as it already has. By that grim arithmetic, the five month old stalemate in the strait stands an even chance of grinding on through the end of this year. And every month it continues, its odds of surviving the next only improve.

If you don’t find that logic persuasive, there are always the prediction markets. Expectations there put a 50 percent chance on commercial vessel traffic in the Strait of Hormuz “returning to normal” (a proxy for the end of conflict) by the end of 2026—basically aligning the wisdom of crowds with a Princeton astrophysicist. Go figure.

Let me know what you think about the Iran War and what this column should cover next by replying to [email protected] .

This work represents the views solely of the author(s). The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiZEFVX3lxTE5CdHBPSVNzWUJhT1o4aUxNVXFjTWI2V0pBLUdURGZCNF9GUDN2SU1vU213UzZDZXNHdExQTkdRMjZYSkwxVFZfdHF6WFF3SDdDM18tejNUOFBfYWlIOGg2ck5MSGM?oc=5