핵심요약

• 이란 드론 공격 비용: $18,000~$46,000
• 미국 패트리어트 미사일 비용: $3.5백만 달러/발 (성공 시 2발 필요)
• 카타르 LNG 수출량 17% 중단, $16.2억 달러 수익 손실
• 이란, 비대칭 전략으로 갈등 지속

도입

이번 기사는 비대칭 전쟁의 경제적 영향과 전략적 교훈을 분석한 것입니다. 투자자들은 군사력과 경제력 간의 상호작용을 이해함으로써, 지정학적 리스크를 평가하는 데 도움이 될 수 있습니다. 특히 에너지 시장의 변동성과 군사 지출의 증가가 글로벌 경제에 미치는 영향을 고려해야 합니다.

본문 1: 비대칭 전쟁의 경제적 부담

이란은 저비용 고효율의 무인기 공격으로 미국과 이스라엘의 고비용 방어 시스템을 압박하고 있습니다. 미국은 단일 드론을 격추하기 위해 $7백만 달러를 지출해야 하는 반면, 이란은 동일한 비용으로 15~38대의 드론을 발사할 수 있습니다. 이는 미국 국방부의 예산을 압박하고, 글로벌 경제에 에너지 공급망 불안정을 초래할 수 있습니다. 특히 카타르의 LNG 수출량 17%가 중단되며, $16.2억 달러의 수익이 손실된 것은 에너지 시장의 변동성을 증폭시켰습니다. 이는 투자자에게 에너지 주식의 변동성과 리스크를 높이는 요인입니다.

본문 2: 전략적 교훈과 장기적 영향

이란의 비대칭 전략은 군사력에서 열세임에도 불구하고 갈등을 지속시킬 수 있는 방법을 보여줍니다. 이는 다른 국가들도 저비용 고효율의 무인기 기술을 도입함으로써 군사적 우위를 확보할 수 있음을 시사합니다. 또한, 에너지 공급망의 취약성을 노리는 전략은 글로벌 경제에 장기적인 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 특히 스트레이트 오브 호르무즈의 통제권은 국제 에너지 시장의 안정성에 중요한 역할을 합니다. 이는 투자자에게 지정학적 리스크를 고려한 포트폴리오 구성의 중요성을 상기시킵니다.

본문 3: 에너지 시장과 군사 지출의 상호작용

에너지 시장과 군사 지출의 상호작용은 글로벌 경제에 복잡한 영향을 미칩니다. 군사 지출의 증가는 에너지 수요를 증가시킬 수 있으며, 이는 에너지 가격을 상승시킬 수 있습니다. 반면, 에너지 공급망의 불안정성은 군사 지출을 증가시키는 요인이 될 수 있습니다. 이는 투자자에게 에너지 주식과 군사 산업 주식의 상관관계를 고려한 투자 전략을 수립해야 함을 의미합니다. 특히 카타르의 LNG 수출량 감소는 에너지 시장의 변동성을 높이고, 이는 투자자에게 리스크를 증가시킬 수 있습니다.

결론

이번 기사는 비대칭 전쟁의 경제적 영향과 전략적 교훈을 분석한 것입니다. 투자자들은 군사력과 경제력 간의 상호작용을 이해함으로써, 지정학적 리스크를 평가하는 데 도움이 될 수 있습니다. 특히 에너지 시장의 변동성과 군사 지출의 증가가 글로벌 경제에 미치는 영향을 고려해야 합니다. 앞으로도 비대칭 전쟁의 경제적 영향과 전략적 교훈에 대한 분석이 지속적으로 필요할 것입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.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?oc=5

United States versus Iran, the war of unequal forces that neither side could win - EL PAÍS English

A simple example of asymmetric warfare: an Iranian drone flies to strike gas facilities in Qatar. The cost of the projectile, depending on the model and year, ranges between about $18,000 and $46,000. A U.S.-made Patriot air-defense interceptor is then launched to destroy it. Each missile of this type costs around $3.5 million. Moreover, to ensure a hit, two interceptors are usually fired. The cost‑benefit ratio of the interception can reach as much as 1 to 10 in favor of the unmanned attacking aircraft. In other words, it is more expensive to shoot down a drone (using kinetic means rather than electronic warfare) than to launch it. This example partly explains what has happened in the war between the United States — alongside Israel — and Iran.

It is a conflict between unequal forces in which the weaker side, the Iranian regime, has managed to stay in the fight through a mix of military capabilities refined over decades, combining both high- and low-cost systems, and a strategy of horizontal escalation (extending the conflict beyond the battlefield — in this case, into the international energy sector through control of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz) that has upended the coffers of the U.S. Department of Defense and the global economy.

The drone example in Qatar may describe a thwarted attack, but a great deal of ordnance reached its targets during the 39 days of fighting and in the more recent breaches of the ceasefire reached on April 8. Evidence of this is that Iranian bombardment disrupted 17% of Qatar’s liquefied natural gas shipments — around $16.2 billion in revenue.

“Iran was facing a titanic challenge against a much larger and more advanced military,” Steven Feldstein, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, explained in an email exchange. “It quickly realized that fighting on the terms of the United States or Israel would lead to a catastrophic defeat.”

Tehran then activated a decentralized military decision‑making strategy, designed some 20 years ago by General Mohammad Jafari , to compensate for the loss of senior commanders and carry out a multi‑pronged offensive: precision ballistic missiles, low‑cost attack drones, and terror tactics in Gulf waters conducted by the naval arm of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. It is effectively a playbook for confronting the world’s leading military power — one that other conflicts may look to as a model.

Iran’s armed forces have put significant strain on the offensive and defensive capabilities deployed by the United States in the region. It marked the first time that U.S. air‑defense systems stationed in allied Gulf countries came under swarm attacks — that is, coordinated offensives combining unmanned explosive drones and missiles, whether ballistic or cruise, aimed at overwhelming the protective shields of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.

According to estimates by Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the United States used between 3,710 (at the low end) and 4,510 units of seven of the most valuable missiles in its arsenal — alongside munitions such as LUCAS drones and guided bombs. For four of these missile types, the Pentagon is believed to have depleted half its stockpile (including Patriot and THAAD interceptors, highly valued by partners such as Ukraine).

Cancian and Park estimate that replenishing missile inventories to prewar levels could take between one and four years. The resulting strain within the Pentagon had been building from the very first weeks of operations, the most demanding phase for U.S. defense systems deployed in the Gulf. For this reason, the Donald Trump administration, which is pushing for a 40% increase in military spending — up to about $1.4 trillion — has urged U.S. arms manufacturers to produce faster and at lower cost.

Asymmetric warfare is not new. As Feldstein notes, military history offers several examples: Ukraine’s counteroffensive after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022; phases of the Israeli‑Palestinian conflict; the wars in Afghanistan against both the Soviet and U.S. armies; and the strategy adopted by Algeria’s National Liberation Front in its struggle against France in the 1950s. The difference now is the context. The current confrontation in the Middle East is unfolding amid a boom in low-cost lethal weaponry — led by drones — and within a highly interconnected global economy that is therefore more vulnerable. All this makes the horizontal escalation pursued by Mojtaba Khamenei’s regime and the Revolutionary Guard even more damaging for their adversary.

The U.S. deployment has been massive — the largest since the invasion of Iraq more than two decades ago. Washington sent close to 40% of its operational ships to the Middle East, a force that, with elite troops and amphibious assault vessels, would have been sufficient to put boots on Iranian soil. But that was not the plan.

“[U.S. President Donald] Trump never convinced his supporters, let alone the country, of the need for war, which made the risk of a ground invasion that could stall and lead to significant U.S. casualties politically unacceptable,” said Feldstein.

And without setting foot on enemy territory, it is difficult to secure military gains and declare a clear-cut victory.

This led to a war of attrition. The United States says it struck 13,000 targets with its missiles, drones and guided bombs. Iran, for its part, launched around 1,300 missiles and 4,400 attack drones against Israel, neighboring countries and vessels in Gulf waters. Needless to say, the smaller contender has suffered the greatest losses on the battlefield. Tehran estimates the offensive caused at least $248 billion in losses — 57% of its GDP. The U.S. Central Command in the region has repeatedly claimed it has destroyed a large part of Iran’s missile apparatus, a cornerstone of the country’s defense. The damage has been significant, but there is no evidence that it was decisive.

In early May, The New York Times reported, citing U.S. intelligence sources, that the regime has restored operational access to 30 of the 33 missile bases it maintains along the Strait of Hormuz, as well as 90% of its underground storage and launch facilities. As Matthew Savill of the Royal United Services Institute noted in a brief analysis on Thursday, the peace memorandum reached between Washington and Tehran makes no mention whatsoever of Iran’s ballistic missile program — one of the key war aims for the United States and Israel. It remains, and will continue to be, non-negotiable for the Iranian regime.

Part of the military might Iran has demonstrated stems from the lack of information about its arsenals, launch sites, and production facilities — very different from the enemy’s easily identifiable targets, whether U.S. bases or energy facilities in neighboring countries. Military experts have also questioned the extent of U.S. successes. While U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has released videos of strikes on launchers, weapons factories and military positions, it remains unclear whether each recorded strike fully destroyed the enemy’s capabilities. Without boots on the ground, the assessment is open to speculation.

Iran’s defense forces are estimated to have taken a heavy hit to their inventories, in addition to the loss of at least a dozen senior military commanders. The regime, however, is believed to still hold a stockpile of between 2,500 and 4,400 missiles — enough to sustain its strike capability. A different matter is the element gaining prominence in modern conflict: drones. Iran’s production operates on a large scale—still capable of supplying its Russian ally — and before this war it had around 80,000 of these attack systems in storage.

Despite everything, and on paper, the United States — the world’s leading military power — had the capacity to sustain its operations in the region, including a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, for which it had deployed some 15,000 personnel. But Iran hit the psychological panic button through horizontal escalation on two fronts.

First, the threat of attacks in Gulf waters. As Mike Plunkett, an analyst at the intelligence firm Janes, recently noted, finding a single mine has the same effect as finding many. Maritime traffic was effectively paralyzed by the risk of striking one of these devices — Iran’s stockpiles include between 5,000 and 6,000 naval mines — or being hit by an Iranian drone.

Second, Tehran pushed the limits of the rules of war — largely shaped in the aftermath of World War II — by targeting civilian infrastructure such as energy facilities, airports and even desalination plants. It struck effectively, spreading fear among U.S. allies in the region, who felt exposed.

Feldstein sums up the result of this dual strategy of horizontal escalation succinctly: “Iran vigorously and successfully exploited the psychological cost of the war. The strategy was effective; it established a narrative among U.S. and global audiences that the United States was not achieving its objectives and opened a path for Iran to wait out the United States and settle for a better deal rather than concede in the first weeks and give up significant concessions.” That is what happened.

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