핵심요약

• 2015년 9월 30일, 러시아 전투기가 홈스 상공에서 전투 비행을 수행하며 중동에서 냉전 이후 첫 전투 비행을 시작했습니다.
• 네타냐후 총리는 러시아와의 협의를 위해 모스크바를 방문하여 시리아 상공에서의 충돌 방지 메커니즘 구축을 논의했습니다.
• 이 메커니즘은 양국의 상이한 이해관계(러시아의 아사드 유지, 이스라엘의 이란/헤즈볼라 견제)를 존중하여 약 10년간 충돌을 예방했습니다.
• 협력의 핵심 원칙은 '각자의 영역 내에서 행동하며 충돌하지 않는다'는 상호 이해에 기반했습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이스라엘과 러시아가 시리아라는 지정학적 환경에서 어떻게 상호 이해관계를 바탕으로 갈등을 관리하고 협력하는지에 대한 외교적 사례를 제시합니다. 이는 단순한 군사적 충돌 방지를 넘어, 복잡한 지역 내에서 강대국들이 어떻게 비공식적인 채널을 통해 전략적 안정성을 확보하는지에 대한 중요한 시사점을 제공합니다. 투자자 관점에서 볼 때, 이러한 양자 간의 전략적 공조는 지역 분쟁의 변동성을 줄이고 장기적인 안정성을 확보하는 데 기여하므로, 지정학적 리스크가 높은 지역의 자산 및 에너지 시장에 미치는 영향을 분석하는 데 필수적입니다.

본문 1: 전략적 공조의 메커니즘과 작동 원리

이스라엘과 러시아가 시리아 상공에서의 군사적 충돌을 피할 수 있었던 핵심은 양국이 상호 간의 전략적 이해관계를 명확히 인식했기 때문입니다. 러시아는 시리아 내 영향력 유지를 위해 아사드 정권을 보존하고자 했으며, 이스라엘은 이란과 헤즈볼라의 확산을 저지하여 자국의 안보를 확보하고자 했습니다. 이러한 상호 이해는 러시아가 아사드의 통치를 보존하는 데 이스라엘이 개입하지 않고, 이스라엘이 이란 및 헤즈볼라에 대해 행동할 때 러시아가 이를 제약하지 않는다는 비공식적 합의를 형성했습니다. 즉, 양측은 '각자의 영역 내에서 행동하며 충돌하지 않는다'는 원칙 아래, 상호 간의 행동 반경을 존중함으로써 긴장 상태를 관리했습니다. 이처럼 비공식적인 '비충돌 메커니즘'은 공식적인 외교 채널이 경직될 때에도 실질적인 군사적 충돌을 회피하는 효과적인 수단이 되었습니다.

본문 2: 외교적 유연성과 장기적 안정성 확보

이러한 협력은 일회성 합의가 아닌, 장기적인 외교적 유연성을 바탕으로 구축되었습니다. 양국은 직접적인 군사적 대결보다는 상호 간의 전략적 목표를 우선시함으로써, 잠재적인 충돌 위험을 최소화하고 장기적인 지역 안정성을 확보하는 데 주력했습니다. 이는 강대국들이 지역 분쟁에 개입할 때 발생하는 예측 불가능한 위험을 관리하는 데 있어, 직접적인 군사적 대결보다 전략적 소통 채널을 활용하는 것이 더 효과적임을 입증합니다. 외교적 채널을 통해 이해관계를 조율하는 방식은 군사적 긴장이 고조될 때 발생할 수 있는 재앙적인 결과를 예방하는 데 중요한 역할을 하며, 이는 국제 관계에서 상호 의존성을 기반으로 한 안정적인 질서를 구축하는 데 기여합니다.

본문 3: 미래 지정학적 리스크와 전망

시리아 내전의 결과로 아사드 정권이 2024년 12월에 교체된 사건은 이러한 비공식적 협력 메커니즘이 현실 정치의 변화에 따라 어떻게 작동하는지를 보여주는 중요한 사례입니다. 이는 외교적 합의가 정치적 현실의 변화에 취약할 수 있음을 시사합니다. 앞으로 중동 지역에서 지정학적 긴장이 고조될 경우, 이러한 비공식적 채널을 통한 상호 이해 기반의 관리 메커니즘의 지속 가능성과 신뢰성이 더욱 중요해질 것입니다. 특히, 러시아와 서방 세력 간의 이해관계가 복잡하게 얽혀 있는 상황에서, 이러한 협력의 틀이 어떻게 재정립되고 유지될지에 대한 지속적인 관찰이 필요합니다. 이는 향후 중동 지역의 안보 환경과 에너지 흐름에 직접적인 영향을 미칠 전망입니다.

결론

이스라엘과 러시아의 사례는 복잡한 지정학적 환경에서 직접적인 군사적 대결을 회피하고 상호 이해를 기반으로 한 전략적 공조를 통해 안정성을 확보할 수 있음을 보여줍니다. 향후 중동 지역의 안보 환경은 여전히 높은 변동성을 내포하고 있으므로, 이러한 비공식적 협력 채널의 지속성과 신뢰성을 면밀히 주시해야 합니다. 지역의 안정은 강대국 간의 전략적 소통과 상호 존중이라는 외교적 원칙에 얼마나 잘 기반하고 있는지에 달려 있다고 판단됩니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 변수를 고려하여 지역별 리스크 프리미엄을 평가할 필요가 있습니다.

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Benjamin Netanyahu looks to Russia playbook to handle Turkey amid Syria tensions - The Jerusalem Post

Israel awoke to a fundamentally changed Middle Eastern reality on September 30, 2015: Russian fighter planes streaked through the skies over Homs, carrying out Moscow's first combat sorties in the Middle East since the end of the Cold War.President Vladimir Putin had arrived to save Russia's key Middle Eastern ally, Syria's then-president Bashar al-Assad.Nine days earlier, on September 21, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – who had good intelligence about Russia's plans – flew to Moscow on a lightning visit. He was accompanied not by the press but by then-IDF chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot and then-head of the Military Intelligence Directorate Herzi Halevi – unusual for a foreign trip.There, Netanyahu and Putin discussed establishing a deconfliction mechanism to prevent Israeli and Russian pilots accidentally confronting each other over Syrian skies. By 2015, Jerusalem had already approved scores of attacks against Hezbollah and Iran's efforts to build a launchpad against Israel.The mechanism worked for nearly a decade, until Assad was overthrown in December 2024 by the forces led by the current president, Ahmed al-Sharaa.How Israel and Russia avoided a Syria confrontation for yearsIt worked largely because Israel and Russia reached an informal understanding: Each had interests in Syria. Israel would not interfere with Russia's, and Russia would allow Israel to protect its own.Those interests were clear. Russia wanted to preserve its regional foothold by keeping Assad in power; Israel wanted to prevent Iran and Hezbollah from entrenching themselves in Syria. Moscow would not interfere with Israel's actions as long as they did not threaten Assad's rule, and Israel would not target his regime as long as Jerusalem retained freedom of action against Iran and Hezbollah.Put another way, the understanding was: “You take care of your business, I'll take care of mine, and we need not clash as long as we remain within our respective spheres.”And it worked. Israel carried out hundreds of attacks in Syria as part of its Campaign Between the Wars without directly confronting or seriously harming Russia's extensive military presence there.Why does this history matter today, in August 2026?Because on Tuesday, Israel attacked the runway and storage facilities at the Abu al-Duhur air base in the Idlib province, some 60 kilometers from the Turkish border. Israel believed the base was being prepared for Turkish forces, according to foreign media reports, and a military delegation from Turkey had visited the site just hours before the attack.Why Israel targeted a Syrian air base linked to TurkeyNetanyahu discussed the reason for the strike in a clip released on Wednesday. “We will not tolerate a Turkish military buildup extending southward. We conveyed that in every possible way.”“Now we saw that Turkey intended to establish itself at an air base farther south, close to Aleppo, and we sent a message,” he continued. “How shall I put that message? 'Don't.'”The prime minister said that although the original message had been received, “apparently it wasn't heard,” so Israel acted to ensure that the Turks “understood it better.”“We will not tolerate a Turkish military buildup extending southward,” he reiterated.Considering Turkey's implacable hostility toward Israel in both words and deeds, Netanyahu's position is understandable. Turkey hosts Hamas and spearheads diplomatic moves against Israel, while President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has spent years spewing virulently anti-Israel rhetoric.In June, Turkish Interior Minister Mustafa Ciftci said that just as Damascus, Aleppo, and Nagorno-Karabakh had been “liberated,” Jerusalem would also be liberated one day. Ciftci added that he had prayed to become Jerusalem's governor and predicted that lands once ruled by the Ottoman Empire would return to Turkish rule.Turkey also recently signed a mutual-defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan – two major Sunni powers, one of them nuclear-armed. A country whose leaders speak that way and whose regional ambitions are expanding is not one Israel wants building up militarily anywhere near its borders.But there is more to it than that, because the air base attacked on Tuesday is not near Israel's border. It is, however, reportedly near a route Israeli aircraft could use to fly to Iran. Israel does not want hostile radar and air defense systems compromising its air superiority and freedom of action.On Tuesday, the Prime Minister's Office posted on X/Twitter that Israel and Syria had agreed to a security status quo that Damascus was on the verge of breaching by permitting Turkish troops to deploy at Abu al-Duhur. Israel warned Syria that such a deployment would pose a threat, the post said, but Syria ignored those warnings.Israel, it continued, “will not tolerate threats to its security and would welcome a return to the status quo.”Syria and Turkey dispute Israel's account. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani said there were no plans for a Turkish base or permanent Turkish troop presence at Abu al-Duhur, and that Turkish officers had visited the site only as part of military training and cooperation.But the Israeli statement nevertheless revealed that some kind of modus vivendi had been established between Jerusalem and Damascus regarding what would and would not be tolerated. In Israel's view, moving Turkish troops – and possibly sophisticated radar and air defense systems – into the Abu al-Duhur air base violated those understandings.The attack, therefore, carried two messages: one to Syria, warning it to respect the previous understandings; and one to Turkey, making clear that Israel has redlines.It also triggered a response from US Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack, who is also Washington's special envoy for Syria and Iraq. Barrack initially called the strike “an unnecessary escalation that does not advance regional stability.”The next day, in an interview with The Jerusalem Post, he stressed the need to establish a deconfliction mechanism – and quickly.“Turkish forces were not aware that the Israeli aircraft were en route to that specific Syrian base, nor of their intended purpose, and therefore could potentially have been inclined to scramble their own jets in the belief that they themselves were under attack,” he said.Barrack said there was no “inherent obstacle” preventing Syria, Israel, and Turkey from maintaining open lines of communication. “Diplomatic discourse is the best prevention to kinetic interactions,” he said in diplomatese.In plain English: Talk to one another through a hotline, not through fighter jets, whereby messages can be misunderstood, leading to potentially tragic consequences.Can the deconfliction model with Russia work with Turkey?But can the kind of deconfliction mechanism Netanyahu established with Putin be replicated with Erdogan's Turkey?On paper, the logic holds. Both sides have a compelling interest in avoiding an accidental war. But there are enormous differences between Putin's Russia in 2015 and Erdogan's Turkey in 2026.Putin did not enter Syria to harm Israel. He came to preserve Russian interests: Saving Assad, maintaining Moscow's Mediterranean foothold, demonstrating Russia's global standing, and preventing Islamist forces from taking control of Syria and potentially feeding jihadist threats in Russia's own North Caucasus region.Erdogan's immediate interest in entrenching Turkey in Syria may likewise not be to attack Israel. He wants to secure Turkey's southern border, curb Kurdish power, shape the new Syrian state, expand Ankara's regional influence, and make billions rebuilding the country's infrastructure.But unlike Putin, Erdogan has ideological and historical ambitions that place Turkey on a collision course with Israel.When a senior minister speaks of “liberating” Jerusalem and becoming its governor – after nearly two decades of Erdogan's poisonous rhetoric against Israel – the difference between Russia's attitude toward Israel and Turkey's becomes clear.Putin operated in Syria with the cold calculation of a global strategist. He had no big ideological stake in the Arab-Israeli conflict — his Russia was not the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev. Moscow viewed the Levant as a chessboard on which pieces could be moved to secure Mediterranean ports, preserve an allied regime, and poke a finger in Washington's eye.When Israeli jets entered Syrian airspace, Putin viewed it pragmatically: As long as Russian assets were not hit and Assad was not endangered, Israel's war against Iranian proxies was none of his business.Erdogan's Turkey poses a different challenge than Putin's RussiaErdogan's Turkey is different. Ankara views Syria as its immediate backyard, and Erdogan's worldview is shaped by Muslim Brotherhood sympathies and Neo-Ottoman ambitions inherently hostile to Israel.While Putin was content to preserve Russia's coastal enclave around Tartus and Latakia and keep Assad in power, Erdogan views himself as the principal patron and protector of al-Sharaa's new Syrian state. He has also made no secret of his desire to project Turkish and Sunni power across the region, with the new defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan the latest expression of Ankara's growing strategic reach.For Erdogan, quietly signing a live-and-let-live airspace agreement with Jerusalem cuts against his ideology and the image he has cultivated as Israel's strident and uncompromising opponent.Yet despite the toxic rhetoric, the danger of an accidental war means that both sides may have little choice but to establish a deconfliction mechanism.And this time there is another actor involved that was less central when Israel and Russia made their arrangement work in 2015: Washington.Washington steps in to prevent an Israel-Turkey Syria escalationIsrael and Turkey, a NATO member, are both close US allies, and Washington is already working to prevent a catastrophic miscalculation between two major military powers. Israeli and Turkish defense officials began technical talks in Azerbaijan in April 2025 aimed at preventing clashes in Syria. Following the Abu al-Duhur strike, Barrack said the US was working to create a broader mechanism involving Israel, Turkey, and Syria.Any arrangement that will emerge will undoubtedly look less like the quiet, permissive green light Israel enjoyed with Russia and more like a tense, highly conditional division of the Syrian arena, brokered and monitored by Washington.Israel's core demand is clear: Turkey may help rebuild Syria, but advanced Turkish radar and air defense systems cannot be allowed to creep southward and threaten the Israel Air Force's freedom of action or strategic routes toward Iran.Turkey and Syria, for their part, will demand that Israel respect Syrian sovereignty, reduce its attacks, and give the new government room to stabilize the country.That is a much more difficult bargain than the one Netanyahu struck with Putin.In September 2015, Israel demonstrated the diplomatic agility needed to share Syrian skies with Russia. But sharing airspace with a distant global power pursuing cold strategic interests is vastly different from sharing it with a hostile, ideologically driven regional power with far-reaching ambitions.Left to their own devices, and considering the bad blood between Ankara and Jerusalem, it is doubtful that Israel and Turkey could reproduce the Israeli-Russian model.But they will not be left to their own devices. Washington has every reason to step in aggressively to ensure that this increasingly tense rivalry does not spiral out of control.

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