핵심요약

• 이스라엘의 계획은 이란 쿠르드 세력을 무장 세력으로 활용하는 데 중점을 두었으나 실행 전에 실패했습니다.
• 이 전략의 실패 원인은 이란의 정치 체제와 쿠르드 반군이 가진 전국적인 사회적 기반의 차이를 간과한 데 있습니다.
• 시리아의 성공적인 정권 교체 사례를 이란에 적용하려는 시도는 비대칭적 무장 세력의 동원 능력에 대한 오판을 반영합니다.
• 이란 쿠르드 무장 세력은 광범위한 대중 봉기와 비교하여 전국적인 사회적 기반이 부족하다는 점이 핵심적인 한계로 작용했습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이스라엘이 이란 쿠르드 반군을 활용하여 이란 정권 교체를 목표로 했던 전략이 왜 전쟁 시작 전에 무산되었는지 분석합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 전략의 실패가 향후 중동 지역의 비대칭적 갈등 양상과 무장 세력의 동원 능력에 미치는 영향을 이해해야 합니다. 이는 단순히 군사적 승패를 넘어, 정치적 목표 달성을 위한 대중적 지지와 내부 구조에 대한 심층적인 이해가 필수적임을 시사합니다.

본문 1: 전략적 오판과 기반의 차이

이스라엘은 이란의 정권 교체를 주 목표로 설정하고 쿠르드 세력을 전략적 구성 요소로 간주했습니다. 이들은 이란 쿠르드 반군이 이란 내에서 대중 봉기를 촉진하고 시위대에 지원할 수 있는 동력으로 작용할 것이라고 계산했습니다. 이러한 전략은 이스라엘이 이라크, 이란, 시리아에서 쿠르드 집단들과 수십 년간 구축해 온 정보 관계를 바탕으로 했습니다. 그러나 이 전략은 시리아에서 발생한 바샤르 알-아사드 정권의 급속한 전복 사례에서 얻은 자신감을 이란에 그대로 적용하려는 오판에서 비롯되었습니다. 시리아에서는 조직적인 무장 반대 세력이 2주도 안 되어 정권을 무너뜨리는 데 성공했지만, 이란 내 쿠르드 무장 세력은 광범위한 대중 봉기와 비교했을 때 전국적인 사회적 기반이 부족하다는 결정적인 차이가 존재합니다. 이 차이를 간과한 것이 계획이 실행 전에 좌절된 주요 원인으로 분석됩니다.

본문 2: 비대칭적 갈등의 본질

이란 쿠르드 무장 세력과 시리아 반군 운동 사이에는 근본적인 동원력의 차이가 존재합니다. 시리아의 반군 운동은 광범위한 대중 봉기의 맥락에서 움직였던 반면, 이란 쿠르드 무장 세력은 특정 민족 소수 집단의 구성원으로 이루어져 있어 전국적인 사회적 기반을 확보하지 못했습니다. 따라서 이스라엘이 기대했던 것과 같이 쿠르드 세력이 이란 내에서 대규모로 봉기 세력을 조직하고 주도하는 것은 현실적으로 불가능했습니다. 이는 무장 세력의 성공 여부가 대중적 지지나 광범위한 민족적 연대와 같은 사회적 동인에 크게 의존한다는 점을 보여줍니다. 즉, 군사적 역량뿐만 아니라 정치적 정당성과 대중적 지지라는 비대칭적 요소를 고려하지 않은 전략적 오류가 발생했습니다.

본문 3: 지정학적 리스크와 장기 전망

이러한 사례는 지정학적 갈등 상황에서 무장 세력의 동원 능력을 평가할 때 사회적 기반과 정치적 정당성을 핵심 변수로 삼아야 함을 강조합니다. 향후 중동 지역의 분쟁에서 무장 세력의 영향력을 예측하기 위해서는 단순히 군사적 규모뿐만 아니라, 해당 세력이 얼마나 광범위한 대중적 지지를 확보하고 있는지에 대한 분석이 필수적입니다. 이란과 같은 복잡한 정치 체제 내에서 내부 분열과 민족적 정체성이 어떻게 무장 투쟁의 동력으로 작용하는지를 이해하는 것이 장기적인 지정학적 위험을 평가하는 데 중요합니다. 따라서 미래의 전략적 접근은 대중적 지지 기반을 확보하는 데 초점을 맞추어야 할 것입니다.

결론

결론적으로, 이스라엘의 전략은 무장 세력의 잠재력에 대한 낙관적인 가정에 기반하여 실행되었으나, 이란 내부의 복잡한 사회적, 정치적 현실을 충분히 반영하지 못했습니다. 향후 유사한 지정학적 상황에서 무장 세력의 효과를 예측하기 위해서는 군사적 동원 능력뿐만 아니라, 해당 집단의 사회적 기반과 대중적 지지 수준을 면밀히 분석하는 다각적인 접근이 필요합니다. 이러한 비대칭적 요소를 고려하는 것이 미래의 전략적 예측에 중요한 관점입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiswFBVV95cUxOUnZ0dS1WX0VHOHoxdDNnenI3NDJqU0s0UmV2RXRtMUJidTk0U3RCZ1ZtUC1WOXRwb2dtX0UxT2hZVXpaY1hybDVGRHI5cE9zZXp5RExLT1lFOFh3NFBfOTJ4Mm9GY2I0UEgyNWVCNURYQS1nUWowRW1IdTZwS1R3eTJSaElZdVhlMFJVV0xoZktTa3A3YUFPQVRyV3d1ZHdFWUNzbTNjMkhDLUZZamxRTldrZw?oc=5

Why Did the Plan to Bring Iran’s Kurds into the War Collapse Before It Even Began? - Al Jazeera Centre for Studies

Israel’s plan to use Iranian Kurdish opposition groups as an armed force in the war against Iran failed before it could be implemented, largely because of serious miscalculations about Iran’s political system, Kurdish opposition groups, and the level of popular support for regime change. From the outset of the war, regime change appeared to be the principal Israeli and American objective, while other aims, including the complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear programme, were viewed as secondary and expected to follow from the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. The participation of Iranian Kurdish forces was therefore considered an important component of the strategy.

Israel had spent decades developing intelligence relationships with Kurdish groups in Iraq, Iran and Syria. Although the precise timing and intermediaries involved in establishing regular contacts with Iranian Kurdish opposition groups remain unclear, Iranian Kurdish militants appear to have long figured in Israeli calculations against the Islamic Republic. Serious consideration of regime change reportedly returned to the Israeli leadership’s agenda in the summer of 2024. At that stage, the emerging concept appears to have involved Israeli-linked Iranian agents encouraging a popular uprising, followed by Kurdish armed groups crossing into Iran to support the protesters and advance toward Tehran.

The rapid overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria in December 2024 may have reinforced Israeli confidence in this approach. The success of an organised armed opposition in defeating a deeply rooted government in less than two weeks seemingly encouraged the belief that a comparable strategy could work in Iran. This assumption, however, overlooked major differences between the two countries. The Syrian opposition operated in the context of a broad popular uprising, whereas Iranian Kurdish armed groups represented only a portion of an ethnic minority and lacked a comparable nationwide social base.

Israeli efforts to prepare Iranian Kurdish groups intensified during 2025. Israeli officials reportedly visited militant camps in Iraqi Kurdistan and supplied weapons, while connections with Iranian opposition figures, merchants and businessmen were strengthened. These efforts appear to have been linked to the expectation that a new wave of popular protests would create an opening for armed intervention. Economic protests that began on 28 December 2025, did expand and were joined by armed elements that attacked government institutions and security forces. However, their involvement gave the Iranian authorities grounds to respond forcefully. Beginning on 8 January 2026, the government suppressed the protests; and within two days, the movement had been completely extinguished, with several hundred people reportedly killed.

The failure of the uprising prompted a major revision of the Kurdish strategy. Rather than waiting for a domestic rebellion to create the conditions for an armed advance, Israel envisaged using an Israeli-American war to weaken the Iranian state first. The expectation was that attacks would eliminate senior leaders, disrupt command-and-control structures, and weaken security and military institutions, particularly in Iran’s Kurdish-majority western provinces. This would supposedly allow Kurdish armed groups to cross the border and establish a secure route toward Tehran.

Netanyahu’s meeting with Donald Trump in Washington on 11 February 2026, appears to have been important in securing American support for this concept. Although subsequent American reports denied that Washington had given prior approval for Kurdish participation, Trump continued to refer to a Kurdish role during the first week of the war and mentioned weapons being supplied to Kurdish groups. He did not explicitly reject their participation until 7 March 2026, the eighth day of the war.

A central weakness of the strategy was the fragmented nature of the Iranian Kurdish opposition. Israel reportedly believed that Kurdish groups could mobilise around 15000 fighters and attract additional recruits as they advanced into Iran. Israeli planners recognised that the groups were divided but apparently assumed that a new coalition could overcome their rivalries. On 22 February 2026, five Kurdish political and armed organisations announced the formation of the Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan coalition following negotiations involving seven groups. The coalition consisted of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), the Kurdistan Struggle Organisation (KHABAT), and Komala of the Toilers of Kurdistan. Yet none possessed significant influence throughout the Kurdish provinces, and several had only limited political or military capabilities. Their activities were largely confined to particular regions, while ideological and organisational divisions remained significant.

The Kurdish option was still being considered in Washington shortly before its abandonment. On 3 March 2026, Trump spoke by telephone with PDKI leader Mustafa Hijri, while Israeli media reported that tens of thousands of Kurdish fighters were gathered on the Iraqi side of the border. At the same time, Iranian Kurdish-majority provinces were subjected to intensive airstrikes against security, police, Basij and intelligence facilities, apparently in preparation for a possible armed incursion.

The strategy nevertheless collapsed before the Kurdish forces entered Iran. Israeli sources close to Netanyahu attributed the reversal partly to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who they claimed had persuaded Trump, during a conversation between the two in the first days of the war, that Kurdish participation was both dangerous and futile. However, because neither Erdoğan nor Trump disclosed the contents of their conversation, the accuracy of this account is difficult to verify.

Ankara understood that an external Kurdish invasion was unlikely to succeed and could instead produce a massacre of Iranian Kurds, particularly Sunni Kurds, while plunging Iran into prolonged armed instability. Turkey may also have sought to influence Iranian Kurdish groups, especially the PDKI, to distance themselves from the Israeli plan. Abdullah Öcalan reportedly warned the Iranian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party against becoming an instrument of outside powers.

More decisive, however, was the assessment conducted by American officials after the war began. According to reports, US officials visited Kurdish groups in northern Iraq and met their leaders directly. They concluded that claims of tens of thousands of armed Kurdish fighters were greatly exaggerated and found no evidence that Kurdish forces would receive broad popular support in Iran’s Kurdish-majority provinces. They also determined that Iranian military and security forces were prepared for an external invasion.

The failure of the strategy reflected a broader pattern of Israeli overconfidence and misjudgement. Israel underestimated the complexity of Iran’s political structure, the distribution of power among its numerous governing and security institutions, and the resilience of its military and security apparatus. It also failed to distinguish between popular dissatisfaction with government policies and an actual desire to overthrow the Islamic Republic or divide Iran. Even reports of contacts with figures around former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would indicate little more than connections with peripheral actors within a highly complex political system.

The Kurdish component was based on equally questionable assumptions. Most of the groups prepared to cooperate with Israel were small and lacked substantial political or military weight, while their actual popular support among Iranian Kurds was uncertain. Crucially, at least 35 percent of Iranian Kurds are Shiite, many of whom are integrated into state institutions, and several prominent figures within the Iranian establishment have Kurdish Shiite backgrounds. Consequently, there was no basis for assuming that Iran’s Kurdish population as a whole would welcome an armed invasion.

The collapse of the regime-change strategy and the Kurdish intervention plan therefore demonstrated the depth of the gap between Israeli perceptions and the realities of Iran and its surrounding region. The failure was not simply a consequence of the strength of the Iranian state or the weaknesses of Kurdish organisations. It exposed a broader inability within Israeli strategic thinking to understand the political, social, and historical complexities of the Arab and Muslim societies in its regional environment.

*This is a summary of a policy brief originally written in Arabic available here .

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMiswFBVV95cUxOUnZ0dS1WX0VHOHoxdDNnenI3NDJqU0s0UmV2RXRtMUJidTk0U3RCZ1ZtUC1WOXRwb2dtX0UxT2hZVXpaY1hybDVGRHI5cE9zZXp5RExLT1lFOFh3NFBfOTJ4Mm9GY2I0UEgyNWVCNURYQS1nUWowRW1IdTZwS1R3eTJSaElZdVhlMFJVV0xoZktTa3A3YUFPQVRyV3d1ZHdFWUNzbTNjMkhDLUZZamxRTldrZw?oc=5