핵심요약

• 이란은 경제적으로 붕괴된 2등 국가임에도 불구하고, 미국과 주요 군사 분쟁에서 균형을 이뤘습니다.
• 이 분쟁은 약 7개월 동안 지속되었는데, 미국은 이를 견딜 수 없었습니다.
• 미국은 고위험적이고 장기적인 작전을 감당하지 못했습니다.
• 이는 베트남, 이라크, 아프가니스탄과 같은 과거 분쟁과 유사하며, 미국은 군사적으로 열세인 적국에게 자신의 의지를 강요하는 데 실패했습니다.

도입

이 기사는 투자자들에게 중동 지역의 지정학적 리스크가 미국과 같은 강대국에게도 큰 영향을 미칠 수 있음을 보여줍니다. 특히, 군사적으로 우세한 국가가 장기적인 분쟁에서 승패를 가리지 못하는 사례는 투자 시 고려해야 할 중요한 요인입니다.

본문 1: 미국, 장기 분쟁에 대한 불내성

기사에서 언급된 바와 같이, 미국은 이란과의 분쟁이 약 7개월 동안 지속되자 이를 견딜 수 없었습니다. 이는 미국이 고위험적이고 장기적인 작전을 감당하지 못하는 점을 보여줍니다. 이는 투자자들에게 미국이 중동 지역에서의 군사적 개입이 장기적으로 지속될 가능성을 고려해야 함을 시사합니다. 특히, 에너지 가격에 미치는 영향이 주목할 만합니다.

본문 2: 중동 지역의 지정학적 리스크

이란과의 분쟁에서 미국이 승패를 가리지 못한 것은 중동 지역의 지정학적 리스크가 얼마나 큰지 보여줍니다. 이는 투자자들에게 중동 지역에 대한 투자 시 지정학적 리스크를 고려해야 함을 상기시킵니다. 특히, 에너지 시장에 미치는 영향이 크기 때문에, 에너지 주식에 대한 투자 결정 시 이 점을 고려해야 합니다.

결론

이 기사는 미국이 중동 지역의 지정학적 리스크에 대해 얼마나 취약한지 보여줍니다. 이는 투자자들에게 중동 지역에 대한 투자 시 지정학적 리스크를 고려해야 함을 시사합니다. 향후 중동 지역의 지정학적 상황 변화에 주목해야 합니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMizwFBVV95cUxNbHgyOGZ6TmdjU1BKVVUxN25fTm5LN0ZQUF9odm1NbWQ3WVdTYlBKNHVIZHBDNlR0NHhhTzJGUVlZcTZCMUhsX1FabTF5eU9OLTJQWHZnbHNzdlFCMFhjU1FBZnJhbTE1UWk0a3dnR3QtUWdqQjhQdFZBYnVZdC04UERrUGlvd3VQaDVGWnRuYzlKYmNPQzJpVzRHUHFZUlhPblJMVXhIbU1DNmRiX0d2akp0NUdyTjFTd1YxWF9CcFIzVUljOUtkUm9ZSVRVa1k?oc=5

Why Trump couldn’t bring Iran to heel in Mideast war - Antelope Valley Press

Iran, a second-rate power in a state of economic collapse, just fought the US to a standstill in a major military conflict.

The disappointing outcome has echoes of Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, in that a major world power hasn’t been able to impose its will on a militarily inferior foe.

The problem comes when we run into an enemy that has a high threshold for pain and is determined to outlast us, while we make what we hope will be a time-limited commitment, seek to avoid escalations that carry unpredictable risks and operate from a tenuous base of domestic political support in the United States.

This is why we can utterly dominate our adversaries and still succumb to asymmetric campaigns of attrition; it explains, in short, why in the post-World War II era, we haven’t lost battles, only wars.

It’s extraordinary to think that, in the struggle over control of the Strait of Hormuz, the country that has carrier fleets and advanced fighters effectively lost to the country that has drones and fast boats.

We didn’t lack the capability to reopen the strait; we lacked the stomach for a risky and protracted operation.

The famous Taliban adage was, “You have the watches, but we have the time.” George C. Marshall once said the US couldn’t fight a Seven Years’ War; the outcome of the Iran conflict suggests we can’t even tolerate a seven-month one.

Trump pushed back against impatience about the pace of the war by saying that Vietnam lasted years. True enough, but Trump was almost as eager to see an end to the war as his critics. He originally conceived of it as a four- to six-week operation, and when it dragged on, he could only tolerate high gas prices ahead of the midterm elections for so long.

We tend to believe that our ability to missile, bomb and shell our enemies at levels never before seen in human history guarantees military success.

As Max Boot notes in his book on America’s small wars, “The Savage Wars of Peace,” when queried by a reporter about how the Americans would defeat the Viet Cong, Gen. William Westmoreland responded simply: “Firepower.”

We possessed it in abundance, then as now. Boot writes: “The US side had sensors, ground radar, infrared equipment, defoliants, herbicides, cluster bombs, missiles of various varieties, tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery of various calibers, naval vessels ranging from small patrol boats to giant nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and, of course, all the aircraft — everything from B-52 bombers to UH-1 Huey helicopters to specially fitted C-47 airplanes known as Puff the Magic Dragon equipped with automatic machine guns capable of spitting out 6,000 rounds a minute.”

All told, LBJ’s bombing campaign, Rolling Thunder, unloaded roughly 800 tons of ordnance a day for three and a half years, according to Boot. Throughout the entire war, the US dropped 8 million tons of bombs, far eclipsing what we used in World War II.

Much of this was the equivalent of Joseph Conrad’s gunboat futilely firing into the jungle in “Heart of Darkness.”

The target list in Iran was more discriminating and achieved concrete goals of degrading the regime’s military and industrial capacity. But the idea that simply listing the number of targets hit, or saying we were “ahead of schedule,” proved that we were close to achieving strategic goals — toppling the regime, or getting it to give up its highly enriched uranium, or reopening the Strait of Hormuz — smacked of the empty bean-counting that characterized the US government’s defense of the conduct of the Vietnam War.

Every war depends on a combination of capability and will. In Iran, we demonstrated that our weapons systems and warfighters are world class, but that our staying power and willingness to bear costs are limited. That’s why we’re allowing a cruel and deranged enemy that absorbed untold punishment to win significant benefits at the negotiating table, and live to fight another day.

Rich Lowry is the editor-in-chief of National Review .

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMizwFBVV95cUxNbHgyOGZ6TmdjU1BKVVUxN25fTm5LN0ZQUF9odm1NbWQ3WVdTYlBKNHVIZHBDNlR0NHhhTzJGUVlZcTZCMUhsX1FabTF5eU9OLTJQWHZnbHNzdlFCMFhjU1FBZnJhbTE1UWk0a3dnR3QtUWdqQjhQdFZBYnVZdC04UERrUGlvd3VQaDVGWnRuYzlKYmNPQzJpVzRHUHFZUlhPblJMVXhIbU1DNmRiX0d2akp0NUdyTjFTd1YxWF9CcFIzVUljOUtkUm9ZSVRVa1k?oc=5