핵심요약

• 미국은 이란과의 전쟁에서 명확한 해결책 없이 교착 상태에 있습니다.
• 호르무즈 해협 폐쇄는 글로벌 경제 위기를 야기하며 지정학적 압력의 주요 원인이 됩니다.
• 미국 행정부는 핵 프로그램 포기보다 해협 개방을 최우선 목표로 설정했습니다.
• 미국의 군사적 목표는 핵 협상에서 해협 개방으로 전환되었습니다.

도입

본 기사는 미국과 이란 간의 분쟁이 단순한 핵 협상 차원을 넘어 글로벌 경제와 지정학적 안정에 미치는 영향을 분석하며, 투자자들이 주목해야 할 거시적 위험 요소를 제시합니다. 현재 상황은 군사적 목표와 경제적 현실 사이의 괴리를 보여주며, 이는 향후 국제 에너지 시장과 중동 지역의 안정성에 직접적인 영향을 미칠 것입니다.

본문 1: 지정학적 압력과 경제적 연관성

미국이 이란에 대한 군사적 압박을 통해 원하는 결과를 얻지 못하고 있는 상황에서, 미국 행정부가 전쟁을 종결하기 위해 고려하는 새로운 동력은 군사적 요구에서 경제적 요구로 전환되었습니다. 특히, 호르무즈 해협이 중동 석유 및 정제 제품의 핵심 통로라는 점은 이 지역의 지정학적 중요성을 극대화합니다. 이 해협이 폐쇄될 경우 발생하는 글로벌 원자재 부족과 유가 변동성 증가는 미국에 대한 정치적 압력을 가중시키는 핵심 요인입니다. 따라서 미국은 핵 프로그램 포기라는 기존의 목표 외에, 해협 개방을 통해 글로벌 공급망을 안정화하려는 전략적 목표를 설정한 것입니다. 이는 단순한 군사적 충돌을 넘어, 에너지 안보와 글로벌 무역 흐름이라는 경제적 현실을 전쟁 해결의 중심으로 끌어들인 사례입니다.

본문 2: 전략적 목표의 전환과 리스크

미국이 핵 협상에서 해협 개방으로 목표를 전환한 것은 지정학적 현실에 대한 실질적인 인식 변화를 반영합니다. 이 전환은 미국이 단기적인 군사적 승리보다는 장기적인 경제적 안정과 공급망 확보를 더 중요하게 여기고 있음을 시사합니다. 그러나 이러한 목표 전환은 새로운 리스크를 수반합니다. 이란이 해협에 대한 운영 통제권을 국가적 안보의 핵심으로 간주하고 있다는 점은, 미국이 해협 개방을 강제하려 할 경우 이란의 보복이나 추가적인 불안정성이 발생할 수 있음을 의미합니다. 즉, 해협 개방을 위한 외교적 압박이 군사적 충돌로 비화될 가능성, 그리고 이로 인한 국제 사회의 개입 가능성 등 예측하기 어려운 변동성이 존재합니다. 미국이 추구하는 경제적 목표와 이란의 안보적 요구 사이의 균형점을 찾는 것이 향후 가장 큰 도전 과제가 될 것입니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망과 정책적 시사점

궁극적으로 이 분쟁의 해결은 단기적인 군사적 해결이 아닌, 장기적인 외교 및 경제적 협상에 달려있습니다. 호르무즈 해협의 안정성은 중동 전체의 에너지 안보와 직결되므로, 미국은 이란과의 관계를 재정립하는 동시에 국제 사회의 중재를 활용하는 다각적인 접근이 필요합니다. 향후 미국은 군사적 강압보다는 경제적 인센티브와 국제법적 프레임워크를 활용하여 이란의 협력을 이끌어내는 정책을 구사해야 합니다. 이러한 접근은 단기적인 갈등을 완화하고 장기적인 에너지 공급망의 안정성을 확보하는 데 기여할 수 있을 것입니다. 투자 관점에서 볼 때, 중동 지역의 지정학적 안정성이 확보될수록 에너지 관련 상품의 가격 변동성은 감소하고, 글로벌 공급망의 불확실성이 줄어들어 장기적인 투자 환경이 개선될 전망입니다. 따라서 투자자들은 군사적 대립보다는 외교적 해법에 초점을 맞추어 중동 지역의 정책 변화를 면밀히 관찰할 필요가 있습니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMic0FVX3lxTFBLQVRJbUJ4Y1BKNm5kblNlV2RpT055M2p1eEdLX2QyMFdRREZqT0U1TGYyODV3TTVGXzFQUDR3QmE0T0NkYjI2b0pJMVdMcXVQNk5GVHpuOE5WQ0NhQXJVOVhkT1cyckl3cDlZS2Ficmlib3PSAXhBVV95cUxQU3F6aFFVNWR6SUVLdGJ2MUt2WDRtVkx1ZVdaZWdPQUZoQWh3bFYzSFVRaVVza3RTT2FQc2djT1QzeFVxUEp2Z3J4RnVSSlZNQ1BQVllKb0gzTEVYQ3dzekNfa1BkU2NSRGM1YUFESDR0dF9SRWJVcF8?oc=5

How to end the ‘Hormuz war’ - Al Jazeera

It is now clear the United States is sinking into the quagmire of its war with Iran with no clear idea of how to get out. More than five months of intermittent bombing of Iran have not brought Tehran any closer to surrender. Recurring threats by US President Donald Trump to launch a massive military campaign against the country aren’t causing Iran to submit to US demands..

Meanwhile, diminished stocks of critical US weapons, plummeting approval ratings heading into the midterms and a looming global economic crisis due to increasing commodity shortages stemming from a closed Strait of Hormuz, are all putting political pressure on the US to end the conflict.

Given this situation, what options does President Trump have for ending the war?

When the Trump administration launched the war on Iran in late February, its stated reasons kept changing, but at least part of the rationale involved the threat of Iran’s nuclear programme. In previous negotiations, the US had insisted on no indigenous uranium enrichment for Iran and the surrender of its 440kg of highly enriched uranium. Iran had refused, and Trump ultimately decided to go to war.

After being attacked by the US and Israel, Iran moved swiftly to close the Strait of Hormuz by threatening maritime traffic passing through it. Although this response was expected – indeed, Iran had repeatedly threatened to do so in the build-up to the war – the US administration was caught off-guard and had no effective response.

Given the strait’s importance as a critical chokepoint for Middle East oil and refined products, the subsequent global economic consequences of a closed strait have been building up these last five months.

As such, the US administration’s priority is no longer getting Iran to capitulate on its nuclear programme but getting the strait open as soon as possible.

However, in trying to do that, it faces a problem. On the one hand, Iran has decided operational control of the strait is essential for its national security and a much-needed strategic deterrence to prevent future US-Israeli attacks. On the other, the US military cannot open the passage and keep it open.

Surprisingly, despite having a military budget more than 100 times the size of Iran’s, the US military is unable to prevent Iran from projecting enough military force to pose an enduring threat to maritime traffic through the strait.

Trump has repeatedly threatened apocalyptic carnage on Iran with the goal of inflicting enough pain on Iranian society to force its leaders to agree to US demands. Most recently, he threatened to expand US targets to include Iranian civilian energy installations. At a July 31 cabinet meeting, he told the media, “Well, we’ll be hitting them very hard and, you know, at some point they’re going to say, we just can’t take it anymore”.

A day later. he backed off, probably because he realised “hitting them hard” will not force Iran to submit.

Why? Because Iran’s new hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) leadership believes the US and Israel seek to eliminate the Islamic Republic. It feels any compromise in the face of US pressure only invites more pressure.

As such, US escalation is likely to cause not Iranian surrender but major retaliatory Iranian attacks on Gulf infrastructure. So unless the US is prepared to militarily “collapse” the regime by far more widespread bombing of critical civilian infrastructure than it has done heretofore, making Iran in effect a “failed -state”, future US use of military force won’t do the job.

When contemplating realistic options going forward, the most important fact to consider is that this US administration doesn’t believe in diplomacy with Iran – it never has. It believes in force, whether punitive tariffs and sanctions or punishing bombings. When it talks about “meaningful diplomacy” with Iran, it means “Iran accepting US demands”.

This US unwillingness to engage in serious, sustained diplomacy means that even if the US administration were to come to an agreement with Iran on the strait, it would likely be unable to continue on to a negotiated nuclear agreement that would put effective constraints on its nuclear programme.

The last nuclear negotiations took a total of five years (2010-2015), with two years of serious, intense negotiations (2013-2015). But this US administration is tired of this failed war and has other priorities, and so is likely unwilling to commit to any such process.

Given this US unwillingness and inability to actually engage in diplomacy to “solve the strait”, it should allow the process outlined in Article 5 of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding signed in June to play out: “The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman, to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in discussions with other Persian Gulf Littoral States, in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz”.

These Iran-Oman talks are ongoing and they are the best chance for a least-bad resolution of the problem. In this scenario, all the US administration has to do is provide input to Oman as needed and approve whatever final settlement the two sides reach. Any such agreement will likely include the US lifting of its naval blockade on Iranian ports, since Iran has linked this lifting to any reopening of the strait.

The outcome of these Iran-Oman talks is unknowable. But what is clear is that Oman and the rest of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council are more adept and more motivated to negotiate with Iran than the US. There are significant differences between the two sides: the Gulf countries want a return to the pre-war status quo; Iran wants a “new normal”, where it controls maritime flow through the strait, perhaps in coordination with Oman.

Unfortunately, given Iran’s strategic leverage over the strait, it is likely that at least in the short term it will have its way, which might well entail “fees” collected by Iran on maritime traffic moving through the strait.

If any such deal over the strait is made, it would be fragile. Pre-war maritime traffic volumes would not return for a long time, if ever. US bases would remain in the region; US sanctions on Iran would remain in place. For its part, Iran would try to rebuild its defence industrial base to get ready for a next US-Israeli attack. And this is the likely best-case scenario.

Such is the likely legacy of a foolish war that brought not peace and stability but economic suffering, regional instability and a major loss of US prestige and power.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMic0FVX3lxTFBLQVRJbUJ4Y1BKNm5kblNlV2RpT055M2p1eEdLX2QyMFdRREZqT0U1TGYyODV3TTVGXzFQUDR3QmE0T0NkYjI2b0pJMVdMcXVQNk5GVHpuOE5WQ0NhQXJVOVhkT1cyckl3cDlZS2Ficmlib3PSAXhBVV95cUxQU3F6aFFVNWR6SUVLdGJ2MUt2WDRtVkx1ZVdaZWdPQUZoQWh3bFYzSFVRaVVza3RTT2FQc2djT1QzeFVxUEp2Z3J4RnVSSlZNQ1BQVllKb0gzTEVYQ3dzekNfa1BkU2NSRGM1YUFESDR0dF9SRWJVcF8?oc=5