이란-미국 전쟁으로 변하는 중동: 호르무즈 해협과 $2.3조 석유시장
Iran War Transforms Gulf Arab Region - الحرة
미국과 이스라엘의 이란 전쟁으로 인해 테헤란의 영향력이 강화되고 호르무즈 해협의 통제권이 흔들리며, 2.3조 달러 규모의 석유무역에 타격이 예상됩니다. GCC 국가들은 안전보장이 미흡한 MOU에 실망하며 방위에 더 많은 투자를 할 것으로 예상되며, 이는 지역 내 불안정성을 높이고 주식을 하락시킬 가능성이 있습니다.
핵심 요약
이란이 호르무즈 해협을 봉쇄해 연간 $2.3조 석유·가스 무역을 위협하며 아랍 해협 국가들은 미국-이란 MOU로 안보 우려가 해소되지 않아 실망하고 있습니다.
핵심요약
- 이란의 호르무즈 해협 봉쇄로 연간 $2.3조 석유·가스 무역이 위협받고 있습니다
- 미국-이란 MOU는 GCC의 안보 우려를 해결하지 못했고, 아랍 해협 국가들은 이란의 성장하는 영향력에 대처할 가능성이 있습니다
- 전문가들은 아랍 해협 국가들이 이란의 위협에 대비해 더 많은 자원을 국방에 투자할 전망입니다
- 아랍 해협 국가들의 연합이 약화되고, 각국이 이란과의 독자적인 협상을 진행할 가능성이 있습니다
도입
이란-미국 전쟁은 중동의 지정학적 판도를 완전히 바꿀 가능성을 가지고 있습니다. 특히 아랍 해협 국가들이 이란의 위협에 직면하며, 미국과 이란 간 MOU가 그들의 안보 우려를 해결하지 못함으로써 새로운 전략적 도전이 예상됩니다. 이 변화는 에너지 시장에 큰 영향을 미칠 수 있으며, 투자자들에게는 중동의 정치·안보 리스크를 재평가할 필요성을 강조합니다.
본문 1: 호르무즈 해협 봉쇄와 에너지 시장 영향
이란의 호르무즈 해협 봉쇄는 연간 $2.3조 규모의 석유·가스 무역을 위협하고 있습니다. 이 해협은 전 세계 석유 수출의 20%가 통과하는 핵심 경로로, 그 봉쇄는 글로벌 에너지 시장에 큰 충격을 줄 수 있습니다. 특히 사우디아라비아, 아랍에미리트, 쿠웨이트, 바레인, 카타르, 오만 등 아랍 해협 국가들의 경제에 큰 타격을 줄 수 있습니다. 이란의 전략적 목표는 미국과 서방의 군대 주둔 국가들을 압박하는 것일 가능성이 높습니다.
본문 2: 아랍 해협 국가들의 전략적 대응
아랍 해협 국가들은 이란의 위협에 대응하기 위해 더 많은 자원을 국방에 투자할 가능성이 있습니다. 특히 GCC의 안보 우려가 해결되지 않음으로써, 각국이 독자적인 전략을 수립할 가능성이 있습니다. 전문가들은 아랍 해협 국가들이 이란의 성장하는 영향력과 약화되는 연합에 대처할 가능성이 있다고 지적하고 있습니다. 이는 중동의 지정학적 균형을 바꿀 수 있는 중요한 변화입니다.
본문 3: 중장기 전망과 리스크
장기적으로는 아랍 해협 국가들이 이란과의 협상을 통해 안보를 확보하려는 시도가 있을 수 있습니다. 그러나 이란의 강경한 입장과 미국과의 MOU가 GCC의 안보 우려를 해결하지 못함으로써, 아랍 해협 국가들의 전략적 선택이 더욱 복잡해질 전망입니다. 또한, 에너지 시장 변화는 글로벌 경제에 큰 영향을 미칠 수 있어, 투자자들에게는 중동의 정치·안보 리스크를 지속적으로 모니터링할 필요가 있습니다.
결론
이란-미국 전쟁은 중동의 지정학적 판도를 바꿀 가능성이 있으며, 아랍 해협 국가들이 이란의 위협에 대응하기 위해 새로운 전략을 수립할 가능성이 있습니다. 특히 에너지 시장에 큰 영향을 미칠 수 있어, 투자자들에게는 중동의 정치·안보 리스크를 재평가할 필요성이 있습니다. 향후 아랍 해협 국가들의 국방 투자 동향과 이란과의 협상 결과를 주시할 필요가 있습니다.
Original Article
Iran War Transforms Gulf Arab Region - الحرة
For Arab Gulf countries, the U.S. and Israeli war with Iran began with promises to topple a regime they had considered an enemy for decades.
Three months later, the battered Shia clerical regime in Tehran has not only survived but is emerging from the war more assertive and potentially wealthier.
Tehran launched thousands of drones and missiles at the six Sunni Arab Gulf monarchies that host U.S. and Western military bases. It also throttled the estimated $2.3 trillion hydrocarbon-dependent economies of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman by closing the Strait of Hormuz, a critical conduit for these energy-rich countries and a fifth of global oil and gas.
Last week’s Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the U.S. and Iran provides a roadmap to a negotiated settlement between the two. Yet it says nothing about the key security concerns of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the regional security, political, and economic bloc.
Former officials and analysts see the Gulf nations adopting several new strategies to protect themselves. They are likely adapting to living with Tehran’s growing power, investing more resources in defense while their fragile unity further erodes.
“Gulf states will be disappointed that this war achieved none of the goals that the U.S. administration set out when it began,” said Gregory Gause, a Gulf expert at Washington’s Middle East Institute. “It leaves Iran in a position to threaten them again and to assert some kind of control over the Strait of Hormuz.”
Vessels at the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from Musandam, Oman, June 18, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
Gause said the MOU between the U.S. and Iran does not commit Tehran to free passage through the Strait of Hormuz. “I think that’s going to be very disappointing to the Gulf states,” he said.
Yet Gulf nations appear to be negotiating on their own with Tehran. In an interview published June 24 in the Financial Times , Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani said Gulf countries are working on a regional security framework with Iran. “That will hopefully have economic co-operation in the future between all of us — to bring the region back to stability,” he said.
Gawdat Bahgat, a professor of national security affairs at Washington’s National Defense University, said Gulf nations will feel relieved by the prospect of an end to the conflict between the U.S. and Iran and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
“You cannot overlook geography,” he said, referring to the Gulf nations. “They have to deal with Iran because it is not going anywhere.” He added that they will now be forced to adopt a new approach to Tehran, which they had long accused of undermining their security through its militant Shia allies across the Middle East and aggressive military posture in the shared waters of the Persian Gulf.
In contrast to previous crises, Bahgat pointed out, the six GCC members did not downgrade or sever ties with Iran during the war. “Even while Iran attacked them, they kept diplomatic channels open because the day after, they and Iran have no choice but to live together,” he said.
After the January 2016 ransacking of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran, Riyadh cut diplomatic ties with Iran, prompting some other GCC and Arab nations to downgrade diplomatic ties with Tehran. However, Chinese mediation restored diplomatic ties between Tehran and Riyadh in 2023, leading to a degree of broader reconciliation between the nations that represent the Shia and Sunni Muslim worlds.
David Des Roches, a professor at Washington’s Thayer Marshall Institute, sees the Gulf nations facing a “pretty big moment” now that it is clear that their efforts to placate Iran through business and cultural ties did not shield them from its attacks.
Tehran targeted the UAE, he said, despite the emirate’s importance as a major conduit for Iranian international trade and investment.
“Iran is no longer a neighbor. It’s a threat,” Des Roches told MBN, adding that Gulf capitals will now be working diligently to figure out how to address this threat. “Until you feel confident in your ability to confront and defeat the threat, then you accommodate it,” he said.
Gause says the Gulf states are likely to maintain a strong security partnership with the U.S. because they have no viable alternative. Yet they will seek resilience by developing new security relationships with a range of countries, including Israel and nations in Europe, East Asia and South Asia. The region is already bolstering military ties to Turkey .
“It’s not going to be an abandonment of the United States, but it’s going to be hedging,” he said.
Pier Camillo Falasca, policy affairs manager at the Euro-Gulf Information Centre think tank in Rome, sees the Gulf countries questioning the old paradigm of seeking protection under a U.S. security umbrella and security guarantees.
“Similar to European nations, they are thinking that the American umbrella is not something that they should take for granted anymore,” he said, referring to the evolving discussions among Gulf nations seeking to diversify defense partnerships in the aftermath of the war. After the Trump administration scaled back its assistance to Ukraine, European nations stepped up to support the country against Russia.
Falasca cited Ukraine as an example of how Gulf nations are exploring new avenues to address their security vulnerabilities. As Gulf nations faced relentless Iranian drone attacks in March and April, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar concluded separate long-term defense agreements with Kyiv. They were eager to access its wartime expertise and technology in countering Iranian drones. During the first four years of the war, Moscow launched more than 55,000 Iranian Shahed drones against Ukraine.
“The Gulf countries understand that collaborating with the country possessing the most advanced drone technology is very important for their future,” he said.
Smoke billows from Jebel Ali port after an Iranian attack, following United States and Israel strikes on Iran, in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, March 1, 2026REUTERS/Raghed Waked/File Photo
Bahgat points out that Gulf countries are also deepening defense ties with China, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Britain, France, Germany, and other European nations, as part of their strategy to diversify security cooperation in anticipation of future uncertainty.
“They will try to diversify their security cooperation,” he said. “But they will also deepen security cooperation with the United States. They have no choice.”