핵심요약

• GCC 국가들의 신용 스프레드는 전쟁 기간 동안 안정적으로 유지되었습니다.
• 오만은 이란 전쟁 중 신용 스프레드가 확대되지 않은 유일한 GCC 국가였습니다.
• GCC 국가들은 신용 강도와 전쟁으로 인한 도전 사이에서 균형을 모색했습니다.
• 바레인은 높은 부채 수준과 낮은 비축량으로 인해 금융 지원에 대한 의존도가 높았습니다.

도입

본 기사는 이란 전쟁이라는 지정학적 위기가 걸프 국가들의 채권 시장과 부채 상환 능력에 미친 영향을 분석합니다. 투자자들은 이러한 거시적 위기가 개별 국가의 신용 위험과 장기적인 금융 안정성에 어떤 영향을 미치는지 이해하는 것이 중요합니다. 특히 GCC 국가들의 채권 시장이 외부 충격 속에서도 어떻게 반응했는지 분석함으로써, 지정학적 위험이 금융 시장의 가격 결정에 미치는 복합적인 메커니즘을 파악할 수 있습니다.

본문 1: 신용 스프레드의 움직임과 시장 신뢰

이란 전쟁이 시작된 직후인 2월 28일 이후, 핵심 GCC 국가들(사우디아라비아, 쿠웨이트, 아랍에미리트, 카타르)의 신용 스프레드는 상승했으나, 이는 '매수 신호'로 이어질 만큼의 수준은 아니었습니다. 시장은 전쟁 소식을 흡수하는 과정에서 신용 스프레드가 약간 벌어지기 시작했지만, 이는 신용 위험과 장기적인 질문 사이에서 균형을 잡으려는 시장의 모습을 반영합니다. 이는 시장이 현재의 신용 위험과 더불어 장기적인 불확실성에 동시에 반응하고 있음을 의미합니다. 이러한 스프레드 움직임은 GCC 국가들이 현재의 신용 강도와 전쟁으로 인해 발생하는 심각한 도전에 사이에서 균형을 잡고 있음을 보여줍니다. 즉, 시장은 단기적인 신용 위험과 장기적인 질문 사이에서 신중하게 평가하고 있는 상태로 읽힙니다.

본문 2: 국가별 차별화된 위험 노출

GCC 국가들 내에서도 위험 노출의 차이가 명확하게 드러났습니다. 특히 오만은 이란 전쟁 기간 동안 신용 스프레드가 확대되지 않았다는 점에서 주목할 만합니다. 이는 오만이 호르무즈 해협에 접해 있어 지정학적 위치적 이점을 가지는 동시에 이란과의 관계가 비교적 덜 불안정하다는 점이 반영된 것으로 해석됩니다. 반면, 바레인은 높은 부채 수준과 지역 내 다른 국가들에 비해 낮은 비축량을 가지고 있어 사우디아라비아로부터의 재정적 지원에 대한 의존도가 높습니다. 이러한 구조적 취약성은 전쟁 상황에서 추가적인 재정적 압박을 가중시킬 수 있는 잠재적 위험 요인으로 작용합니다. 이는 국가별로 지정학적 위치와 재정 구조에 따라 위험에 대한 노출 정도가 다르게 나타난다는 점을 시사합니다.

본문 3: 장기적 전망과 구조적 위험

GCC 국가들의 채권 시장이 외부 충격에 비교적 잘 견뎌냈다는 사실은 해당 지역의 금융 시스템이 어느 정도의 회복탄력성을 가지고 있음을 보여줍니다. 그러나 장기적으로 볼 때, 지정학적 불안정성이 지속될 경우, 이는 인프라 투자 및 에너지 시장에 대한 GCC 국가들의 사업 모델의 지속 가능성에 대한 근본적인 질문을 제기할 수 있습니다. 향후 GCC 국가들은 외부 충격에 대응하기 위해 재정 건전성을 강화하고 지정학적 위험을 완화하는 동시에, 국제 무역 및 에너지 흐름에 대한 새로운 전략을 모색해야 할 것입니다. 이러한 구조적 위험을 관리하는 것이 장기적인 금융 안정성을 확보하는 데 핵심이 될 것입니다.

결론

결론적으로, GCC 국가들의 채권 시장은 이란 전쟁과 같은 지정학적 위기 속에서도 일정 수준의 안정성을 유지했습니다. 이는 시장이 현재의 신용 위험과 장기적인 불확실성을 동시에 고려하며 신중하게 반응했음을 의미합니다. 향후 GCC 국가들의 금융 안정성은 지정학적 환경의 변화와 내부적인 재정 관리 능력에 따라 달라질 것으로 전망됩니다. 투자자들은 이러한 지정학적 리스크가 채권 시장의 스프레드와 장기 수익률에 미치는 영향을 지속적으로 모니터링해야 할 것입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMitwFBVV95cUxONGl1ZmhVa2pNR0FfWFltNWJjSW5JT0R4bFVRaWpOSnNzNjl2QThvUUJ4MGJpak9temozZjBsY0xTLVFTMHg1ZFpWVkd6MmJ1bzVZaWNwdGltT0hYTWpLZll2OWtaWU9hTnlwdmlWbVRhTGo1c211OFl4MkJZdHRhZTBpZXJwT25uUFJGclNCMGE3Z3BkY0FTZUlBNmZXVzhiNkFmNzgtZ0RjQlhDdW1uZXVzc08tQ0k?oc=5

The GCC’s wartime borrowing machine is helping counter the Iran war - Atlantic Council

Nearly six months since the start of the Iran war, Gulf countries have weathered serious attacks on their infrastructure. This dynamic has increased talk about the sustainability of the business models of Gulf Coordination Council (GCC) countries, which have thrived on the idea that they are safe places where the world can come together to do business. And yet, their bond markets have held up relatively well in the face of missiles and drones. To dig into the reasons for this, we turned to Eric Fine, a nonresident fellow in the MENA Futures Lab and an experienced investor in emerging market debt. Below, he answers seven burning questions about GCC debt and borrowing.

Core GCC countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar) all saw spreads grind higher, but not enough to become a “screaming buy” opportunity. The GCC stalwarts saw their credit spreads (the difference between their bond yields and certain benchmarks) languish in the war—they are torn between their credit strength and the profound challenges they face as a result of the Iran war. More precisely, the first several weeks after the start of the war on February 28 saw these spreads reluctant to budge or even tightening, reflecting market confidence. As the markets absorbed the war news, these spreads started widening slightly, but not a lot (see chart below). As a result, they remain in between two worlds—one world pricing their current credit risk, the other worrying about longer term questions.

Oman was a winner. Oman was the only major GCC country to see its credit spreads not widen during the Iran war. This reflects its upgraded geostrategic profile based on geography, as it borders the Strait of Hormuz, but also its less fractured relationship with Iran.

Bahrain became the clear high-variance bellwether. This is logical given the country’s high debt levels and lower reserves compared to the region, and its resultant reliance on Saudi Arabia for financial support. Because the Gulf, generally speaking, has high liquidity buffers and deep and broad market access (more on this below), none of these credit spreads widened materially. Even if most GCC countries faced arguably existential challenges, the market was rightly unwilling to sell such strong credits. Bahrain was the only credit spread that at least partially reflected Iran war risks.

The GCC proved to have a wartime borrowing machine. The chart below details actual credit deals for sovereigns (governments) and quasi-sovereign entities (i.e. state-owned oil companies) in private and public credit during 2026. The bottom line is that, despite the war, 2026 is on course to beat 2023 and 2024 in comparable financings.

The GCC debt capital market stands at approximately $1.2 trillion outstanding—roughly $750 billion in hard currency (almost entirely US dollars, reflecting the dollar pegs) and about $450 billion in local currency (dominated by the Saudi riyal). The hard currency sovereign/quasi-sovereign portion represents approximately 14–16 percent of the JPMorgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global Diversified, making the GCC collectively the largest single regional bloc in the premier emerging market hard currency benchmark. For scale, that weight is comparable to all of Latin America’s investment-grade sovereigns combined, or roughly double Mexico alone.

These spreads are the basis for pricing a sovereign’s borrowing and capital raising activities; the GCC has large fiscal and external borrowing requirements, and oil prices create risks of higher requirements. The war-driven price windfall of 2026 masks that risk rather than resolving it. At the price levels that prevailed in 2025, roughly two-thirds of GCC sovereigns run fiscal deficits ranging from moderate to severe, according to the International Monetary Fund , and the cost at which they access international capital markets has a direct impact on their debt trajectory. All GCC countries have a debt to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio below 40 percent and manageable fiscal deficits in the 3–5 percent of GDP range, other than Bahrain at 133 percent and 11 percent of GDP. If credit spreads do not remain stable—credit rating downgrades are a risk, for example—a self-reinforcing trajectory can take hold. Higher debt service costs worsen the deficit, which worsens the debt trajectory, which widens spreads further.

Currency pegs complicate this, though not for the reason usually given. Most of the region’s debt is dollar-denominated, so significantly reducing the value through inflation was never available regardless of the exchange rate regime. What the pegs actually cost is monetary autonomy: a fixed rate combined with an open capital account means Gulf central banks track the Federal Reserve whether or not domestic conditions warrant it. More consequentially, the peg removes the shock absorber. Fiscal stress that would show up as currency depreciation elsewhere transmits directly into reserves and onto the peg itself. This is why Bahrain has never really been a standalone credit—its spread prices the willingness of its neighbors to support it, as the 2018 assistance package demonstrated.

What the market needs to more fully move on from Iran war-related risks is, number one, clarity on the basic security framework. Two, Gulf country business models need to be cemented or changed; UAE’s service-oriented economy and Saudi Arabia’s heavily financialized (i.e., financing-dependent) system are key examples of new unanswered questions generated by the Iran war.

In addition, UAE Central Bank Governor Khaled Mohamed Balama raised the idea of a swap line with US Federal Reserve and Treasury officials, including Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, during the International Monetary Fund/World Bank spring meetings in Washington. The UAE warned it may have to use the Chinese yuan for oil sales if it runs short on dollars—a classic dollar-loyalty leverage play. New Federal Reserve Chairman Kevin Warsh indicated that the Fed would defer to Treasury on such issues, but the issue remains unresolved.

The bonds are cheap, using ratings or a purely quantitative process that does not incorporate non-systematic risks such as wars. These countries deserve their credit ratings on the numbers, in our view. But we are underweighting GCC in our emerging market portfolio because the non-systematic risks from the war are too high for the small increase in spread that the bonds now generate. Luckily for the GCC, not all investors have our level of flexibility. The GCC and many investment-grade sovereign borrowers depend on dedicated Asian investors who are strongly inclined to base decisions on purely a ratings basis. So, the questions these buyers are asking aren’t as acute as the questions we are asking because we do not have to have this Gulf exposure in our funds, while many of these Asian investors have no alternatives.

Despite fiscal pressures arising due to war costs and production hits, global investors continue to view GCC sovereign credits favorably. The region retains exceptional access to international capital markets, as detailed above. Even Bahrain, the riskiest sovereign credit in the GCC, was recently able to issue one billion dollars at approximately 7.5 percent interest, underscoring the depth of investor appetite for the region. The wartime borrowing machine is proving its mettle so far.

Eric Fine is a nonresident fellow at the MENA Futures Lab, part of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. He is a portfolio manager at VanEck with more than thirty years of experience investing in emerging market sovereign debt.

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Image: International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) Chair and Saudi Arabia's Minister of Finance Mohammed Al‑Jadaan and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva look on as reporters raise their hands during a press briefing at the IMF/World Bank 2026 Spring Meetings in Washington, D.C., US April 17, 2026. REUTERS/Elizabeth Frantz

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMitwFBVV95cUxONGl1ZmhVa2pNR0FfWFltNWJjSW5JT0R4bFVRaWpOSnNzNjl2QThvUUJ4MGJpak9temozZjBsY0xTLVFTMHg1ZFpWVkd6MmJ1bzVZaWNwdGltT0hYTWpLZll2OWtaWU9hTnlwdmlWbVRhTGo1c211OFl4MkJZdHRhZTBpZXJwT25uUFJGclNCMGE3Z3BkY0FTZUlBNmZXVzhiNkFmNzgtZ0RjQlhDdW1uZXVzc08tQ0k?oc=5