핵심요약

• 2022년 2월 우크라이나 전면 침공 이후 서방의 제재로 러시아 경제는 국방 분야로 편중되기 시작했습니다.
• 정치 엘리트는 방위 계약에서 불법적인 자금을 조달하는 데 increasingly 의존하고 있습니다.
• 푸틴 대통령은 엘리트들의 충성심을 유지하고 국내 정치적 안정성을 확보하기 위해 방위 지출을 유지하는 것이 중요하다고 판단하고 있습니다.
• 제재 완화 없이 전쟁이 종료될 경우, 푸틴은 방위 관련 후원 흐름을 계속 유지하기 위해 다른 갈등을 유발할 가능성이 있습니다.

도입

러시아의 경제 구조 변화는 국제 투자자들에게 중요한 시사점을 제공합니다. 특히 국방 분야의 의존도가 높아지면서 푸틴 정권의 정책 방향과 해외 갈등 가능성에 대한 심층적인 분석이 필요합니다. 이 변화가 러시아의 경제 안정성과 국제 관계에 미칠 영향에 대한 이해가 필수적입니다.

본문 1: 러시아 경제의 국방 의존도 증가

2022년 2월 우크라이나 전면 침공 이후 러시아 경제는 국방 분야로 increasingly 편중되기 시작했습니다. 이 변화는 서방의 제재로 인해 러시아의 정치 엘리트가 방위 계약에서 불법적인 자금을 조달하는 데 increasingly 의존하게 만들었습니다. 이 의존도는 푸틴 정권의 안정성을 위협할 수 있는 중요한 요인이 되었습니다. 방위 지출을 유지하는 것이 엘리트들의 충성심을 유지하고 국내 정치적 안정성을 확보하는 데 필수적이라고 푸틴 대통령이 판단하고 있습니다. 이 점은 러시아의 경제 정책과 국제 관계에 미칠 영향을 예측하는 데 중요한 기준이 됩니다.

본문 2: 푸틴의 해외 갈등 유발 가능성

제재 완화 없이 전쟁이 종료될 경우, 푸틴은 방위 관련 후원 흐름을 계속 유지하기 위해 다른 갈등을 유발할 가능성이 있습니다. 특히 나토 가입 국가가 아닌 러시아 nearby 국가, 예를 들어 몰도바가 주요 타겟이 될 수 있습니다. 이는 러시아의 국제 관계와 경제 안정성에 큰 영향을 미칠 수 있는 중요한 이슈입니다. 투자자들은 이 가능성을 고려하여 러시아와의 투자 전략을 재검토할 필요가 있습니다.

본문 3: 유럽 기업의 위험 증가

공공 및 민간 부문 기업들은 러시아와의 투자 또는 사용자 관계를 통해 고위험한 러시아 관련 사이버, 물리적, 경제적 위협 환경에 직면할 가능성이 있습니다. 이 위험은 유럽 기업들의 투자 전략과 러시아와의 관계에 중요한 영향을 미칠 수 있습니다. 투자자들은 이 위험을 고려하여 러시아와의 투자 전략을 재검토할 필요가 있습니다.

결론

러시아의 경제 구조 변화와 푸틴의 정책 방향은 국제 투자자들에게 중요한 시사점을 제공합니다. 특히 국방 분야의 의존도가 높아지면서 푸틴 정권의 안정성과 해외 갈등 가능성에 대한 심층적인 분석이 필요합니다. 향후 러시아의 경제 안정성과 국제 관계에 미칠 영향을 예측하는 데 중요한 기준이 될 것입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMihAFBVV95cUxNVExrNmV2UFZyaEU2OV9oNU5SZ1hIV0hYQlpWTllRM1BmWnJmSHZYVDFMYV9vMVhKbDZjQk5fUWxyNkNMY3lhdmlmUVdxQXZZeTNPSTFCMnhuSzFFeXJ6UTRyaWk1b1R3TldGWTVCNXNGZU9kdUIxOVNOTTh0WS01SkMwVEw?oc=5

Russia’s Defense-Based Economy Risks Forcing Putin to Fight Wars - Recorded Future

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the subsequent increase in Western sanctions on Russian individuals and firms, Russia’s economy has become increasingly skewed toward the defense sector. This has very likely led Russian political elites to increasingly draw patronage flows from defense-related expenditures. The wide range of sanctions has likely made it difficult for elites to diversify the sources of their graft, leaving them increasingly dependent on defense contracts for illicit funds.

As Russian President Vladimir Putin uses the distribution and withdrawal of patronage flows as a key way to maintain elite loyalty, a steady stream of defense expenditures has likely become an increasingly important cornerstone for Putin’s ability to maintain domestic political stability. Since maintaining domestic political stability is critical to Putin’s political survival, he very likely sees maintaining current defense expenditures as not only a foreign policy priority, but also a domestic political imperative. A decrease in defense expenditures would likely result in a decline in patronage flows to elites, thereby raising the prospect of elite discontent and greater difficulty in maintaining political stability.

Insikt Group therefore assesses that Putin is likely incentivized to engage in conflict abroad, not only for geopolitical purposes, but also to maintain high levels of defense spending. Should the war in Ukraine end without sanctions abatement –– and thus without providing a pathway for economic and patronage flow diversification –– Putin would likely seek alternative venues for mobilization to ensure defense-related patronage flows continue. Likely target states include non-NATO states close to Russia, including Moldova.

Public- and private-sector entities based in Europe and those with investment in Russia or users there are therefore likely to face a high-risk, unpredictable Russia-nexus cyber, physical, and economic threat environment, as long as sanctions preclude diversification of patronage flows beyond the defense sector.

As such, political settlement in Ukraine, coupled with sanctions rollbacks and security guarantees for Ukraine and other non-NATO states close to Russia, such as Moldova, likely would raise the cost of starting a conflict elsewhere while providing Putin with a pathway to diversify his elites’ patronage flows, thereby reducing his incentive to fund Russia’s patronage networks via mobilization.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s economy has become much more dependent on defense-driven state demand. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, United States (US) and European Union (EU) sanctions forced Russia toward import substitution and greater state involvement in the economy; however, Russia’s economic reliance on defense to generate GDP revenue accelerated after the full-scale invasion. This increasing dependence is apparent in three main areas: budgetary allocations for defense spending, the percentage of industrial output tied to military production, and the fact that macroeconomic indicators showing growth, employment, and inflation are increasingly tied to war spending.

Russia’s military expenditures have occupied an increasing share of GDP since 2014, particularly since 2021, when defense spending began taking up a larger percentage of GDP. As of 2025, Russia’s defense spending is comparable to estimates from the 1980s, when the Soviet Union was fighting in Afghanistan and maintaining a large nuclear arsenal to counter the US.

Russia’s military spending has also increased as a share of its state budget. Military spending accounted for 16% and 19% of total government spending in 2023 and 2024, respectively. In 2025, the “defense spending and national defense” category of the budget accounted for an estimated 32% of total federal spending.

Real military spending has increased significantly since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. In 2021, Russia spent an estimated 4.9 trillion rubles on the military; that figure increased to 14 trillion rubles in 2024 and 15.5 trillion rubles in 2025.

Military production as a share of Russian manufacturing has risen in recent years, according to official data from Rosstat, Russia’s government statistical service.

Military machine building has increased as a share of overall machinery and engineering output, from 30.6% in 2021 to 33.6% in 2022, 34.7% in 2023, and 36.5% in 2024. The total volume of military production increased to more than 7.2 trillion rubles in 2024, almost twice the pre-invasion level in 2021. Finally, the World Bank reported that, while Russia’s economy grew by 3.6% in 2023, manufacturing increased by 7%, reflecting a large increase in military-related activity and import substitution amid sanctions that isolated Russia’s economy.

Russia’s largest military manufacturing firms include Rostec (Russian Technologies), which is the world’s largest tank manufacturer; Almaz-Antey, the primary developer of Russia's surface-to-air missiles, such as the S-300, S-400, and S-500; United Engine Corporation, which manufactures engines for Russia’s fighter jets and cruise missiles; and United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC), which is responsible for Russia’s naval manufacturing.

As military production has occupied a greater percentage of Russia’s industrial output, production of civilian goods has decreased. For example , production of civilian cars in Russia remained roughly at 2021 levels in 2026; output of cement and bricks fell by 10–25% in early 2026, in part due to the diversion of steel to tank manufacturing; and manufacturing of home appliances such as refrigerators and washing machines has stagnated, as components have been diverted to military electronics.

Key macroeconomic indicators –– including employment rate, size of the workforce, and inflation –– are very likely increasingly tied to defense spending. Defense industry employment has increased by an estimated 520,000 jobs since 2022; 3.5 million Russians are now employed in sectors supporting the military-industrial complex. As defense industry employment has risen, the civilian workforce has shrunk because Russia’s overall labor force has remained roughly steady at 76 million individuals. Between 2021 and 2026, the percentage of the Russian labor force employed by the defense industry rose from 3.9% to an estimated 5.1%.

In addition, the unemployment rate in 2025 was under 3%; economists consider this above “full employment,” and it is an indication that Russia may face a labor shortage driven by overinvestment in defense. Inflation has increased from 7.3% in 2023 to 9.5% in 2024 before dropping to 5.6% in 2025, driven by a combination of government defense spending, labor shortages, and supply constraints due to sanctions.

Corruption in Russia has long been at systemic levels that are higher than in the vast majority of countries. Transparency International –– a highly respected think tank that measures corruption worldwide –– ranked Russia 157th out of 182 countries in 2025, in terms of level of corruption, with a score of 22/100. Large-scale academic and think tank studies demonstrate the extent of corruption in Russia. For example, a 2013 Credit Suisse report showed that 110 individuals control about 35% of Russia’s total wealth, and an estimated $17 billion in assets is tied to 35 individuals close to President Putin. Putin himself has used state funds to amass wealth; for example, an investigation found that he owns a $1.3 billion palace financed via corruption schemes involving state-linked companies. Corruption in Russia extends beyond elites; an estimated one-quarter of Russian government officials regularly take bribes.

Putin very likely uses the distribution of government contracts and funds as one way to keep elites wealthy and therefore loyal. A 2022 study by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) documented over $19.8 billion in state assets owned by individuals in politically influential positions in the Russian political system. Some of these individuals have official roles in the Russian government; others have long acted as influential advisors without formal positions. For example, Alisher Usmanov –– who allegedly has financial ties to Putin and former Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev –– has enriched himself by siphoning from telecommunications, media, and mining entities and has an estimated net worth of $3.5 billion. Gennady Timchenko –– one of Putin’s longtime confidants –– co-founded crude oil trader Gunvor, which very likely helped fuel his $70.5 billion net worth, as well as Putin’s wealth. Igor Sechin –– CEO of state oil company Rosneft, former deputy prime minister, and longtime Putin advisor –– very likely extracts money from Rosneft to build up his personal net wealth, which is estimated at roughly $800 million.

As the Russian economy has become increasingly dependent on defense spending for GDP and industrial output, Russian elites have likely drawn a greater share of their graft from defense-sector entities. Analysts estimate that about 40% of defense spending goes towards procurements and that kickbacks roughly double that cost. This suggests that the level of kickbacks from defense entities has increased alongside defense spending. A 2024 investigation by Proekt showed that at least 81 of the individuals on Forbes’s rankings of the 200 richest Russians were involved in supplying Russia’s military-industrial complex, strongly suggesting these individuals are extracting wealth from these enterprises, given Russian elites’ history of using state enterprises for personal wealth. Indeed, former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev stated that up to 20% of Russia’s budget designated to modernize the military has been stolen by oligarchs over the last twenty years.

Insikt Group assesses with moderate confidence that the increase in patronage flows from defense contracts means many of Russia’s political and business elites likely favor continued mobilization. We do not assess that these elites favor endless war; rather, they likely recognize that political influence depends on supporting the war in Ukraine and that financial wealth is increasingly tied to defense contracts.

Russia’s political system allocates resources to elites through state-directed spending and political priorities, as reflected by the federal budget structure. As detailed in the section above, defense spending has become an increasingly large percentage of the federal budget, and businessmen who have long had close connections to Putin –– including Gennady Timchenko and Igor Sechin –– have vested interests in the defense sector. For example, Timchenko is reportedly a major investor in Redut PMC, a private military company that has been deployed in Ukraine. Timchenko is also likely an informal advisor to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), likely in part to ensure MoD contracts funnel to his companies. As noted above, Sechin is the CEO of Rosneft , Russia’s largest oil company, which has served as a financial backbone to Russia’s war economy. In addition, Sechin is on the board of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, Russia’s main naval shipbuilder. Russian elites likely see financial value and political benefits in supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine and having the war continue.

Elites very likely see political and financial costs to not supporting the war in Ukraine. Between February 2022 and October 2025, the Russian state has nationalized and redistributed an estimated $14 billion USD in previously private Russian assets, as well as Western assets, with the seized assets often given as rewards to loyal businessmen close to the Kremlin. In addition, employees at defense firms receive double pay compared to their counterparts in civilian firms and are exempt from partial mobilization; these benefits likely provide additional incentive to oligarchs to remain invested in the defense sector, as employees at these defense firms likely report higher job satisfaction and are less likely to be deployed to the front lines, creating a more reliable workforce. Senior Kremlin officials have threatened to seize assets from those who are not sufficiently loyal or supportive of the war. Deputy Minister of Finance Aleksey Moiseyev said the state will seize assets from owners who “cannot effectively manage the property” or “direct funds earned in Russia to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”

Western sanctions on Russia have restricted elites’ access to foreign capital, technology, and markets, very likely reducing the number of corruption opportunities in the non-defense sector. This likely underscores the defense sector's importance as a source of patronage for elites and as a mechanism for Putin to distribute and withdraw patronage to maintain elite loyalty.

The US and the EU first instituted sanctions on Russia in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine prompted a significant expansion of sanctions, leading Russia to become the most sanctioned country in the world. US sanctions alone comprise over 6,000 individual sanctions designations on Russia, and the EU has passed nineteen sanctions packages targeting Russia. The Western sanctions regime as a whole targets strategic sectors responsible for generating revenue and helping Russia project political influence globally, including the financial sector, energy, and portions of the defense sector.

Insikt Group assesses that, though Russian elites have engaged in sanctions evasion, those efforts have not generated enough revenue to offset the impact sanctions have had on elites’ access to non-defense-related corruption. It is very likely more costly to extract illicit revenue through sanctions evasion efforts because of reliance on intermediaries, which reduces the amount of rent capture available to elites engaging in sanctions evasion. In addition, sanctioned transactions are less stable and predictable, in part due to ongoing efforts by the EU and the US to monitor, identify, and close sanctions evasion channels such as Russia’s shadow fleet. Lastly, most sanctions evasion efforts focus on defense and defense-adjacent goods to feed Russia’s military-industrial base. As such, these efforts mostly amplify Russia’s defense sector rather than providing an alternative for elites seeking other sources of patronage flows.

President Putin likely judges that there are domestic political costs to rapid demobilization or a long-term political settlement in Ukraine, as both scenarios would very likely reduce defense-related patronage flows and offer fewer opportunities for graft, risking elite discontent. Rapid demobilization –– especially if it were not accompanied by sanctions relief –– would likely lead to economic stagnation as defense spending decreases.

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMihAFBVV95cUxNVExrNmV2UFZyaEU2OV9oNU5SZ1hIV0hYQlpWTllRM1BmWnJmSHZYVDFMYV9vMVhKbDZjQk5fUWxyNkNMY3lhdmlmUVdxQXZZeTNPSTFCMnhuSzFFeXJ6UTRyaWk1b1R3TldGWTVCNXNGZU9kdUIxOVNOTTh0WS01SkMwVEw?oc=5