지정학적 패배가 에너지 시장에 미치는 영향

미국과 이스라엘이 이란에 대한 군사 작전을 수행했음에도 불구하고, 이란이 호르무즈 해협을 효과적으로 통제함으로써 글로벌 에너지 시장에 미치는 영향은 매우 심각합니다. 이 해협은 전 세계 석유 및 천연가스 수송의 핵심 통로이며, 이 통로의 통제권이 불확실해지면 국제 유가와 가스 가격은 즉각적인 변동성을 겪게 됩니다. 기사에서 언급되었듯이, 이란이 선박을 공격하고 통제권을 유지하려는 시도는 에너지 공급망의 안정성을 위협하며, 이는 국제 무역 비용 상승으로 이어집니다. 따라서 투자자들은 이란의 행동이 에너지 가격에 미치는 직접적인 영향을 분석하고, 지정학적 위험 프리미엄을 가격에 반영해야 합니다.

비대칭 전략의 장기적 효과

이란이 군사적 충돌의 직접적인 결과보다는 비대칭적 능력을 활용하여 전략적 목표를 달성하려 했다는 점은 장기적인 관점에서 주목할 필요가 있습니다. 이란은 군사력의 직접적인 충돌 대신 지리적 위치와 비대칭적 압력을 통해 서방 세계에 대한 영향력을 행사하고 있습니다. 이는 향후 수년간 중동 지역의 정치적, 경제적 역학 관계에 지속적인 불안정성을 야기할 수 있습니다. 특히, 이란이 해협 통제권을 유지하려는 시도는 국제법적 및 경제적 측면에서 복잡한 문제를 제기하며, 이는 국제 사회의 개입과 외교적 해결의 필요성을 강조합니다.

공급망 위험과 투자 전략

에너지 공급망의 불안정성은 원자재 가격의 상승 압력으로 이어지며, 이는 인플레이션 위험을 증대시킵니다. 투자 관점에서 볼 때, 이러한 지정학적 위험은 에너지 관련 자산뿐만 아니라 전 세계 공급망에 의존하는 산업 전반에 걸쳐 위험 요인으로 작용합니다. 따라서 포트폴리오를 구성할 때, 지정학적 리스크에 민감한 에너지 섹터에 대한 노출도를 재평가하고, 공급망 다변화에 투자하는 방안을 고려해야 합니다. 단기적인 군사적 결과보다는 이란의 비대칭적 전략이 장기적인 경제 환경에 미치는 구조적 변화를 예측하는 것이 중요합니다.

결론

결론적으로, 이란의 행동은 단순한 지역 분쟁을 넘어 글로벌 에너지 및 무역 질서에 대한 근본적인 도전을 의미합니다. 향후 상황은 이란이 해협 통제권을 얼마나 효과적으로 유지하고, 미국 및 국제 사회가 어떤 외교적 또는 경제적 대응을 취하는지에 따라 그 양상이 달라질 것입니다. 따라서 시장은 이란의 지정학적 행동에 대한 지속적인 모니터링을 통해 잠재적인 위험과 기회를 평가해야 할 것입니다.

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원문 링크: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMingFBVV95cUxNbzk1V081emVFMFlFelhwSFd3akN2Q0RKaFVBZnBiZkVjbVNtOFZJbk9FOXdRcWE1VG5TaXVENjlfN2s2c3dsV2FYV0Nha2t5bGhSN2dpekxXc0U5dEd5bm56RXVnYlA4UGlfQ0I3SmZQREU3TDQtOV9XWUV0ck5QNlVGU09RV2czbm42SGMtelZkcFlCdVQ2UjVUTjEzZw?oc=5

After Six Months of War, Trump Is Still Losing to Iran - The New Yorker

Spare a thought, too, for the Iranian people, who have been on the receiving end of 1.5 million pounds of ordnance dropped, in some ten thousand sorties, by the forces aboard the Lincoln since late February, when Trump started a war, alongside Israel, to topple the Islamic Republic. Six months later, it’s hard to view the outcome of the conflict as anything other than a profound strategic defeat for the United States. The year had begun with mass anti-government protests in cities across Iran, spurred by the theocratic regime’s mismanagement of the economy, which has also been saddled for years with crippling U.S. sanctions. The protests were brutally quashed by authorities. Then came the bombardments by U.S. and Israeli forces, which assassinated Iran’s octogenarian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and a number of his cadre; degraded its Air Force and Navy; and struck schools, universities, and health facilities, while killing more than three thousand civilians in the first weeks of the campaign. The surviving regime, in turn, hunkered down and used its asymmetric capabilities to close the crucial Strait of Hormuz, weaponizing the country’s geography in ways it hadn’t done before, in order to exact its own toll on the global economy and heap pressure on Washington. Now none of the initial aims touted by Trump—including the shuttering of Iran’s nuclear program and the dismantling of its ballistic-missile capabilities—have been realized; instead, the U.S. finds itself trying to figure out how to deprive Iran of a tool—the strait—that is in play only because of Trump’s intervention. Despite recently reported initiatives by Trump and his allies, oil and other critical supplies are still not moving freely through the waterway, and gas prices remain high. Iran still strikes at tankers, and expects some form of control over the strait to endure even after a diplomatic settlement. Iran has also continued its crackdown on the opposition; according to the United Nations, executions of political prisoners and dissidents are surging. Trump told Iran’s citizens early on that “help is on its way,” but all that has come for them has been destruction, deeper economic pain, and the renewed repression of a regime that knows, better than anything else, how to preserve itself. Trump came into the war on a high. The relative ease of his operation to remove Nicolás Maduro, the Venezuelan President, from office likely convinced him of the overwhelming primacy of American power. The conflicts that unfurled in the wake of the war in Gaza had also exposed Iran’s many vulnerabilities: Iranian proxies were toppled in Syria and humbled in Lebanon, and Israeli intelligence has repeatedly conducted successful assassination and sabotage missions within Iran. But Trump was overconfident and now finds himself unable to end a war that none of Iran’s neighbors wanted him to start. American power has also been perceptibly diminished. The U.S. has burned through inventories of precision-guided and air-defense munitions, and seen its array of military bases in the region come under significant Iranian fire—which has also inflicted damage to civilian and energy infrastructure across the region. Some countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, have no love for Tehran, but recognize that Trump’s current belligerence may not be doing them any favors. A new tripartite defense alliance between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan—though publicly welcomed by Trump—is emblematic of a region thinking beyond the United States, and hedging against the uncertainty posed by both a resilient Iran and an aggressive Israel. “The larger shift is that Gulf capitals are no longer comfortable simply aligning behind maximum pressure. They increasingly want autonomy from both Washington and Tehran,” Alex Vatanka, the director of the Iran program at the Middle East Institute, a Washington think tank, told me. According to Nasr, “Everybody now sees America as less than it was before.” He views Trump’s travails as part of a “precipitous collapse of American power and American prestige” and says that “once this war is over, the U.S. is going to find the rest of the world much more difficult to herd around any coherent policy.” The war is already deeply unpopular in the United States and has become a weight on Republican electoral prospects in the upcoming midterms. “Trump has trapped himself into an unwinnable war for America,” Ellie Geranmayeh, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told me. “He seems shackled now by the sunk-cost fallacy that, because America has expended heavy resources, ammunition, and reputation in this war, it cannot pull back before a decisive win.” But Tehran seems to believe it can both outfox and outlast Trump. “Iran is now confident that it can absorb U.S. bombings, which seriously weakens any military threats the U.S. may issue in the future,” Gregory Brew, an expert on Iran and energy at the Eurasia Group, a political-risk consultancy, told me. “In addition, the U.S. now looks broadly deterred from attempting more aggressive action against Iran, cowed by the risk of sweeping Iranian retaliation.” This week, a sixty-day deadline for the United States and Iran to resolve larger differences—set in June as part of an earlier memorandum of understanding—elapsed with little fanfare. It was a mark of the fragility (and, frankly, the unseriousness) of the diplomatic round between the two sides. On Tuesday, Trump fumed in the Oval Office, demanding Iran raise “the white flag of surrender,” while threatening Oman—a key diplomatic intermediary—with military strikes because of its parallel negotiations with Iran over the handling of the Strait of Hormuz. He also lashed out at South Korea, justifying an astonishing decision to draw down military exercises with the country over Seoul’s apparent unhelpfulness in supporting Trump’s war in the Middle East. And then, in perhaps the most glaring illustration of his frustration, the President posted a bizarre map on Truth Social labelling the Strait of Hormuz as “U.S. territory.” But Trump cannot “Gulf of America” his way out of this disaster. It is a blow that some analysts have already likened to the calamities of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars, and Iran’s leadership seems happy to continue this game of brinkmanship. “Stop waiting for the clown crew to pull a rabbit out of their hat and clean up the mess you made,” Ghalibaf said on social media, in response to new threats of maximum pressure from Trump’s Cabinet officials. Ordinary Iranians, many of whom are desperate for a change in their domestic politics and for a rapprochement with the West, have to wait. Gissou Nia, an Iranian American human-rights lawyer, lamented the absence of any “greater political strategy” from Trump that would have supported Iran’s opposition and embattled civil society—of “anything that would incentivize defections or really be able to crack this regime, which is what all of those protesters were looking for and what they risked their lives for,” she told me. Instead, Nia said, “it became clear that the only strategy from this Administration was to bomb the country.” And that strategy has failed. ♦

Source: https://news.google.com/rss/articles/CBMingFBVV95cUxNbzk1V081emVFMFlFelhwSFd3akN2Q0RKaFVBZnBiZkVjbVNtOFZJbk9FOXdRcWE1VG5TaXVENjlfN2s2c3dsV2FYV0Nha2t5bGhSN2dpekxXc0U5dEd5bm56RXVnYlA4UGlfQ0I3SmZQREU3TDQtOV9XWUV0ck5QNlVGU09RV2czbm42SGMtelZkcFlCdVQ2UjVUTjEzZw?oc=5