이스라엘, 인공지능 기반 정보전으로 국가 안보 방어에 5천만 달러 투입
Israel finally fights the information war - The Jerusalem Post
지정학적 전략 비판은 일반적으로 즉각적인 시장 움직임에 큰 영향을 미치지 않아 단기적으로 중립적인 편향을 보입니다.
핵심 요약
이스라엘은 국가 정당성을 방어하기 위해 5천만 달러를 정보전 비용으로 사용하고 있습니다.
핵심요약
- 이스라엘은 미국 영향력 캠페인에 약 5천만 달러를 지출했습니다.
- 정보전의 실패는 국가 안보를 마케팅 과제로 취급한 데 있습니다.
- 외세는 '제노사이드', '전쟁 범죄' 등의 비난을 퍼뜨려 신뢰를 훼손하고 있습니다.
- 정보 전달 경로에는 카타르, 이란, 중국, 러시아 등 적대 세력이 관여하고 있습니다.
도입
본 기사는 지정학적 갈등이 단순한 군사적 충돌을 넘어 인지적 영역에서 정보전으로 확장되고 있음을 보여줍니다. 투자자 관점에서 이 정보전의 실패는 국가의 정당성(legitimacy)과 안보에 대한 시장의 신뢰(trust)가 얼마나 취약한지를 시사합니다. 국가 안보를 외부의 영향력에 의해 조작될 수 있는 '마케팅 도전'으로 간주하는 접근 방식은 장기적인 안보 안정성과 거시 경제적 예측 가능성에 심각한 위험을 초래할 수 있습니다.
본문 1: 정보전의 비용과 실패
이스라엘이 5천만 달러를 정보전 비용으로 지출한 것은, 국가 안보를 알고리즘과 광고 대행사에 아웃소싱하는 접근 방식의 실패를 반영합니다. 기사는 이 투자가 메시지와 데이터 구매에는 성공했으나, 궁극적인 목표인 '신뢰'를 획득하는 데 실패했음을 지적합니다. 이는 정보의 양(quantity)이 질(quality)을 보장하지 않으며, 외부 세력이 주입하는 부정적인 서사가 공공 영역에 침투했을 때, 아무리 많은 자원을 투입해도 국가의 정당성에 대한 근본적인 신뢰를 회복하기 어렵다는 점을 의미합니다. 즉, 자본력은 메시지를 구매할 수 있지만, 진정한 신뢰는 구매할 수 없다는 점이 핵심입니다.
본문 2: 신뢰의 취약성과 지정학적 변동성
정보전의 본질은 물리적 자원이나 군사력보다 심리적 자원인 '신뢰'를 목표로 합니다. 외부 행위자들이 공공 영역에 '인종 청소', '전쟁 범죄'와 같은 비난을 주입함으로써, 국가의 정당성에 대한 내부적 신뢰를 붕괴시키고 있습니다. 이러한 정보의 흐름은 지정학적 변동성(geopolitical volatility)을 극대화하며, 이는 에너지 시장, 무역 관계, 그리고 관련 국채 시장에 직접적인 영향을 미칩니다. 시장은 이러한 정보의 진위 여부를 판단하기 위해 끊임없이 불확실성에 노출되며, 이는 투자 결정의 불확실성을 증대시킵니다. 따라서 정보의 투명성과 진실성에 대한 집단적 신뢰가 장기적인 경제 안정성의 핵심 기반이 됩니다.
본문 3: AI 시대의 시스템적 위험
인공지능(AI)이 정보전의 도구로 사용됨에 따라, 미래에는 정보의 조작과 생성 속도가 기하급수적으로 빨라질 것입니다. 이는 국가 간의 정보 우위를 확보하는 데 있어 기존의 방어 메커니즘을 무력화시키고, 시스템적 위험을 야기합니다. AI 기반의 허위 정보는 기존의 검증 시스템을 우회하며, 사회적 분열을 심화시키고 정치적 안정성을 위협합니다. 따라서 투자자들은 단순한 개별 국가의 안보 상황뿐만 아니라, AI가 어떻게 정보 환경을 재편하고 사회적 신뢰를 침식하는지에 대한 거시적인 프레임워크를 이해해야 합니다. 이는 향후 글로벌 공급망과 정치적 리스크 평가에 있어 새로운 변수로 작용할 것입니다.
결론
국가 안보를 정보 마케팅의 영역으로 접근하는 것은 단기적인 노출 증대에는 기여할 수 있으나, 장기적인 국가적 정당성과 시장 신뢰를 확보하는 데는 근본적인 한계를 가집니다. 투자자들은 개별 국가의 안보 상황을 분석함과 동시에, AI와 정보 기술이 어떻게 글로벌 신뢰와 지정학적 안정성에 영향을 미치는지를 종합적으로 평가해야 합니다. 향후 시장은 정보의 진실성과 투명성에 대한 집단적 신뢰 수준에 따라 더욱 큰 변동성을 보일 가능성이 높습니다. 따라서 지정학적 리스크를 평가할 때 정보의 출처와 맥락을 심층적으로 분석하는 것이 필수적입니다.
Original Article
Israel finally fights the information war - The Jerusalem Post
The Wall Street Journal recently revealed that Israel is spending roughly $50 million on an American influence campaign involving artificial-intelligence-generated text messages, conservative media, online influencers, and former Trump campaign manager Brad Parscale. According to the report, millions of Americans have received messages from seemingly friendly senders named “Emma” or “Sarah,” asking for their opinions about Israel, Iran, and global security. This story was published only a matter of days after Vice President JD Vance accused some Israeli officials of attempting to manipulate American opinion in order to keep the Iran conflict going and frustrate US diplomacy via influence campaigns in America. Israel is right to spend serious money defending itself on the cognitive battlefield. The failure is not the size of the investment. The failure is both that we didn't expose those detractors running campaigns in America twisting the truth against Israel and that we treated an existential national-security responsibility as a marketing challenge that can be outsourced to advertising agencies, political consultants, and algorithms.Fifty million dollars can buy messages, impressions, consultants, and data. As the famous Beatles song suggests, “money can't buy you love.” What our government forgot is that it also cannot buy you trust in a short-term campaign. Without trust, the campaign risks becoming another missile fired at Israel's own legitimacy.The accompanying cartoon captures the problem. In an American town square, people happily drink apparently pure water while polished robots assure them, “We just want to explain Israel to you.” But beneath the ground, the information pipes have been fed by Qatar, Iran, China, and Russia for decades. Nearby, hostile operatives pour accusations of “genocide,” “war crimes,” and “death to the IDF” into the public reservoir.The drinkers see the sparkling fountain. They do not see who is influencing the content of the pipes.This is how cognitive warfare operates. The objective is not simply to persuade someone to accept one false allegation. It is to influence the entire information environment through which that person interprets every subsequent event. Once the water supply is contaminated, offering the public an explanation is not a winning strategy.Israel's enemies understood this long ago. Qatar did not merely purchase advertisements promoting its agenda. It invested for decades in media, universities, research institutions, political relationships, and cultural influence. Iran, China, and Russia do not separate intelligence, diplomacy, information operations, cyber activity, and national strategy into unrelated assignments. They construct ecosystems intended to shape what societies see, whom they trust, and which political choices become acceptable.Israel, by contrast, repeatedly behaves as if its problem is insufficient explanation (i.e. hasbara – public diplomacy). When hostility rises, we produce another video, hire another spokesperson, launch another campaign, and count another million impressions. We measure how many people saw our content, not whether legislation changed, a university acted, a false legal allegation was defeated, or an ally maintained political support.That is a communications activity. It is not strategic influence.From hasbara to strategic influenceThe new campaign does contain important innovations. Israel has correctly identified younger Americans – including younger conservatives – as a critical audience.It recognizes that artificial intelligence and search engines are becoming gateways through which people understand history and current affairs. It is collecting audience data, producing content at scale, and attempting to compete in environments Israel neglected for too long.Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar is also correct that public diplomacy must be funded as seriously as jets, bombs, and missile interceptors. The latest Pew data explain why: 60% of American adults view Israel unfavorably, as do 57% of Republicans between 18 and 49. This is no longer only a problem on the progressive Left. It has reached the emerging generation of the Republican Right and is weakening what was once a broadly bipartisan alliance.But responding to an existential threat through a collection of commercial contracts creates a dangerous contradiction. If the cognitive war is truly a war, where is the war cabinet? Where is the national intelligence assessment? Where is the chain of command integrating the Prime Minister's Office, Foreign Ministry, intelligence community, IDF, Diaspora Affairs Ministry, and Israel's diplomatic missions? Who defines the strategic objectives, tests the messages, examines unintended consequences, and measures policy outcomes?Most importantly, who is accountable if the strategy fails?The IDF would never outsource the defense of Israel's airspace to mercenaries and then evaluate them by counting how many interceptor videos received views. Yet Israel has placed significant elements of its defense against cognitive missiles in the hands of advertising firms, foreign consultants, and politically connected intermediaries.These contractors may be talented. Parscale understands political data and digital targeting. Media firms understand distribution. Influencers understand their audiences. But none of them is responsible for the national security of Israel or the safety of Jewish communities worldwide. Ultimately there are four major failures with the campaign that need addressing: anonymity instead of authenticity; impressions instead of policy impact; contractors instead of an integrated national command; persuasion without policy feedback.The reported use of AI personas presents an additional danger. A recipient who believes she is communicating with a person named Emma, only to discover an automated system connected to a foreign government campaign, is unlikely to feel better about Israel. She will feel manipulated. The tactic can validate the very allegation Israel's adversaries promote: that support for Israel is manufactured through concealed influence rather than earned through truth and shared values.In cognitive warfare, credibility is ammunition. Once expended, it is extremely difficult to replace. Israel needs a permanent cognitive-security directorate operating under a national-security authority. It must research the networks contaminating the information supply, expose their funding and methods, communicate through credible and properly disclosed messengers, receive continuous feedback, and connect that feedback to policy decisions. Its measurements must move beyond clicks and impressions to consequences: votes, regulations, diplomatic decisions, prosecutions, university policies, media corrections, and durable changes in public attitudes.This command must also be capable of telling Israel's political and military leaders when the problem is not merely how a policy is explained but how it is understood and experienced. Public diplomacy cannot succeed if it functions only as the final packaging department for decisions already made. Strategic influence requires communication to be considered before, during, and after policy formation.Israel is not facing an eighth “front” that can be addressed with occasional public relations. It is fighting an all-out war – one that affects its freedom of military action, diplomatic alliances, legal legitimacy, economic relationships, and the physical security of Jews around the world.The government deserves credit for finally putting serious resources into this battle. But purchasing reach is not the same as building influence, and neither is it the same as earning trust.Israel does not need more robots to build trust and legitimacy. It needs to defend the reservoir, expose those poisoning it, and take responsibility for the entire system – from the source of the information to its ultimate effect on policy.The national security of Israel and the Jewish people is too important to outsource.